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Author SHA1 Message Date
Carl Tashian
7a6f3f5ea1
Clarify error when root certificate is not found 2023-02-08 11:39:44 -08:00
143 changed files with 1894 additions and 6306 deletions

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@ -20,8 +20,7 @@ jobs:
ci:
uses: smallstep/workflows/.github/workflows/goCI.yml@main
with:
only-latest-golang: false
os-dependencies: 'libpcsclite-dev'
os-dependencies: "libpcsclite-dev"
run-gitleaks: true
run-codeql: true
test-command: 'V=1 make test'
secrets: inherit

View file

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
name: Dependabot auto-merge
on: pull_request
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
dependabot:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: ${{ github.actor == 'dependabot[bot]' }}
steps:
- name: Dependabot metadata
id: metadata
uses: dependabot/fetch-metadata@v1.1.1
with:
github-token: "${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}"
- name: Enable auto-merge for Dependabot PRs
run: gh pr merge --auto --merge "$PR_URL"
env:
PR_URL: ${{github.event.pull_request.html_url}}
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN}}

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@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
DOCKER_IMAGE: smallstep/step-ca
DOCKER_IMAGE_HSM: smallstep/step-ca-hsm
outputs:
version: ${{ steps.extract-tag.outputs.VERSION }}
is_prerelease: ${{ steps.is_prerelease.outputs.IS_PRERELEASE }}
@ -37,12 +38,12 @@ jobs:
VERSION=${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}
echo "VERSION=${VERSION}" >> ${GITHUB_OUTPUT}
echo "DOCKER_TAGS=${{ env.DOCKER_IMAGE }}:${VERSION}" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "DOCKER_TAGS_HSM=${{ env.DOCKER_IMAGE }}:${VERSION}-hsm" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "DOCKER_TAGS_HSM=${{ env.DOCKER_IMAGE_HSM }}:${VERSION}" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
- name: Add Latest Tag
if: steps.is_prerelease.outputs.IS_PRERELEASE == 'false'
run: |
echo "DOCKER_TAGS=${{ env.DOCKER_TAGS }},${{ env.DOCKER_IMAGE }}:latest" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "DOCKER_TAGS_HSM=${{ env.DOCKER_TAGS_HSM }},${{ env.DOCKER_IMAGE }}:hsm" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
echo "DOCKER_TAGS_HSM=${{ env.DOCKER_TAGS_HSM }},${{ env.DOCKER_IMAGE_HSM }}:latest" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
- name: Create Release
id: create_release
uses: actions/create-release@v1
@ -55,12 +56,38 @@ jobs:
prerelease: ${{ steps.is_prerelease.outputs.IS_PRERELEASE }}
goreleaser:
name: Upload Assets To Github w/ goreleaser
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: create_release
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: write
uses: smallstep/workflows/.github/workflows/goreleaser.yml@main
secrets: inherit
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v3
with:
go-version: 1.19
check-latest: true
- name: Install cosign
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v2
with:
cosign-release: 'v1.13.1'
- name: Get Release Date
id: release_date
run: |
RELEASE_DATE=$(date +"%y-%m-%d")
echo "RELEASE_DATE=${RELEASE_DATE}" >> ${GITHUB_ENV}
- name: Run GoReleaser
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v3
with:
version: 'latest'
args: release --rm-dist
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GORELEASER_PAT }}
RELEASE_DATE: ${{ env.RELEASE_DATE }}
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: 1
build_upload_docker:
name: Build & Upload Docker Images
@ -86,6 +113,6 @@ jobs:
with:
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/386,linux/arm,linux/arm64
tags: ${{ needs.create_release.outputs.docker_tags_hsm }}
docker_image: smallstep/step-ca
docker_image: smallstep/step-ca-hsm
docker_file: docker/Dockerfile.hsm
secrets: inherit

1
.gitignore vendored
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@ -24,4 +24,3 @@ output
vendor
.idea
.envrc
.vscode

View file

@ -31,12 +31,11 @@ builds:
- -w -X main.Version={{.Version}} -X main.BuildTime={{.Date}}
archives:
- &ARCHIVE
-
# Can be used to change the archive formats for specific GOOSs.
# Most common use case is to archive as zip on Windows.
# Default is empty.
name_template: "{{ .ProjectName }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Arch }}{{ if .Arm }}v{{ .Arm }}{{ end }}{{ if .Mips }}_{{ .Mips }}{{ end }}"
rlcp: true
format_overrides:
- goos: windows
format: zip
@ -45,11 +44,6 @@ archives:
- README.md
- LICENSE
allow_different_binary_count: true
-
<< : *ARCHIVE
id: unversioned
name_template: "{{ .ProjectName }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}{{ if .Arm }}v{{ .Arm }}{{ end }}{{ if .Mips }}_{{ .Mips }}{{ end }}"
nfpms:
# Configure nFPM for .deb and .rpm releases
@ -61,7 +55,7 @@ nfpms:
# List file contents: dpkg -c dist/step_...deb
# Package metadata: dpkg --info dist/step_....deb
#
- &NFPM
-
builds:
- step-ca
package_name: step-ca
@ -81,14 +75,9 @@ nfpms:
contents:
- src: debian/copyright
dst: /usr/share/doc/step-ca/copyright
-
<< : *NFPM
id: unversioned
file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}_{{ .Arch }}{{ if .Arm }}v{{ .Arm }}{{ end }}{{ if .Mips }}_{{ .Mips }}{{ end }}"
source:
enabled: true
rlcp: true
name_template: '{{ .ProjectName }}_{{ .Version }}'
checksum:
@ -141,17 +130,17 @@ release:
#### Linux
- 📦 [step-ca_linux_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz](https://dl.smallstep.com/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_linux_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz)
- 📦 [step-ca_{{ .Version }}_amd64.deb](https://dl.smallstep.com/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_{{ .Version }}_amd64.deb)
- 📦 [step-ca_linux_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz](https://dl.step.sm/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_linux_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz)
- 📦 [step-ca_{{ .Version }}_amd64.deb](https://dl.step.sm/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_{{ .Version }}_amd64.deb)
#### OSX Darwin
- 📦 [step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz](https://dl.smallstep.com/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz)
- 📦 [step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_arm64.tar.gz](https://dl.smallstep.com/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_arm64.tar.gz)
- 📦 [step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz](https://dl.step.sm/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz)
- 📦 [step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_arm64.tar.gz](https://dl.step.sm/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_arm64.tar.gz)
#### Windows
- 📦 [step-ca_windows_{{ .Version }}_amd64.zip](https://dl.smallstep.com/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_windows_{{ .Version }}_amd64.zip)
- 📦 [step-ca_windows_{{ .Version }}_amd64.zip](https://dl.step.sm/gh-release/certificates/gh-release-header/{{ .Tag }}/step-ca_windows_{{ .Version }}_amd64.zip)
For more builds across platforms and architectures, see the `Assets` section below.
And for packaged versions (Docker, k8s, Homebrew), see our [installation docs](https://smallstep.com/docs/step-ca/installation).
@ -165,11 +154,9 @@ release:
Below is an example using `cosign` to verify a release artifact:
```
cosign verify-blob \
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify-blob \
--certificate ~/Downloads/step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz.sig.pem \
--signature ~/Downloads/step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz.sig \
--certificate-identity-regexp "https://github\.com/smallstep/certificates/.*" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
~/Downloads/step-ca_darwin_{{ .Version }}_amd64.tar.gz
```
@ -199,14 +186,13 @@ release:
# - glob: ./glob/**/to/**/file/**/*
# - glob: ./glob/foo/to/bar/file/foobar/override_from_previous
scoops:
-
ids: [ default ]
scoop:
# Template for the url which is determined by the given Token (github or gitlab)
# Default for github is "https://github.com/<repo_owner>/<repo_name>/releases/download/{{ .Tag }}/{{ .ArtifactName }}"
# Default for gitlab is "https://gitlab.com/<repo_owner>/<repo_name>/uploads/{{ .ArtifactUploadHash }}/{{ .ArtifactName }}"
# Default for gitea is "https://gitea.com/<repo_owner>/<repo_name>/releases/download/{{ .Tag }}/{{ .ArtifactName }}"
url_template: "http://github.com/smallstep/certificates/releases/download/{{ .Tag }}/{{ .ArtifactName }}"
# Repository to push the app manifest to.
bucket:
owner: smallstep

View file

@ -27,70 +27,6 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](http://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.
## [Unreleased]
### Fixed
- Improved authentication for ACME requests using kid and provisioner name
(smallstep/certificates#1386).
## [v0.24.2] - 2023-05-11
### Added
- Log SSH certificates (smallstep/certificates#1374)
- CRL endpoints on the HTTP server (smallstep/certificates#1372)
- Dynamic SCEP challenge validation using webhooks (smallstep/certificates#1366)
- For Docker deployments, added DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE. Useful for pointing to a Docker Secret in the container (smallstep/certificates#1384)
### Changed
- Depend on [smallstep/go-attestation](https://github.com/smallstep/go-attestation) instead of [google/go-attestation](https://github.com/google/go-attestation)
- Render CRLs into http.ResponseWriter instead of memory (smallstep/certificates#1373)
- Redaction of SCEP static challenge when listing provisioners (smallstep/certificates#1204)
### Fixed
- VaultCAS certificate lifetime (smallstep/certificates#1376)
## [v0.24.1] - 2023-04-14
### Fixed
- Docker image name for HSM support (smallstep/certificates#1348)
## [v0.24.0] - 2023-04-12
### Added
- Add ACME `device-attest-01` support with TPM 2.0
(smallstep/certificates#1063).
- Add support for new Azure SDK, sovereign clouds, and HSM keys on Azure KMS
(smallstep/crypto#192, smallstep/crypto#197, smallstep/crypto#198,
smallstep/certificates#1323, smallstep/certificates#1309).
- Add support for ASN.1 functions on certificate templates
(smallstep/crypto#208, smallstep/certificates#1345)
- Add `DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_ADDRESS` to configure the address to use in a docker
container (smallstep/certificates#1262).
- Make sure that the CSR used matches the attested key when using AME
`device-attest-01` challenge (smallstep/certificates#1265).
- Add support for compacting the Badger DB (smallstep/certificates#1298).
- Build and release cleanups (smallstep/certificates#1322,
smallstep/certificates#1329, smallstep/certificates#1340).
### Fixed
- Fix support for PKCS #7 RSA-OAEP decryption through
[smallstep/pkcs7#4](https://github.com/smallstep/pkcs7/pull/4), as used in
SCEP.
- Fix RA installation using `scripts/install-step-ra.sh`
(smallstep/certificates#1255).
- Clarify error messages on policy errors (smallstep/certificates#1287,
smallstep/certificates#1278).
- Clarify error message on OIDC email validation (smallstep/certificates#1290).
- Mark the IDP critical in the generated CRL data (smallstep/certificates#1293).
- Disable database if CA is initialized with the `--no-db` flag
(smallstep/certificates#1294).
## [v0.23.2] - 2023-02-02
### Added

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@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ sudo yum install pcsc-lite-devel
To build `step-ca`, clone this repository and run the following:
```shell
make bootstrap && make build GO_ENVS="CGO_ENABLED=1"
make bootstrap && make build GOFLAGS=""
```
When the build is complete, you will find binaries in `bin/`.

