We have lots of small _private_ methods on `execCtx` whose sole purpose
is to just return a struct field.
Signed-off-by: Evgenii Stratonikov <e.stratonikov@yadro.com>
This reverts commit 2567f8020e. It assumes
that assembling logic could break some failover scenarios if request
forwarding is done. However, it also breaks requesting big objects via a
non-container node with TTL=2. Failover has been rechecked without that
commit and no problems were found. Any (if found) other bugs related to
the forwarding and object assembling must be solved more carefully.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <p.karpy@yadro.com>
Allow replication of any (expired too) locked object. Information about
object locking is considered to be presented on the _container nodes_.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <p.karpy@yadro.com>
Previously a token could've expired in the middle of an object.PUT
stream, leading to upload being interrupted. This is bad, because user
doesn't always now what is the right values for the session token
lifetime. More than that, setting it to a very high value will
eventually blow up the session token database.
In this commit we read the session token once and reuse it for the whole
stream duration.
Signed-off-by: Evgenii Stratonikov <e.stratonikov@yadro.com>
`GETRANGEHASH` request spawns `GETRANGE` requests if an object could not be
found locally. If the original request contains session, it can be static
and, therefore, fetching session key can not be performed successfully.
As the best effort a node could request object's range with its own key.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <p.karpy@yadro.com>
Stop child objects collection if the last returned object (the most "left"
object in the collected chain) starts exactly from the `GETRANGE`'s `from`
value.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <carpawell@nspcc.ru>
That could happen if a node forwards request to a node that closed the
connection during the original object stream.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <carpawell@nspcc.ru>
A container node is expected to have full "get" access to assemble the
object.
A non-container node is expected to forward any request to a container node.
Any token is expected to be issued for an original request sender not for a
node so any new request is invalid by design with that token.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <carpawell@nspcc.ru>
Do not lose meta information of the original requests: cache session and
bearer tokens of the original request b/w a new generated ones. Middle
request wrappers should not contain any meta information, since it is
useless (e.g. ACL service checks only the original tokens).
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <carpawell@nspcc.ru>
After presenting request statuses on the API level, all the errors are
unwrapped before sending to the caller side. It led to a losing invalid
request's context.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <carpawell@nspcc.ru>
Do not use node's local storage if it is clear that an object will be
removed anyway as a redundant. It requires moving the changing local storage
logic from the validation step to the local target implementation.
It allows performing any relations checks (e.g. object locking) only if a
node is considered as a valid container member and is expected to store
(stored previously) all the helper objects (e.g. `LOCK`, `TOMBSTONE`, etc).
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <carpawell@nspcc.ru>
Storage node should not provide NeoFS Object API service when it is
under maintenance.
Declare `Common` service that unifies behavior of all object operations.
The implementation pre-checks if node is under maintenance and returns
`apistatus.NodeUnderMaintenance` if so. Use `Common` service as a first
logical processor in object service pipeline.
Signed-off-by: Leonard Lyubich <ctulhurider@gmail.com>