View file

@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Q=$(if $V,,@)
PREFIX?=
SRC=$(shell find . -type f -name '*.go' -not -path "./vendor/*")
GOOS_OVERRIDE ?=
OUTPUT_ROOT=output/
RELEASE=./.releases
all: lint test build
@ -21,8 +23,6 @@ bootstra%:
$Q curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/golangci/golangci-lint/master/install.sh | sh -s -- -b $$(go env GOPATH)/bin latest
$Q go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
$Q go install gotest.tools/gotestsum@latest
$Q go install github.com/goreleaser/goreleaser@latest
$Q go install github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2/cmd/cosign@latest
.PHONY: bootstra%
@ -30,8 +30,17 @@ bootstra%:
# Determine the type of `push` and `version`
#################################################
# If TRAVIS_TAG is set then we know this ref has been tagged.
ifdef TRAVIS_TAG
VERSION ?= $(TRAVIS_TAG)
NOT_RC := $(shell echo $(VERSION) | grep -v -e -rc)
ifeq ($(NOT_RC),)
PUSHTYPE := release-candidate
else
PUSHTYPE := release
endif
# GITHUB Actions
ifdef GITHUB_REF
else ifdef GITHUB_REF
VERSION ?= $(shell echo $(GITHUB_REF) | sed 's/^refs\/tags\///')
NOT_RC := $(shell echo $(VERSION) | grep -v -e -rc)
ifeq ($(NOT_RC),)
@ -44,14 +53,21 @@ VERSION ?= $(shell [ -d .git ] && git describe --tags --always --dirty="-dev")
# If we are not in an active git dir then try reading the version from .VERSION.
# .VERSION contains a slug populated by `git archive`.
VERSION := $(or $(VERSION),$(shell ./.version.sh .VERSION))
ifeq ($(TRAVIS_BRANCH),master)
PUSHTYPE := master
else
PUSHTYPE := branch
endif
endif
VERSION := $(shell echo $(VERSION) | sed 's/^v//')
DEB_VERSION := $(shell echo $(VERSION) | sed 's/-/./g')
ifdef V
$(info TRAVIS_TAG is $(TRAVIS_TAG))
$(info GITHUB_REF is $(GITHUB_REF))
$(info VERSION is $(VERSION))
$(info DEB_VERSION is $(DEB_VERSION))
$(info PUSHTYPE is $(PUSHTYPE))
endif
@ -61,23 +77,7 @@ endif
DATE := $(shell date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')
LDFLAGS := -ldflags='-w -X "main.Version=$(VERSION)" -X "main.BuildTime=$(DATE)"'
# Always explicitly enable or disable cgo,
# so that go doesn't silently fall back on
# non-cgo when gcc is not found.
ifeq (,$(findstring CGO_ENABLED,$(GO_ENVS)))
ifneq ($(origin GOFLAGS),undefined)
# This section is for backward compatibility with
#
# $ make build GOFLAGS=""
#
# which is how we recommended building step-ca with cgo support
# until June 2023.
GO_ENVS := $(GO_ENVS) CGO_ENABLED=1
else
GO_ENVS := $(GO_ENVS) CGO_ENABLED=0
endif
endif
GOFLAGS := CGO_ENABLED=0
download:
$Q go mod download
@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ build: $(PREFIX)bin/$(BINNAME)
$(PREFIX)bin/$(BINNAME): download $(call rwildcard,*.go)
$Q mkdir -p $(@D)
$Q $(GOOS_OVERRIDE) GOFLAGS="$(GOFLAGS)" $(GO_ENVS) go build -v -o $(PREFIX)bin/$(BINNAME) $(LDFLAGS) $(PKG)
$Q $(GOOS_OVERRIDE) $(GOFLAGS) go build -v -o $(PREFIX)bin/$(BINNAME) $(LDFLAGS) $(PKG)
# Target to force a build of step-ca without running tests
simple: build
@ -106,26 +106,18 @@ generate:
#########################################
# Test
#########################################
test: testdefault testtpmsimulator combinecoverage
testdefault:
$Q $(GO_ENVS) gotestsum -- -coverprofile=defaultcoverage.out -short -covermode=atomic ./...
testtpmsimulator:
$Q CGO_ENABLED=1 gotestsum -- -coverprofile=tpmsimulatorcoverage.out -short -covermode=atomic -tags tpmsimulator ./acme
test:
$Q $(GOFLAGS) gotestsum -- -coverprofile=coverage.out -short -covermode=atomic ./...
testcgo:
$Q gotestsum -- -coverprofile=coverage.out -short -covermode=atomic ./...
combinecoverage:
cat defaultcoverage.out tpmsimulatorcoverage.out > coverage.out
.PHONY: test testdefault testtpmsimulator testcgo combinecoverage
.PHONY: test testcgo
integrate: integration
integration: bin/$(BINNAME)
$Q $(GO_ENVS) gotestsum -- -tags=integration ./integration/...
$Q $(GOFLAGS) gotestsum -- -tags=integration ./integration/...
.PHONY: integrate integration
@ -177,3 +169,23 @@ run:
.PHONY: run
#########################################
# Debian
#########################################
changelog:
$Q echo "step-ca ($(DEB_VERSION)) unstable; urgency=medium" > debian/changelog
$Q echo >> debian/changelog
$Q echo " * See https://github.com/smallstep/certificates/releases" >> debian/changelog
$Q echo >> debian/changelog
$Q echo " -- Smallstep Labs, Inc. <techadmin@smallstep.com> $(shell date -uR)" >> debian/changelog
debian: changelog
$Q mkdir -p $(RELEASE); \
OUTPUT=../step-ca*.deb; \
rm $$OUTPUT; \
dpkg-buildpackage -b -rfakeroot -us -uc && cp $$OUTPUT $(RELEASE)/
distclean: clean
.PHONY: changelog debian distclean

View file

@ -119,12 +119,18 @@ See our installation docs [here](https://smallstep.com/docs/step-ca/installation
## Documentation
* [Official documentation](https://smallstep.com/docs/step-ca) is on smallstep.com
* The `step` command reference is available via `step help`,
[on smallstep.com](https://smallstep.com/docs/step-cli/reference/),
or by running `step help --http=:8080` from the command line
Documentation can be found in a handful of different places:
1. On the web at https://smallstep.com/docs/step-ca.
2. On the command line with `step help ca xxx` where `xxx` is the subcommand
you are interested in. Ex: `step help ca provisioner list`.
3. In your browser, by running `step help --http=:8080 ca` from the command line
and visiting http://localhost:8080.
4. The [docs](./docs/README.md) folder is being deprecated, but it still has some documentation and tutorials.
## Feedback?
* Tell us what you like and don't like about managing your PKI - we're eager to help solve problems in this space.

View file

@ -20,16 +20,6 @@ type Account struct {
Status Status `json:"status"`
OrdersURL string `json:"orders"`
ExternalAccountBinding interface{} `json:"externalAccountBinding,omitempty"`
LocationPrefix string `json:"-"`
ProvisionerName string `json:"-"`
}
// GetLocation returns the URL location of the given account.
func (a *Account) GetLocation() string {
if a.LocationPrefix == "" {
return ""
}
return a.LocationPrefix + a.ID
}
// ToLog enables response logging.
@ -82,7 +72,6 @@ func (p *Policy) GetAllowedNameOptions() *policy.X509NameOptions {
IPRanges: p.X509.Allowed.IPRanges,
}
}
func (p *Policy) GetDeniedNameOptions() *policy.X509NameOptions {
if p == nil {
return nil

View file

@ -66,23 +66,6 @@ func TestKeyToID(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestAccount_GetLocation(t *testing.T) {
locationPrefix := "https://test.ca.smallstep.com/acme/foo/account/"
type test struct {
acc *Account
exp string
}
tests := map[string]test{
"empty": {acc: &Account{LocationPrefix: ""}, exp: ""},
"not-empty": {acc: &Account{ID: "bar", LocationPrefix: locationPrefix}, exp: locationPrefix + "bar"},
}
for name, tc := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equals(t, tc.acc.GetLocation(), tc.exp)
})
}
}
func TestAccount_IsValid(t *testing.T) {
type test struct {
acc *Account

View file

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
@ -68,12 +67,6 @@ func (u *UpdateAccountRequest) Validate() error {
}
}
// getAccountLocationPath returns the current account URL location.
// Returned location will be of the form: https://<ca-url>/acme/<provisioner>/account/<accID>
func getAccountLocationPath(ctx context.Context, linker acme.Linker, accID string) string {
return linker.GetLink(ctx, acme.AccountLinkType, accID)
}
// NewAccount is the handler resource for creating new ACME accounts.
func NewAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
@ -135,8 +128,6 @@ func NewAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
Key: jwk,
Contact: nar.Contact,
Status: acme.StatusValid,
LocationPrefix: getAccountLocationPath(ctx, linker, ""),
ProvisionerName: prov.GetName(),
}
if err := db.CreateAccount(ctx, acc); err != nil {
render.Error(w, acme.WrapErrorISE(err, "error creating account"))
@ -161,7 +152,7 @@ func NewAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
linker.LinkAccount(ctx, acc)
w.Header().Set("Location", getAccountLocationPath(ctx, linker, acc.ID))
w.Header().Set("Location", linker.GetLink(r.Context(), acme.AccountLinkType, acc.ID))
render.JSONStatus(w, acc, httpStatus)
}

View file

@ -34,20 +34,27 @@ var (
type fakeProvisioner struct{}
func (*fakeProvisioner) AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(context.Context, provisioner.ACMEIdentifier) error {
func (*fakeProvisioner) AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(ctx context.Context, identifier provisioner.ACMEIdentifier) error {
return nil
}
func (*fakeProvisioner) AuthorizeSign(context.Context, string) ([]provisioner.SignOption, error) {
func (*fakeProvisioner) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]provisioner.SignOption, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (*fakeProvisioner) IsChallengeEnabled(context.Context, provisioner.ACMEChallenge) bool {
func (*fakeProvisioner) IsChallengeEnabled(ctx context.Context, challenge provisioner.ACMEChallenge) bool {
return true
}
func (*fakeProvisioner) IsAttestationFormatEnabled(context.Context, provisioner.ACMEAttestationFormat) bool {
func (*fakeProvisioner) IsAttestationFormatEnabled(ctx context.Context, format provisioner.ACMEAttestationFormat) bool {
return true
}
func (*fakeProvisioner) GetAttestationRoots() (*x509.CertPool, bool) { return nil, false }
func (*fakeProvisioner) AuthorizeRevoke(context.Context, string) error { return nil }
func (*fakeProvisioner) GetAttestationRoots() (*x509.CertPool, bool) {
return nil, false
}
func (*fakeProvisioner) AuthorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error { return nil }
func (*fakeProvisioner) GetID() string { return "" }
func (*fakeProvisioner) GetName() string { return "" }
func (*fakeProvisioner) DefaultTLSCertDuration() time.Duration { return 0 }
@ -362,7 +369,7 @@ func TestHandler_GetOrdersByAccountID(t *testing.T) {
for name, run := range tests {
tc := run(t)
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil, "")
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", u, nil)
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@ -801,7 +808,7 @@ func TestHandler_NewAccount(t *testing.T) {
for name, run := range tests {
tc := run(t)
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil, "")
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/foo/bar", nil)
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@ -1004,7 +1011,7 @@ func TestHandler_GetOrUpdateAccount(t *testing.T) {
for name, run := range tests {
tc := run(t)
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil, "")
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/foo/bar", nil)
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()

View file

@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func (h *handler) Route(r api.Router) {
if ca, ok := h.opts.CA.(*authority.Authority); ok && ca != nil {
ctx = authority.NewContext(ctx, ca)
}
ctx = acme.NewContext(ctx, h.opts.DB, client, linker, h.opts.PrerequisitesChecker, "")
ctx = acme.NewContext(ctx, h.opts.DB, client, linker, h.opts.PrerequisitesChecker)
next(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
}
})
@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ func shouldAddMetaObject(p *provisioner.ACME) bool {
// NotImplemented returns a 501 and is generally a placeholder for functionality which
// MAY be added at some point in the future but is not in any way a guarantee of such.
func NotImplemented(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
func NotImplemented(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
render.Error(w, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorNotImplementedType, "this API is not implemented"))
}

View file

@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ func TestHandler_GetAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
for name, run := range tests {
tc := run(t)
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil, "")
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/foo/bar", nil)
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ func TestHandler_GetChallenge(t *testing.T) {
for name, run := range tests {
tc := run(t)
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil, "")
ctx := acme.NewContext(tc.ctx, tc.db, nil, acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"), nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", u, nil)
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()

View file

@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"path"
"strings"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
@ -17,6 +16,7 @@ import (
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/api/render"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/logging"
"github.com/smallstep/nosql"
)
type nextHTTP = func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request)
@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ func lookupJWK(next nextHTTP) nextHTTP {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
db := acme.MustDatabaseFromContext(ctx)
linker := acme.MustLinkerFromContext(ctx)
jws, err := jwsFromContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
@ -300,16 +301,19 @@ func lookupJWK(next nextHTTP) nextHTTP {
return
}
kidPrefix := linker.GetLink(ctx, acme.AccountLinkType, "")
kid := jws.Signatures[0].Protected.KeyID
if kid == "" {
render.Error(w, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "signature missing 'kid'"))
if !strings.HasPrefix(kid, kidPrefix) {
render.Error(w, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType,
"kid does not have required prefix; expected %s, but got %s",
kidPrefix, kid))
return
}
accID := path.Base(kid)
accID := strings.TrimPrefix(kid, kidPrefix)
acc, err := db.GetAccount(ctx, accID)
switch {
case acme.IsErrNotFound(err):
case nosql.IsErrNotFound(err):
render.Error(w, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorAccountDoesNotExistType, "account with ID '%s' not found", accID))
return
case err != nil:
@ -320,45 +324,6 @@ func lookupJWK(next nextHTTP) nextHTTP {
render.Error(w, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorUnauthorizedType, "account is not active"))
return
}
if storedLocation := acc.GetLocation(); storedLocation != "" {
if kid != storedLocation {
// ACME accounts should have a stored location equivalent to the
// kid in the ACME request.
render.Error(w, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorUnauthorizedType,
"kid does not match stored account location; expected %s, but got %s",
storedLocation, kid))
return
}
// Verify that the provisioner with which the account was created
// matches the provisioner in the request URL.
reqProv := acme.MustProvisionerFromContext(ctx)
reqProvName := reqProv.GetName()
accProvName := acc.ProvisionerName
if reqProvName != accProvName {
// Provisioner in the URL must match the provisioner with
// which the account was created.
render.Error(w, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorUnauthorizedType,
"account provisioner does not match requested provisioner; account provisioner = %s, requested provisioner = %s",
accProvName, reqProvName))
return
}
} else {
// This code will only execute for old ACME accounts that do
// not have a cached location. The following validation was
// the original implementation of the `kid` check which has
// since been deprecated. However, the code will remain to
// ensure consistent behavior for old ACME accounts.
linker := acme.MustLinkerFromContext(ctx)
kidPrefix := linker.GetLink(ctx, acme.AccountLinkType, "")
if !strings.HasPrefix(kid, kidPrefix) {
render.Error(w, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType,
"kid does not have required prefix; expected %s, but got %s",
kidPrefix, kid))
return
}
}
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, accContextKey, acc)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, jwkContextKey, acc.Key)
next(w, r.WithContext(ctx))

View file

@ -17,13 +17,14 @@ import (
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/smallstep/assert"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
"github.com/smallstep/nosql/database"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil"
)
var testBody = []byte("foo")
func testNext(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
func testNext(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Write(testBody)
}
@ -327,7 +328,7 @@ func TestHandler_isPostAsGet(t *testing.T) {
type errReader int
func (errReader) Read([]byte) (int, error) {
func (errReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
return 0, errors.New("force")
}
func (errReader) Close() error {
@ -677,7 +678,31 @@ func TestHandler_lookupJWK(t *testing.T) {
linker: acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"),
ctx: ctx,
statusCode: 400,
err: acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "signature missing 'kid'"),
err: acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "kid does not have required prefix; expected %s, but got ", prefix),
}
},
"fail/bad-kid-prefix": func(t *testing.T) test {
_so := new(jose.SignerOptions)
_so.WithHeader("kid", "foo")
_signer, err := jose.NewSigner(jose.SigningKey{
Algorithm: jose.SignatureAlgorithm(jwk.Algorithm),
Key: jwk.Key,
}, _so)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
_jws, err := _signer.Sign([]byte("baz"))
assert.FatalError(t, err)
_raw, err := _jws.CompactSerialize()
assert.FatalError(t, err)
_parsed, err := jose.ParseJWS(_raw)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
ctx := acme.NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), prov)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, jwsContextKey, _parsed)
return test{
db: &acme.MockDB{},
linker: acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"),
ctx: ctx,
statusCode: 400,
err: acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "kid does not have required prefix; expected %s, but got foo", prefix),
}
},
"fail/account-not-found": func(t *testing.T) test {
@ -688,7 +713,7 @@ func TestHandler_lookupJWK(t *testing.T) {
db: &acme.MockDB{
MockGetAccount: func(ctx context.Context, accID string) (*acme.Account, error) {
assert.Equals(t, accID, accID)
return nil, acme.ErrNotFound
return nil, database.ErrNotFound
},
},
ctx: ctx,
@ -729,77 +754,7 @@ func TestHandler_lookupJWK(t *testing.T) {
err: acme.NewError(acme.ErrorUnauthorizedType, "account is not active"),
}
},
"fail/account-with-location-prefix/bad-kid": func(t *testing.T) test {
acc := &acme.Account{LocationPrefix: "foobar", Status: "valid"}
ctx := acme.NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), prov)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, jwsContextKey, parsedJWS)
return test{
linker: acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"),
db: &acme.MockDB{
MockGetAccount: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*acme.Account, error) {
assert.Equals(t, id, accID)
return acc, nil
},
},
ctx: ctx,
statusCode: http.StatusUnauthorized,
err: acme.NewError(acme.ErrorUnauthorizedType, "kid does not match stored account location; expected foobar, but %q", prefix+accID),
}
},
"fail/account-with-location-prefix/bad-provisioner": func(t *testing.T) test {
acc := &acme.Account{LocationPrefix: prefix + accID, Status: "valid", Key: jwk, ProvisionerName: "other"}
ctx := acme.NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), prov)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, jwsContextKey, parsedJWS)
return test{
linker: acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"),
db: &acme.MockDB{
MockGetAccount: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*acme.Account, error) {
assert.Equals(t, id, accID)
return acc, nil
},
},
ctx: ctx,
next: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_acc, err := accountFromContext(r.Context())
assert.FatalError(t, err)
assert.Equals(t, _acc, acc)
_jwk, err := jwkFromContext(r.Context())
assert.FatalError(t, err)
assert.Equals(t, _jwk, jwk)
w.Write(testBody)
},
statusCode: http.StatusUnauthorized,
err: acme.NewError(acme.ErrorUnauthorizedType,
"account provisioner does not match requested provisioner; account provisioner = %s, reqested provisioner = %s",
prov.GetName(), "other"),
}
},
"ok/account-with-location-prefix": func(t *testing.T) test {
acc := &acme.Account{LocationPrefix: prefix + accID, Status: "valid", Key: jwk, ProvisionerName: prov.GetName()}
ctx := acme.NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), prov)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, jwsContextKey, parsedJWS)
return test{
linker: acme.NewLinker("test.ca.smallstep.com", "acme"),
db: &acme.MockDB{
MockGetAccount: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*acme.Account, error) {
assert.Equals(t, id, accID)
return acc, nil
},
},
ctx: ctx,
next: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_acc, err := accountFromContext(r.Context())
assert.FatalError(t, err)
assert.Equals(t, _acc, acc)
_jwk, err := jwkFromContext(r.Context())
assert.FatalError(t, err)
assert.Equals(t, _jwk, jwk)
w.Write(testBody)
},
statusCode: http.StatusOK,
}
},
"ok/account-without-location-prefix": func(t *testing.T) test {
"ok": func(t *testing.T) test {
acc := &acme.Account{Status: "valid", Key: jwk}
ctx := acme.NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), prov)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, jwsContextKey, parsedJWS)

View file

@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ func challengeTypes(az *acme.Authorization) []acme.ChallengeType {
case acme.IP:
chTypes = []acme.ChallengeType{acme.HTTP01, acme.TLSALPN01}
case acme.DNS:
chTypes = []acme.ChallengeType{acme.DNS01, acme.NNS01}
chTypes = []acme.ChallengeType{acme.DNS01}
// HTTP and TLS challenges can only be used for identifiers without wildcards.
if !az.Wildcard {
chTypes = append(chTypes, []acme.ChallengeType{acme.HTTP01, acme.TLSALPN01}...)

View file

@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ func RevokeCert(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// the identifiers in the certificate are extracted and compared against the (valid) Authorizations
// that are stored for the ACME Account. If these sets match, the Account is considered authorized
// to revoke the certificate. If this check fails, the client will receive an unauthorized error.
func isAccountAuthorized(_ context.Context, dbCert *acme.Certificate, certToBeRevoked *x509.Certificate, account *acme.Account) *acme.Error {
func isAccountAuthorized(ctx context.Context, dbCert *acme.Certificate, certToBeRevoked *x509.Certificate, account *acme.Account) *acme.Error {
if !account.IsValid() {
return wrapUnauthorizedError(certToBeRevoked, nil, fmt.Sprintf("account '%s' has status '%s'", account.ID, account.Status), nil)
}

View file

@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ func jwkEncode(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
// jwsFinal constructs the final JWS object.
// Implementation taken from github.com/mholt/acmez, which seems to be based on
// https://github.com/golang/crypto/blob/master/acme/jws.go.
func jwsFinal(_ crypto.Hash, sig []byte, phead, payload string) ([]byte, error) {
func jwsFinal(sha crypto.Hash, sig []byte, phead, payload string) ([]byte, error) {
enc := struct {
Protected string `json:"protected"`
Payload string `json:"payload"`
@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ type mockCA struct {
MockAreSANsallowed func(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error
}
func (m *mockCA) Sign(*x509.CertificateRequest, provisioner.SignOptions, ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
func (m *mockCA) Sign(cr *x509.CertificateRequest, opts provisioner.SignOptions, signOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
return nil, nil
}

View file

@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ type Authorization struct {
ID string `json:"-"`
AccountID string `json:"-"`
Token string `json:"-"`
Fingerprint string `json:"-"`
Identifier Identifier `json:"identifier"`
Status Status `json:"status"`
Challenges []*Challenge `json:"challenges"`

View file

@ -26,14 +26,8 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2"
"golang.org/x/exp/slices"
"github.com/smallstep/go-attestation/attest"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/pemutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
)
@ -49,8 +43,6 @@ const (
TLSALPN01 ChallengeType = "tls-alpn-01"
// DEVICEATTEST01 is the device-attest-01 ACME challenge type
DEVICEATTEST01 ChallengeType = "device-attest-01"
// NNS01 is the nns-01 ACME challenge type
NNS01 ChallengeType = "nns-01"
)
var (
@ -105,8 +97,6 @@ func (ch *Challenge) Validate(ctx context.Context, db DB, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey,
return tlsalpn01Validate(ctx, ch, db, jwk)
case DEVICEATTEST01:
return deviceAttest01Validate(ctx, ch, db, jwk, payload)
case NNS01:
return nns01Validate(ctx, ch, db, jwk)
default:
return NewErrorISE("unexpected challenge type '%s'", ch.Type)
}
@ -357,13 +347,6 @@ type attestationObject struct {
// TODO(bweeks): move attestation verification to a shared package.
func deviceAttest01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey, payload []byte) error {
// Load authorization to store the key fingerprint.
az, err := db.GetAuthorization(ctx, ch.AuthorizationID)
if err != nil {
return WrapErrorISE(err, "error loading authorization")
}
// Parse payload.
var p payloadType
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &p); err != nil {
return WrapErrorISE(err, "error unmarshalling JSON")
@ -402,6 +385,7 @@ func deviceAttest01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose
}
return WrapErrorISE(err, "error validating attestation")
}
// Validate nonce with SHA-256 of the token.
if len(data.Nonce) != 0 {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ch.Token))
@ -417,9 +401,6 @@ func deviceAttest01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose
if data.UDID != ch.Value && data.SerialNumber != ch.Value {
return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "permanent identifier does not match"))
}
// Update attestation key fingerprint to compare against the CSR
az.Fingerprint = data.Fingerprint
case "step":
data, err := doStepAttestationFormat(ctx, prov, ch, jwk, &att)
if err != nil {
@ -445,41 +426,6 @@ func deviceAttest01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose
)
return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "permanent identifier does not match").AddSubproblems(subproblem))
}
// Update attestation key fingerprint to compare against the CSR
az.Fingerprint = data.Fingerprint
case "tpm":
data, err := doTPMAttestationFormat(ctx, prov, ch, jwk, &att)
if err != nil {
// TODO(hs): we should provide more details in the error reported to the client;
// "Attestation statement cannot be verified" is VERY generic. Also holds true for the other formats.
var acmeError *Error
if errors.As(err, &acmeError) {
if acmeError.Status == 500 {
return acmeError
}
return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, acmeError)
}
return WrapErrorISE(err, "error validating attestation")
}
// TODO(hs): currently this will allow a request for which no PermanentIdentifiers have been
// extracted from the AK certificate. This is currently the case for AK certs from the CLI, as we
// haven't implemented a way for AK certs requested by the CLI to always contain the requested
// PermanentIdentifier. Omitting the check below doesn't allow just any request, as the Order can
// still fail if the challenge value isn't equal to the CSR subject.
if len(data.PermanentIdentifiers) > 0 && !slices.Contains(data.PermanentIdentifiers, ch.Value) { // TODO(hs): add support for HardwareModuleName
subproblem := NewSubproblemWithIdentifier(
ErrorMalformedType,
Identifier{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: ch.Value},
"challenge identifier %q doesn't match any of the attested hardware identifiers %q", ch.Value, data.PermanentIdentifiers,
)
return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, "permanent identifier does not match").AddSubproblems(subproblem))
}
// Update attestation key fingerprint to compare against the CSR
az.Fingerprint = data.Fingerprint
default:
return storeError(ctx, db, ch, true, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "unexpected attestation object format"))
}
@ -489,362 +435,12 @@ func deviceAttest01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose
ch.Error = nil
ch.ValidatedAt = clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339)
// Store the fingerprint in the authorization.
//
// TODO: add method to update authorization and challenge atomically.
if az.Fingerprint != "" {
if err := db.UpdateAuthorization(ctx, az); err != nil {
return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating authorization")
}
}
if err := db.UpdateChallenge(ctx, ch); err != nil {
return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating challenge")
}
return nil
}
func nns01Validate(ctx context.Context, ch *Challenge, db DB, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey) error {
domain := strings.TrimPrefix(ch.Value, "*.")
nnsCtx, ok := GetNNSContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return errors.New("error retrieving NNS context")
}
nns := NNS{}
err := nns.Dial(nnsCtx.nnsServer)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer nns.Close()
txtRecords, err := nns.GetTXTRecords("acme-challenge." + domain)
if err != nil {
return storeError(ctx, db, ch, false, WrapError(ErrorNNSType, err,
"error looking up TXT records for domain %s", domain))
}
expectedKeyAuth, err := KeyAuthorization(ch.Token, jwk)
if err != nil {
return err
}
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(expectedKeyAuth))
expected := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
var found bool
for _, r := range txtRecords {
if r == expected {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
return storeError(ctx, db, ch, false, NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType,
"keyAuthorization does not match; expected %s, but got %s", expectedKeyAuth, txtRecords))
}
// Update and store the challenge.
ch.Status = StatusValid
ch.Error = nil
ch.ValidatedAt = clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339)
if err = db.UpdateChallenge(ctx, ch); err != nil {
return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating challenge")
}
return nil
}
var (
oidSubjectAlternativeName = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 17}
)
type tpmAttestationData struct {
Certificate *x509.Certificate
VerifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate
PermanentIdentifiers []string
Fingerprint string
}
// coseAlgorithmIdentifier models a COSEAlgorithmIdentifier.
// Also see https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-alg-identifier.
type coseAlgorithmIdentifier int32
const (
coseAlgES256 coseAlgorithmIdentifier = -7
coseAlgRS256 coseAlgorithmIdentifier = -257
)
func doTPMAttestationFormat(_ context.Context, prov Provisioner, ch *Challenge, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey, att *attestationObject) (*tpmAttestationData, error) {
ver, ok := att.AttStatement["ver"].(string)
if !ok {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "ver not present")
}
if ver != "2.0" {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "version %q is not supported", ver)
}
x5c, ok := att.AttStatement["x5c"].([]interface{})
if !ok {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c not present")
}
if len(x5c) == 0 {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is empty")
}
akCertBytes, ok := x5c[0].([]byte)
if !ok {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is malformed")
}
akCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(akCertBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is malformed")
}
intermediates := x509.NewCertPool()
for _, v := range x5c[1:] {
intCertBytes, vok := v.([]byte)
if !vok {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "x5c is malformed")
}
intCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(intCertBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is malformed")
}
intermediates.AddCert(intCert)
}
// TODO(hs): this can be removed when permanent-identifier/hardware-module-name are handled correctly in
// the stdlib in https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.19:src/crypto/x509/parser.go;drc=b5b2cf519fe332891c165077f3723ee74932a647;l=362,
// but I doubt that will happen.
if len(akCert.UnhandledCriticalExtensions) > 0 {
unhandledCriticalExtensions := akCert.UnhandledCriticalExtensions[:0]
for _, extOID := range akCert.UnhandledCriticalExtensions {
if !extOID.Equal(oidSubjectAlternativeName) {
// critical extensions other than the Subject Alternative Name remain unhandled
unhandledCriticalExtensions = append(unhandledCriticalExtensions, extOID)
}
}
akCert.UnhandledCriticalExtensions = unhandledCriticalExtensions
}
roots, ok := prov.GetAttestationRoots()
if !ok {
return nil, NewErrorISE("no root CA bundle available to verify the attestation certificate")
}
// verify that the AK certificate was signed by a trusted root,
// chained to by the intermediates provided by the client. As part
// of building the verified certificate chain, the signature over the
// AK certificate is checked to be a valid signature of one of the
// provided intermediates. Signatures over the intermediates are in
// turn also verified to be valid signatures from one of the trusted
// roots.
verifiedChains, err := akCert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: roots,
Intermediates: intermediates,
CurrentTime: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second),
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny},
})
if err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "x5c is not valid")
}
// validate additional AK certificate requirements
if err := validateAKCertificate(akCert); err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "AK certificate is not valid")
}
// TODO(hs): implement revocation check; Verify() doesn't perform CRL check nor OCSP lookup.
sans, err := x509util.ParseSubjectAlternativeNames(akCert)
if err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "failed parsing AK certificate Subject Alternative Names")
}
permanentIdentifiers := make([]string, len(sans.PermanentIdentifiers))
for i, pi := range sans.PermanentIdentifiers {
permanentIdentifiers[i] = pi.Identifier
}
// extract and validate pubArea, sig, certInfo and alg properties from the request body
pubArea, ok := att.AttStatement["pubArea"].([]byte)
if !ok {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid pubArea in attestation statement")
}
if len(pubArea) == 0 {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "pubArea is empty")
}
sig, ok := att.AttStatement["sig"].([]byte)
if !ok {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid sig in attestation statement")
}
if len(sig) == 0 {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "sig is empty")
}
certInfo, ok := att.AttStatement["certInfo"].([]byte)
if !ok {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid certInfo in attestation statement")
}
if len(certInfo) == 0 {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "certInfo is empty")
}
alg, ok := att.AttStatement["alg"].(int64)
if !ok {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid alg in attestation statement")
}
// only RS256 and ES256 are allowed
coseAlg := coseAlgorithmIdentifier(alg)
if coseAlg != coseAlgRS256 && coseAlg != coseAlgES256 {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "invalid alg %d in attestation statement", alg)
}
// set the hash algorithm to use to SHA256
hash := crypto.SHA256
// recreate the generated key certification parameter values and verify
// the attested key using the public key of the AK.
certificationParameters := &attest.CertificationParameters{
Public: pubArea, // the public key that was attested
CreateAttestation: certInfo, // the attested properties of the key
CreateSignature: sig, // signature over the attested properties
}
verifyOpts := attest.VerifyOpts{
Public: akCert.PublicKey, // public key of the AK that attested the key
Hash: hash,
}
if err = certificationParameters.Verify(verifyOpts); err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "invalid certification parameters")
}
// decode the "certInfo" data. This won't fail, as it's also done as part of Verify().
tpmCertInfo, err := tpm2.DecodeAttestationData(certInfo)
if err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "failed decoding attestation data")
}
keyAuth, err := KeyAuthorization(ch.Token, jwk)
if err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "failed creating key auth digest")
}
hashedKeyAuth := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuth))
// verify the WebAuthn object contains the expect key authorization digest, which is carried
// within the encoded `certInfo` property of the attestation statement.
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(hashedKeyAuth[:], []byte(tpmCertInfo.ExtraData)) == 0 {
return nil, NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, "key authorization does not match")
}
// decode the (attested) public key and determine its fingerprint. This won't fail, as it's also done as part of Verify().
pub, err := tpm2.DecodePublic(pubArea)
if err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "failed decoding pubArea")
}
publicKey, err := pub.Key()
if err != nil {
return nil, WrapError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, err, "failed getting public key")
}
data := &tpmAttestationData{
Certificate: akCert,
VerifiedChains: verifiedChains,
PermanentIdentifiers: permanentIdentifiers,
}
if data.Fingerprint, err = keyutil.Fingerprint(publicKey); err != nil {
return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error calculating key fingerprint")
}
// TODO(hs): pass more attestation data, so that that can be used/recorded too?
return data, nil
}
var (
oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 37}
oidTCGKpAIKCertificate = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 23, 133, 8, 3}
)
// validateAKCertifiate validates the X.509 AK certificate to be
// in accordance with the required properties. The requirements come from:
// https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-tpm-cert-requirements.
//
// - Version MUST be set to 3.
// - Subject field MUST be set to empty.
// - The Subject Alternative Name extension MUST be set as defined
// in [TPMv2-EK-Profile] section 3.2.9.
// - The Extended Key Usage extension MUST contain the OID 2.23.133.8.3
// ("joint-iso-itu-t(2) internationalorganizations(23) 133 tcg-kp(8) tcg-kp-AIKCertificate(3)").
// - The Basic Constraints extension MUST have the CA component set to false.
// - An Authority Information Access (AIA) extension with entry id-ad-ocsp
// and a CRL Distribution Point extension [RFC5280] are both OPTIONAL as
// the status of many attestation certificates is available through metadata
// services. See, for example, the FIDO Metadata Service.
func validateAKCertificate(c *x509.Certificate) error {
if c.Version != 3 {
return fmt.Errorf("AK certificate has invalid version %d; only version 3 is allowed", c.Version)
}
if c.Subject.String() != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("AK certificate subject must be empty; got %q", c.Subject)
}
if c.IsCA {
return errors.New("AK certificate must not be a CA")
}
if err := validateAKCertificateExtendedKeyUsage(c); err != nil {
return err
}
return validateAKCertificateSubjectAlternativeNames(c)
}
// validateAKCertificateSubjectAlternativeNames checks if the AK certificate
// has TPM hardware details set.
func validateAKCertificateSubjectAlternativeNames(c *x509.Certificate) error {
sans, err := x509util.ParseSubjectAlternativeNames(c)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed parsing AK certificate Subject Alternative Names: %w", err)
}
details := sans.TPMHardwareDetails
manufacturer, model, version := details.Manufacturer, details.Model, details.Version
switch {
case manufacturer == "":
return errors.New("missing TPM manufacturer")
case model == "":
return errors.New("missing TPM model")
case version == "":
return errors.New("missing TPM version")
}
return nil
}
// validateAKCertificateExtendedKeyUsage checks if the AK certificate
// has the "tcg-kp-AIKCertificate" Extended Key Usage set.
func validateAKCertificateExtendedKeyUsage(c *x509.Certificate) error {
var (
valid = false
ekus []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
)
for _, ext := range c.Extensions {
if ext.Id.Equal(oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage) {
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ext.Value, &ekus); err != nil || !ekus[0].Equal(oidTCGKpAIKCertificate) {
return errors.New("AK certificate is missing Extended Key Usage value tcg-kp-AIKCertificate (2.23.133.8.3)")
}
valid = true
}
}
if !valid {
return errors.New("AK certificate is missing Extended Key Usage extension")
}
return nil
}
// Apple Enterprise Attestation Root CA from
// https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/private/
const appleEnterpriseAttestationRootCA = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
@ -875,10 +471,9 @@ type appleAttestationData struct {
UDID string
SEPVersion string
Certificate *x509.Certificate
Fingerprint string
}
func doAppleAttestationFormat(_ context.Context, prov Provisioner, _ *Challenge, att *attestationObject) (*appleAttestationData, error) {
func doAppleAttestationFormat(ctx context.Context, prov Provisioner, ch *Challenge, att *attestationObject) (*appleAttestationData, error) {
// Use configured or default attestation roots if none is configured.
roots, ok := prov.GetAttestationRoots()
if !ok {
@ -932,9 +527,6 @@ func doAppleAttestationFormat(_ context.Context, prov Provisioner, _ *Challenge,
data := &appleAttestationData{
Certificate: leaf,
}
if data.Fingerprint, err = keyutil.Fingerprint(leaf.PublicKey); err != nil {
return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error calculating key fingerprint")
}
for _, ext := range leaf.Extensions {
switch {
case ext.Id.Equal(oidAppleSerialNumber):
@ -980,10 +572,9 @@ var oidYubicoSerialNumber = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 41482, 3, 7}
type stepAttestationData struct {
Certificate *x509.Certificate
SerialNumber string
Fingerprint string
}
func doStepAttestationFormat(_ context.Context, prov Provisioner, ch *Challenge, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey, att *attestationObject) (*stepAttestationData, error) {
func doStepAttestationFormat(ctx context.Context, prov Provisioner, ch *Challenge, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey, att *attestationObject) (*stepAttestationData, error) {
// Use configured or default attestation roots if none is configured.
roots, ok := prov.GetAttestationRoots()
if !ok {
@ -1076,9 +667,6 @@ func doStepAttestationFormat(_ context.Context, prov Provisioner, ch *Challenge,
data := &stepAttestationData{
Certificate: leaf,
}
if data.Fingerprint, err = keyutil.Fingerprint(leaf.PublicKey); err != nil {
return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error calculating key fingerprint")
}
for _, ext := range leaf.Extensions {
if !ext.Id.Equal(oidYubicoSerialNumber) {
continue
@ -1142,10 +730,10 @@ func uitoa(val uint) string {
var buf [20]byte // big enough for 64bit value base 10
i := len(buf) - 1
for val >= 10 {
v := val / 10
buf[i] = byte('0' + val - v*10)
q := val / 10
buf[i] = byte('0' + val - q*10)
i--
val = v
val = q
}
// val < 10
buf[i] = byte('0' + val)

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -1,860 +0,0 @@
//go:build tpmsimulator
// +build tpmsimulator
package acme
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"testing"
"github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/smallstep/go-attestation/attest"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/minica"
"go.step.sm/crypto/tpm"
"go.step.sm/crypto/tpm/simulator"
tpmstorage "go.step.sm/crypto/tpm/storage"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
)
func newSimulatedTPM(t *testing.T) *tpm.TPM {
t.Helper()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
tpm, err := tpm.New(withSimulator(t), tpm.WithStore(tpmstorage.NewDirstore(tmpDir))) // TODO: provide in-memory storage implementation instead
require.NoError(t, err)
return tpm
}
func withSimulator(t *testing.T) tpm.NewTPMOption {
t.Helper()
var sim simulator.Simulator
t.Cleanup(func() {
if sim == nil {
return
}
err := sim.Close()
require.NoError(t, err)
})
sim, err := simulator.New()
require.NoError(t, err)
err = sim.Open()
require.NoError(t, err)
return tpm.WithSimulator(sim)
}
func generateKeyID(t *testing.T, pub crypto.PublicKey) []byte {
t.Helper()
b, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub)
require.NoError(t, err)
hash := sha256.Sum256(b)
return hash[:]
}
func mustAttestTPM(t *testing.T, keyAuthorization string, permanentIdentifiers []string) ([]byte, crypto.Signer, *x509.Certificate) {
t.Helper()
aca, err := minica.New(
minica.WithName("TPM Testing"),
minica.WithGetSignerFunc(
func() (crypto.Signer, error) {
return keyutil.GenerateSigner("RSA", "", 2048)
},
),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
// prepare simulated TPM and create an AK
stpm := newSimulatedTPM(t)
eks, err := stpm.GetEKs(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
ak, err := stpm.CreateAK(context.Background(), "first-ak")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, ak)
// extract the AK public key // TODO(hs): replace this when there's a simpler method to get the AK public key (e.g. ak.Public())
ap, err := ak.AttestationParameters(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
akp, err := attest.ParseAKPublic(attest.TPMVersion20, ap.Public)
require.NoError(t, err)
// create template and sign certificate for the AK public key
keyID := generateKeyID(t, eks[0].Public())
template := &x509.Certificate{
PublicKey: akp.Public,
IsCA: false,
UnknownExtKeyUsage: []asn1.ObjectIdentifier{oidTCGKpAIKCertificate},
}
sans := []x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{}
uris := []*url.URL{{Scheme: "urn", Opaque: "ek:sha256:" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(keyID)}}
for _, pi := range permanentIdentifiers {
sans = append(sans, x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{
Type: x509util.PermanentIdentifierType,
Value: pi,
})
}
asn1Value := []byte(fmt.Sprintf(`{"extraNames":[{"type": %q, "value": %q},{"type": %q, "value": %q},{"type": %q, "value": %q}]}`, oidTPMManufacturer, "1414747215", oidTPMModel, "SLB 9670 TPM2.0", oidTPMVersion, "7.55"))
sans = append(sans, x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{
Type: x509util.DirectoryNameType,
ASN1Value: asn1Value,
})
ext, err := createSubjectAltNameExtension(nil, nil, nil, uris, sans, true)
require.NoError(t, err)
ext.Set(template)
akCert, err := aca.Sign(template)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, akCert)
// create a new key attested by the AK, while including
// the key authorization bytes as qualifying data.
keyAuthSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuthorization))
config := tpm.AttestKeyConfig{
Algorithm: "RSA",
Size: 2048,
QualifyingData: keyAuthSum[:],
}
key, err := stpm.AttestKey(context.Background(), "first-ak", "first-key", config)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, key)
require.Equal(t, "first-key", key.Name())
require.NotEqual(t, 0, len(key.Data()))
require.Equal(t, "first-ak", key.AttestedBy())
require.True(t, key.WasAttested())
require.True(t, key.WasAttestedBy(ak))
signer, err := key.Signer(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
// prepare the attestation object with the AK certificate chain,
// the attested key, its metadata and the signature signed by the
// AK.
params, err := key.CertificationParameters(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
attObj, err := cbor.Marshal(struct {
Format string `json:"fmt"`
AttStatement map[string]interface{} `json:"attStmt,omitempty"`
}{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
// marshal the ACME payload
payload, err := json.Marshal(struct {
AttObj string `json:"attObj"`
}{
AttObj: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(attObj),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
return payload, signer, aca.Root
}
func Test_deviceAttest01ValidateWithTPMSimulator(t *testing.T) {
type args struct {
ctx context.Context
ch *Challenge
db DB
jwk *jose.JSONWebKey
payload []byte
}
type test struct {
args args
wantErr *Error
}
tests := map[string]func(t *testing.T) test{
"ok/doTPMAttestationFormat-storeError": func(t *testing.T) test {
jwk, keyAuth := mustAccountAndKeyAuthorization(t, "token")
payload, _, root := mustAttestTPM(t, keyAuth, nil) // TODO: value(s) for AK cert?
caRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: root.Raw})
ctx := NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), mustAttestationProvisioner(t, caRoot))
// parse payload, set invalid "ver", remarshal
var p payloadType
err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &p)
require.NoError(t, err)
attObj, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(p.AttObj)
require.NoError(t, err)
att := attestationObject{}
err = cbor.Unmarshal(attObj, &att)
require.NoError(t, err)
att.AttStatement["ver"] = "bogus"
attObj, err = cbor.Marshal(struct {
Format string `json:"fmt"`
AttStatement map[string]interface{} `json:"attStmt,omitempty"`
}{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: att.AttStatement,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
payload, err = json.Marshal(struct {
AttObj string `json:"attObj"`
}{
AttObj: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(attObj),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
return test{
args: args{
ctx: ctx,
jwk: jwk,
ch: &Challenge{
ID: "chID",
AuthorizationID: "azID",
Token: "token",
Type: "device-attest-01",
Status: StatusPending,
Value: "device.id.12345678",
},
payload: payload,
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
assert.Equal(t, "azID", id)
return &Authorization{ID: "azID"}, nil
},
MockUpdateChallenge: func(ctx context.Context, updch *Challenge) error {
assert.Equal(t, "chID", updch.ID)
assert.Equal(t, "token", updch.Token)
assert.Equal(t, StatusInvalid, updch.Status)
assert.Equal(t, ChallengeType("device-attest-01"), updch.Type)
assert.Equal(t, "device.id.12345678", updch.Value)
err := NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, `version "bogus" is not supported`)
assert.EqualError(t, updch.Error.Err, err.Err.Error())
assert.Equal(t, err.Type, updch.Error.Type)
assert.Equal(t, err.Detail, updch.Error.Detail)
assert.Equal(t, err.Status, updch.Error.Status)
assert.Equal(t, err.Subproblems, updch.Error.Subproblems)
return nil
},
},
},
wantErr: nil,
}
},
"ok with invalid PermanentIdentifier SAN": func(t *testing.T) test {
jwk, keyAuth := mustAccountAndKeyAuthorization(t, "token")
payload, _, root := mustAttestTPM(t, keyAuth, []string{"device.id.12345678"}) // TODO: value(s) for AK cert?
caRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: root.Raw})
ctx := NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), mustAttestationProvisioner(t, caRoot))
return test{
args: args{
ctx: ctx,
jwk: jwk,
ch: &Challenge{
ID: "chID",
AuthorizationID: "azID",
Token: "token",
Type: "device-attest-01",
Status: StatusPending,
Value: "device.id.99999999",
},
payload: payload,
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
assert.Equal(t, "azID", id)
return &Authorization{ID: "azID"}, nil
},
MockUpdateChallenge: func(ctx context.Context, updch *Challenge) error {
assert.Equal(t, "chID", updch.ID)
assert.Equal(t, "token", updch.Token)
assert.Equal(t, StatusInvalid, updch.Status)
assert.Equal(t, ChallengeType("device-attest-01"), updch.Type)
assert.Equal(t, "device.id.99999999", updch.Value)
err := NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, `permanent identifier does not match`).
AddSubproblems(NewSubproblemWithIdentifier(
ErrorMalformedType,
Identifier{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: "device.id.99999999"},
`challenge identifier "device.id.99999999" doesn't match any of the attested hardware identifiers ["device.id.12345678"]`,
))
assert.EqualError(t, updch.Error.Err, err.Err.Error())
assert.Equal(t, err.Type, updch.Error.Type)
assert.Equal(t, err.Detail, updch.Error.Detail)
assert.Equal(t, err.Status, updch.Error.Status)
assert.Equal(t, err.Subproblems, updch.Error.Subproblems)
return nil
},
},
},
wantErr: nil,
}
},
"ok": func(t *testing.T) test {
jwk, keyAuth := mustAccountAndKeyAuthorization(t, "token")
payload, signer, root := mustAttestTPM(t, keyAuth, nil) // TODO: value(s) for AK cert?
caRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: root.Raw})
ctx := NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), mustAttestationProvisioner(t, caRoot))
return test{
args: args{
ctx: ctx,
jwk: jwk,
ch: &Challenge{
ID: "chID",
AuthorizationID: "azID",
Token: "token",
Type: "device-attest-01",
Status: StatusPending,
Value: "device.id.12345678",
},
payload: payload,
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
assert.Equal(t, "azID", id)
return &Authorization{ID: "azID"}, nil
},
MockUpdateAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error {
fingerprint, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(signer.Public())
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "azID", az.ID)
assert.Equal(t, fingerprint, az.Fingerprint)
return nil
},
MockUpdateChallenge: func(ctx context.Context, updch *Challenge) error {
assert.Equal(t, "chID", updch.ID)
assert.Equal(t, "token", updch.Token)
assert.Equal(t, StatusValid, updch.Status)
assert.Equal(t, ChallengeType("device-attest-01"), updch.Type)
assert.Equal(t, "device.id.12345678", updch.Value)
return nil
},
},
},
wantErr: nil,
}
},
"ok with PermanentIdentifier SAN": func(t *testing.T) test {
jwk, keyAuth := mustAccountAndKeyAuthorization(t, "token")
payload, signer, root := mustAttestTPM(t, keyAuth, []string{"device.id.12345678"}) // TODO: value(s) for AK cert?
caRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: root.Raw})
ctx := NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), mustAttestationProvisioner(t, caRoot))
return test{
args: args{
ctx: ctx,
jwk: jwk,
ch: &Challenge{
ID: "chID",
AuthorizationID: "azID",
Token: "token",
Type: "device-attest-01",
Status: StatusPending,
Value: "device.id.12345678",
},
payload: payload,
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
assert.Equal(t, "azID", id)
return &Authorization{ID: "azID"}, nil
},
MockUpdateAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error {
fingerprint, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(signer.Public())
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "azID", az.ID)
assert.Equal(t, fingerprint, az.Fingerprint)
return nil
},
MockUpdateChallenge: func(ctx context.Context, updch *Challenge) error {
assert.Equal(t, "chID", updch.ID)
assert.Equal(t, "token", updch.Token)
assert.Equal(t, StatusValid, updch.Status)
assert.Equal(t, ChallengeType("device-attest-01"), updch.Type)
assert.Equal(t, "device.id.12345678", updch.Value)
return nil
},
},
},
wantErr: nil,
}
},
}
for name, run := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
tc := run(t)
if err := deviceAttest01Validate(tc.args.ctx, tc.args.ch, tc.args.db, tc.args.jwk, tc.args.payload); err != nil {
assert.Error(t, tc.wantErr)
assert.EqualError(t, err, tc.wantErr.Error())
return
}
assert.Nil(t, tc.wantErr)
})
}
}
func newBadAttestationStatementError(msg string) *Error {
return &Error{
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badAttestationStatement",
Status: 400,
Err: errors.New(msg),
}
}
func newInternalServerError(msg string) *Error {
return &Error{
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:serverInternal",
Status: 500,
Err: errors.New(msg),
}
}
var (
oidPermanentIdentifier = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 3}
oidHardwareModuleNameIdentifier = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 4}
)
func Test_doTPMAttestationFormat(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
aca, err := minica.New(
minica.WithName("TPM Testing"),
minica.WithGetSignerFunc(
func() (crypto.Signer, error) {
return keyutil.GenerateSigner("RSA", "", 2048)
},
),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
acaRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: aca.Root.Raw})
// prepare simulated TPM and create an AK
stpm := newSimulatedTPM(t)
eks, err := stpm.GetEKs(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
ak, err := stpm.CreateAK(context.Background(), "first-ak")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, ak)
// extract the AK public key // TODO(hs): replace this when there's a simpler method to get the AK public key (e.g. ak.Public())
ap, err := ak.AttestationParameters(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
akp, err := attest.ParseAKPublic(attest.TPMVersion20, ap.Public)
require.NoError(t, err)
// create template and sign certificate for the AK public key
keyID := generateKeyID(t, eks[0].Public())
template := &x509.Certificate{
PublicKey: akp.Public,
IsCA: false,
UnknownExtKeyUsage: []asn1.ObjectIdentifier{oidTCGKpAIKCertificate},
}
sans := []x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{}
uris := []*url.URL{{Scheme: "urn", Opaque: "ek:sha256:" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(keyID)}}
asn1Value := []byte(fmt.Sprintf(`{"extraNames":[{"type": %q, "value": %q},{"type": %q, "value": %q},{"type": %q, "value": %q}]}`, oidTPMManufacturer, "1414747215", oidTPMModel, "SLB 9670 TPM2.0", oidTPMVersion, "7.55"))
sans = append(sans, x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{
Type: x509util.DirectoryNameType,
ASN1Value: asn1Value,
})
ext, err := createSubjectAltNameExtension(nil, nil, nil, uris, sans, true)
require.NoError(t, err)
ext.Set(template)
akCert, err := aca.Sign(template)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, akCert)
invalidTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
PublicKey: akp.Public,
IsCA: false,
UnknownExtKeyUsage: []asn1.ObjectIdentifier{oidTCGKpAIKCertificate},
}
invalidAKCert, err := aca.Sign(invalidTemplate)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, invalidAKCert)
// generate a JWK and the key authorization value
jwk, err := jose.GenerateJWK("EC", "P-256", "ES256", "sig", "", 0)
require.NoError(t, err)
keyAuthorization, err := KeyAuthorization("token", jwk)
require.NoError(t, err)
// create a new key attested by the AK, while including
// the key authorization bytes as qualifying data.
keyAuthSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuthorization))
config := tpm.AttestKeyConfig{
Algorithm: "RSA",
Size: 2048,
QualifyingData: keyAuthSum[:],
}
key, err := stpm.AttestKey(context.Background(), "first-ak", "first-key", config)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, key)
params, err := key.CertificationParameters(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
signer, err := key.Signer(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
fingerprint, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(signer.Public())
require.NoError(t, err)
// attest another key and get its certification parameters
anotherKey, err := stpm.AttestKey(context.Background(), "first-ak", "another-key", config)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, key)
anotherKeyParams, err := anotherKey.CertificationParameters(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
type args struct {
ctx context.Context
prov Provisioner
ch *Challenge
jwk *jose.JSONWebKey
att *attestationObject
}
tests := []struct {
name string
args args
want *tpmAttestationData
expErr *Error
}{
{"ok", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, nil},
{"fail ver not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("ver not present")},
{"fail ver type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": []interface{}{},
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("ver not present")},
{"fail bogus ver", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "bogus",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError(`version "bogus" is not supported`)},
{"fail x5c not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c not present")},
{"fail x5c type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": [][]byte{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c not present")},
{"fail x5c empty", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is empty")},
{"fail leaf type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "step",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{"leaf", aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is malformed")},
{"fail leaf parse", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "step",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw[:100], aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is malformed: x509: malformed certificate")},
{"fail intermediate type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "step",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, "intermediate"},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is malformed")},
{"fail intermediate parse", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "step",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw[:100]},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is malformed: x509: malformed certificate")},
{"fail roots", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, nil), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newInternalServerError("no root CA bundle available to verify the attestation certificate")},
{"fail verify", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "step",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is not valid: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority")},
{"fail validateAKCertificate", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{invalidAKCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("AK certificate is not valid: missing TPM manufacturer")},
{"fail pubArea not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid pubArea in attestation statement")},
{"fail pubArea type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": []interface{}{},
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid pubArea in attestation statement")},
{"fail pubArea empty", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": []byte{},
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("pubArea is empty")},
{"fail sig not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid sig in attestation statement")},
{"fail sig type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": []interface{}{},
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid sig in attestation statement")},
{"fail sig empty", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": []byte{},
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("sig is empty")},
{"fail certInfo not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid certInfo in attestation statement")},
{"fail certInfo type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": []interface{}{},
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid certInfo in attestation statement")},
{"fail certInfo empty", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": []byte{},
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("certInfo is empty")},
{"fail alg not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid alg in attestation statement")},
{"fail alg type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(0), // invalid alg
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid alg 0 in attestation statement")},
{"fail attestation verification", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": anotherKeyParams.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid certification parameters: certification refers to a different key")},
{"fail keyAuthorization", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: []byte("not an asymmetric key")}, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), // RS256
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newInternalServerError("failed creating key auth digest: error generating JWK thumbprint: square/go-jose: unknown key type '[]uint8'")},
{"fail different keyAuthorization", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "aDifferentToken"}, jwk, &attestationObject{
Format: "tpm",
AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{
"ver": "2.0",
"x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw},
"alg": int64(-257), //
"sig": params.CreateSignature,
"certInfo": params.CreateAttestation,
"pubArea": params.Public,
},
}}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("key authorization does not match")},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := doTPMAttestationFormat(tt.args.ctx, tt.args.prov, tt.args.ch, tt.args.jwk, tt.args.att)
if tt.expErr != nil {
var ae *Error
if assert.True(t, errors.As(err, &ae)) {
assert.EqualError(t, err, tt.expErr.Error())
assert.Equal(t, ae.StatusCode(), tt.expErr.StatusCode())
assert.Equal(t, ae.Type, tt.expErr.Type)
}
assert.Nil(t, got)
return
}
assert.NoError(t, err)
if assert.NotNil(t, got) {
assert.Equal(t, akCert, got.Certificate)
assert.Equal(t, [][]*x509.Certificate{
{
akCert, aca.Intermediate, aca.Root,
},
}, got.VerifiedChains)
assert.Equal(t, fingerprint, got.Fingerprint)
assert.Empty(t, got.PermanentIdentifiers) // currently expected to be always empty
}
})
}
}

View file

@ -29,12 +29,10 @@ type CertificateAuthority interface {
}
// NewContext adds the given acme components to the context.
func NewContext(ctx context.Context, db DB, client Client, linker Linker, fn PrerequisitesChecker,
nnsServer string) context.Context {
func NewContext(ctx context.Context, db DB, client Client, linker Linker, fn PrerequisitesChecker) context.Context {
ctx = NewDatabaseContext(ctx, db)
ctx = NewClientContext(ctx, client)
ctx = NewLinkerContext(ctx, linker)
ctx = NewNNSContext(ctx, nnsServer)
// Prerequisite checker is optional.
if fn != nil {
ctx = NewPrerequisitesCheckerContext(ctx, fn)
@ -48,7 +46,7 @@ type PrerequisitesChecker func(ctx context.Context) (bool, error)
// DefaultPrerequisitesChecker is the default PrerequisiteChecker and returns
// always true.
func DefaultPrerequisitesChecker(context.Context) (bool, error) {
func DefaultPrerequisitesChecker(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
return true, nil
}

View file

@ -12,12 +12,6 @@ import (
// account.
var ErrNotFound = errors.New("not found")
// IsErrNotFound returns true if the error is a "not found" error. Returns false
// otherwise.
func IsErrNotFound(err error) bool {
return errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound)
}
// DB is the DB interface expected by the step-ca ACME API.
type DB interface {
CreateAccount(ctx context.Context, acc *Account) error

View file

@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ type dbAccount struct {
Key *jose.JSONWebKey `json:"key"`
Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"`
Status acme.Status `json:"status"`
LocationPrefix string `json:"locationPrefix"`
ProvisionerName string `json:"provisionerName"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
DeactivatedAt time.Time `json:"deactivatedAt"`
}
@ -28,7 +26,7 @@ func (dba *dbAccount) clone() *dbAccount {
return &nu
}
func (db *DB) getAccountIDByKeyID(_ context.Context, kid string) (string, error) {
func (db *DB) getAccountIDByKeyID(ctx context.Context, kid string) (string, error) {
id, err := db.db.Get(accountByKeyIDTable, []byte(kid))
if err != nil {
if nosqlDB.IsErrNotFound(err) {
@ -40,7 +38,7 @@ func (db *DB) getAccountIDByKeyID(_ context.Context, kid string) (string, error)
}
// getDBAccount retrieves and unmarshals dbAccount.
func (db *DB) getDBAccount(_ context.Context, id string) (*dbAccount, error) {
func (db *DB) getDBAccount(ctx context.Context, id string) (*dbAccount, error) {
data, err := db.db.Get(accountTable, []byte(id))
if err != nil {
if nosqlDB.IsErrNotFound(err) {
@ -68,8 +66,6 @@ func (db *DB) GetAccount(ctx context.Context, id string) (*acme.Account, error)
Contact: dbacc.Contact,
Key: dbacc.Key,
ID: dbacc.ID,
LocationPrefix: dbacc.LocationPrefix,
ProvisionerName: dbacc.ProvisionerName,
}, nil
}
@ -96,8 +92,6 @@ func (db *DB) CreateAccount(ctx context.Context, acc *acme.Account) error {
Contact: acc.Contact,
Status: acc.Status,
CreatedAt: clock.Now(),
LocationPrefix: acc.LocationPrefix,
ProvisionerName: acc.ProvisionerName,
}
kid, err := acme.KeyToID(dba.Key)

View file

@ -197,8 +197,6 @@ func TestDB_getAccountIDByKeyID(t *testing.T) {
func TestDB_GetAccount(t *testing.T) {
accID := "accID"
locationPrefix := "https://test.ca.smallstep.com/acme/foo/account/"
provisionerName := "foo"
type test struct {
db nosql.DB
err error
@ -230,8 +228,6 @@ func TestDB_GetAccount(t *testing.T) {
DeactivatedAt: now,
Contact: []string{"foo", "bar"},
Key: jwk,
LocationPrefix: locationPrefix,
ProvisionerName: provisionerName,
}
b, err := json.Marshal(dbacc)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
@ -270,8 +266,6 @@ func TestDB_GetAccount(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equals(t, acc.ID, tc.dbacc.ID)
assert.Equals(t, acc.Status, tc.dbacc.Status)
assert.Equals(t, acc.Contact, tc.dbacc.Contact)
assert.Equals(t, acc.LocationPrefix, tc.dbacc.LocationPrefix)
assert.Equals(t, acc.ProvisionerName, tc.dbacc.ProvisionerName)
assert.Equals(t, acc.Key.KeyID, tc.dbacc.Key.KeyID)
}
})
@ -385,7 +379,6 @@ func TestDB_GetAccountByKeyID(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestDB_CreateAccount(t *testing.T) {
locationPrefix := "https://test.ca.smallstep.com/acme/foo/account/"
type test struct {
db nosql.DB
acc *acme.Account
@ -400,7 +393,6 @@ func TestDB_CreateAccount(t *testing.T) {
Status: acme.StatusValid,
Contact: []string{"foo", "bar"},
Key: jwk,
LocationPrefix: locationPrefix,
}
return test{
db: &db.MockNoSQLDB{
@ -424,7 +416,6 @@ func TestDB_CreateAccount(t *testing.T) {
Status: acme.StatusValid,
Contact: []string{"foo", "bar"},
Key: jwk,
LocationPrefix: locationPrefix,
}
return test{
db: &db.MockNoSQLDB{
@ -448,7 +439,6 @@ func TestDB_CreateAccount(t *testing.T) {
Status: acme.StatusValid,
Contact: []string{"foo", "bar"},
Key: jwk,
LocationPrefix: locationPrefix,
}
return test{
db: &db.MockNoSQLDB{
@ -466,8 +456,6 @@ func TestDB_CreateAccount(t *testing.T) {
assert.FatalError(t, json.Unmarshal(nu, dbacc))
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.ID, string(key))
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.Contact, acc.Contact)
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.LocationPrefix, acc.LocationPrefix)
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.ProvisionerName, acc.ProvisionerName)
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.Key.KeyID, acc.Key.KeyID)
assert.True(t, clock.Now().Add(-time.Minute).Before(dbacc.CreatedAt))
assert.True(t, clock.Now().Add(time.Minute).After(dbacc.CreatedAt))
@ -494,7 +482,6 @@ func TestDB_CreateAccount(t *testing.T) {
Status: acme.StatusValid,
Contact: []string{"foo", "bar"},
Key: jwk,
LocationPrefix: locationPrefix,
}
return test{
db: &db.MockNoSQLDB{
@ -513,8 +500,6 @@ func TestDB_CreateAccount(t *testing.T) {
assert.FatalError(t, json.Unmarshal(nu, dbacc))
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.ID, string(key))
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.Contact, acc.Contact)
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.LocationPrefix, acc.LocationPrefix)
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.ProvisionerName, acc.ProvisionerName)
assert.Equals(t, dbacc.Key.KeyID, acc.Key.KeyID)
assert.True(t, clock.Now().Add(-time.Minute).Before(dbacc.CreatedAt))
assert.True(t, clock.Now().Add(time.Minute).After(dbacc.CreatedAt))
@ -559,8 +544,6 @@ func TestDB_UpdateAccount(t *testing.T) {
CreatedAt: now,
DeactivatedAt: now,
Contact: []string{"foo", "bar"},
LocationPrefix: "foo",
ProvisionerName: "alpha",
Key: jwk,
}
b, err := json.Marshal(dbacc)
@ -663,9 +646,7 @@ func TestDB_UpdateAccount(t *testing.T) {
acc := &acme.Account{
ID: accID,
Status: acme.StatusDeactivated,
Contact: []string{"baz", "zap"},
LocationPrefix: "bar",
ProvisionerName: "beta",
Contact: []string{"foo", "bar"},
Key: jwk,
}
return test{
@ -685,10 +666,7 @@ func TestDB_UpdateAccount(t *testing.T) {
assert.FatalError(t, json.Unmarshal(nu, dbNew))
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.ID, dbacc.ID)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.Status, acc.Status)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.Contact, acc.Contact)
// LocationPrefix should not change.
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.LocationPrefix, dbacc.LocationPrefix)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.ProvisionerName, dbacc.ProvisionerName)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.Contact, dbacc.Contact)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.Key.KeyID, dbacc.Key.KeyID)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.CreatedAt, dbacc.CreatedAt)
assert.True(t, dbNew.DeactivatedAt.Add(-time.Minute).Before(now))
@ -708,7 +686,12 @@ func TestDB_UpdateAccount(t *testing.T) {
assert.HasPrefix(t, err.Error(), tc.err.Error())
}
} else {
assert.Nil(t, tc.err)
if assert.Nil(t, tc.err) {
assert.Equals(t, tc.acc.ID, dbacc.ID)
assert.Equals(t, tc.acc.Status, dbacc.Status)
assert.Equals(t, tc.acc.Contact, dbacc.Contact)
assert.Equals(t, tc.acc.Key.KeyID, dbacc.Key.KeyID)
}
}
})
}

View file

@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ type dbAuthz struct {
Identifier acme.Identifier `json:"identifier"`
Status acme.Status `json:"status"`
Token string `json:"token"`
Fingerprint string `json:"fingerprint,omitempty"`
ChallengeIDs []string `json:"challengeIDs"`
Wildcard bool `json:"wildcard"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
@ -32,7 +31,7 @@ func (ba *dbAuthz) clone() *dbAuthz {
// getDBAuthz retrieves and unmarshals a database representation of the
// ACME Authorization type.
func (db *DB) getDBAuthz(_ context.Context, id string) (*dbAuthz, error) {
func (db *DB) getDBAuthz(ctx context.Context, id string) (*dbAuthz, error) {
data, err := db.db.Get(authzTable, []byte(id))
if nosql.IsErrNotFound(err) {
return nil, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "authz %s not found", id)
@ -70,7 +69,6 @@ func (db *DB) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, id string) (*acme.Authorizat
Wildcard: dbaz.Wildcard,
ExpiresAt: dbaz.ExpiresAt,
Token: dbaz.Token,
Fingerprint: dbaz.Fingerprint,
Error: dbaz.Error,
}, nil
}
@ -99,7 +97,6 @@ func (db *DB) CreateAuthorization(ctx context.Context, az *acme.Authorization) e
Identifier: az.Identifier,
ChallengeIDs: chIDs,
Token: az.Token,
Fingerprint: az.Fingerprint,
Wildcard: az.Wildcard,
}
@ -114,14 +111,14 @@ func (db *DB) UpdateAuthorization(ctx context.Context, az *acme.Authorization) e
}
nu := old.clone()
nu.Status = az.Status
nu.Fingerprint = az.Fingerprint
nu.Error = az.Error
return db.save(ctx, old.ID, nu, old, "authz", authzTable)
}
// GetAuthorizationsByAccountID retrieves and unmarshals ACME authz types from the database.
func (db *DB) GetAuthorizationsByAccountID(_ context.Context, accountID string) ([]*acme.Authorization, error) {
func (db *DB) GetAuthorizationsByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*acme.Authorization, error) {
entries, err := db.db.List(authzTable)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "error listing authz")
@ -147,7 +144,6 @@ func (db *DB) GetAuthorizationsByAccountID(_ context.Context, accountID string)
Wildcard: dbaz.Wildcard,
ExpiresAt: dbaz.ExpiresAt,
Token: dbaz.Token,
Fingerprint: dbaz.Fingerprint,
Error: dbaz.Error,
})
}

View file

@ -473,7 +473,6 @@ func TestDB_UpdateAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),
ChallengeIDs: []string{"foo", "bar"},
Wildcard: true,
Fingerprint: "fingerprint",
}
b, err := json.Marshal(dbaz)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
@ -553,7 +552,6 @@ func TestDB_UpdateAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
Token: dbaz.Token,
Wildcard: dbaz.Wildcard,
ExpiresAt: dbaz.ExpiresAt,
Fingerprint: "fingerprint",
Error: acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "malformed"),
}
return test{
@ -584,7 +582,6 @@ func TestDB_UpdateAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.Wildcard, dbaz.Wildcard)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.CreatedAt, dbaz.CreatedAt)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.ExpiresAt, dbaz.ExpiresAt)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.Fingerprint, dbaz.Fingerprint)
assert.Equals(t, dbNew.Error.Error(), acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "The request message was malformed").Error())
return nu, true, nil
},

View file

@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func (db *DB) CreateCertificate(ctx context.Context, cert *acme.Certificate) err
// GetCertificate retrieves and unmarshals an ACME certificate type from the
// datastore.
func (db *DB) GetCertificate(_ context.Context, id string) (*acme.Certificate, error) {
func (db *DB) GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) (*acme.Certificate, error) {
b, err := db.db.Get(certTable, []byte(id))
if nosql.IsErrNotFound(err) {
return nil, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "certificate %s not found", id)

View file

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ func (dbc *dbChallenge) clone() *dbChallenge {
return &u
}
func (db *DB) getDBChallenge(_ context.Context, id string) (*dbChallenge, error) {
func (db *DB) getDBChallenge(ctx context.Context, id string) (*dbChallenge, error) {
data, err := db.db.Get(challengeTable, []byte(id))
if nosql.IsErrNotFound(err) {
return nil, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "challenge %s not found", id)
@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ func (db *DB) CreateChallenge(ctx context.Context, ch *acme.Challenge) error {
// GetChallenge retrieves and unmarshals an ACME challenge type from the database.
// Implements the acme.DB GetChallenge interface.
func (db *DB) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, id, authzID string) (*acme.Challenge, error) {
_ = authzID // unused input
dbch, err := db.getDBChallenge(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return nil, err

View file

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ type dbExternalAccountKeyReference struct {
}
// getDBExternalAccountKey retrieves and unmarshals dbExternalAccountKey.
func (db *DB) getDBExternalAccountKey(_ context.Context, id string) (*dbExternalAccountKey, error) {
func (db *DB) getDBExternalAccountKey(ctx context.Context, id string) (*dbExternalAccountKey, error) {
data, err := db.db.Get(externalAccountKeyTable, []byte(id))
if err != nil {
if nosqlDB.IsErrNotFound(err) {
@ -160,8 +160,6 @@ func (db *DB) DeleteExternalAccountKey(ctx context.Context, provisionerID, keyID
// GetExternalAccountKeys retrieves all External Account Binding keys for a provisioner
func (db *DB) GetExternalAccountKeys(ctx context.Context, provisionerID, cursor string, limit int) ([]*acme.ExternalAccountKey, string, error) {
_, _ = cursor, limit // unused input
externalAccountKeyMutex.RLock()
defer externalAccountKeyMutex.RUnlock()
@ -229,7 +227,7 @@ func (db *DB) GetExternalAccountKeyByReference(ctx context.Context, provisionerI
return db.GetExternalAccountKey(ctx, provisionerID, dbExternalAccountKeyReference.ExternalAccountKeyID)
}
func (db *DB) GetExternalAccountKeyByAccountID(context.Context, string, string) (*acme.ExternalAccountKey, error) {
func (db *DB) GetExternalAccountKeyByAccountID(ctx context.Context, provisionerID, accountID string) (*acme.ExternalAccountKey, error) {
//nolint:nilnil // legacy
return nil, nil
}

View file

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func (db *DB) CreateNonce(ctx context.Context) (acme.Nonce, error) {
// DeleteNonce verifies that the nonce is valid (by checking if it exists),
// and if so, consumes the nonce resource by deleting it from the database.
func (db *DB) DeleteNonce(_ context.Context, nonce acme.Nonce) error {
func (db *DB) DeleteNonce(ctx context.Context, nonce acme.Nonce) error {
err := db.db.Update(&database.Tx{
Operations: []*database.TxEntry{
{

View file

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func New(db nosqlDB.DB) (*DB, error) {
// save writes the new data to the database, overwriting the old data if it
// existed.
func (db *DB) save(_ context.Context, id string, nu, old interface{}, typ string, table []byte) error {
func (db *DB) save(ctx context.Context, id string, nu, old interface{}, typ string, table []byte) error {
var (
err error
newB []byte

View file

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func (a *dbOrder) clone() *dbOrder {
}
// getDBOrder retrieves and unmarshals an ACME Order type from the database.
func (db *DB) getDBOrder(_ context.Context, id string) (*dbOrder, error) {
func (db *DB) getDBOrder(ctx context.Context, id string) (*dbOrder, error) {
b, err := db.db.Get(orderTable, []byte(id))
if nosql.IsErrNotFound(err) {
return nil, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "order %s not found", id)

View file

@ -65,8 +65,6 @@ const (
ErrorUserActionRequiredType
// ErrorNotImplementedType operation is not implemented
ErrorNotImplementedType
// ErrorNNSType was a problem with a NNS query during identifier validation
ErrorNNSType
)
// String returns the string representation of the acme problem type,
@ -123,8 +121,6 @@ func (ap ProblemType) String() string {
return "userActionRequired"
case ErrorNotImplementedType:
return "notImplemented"
case ErrorNNSType:
return "nns"
default:
return fmt.Sprintf("unsupported type ACME error type '%d'", int(ap))
}

View file

@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
package acme
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-contract/nns"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/core/state"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/rpcclient"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/rpcclient/invoker"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/rpcclient/unwrap"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/smartcontract"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/util"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/vm/stackitem"
)
// multiSchemeClient unites invoker.RPCInvoke and common interface of
// rpcclient.Client and rpcclient.WSClient.
type multiSchemeClient interface {
invoker.RPCInvoke
// Init turns client to "ready-to-work" state.
Init() error
// Close closes connections.
Close()
// GetContractStateByID returns state of the NNS contract on 1 input.
GetContractStateByID(int32) (*state.Contract, error)
}
// NNS is used to interact with NNS contract.
// Before work, the connection to the NNS server must be established using Dial method.
type NNS struct {
nnsContract util.Uint160
client multiSchemeClient
}
// NNSContext is used to store info about NNS server.
type NNSContext struct {
nnsServer string
}
type nnsKey struct{}
// NewNNSContext adds new NNSContext with given params to the context.
func NewNNSContext(ctx context.Context, nnsServer string) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, nnsKey{}, NNSContext{nnsServer: nnsServer})
}
// GetNNSContext returns NNSContext from the given context.
func GetNNSContext(ctx context.Context) (NNSContext, bool) {
c, ok := ctx.Value(nnsKey{}).(NNSContext)
return c, ok
}
// Dial connects to the address of the NNS server.
// If URL address scheme is 'ws' or 'wss', then WebSocket protocol is used, otherwise HTTP.
func (n *NNS) Dial(address string) error {
var err error
uri, err := url.Parse(address)
if err == nil && (uri.Scheme == "ws" || uri.Scheme == "wss") {
n.client, err = rpcclient.NewWS(context.Background(), address, rpcclient.WSOptions{})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create Neo WebSocket client: %w", err)
}
} else {
n.client, err = rpcclient.New(context.Background(), address, rpcclient.Options{})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create Neo HTTP client: %w", err)
}
}
if err = n.client.Init(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("initialize Neo client: %w", err)
}
nnsContract, err := n.client.GetContractStateByID(1)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("get NNS contract state: %w", err)
}
n.nnsContract = nnsContract.Hash
return nil
}
// Close closes connections of multiSchemeClient.
func (n *NNS) Close() {
n.client.Close()
}
// GetTXTRecords returns TXT records of the provided domain by calling `getRecords` method of NNS contract.
func (n *NNS) GetTXTRecords(name string) ([]string, error) {
params, err := smartcontract.NewParametersFromValues(name, int64(nns.TXT))
if err != nil {
return make([]string, 0), fmt.Errorf("create slice of params: %w", err)
}
item, err := unwrap.Item(n.client.InvokeFunction(n.nnsContract, "getRecords", params, nil))
if err != nil {
return make([]string, 0), fmt.Errorf("contract invocation: %w", err)
}
if _, ok := item.(stackitem.Null); !ok {
arr, ok := item.Value().([]stackitem.Item)
if !ok {
return make([]string, 0), errors.New("invalid cast to stack item slice")
}
var result = make([]string, 0, len(arr))
for i := range arr {
recordValue, err := arr[i].TryBytes()
if err != nil {
return make([]string, 0), fmt.Errorf("convert array item to byte slice: %w", err)
}
result = append(result, string(recordValue))
}
return result, nil
}
return make([]string, 0), errors.New("records not found")
}

View file

@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package acme
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/subtle"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"net"
@ -12,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
"go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
)
@ -127,27 +125,6 @@ func (o *Order) UpdateStatus(ctx context.Context, db DB) error {
return nil
}
// getKeyFingerprint returns a fingerprint from the list of authorizations. This
// fingerprint is used on the device-attest-01 flow to verify the attestation
// certificate public key with the CSR public key.
//
// There's no point on reading all the authorizations as there will be only one
// for a permanent identifier.
func (o *Order) getAuthorizationFingerprint(ctx context.Context, db DB) (string, error) {
for _, azID := range o.AuthorizationIDs {
az, err := db.GetAuthorization(ctx, azID)
if err != nil {
return "", WrapErrorISE(err, "error getting authorization %q", azID)
}
// There's no point on reading all the authorizations as there will
// be only one for a permanent identifier.
if az.Fingerprint != "" {
return az.Fingerprint, nil
}
}
return "", nil
}
// Finalize signs a certificate if the necessary conditions for Order completion
// have been met.
//
@ -173,24 +150,6 @@ func (o *Order) Finalize(ctx context.Context, db DB, csr *x509.CertificateReques
return NewErrorISE("unexpected status %s for order %s", o.Status, o.ID)
}
// Get key fingerprint if any. And then compare it with the CSR fingerprint.
//
// In device-attest-01 challenges we should check that the keys in the CSR
// and the attestation certificate are the same.
fingerprint, err := o.getAuthorizationFingerprint(ctx, db)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if fingerprint != "" {
fp, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(csr.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
return WrapErrorISE(err, "error calculating key fingerprint")
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(fingerprint), []byte(fp)) == 0 {
return NewError(ErrorUnauthorizedType, "order %s csr does not match the attested key", o.ID)
}
}
// canonicalize the CSR to allow for comparison
csr = canonicalize(csr)

View file

@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package acme
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/asn1"
@ -19,7 +18,6 @@ import (
"github.com/smallstep/assert"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
"go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
)
@ -301,7 +299,7 @@ func (m *mockSignAuth) LoadProvisionerByName(name string) (provisioner.Interface
return m.ret1.(provisioner.Interface), m.err
}
func (m *mockSignAuth) IsRevoked(string) (bool, error) {
func (m *mockSignAuth) IsRevoked(sn string) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}
@ -310,14 +308,6 @@ func (m *mockSignAuth) Revoke(context.Context, *authority.RevokeOptions) error {
}
func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
mustSigner := func(kty, crv string, size int) crypto.Signer {
s, err := keyutil.GenerateSigner(kty, crv, size)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return s
}
type test struct {
o *Order
err *Error
@ -410,18 +400,10 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: "a-permanent-identifier"},
},
}
signer := mustSigner("EC", "P-256", 0)
fingerprint, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(signer.Public())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
csr := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{
CommonName: "a-different-identifier",
},
PublicKey: signer.Public(),
ExtraExtensions: []pkix.Extension{
{
Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 3},
@ -432,29 +414,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
return test{
o: o,
csr: csr,
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
switch id {
case "a":
return &Authorization{
ID: id,
Status: StatusValid,
}, nil
case "b":
return &Authorization{
ID: id,
Fingerprint: fingerprint,
Status: StatusValid,
}, nil
default:
assert.FatalError(t, errors.Errorf("unexpected authorization %s", id))
return nil, errors.New("force")
}
},
MockUpdateOrder: func(ctx context.Context, o *Order) error {
return nil
},
},
err: &Error{
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badCSR",
Detail: "The CSR is unacceptable",
@ -493,11 +452,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
return nil, errors.New("force")
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
},
err: NewErrorISE("error retrieving authorization options from ACME provisioner: force"),
}
},
@ -537,11 +491,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
}
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
},
err: NewErrorISE("error creating template options from ACME provisioner: error unmarshaling template data: invalid character 'o' in literal false (expecting 'a')"),
}
},
@ -583,11 +532,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
return nil, errors.New("force")
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
},
err: NewErrorISE("error signing certificate for order oID: force"),
}
},
@ -634,9 +578,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
MockCreateCertificate: func(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error {
assert.Equals(t, cert.AccountID, o.AccountID)
assert.Equals(t, cert.OrderID, o.ID)
@ -691,9 +632,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
MockCreateCertificate: func(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error {
cert.ID = "certID"
assert.Equals(t, cert.AccountID, o.AccountID)
@ -716,95 +654,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
err: NewErrorISE("error updating order oID: force"),
}
},
"fail/csr-fingerprint": func(t *testing.T) test {
now := clock.Now()
o := &Order{
ID: "oID",
AccountID: "accID",
Status: StatusReady,
ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),
AuthorizationIDs: []string{"a", "b"},
Identifiers: []Identifier{
{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: "a-permanent-identifier"},
},
}
signer := mustSigner("EC", "P-256", 0)
csr := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{
CommonName: "a-permanent-identifier",
},
PublicKey: signer.Public(),
ExtraExtensions: []pkix.Extension{
{
Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 3},
Value: []byte("a-permanent-identifier"),
},
},
}
leaf := &x509.Certificate{
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "a-permanent-identifier"},
PublicKey: signer.Public(),
ExtraExtensions: []pkix.Extension{
{
Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 3},
Value: []byte("a-permanent-identifier"),
},
},
}
inter := &x509.Certificate{Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "inter"}}
root := &x509.Certificate{Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "root"}}
return test{
o: o,
csr: csr,
prov: &MockProvisioner{
MauthorizeSign: func(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]provisioner.SignOption, error) {
assert.Equals(t, token, "")
return nil, nil
},
MgetOptions: func() *provisioner.Options {
return nil
},
},
ca: &mockSignAuth{
sign: func(_csr *x509.CertificateRequest, signOpts provisioner.SignOptions, extraOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
assert.Equals(t, _csr, csr)
return []*x509.Certificate{leaf, inter, root}, nil
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{
ID: id,
Fingerprint: "other-fingerprint",
Status: StatusValid,
}, nil
},
MockCreateCertificate: func(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error {
cert.ID = "certID"
assert.Equals(t, cert.AccountID, o.AccountID)
assert.Equals(t, cert.OrderID, o.ID)
assert.Equals(t, cert.Leaf, leaf)
assert.Equals(t, cert.Intermediates, []*x509.Certificate{inter, root})
return nil
},
MockUpdateOrder: func(ctx context.Context, updo *Order) error {
assert.Equals(t, updo.CertificateID, "certID")
assert.Equals(t, updo.Status, StatusValid)
assert.Equals(t, updo.ID, o.ID)
assert.Equals(t, updo.AccountID, o.AccountID)
assert.Equals(t, updo.ExpiresAt, o.ExpiresAt)
assert.Equals(t, updo.AuthorizationIDs, o.AuthorizationIDs)
assert.Equals(t, updo.Identifiers, o.Identifiers)
return nil
},
},
err: NewError(ErrorUnauthorizedType, "order oID csr does not match the attested key"),
}
},
"ok/permanent-identifier": func(t *testing.T) test {
now := clock.Now()
o := &Order{
@ -817,18 +666,10 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: "a-permanent-identifier"},
},
}
signer := mustSigner("EC", "P-256", 0)
fingerprint, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(signer.Public())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
csr := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{
CommonName: "a-permanent-identifier",
},
PublicKey: signer.Public(),
ExtraExtensions: []pkix.Extension{
{
Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 3},
@ -839,7 +680,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
leaf := &x509.Certificate{
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "a-permanent-identifier"},
PublicKey: signer.Public(),
ExtraExtensions: []pkix.Extension{
{
Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 3},
@ -869,24 +709,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
switch id {
case "a":
return &Authorization{
ID: id,
Status: StatusValid,
}, nil
case "b":
return &Authorization{
ID: id,
Fingerprint: fingerprint,
Status: StatusValid,
}, nil
default:
assert.FatalError(t, errors.Errorf("unexpected authorization %s", id))
return nil, errors.New("force")
}
},
MockCreateCertificate: func(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error {
cert.ID = "certID"
assert.Equals(t, cert.AccountID, o.AccountID)
@ -921,19 +743,11 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: "a-permanent-identifier"},
},
}
signer := mustSigner("EC", "P-256", 0)
fingerprint, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(signer.Public())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
csr := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{
CommonName: "a-permanent-identifier",
},
DNSNames: []string{"foo.internal"},
PublicKey: signer.Public(),
ExtraExtensions: []pkix.Extension{
{
Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 3},
@ -944,7 +758,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
leaf := &x509.Certificate{
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "a-permanent-identifier"},
PublicKey: signer.Public(),
ExtraExtensions: []pkix.Extension{
{
Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 3},
@ -979,13 +792,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{
ID: id,
Fingerprint: fingerprint,
Status: StatusValid,
}, nil
},
MockCreateCertificate: func(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error {
cert.ID = "certID"
assert.Equals(t, cert.AccountID, o.AccountID)
@ -1050,9 +856,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
MockCreateCertificate: func(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error {
cert.ID = "certID"
assert.Equals(t, cert.AccountID, o.AccountID)
@ -1114,9 +917,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
MockCreateCertificate: func(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error {
cert.ID = "certID"
assert.Equals(t, cert.AccountID, o.AccountID)
@ -1181,9 +981,6 @@ func TestOrder_Finalize(t *testing.T) {
},
},
db: &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
MockCreateCertificate: func(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error {
cert.ID = "certID"
assert.Equals(t, cert.AccountID, o.AccountID)
@ -1891,55 +1688,3 @@ func TestOrder_sans(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
func TestOrder_getAuthorizationFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
type fields struct {
AuthorizationIDs []string
}
type args struct {
ctx context.Context
db DB
}
tests := []struct {
name string
fields fields
args args
want string
wantErr bool
}{
{"ok", fields{[]string{"az1", "az2"}}, args{ctx, &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
}}, "", false},
{"ok fingerprint", fields{[]string{"az1", "az2"}}, args{ctx, &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
if id == "az1" {
return &Authorization{ID: id, Status: StatusValid}, nil
}
return &Authorization{ID: id, Fingerprint: "fingerprint", Status: StatusValid}, nil
},
}}, "fingerprint", false},
{"fail", fields{[]string{"az1", "az2"}}, args{ctx, &MockDB{
MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) {
return nil, errors.New("force")
},
}}, "", true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
o := &Order{
AuthorizationIDs: tt.fields.AuthorizationIDs,
}
got, err := o.getAuthorizationFingerprint(tt.args.ctx, tt.args.db)
if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
t.Errorf("Order.getAuthorizationFingerprint() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
return
}
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("Order.getAuthorizationFingerprint() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}

View file

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package api
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/dsa" //nolint:staticcheck // support legacy algorithms
@ -21,8 +20,6 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"go.step.sm/crypto/sshutil"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/api/log"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/api/render"
@ -227,39 +224,8 @@ type RootResponse struct {
// ProvisionersResponse is the response object that returns the list of
// provisioners.
type ProvisionersResponse struct {
Provisioners provisioner.List
NextCursor string
}
// MarshalJSON implements json.Marshaler. It marshals the ProvisionersResponse
// into a byte slice.
//
// Special treatment is given to the SCEP provisioner, as it contains a
// challenge secret that MUST NOT be leaked in (public) HTTP responses. The
// challenge value is thus redacted in HTTP responses.
func (p ProvisionersResponse) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
for _, item := range p.Provisioners {
scepProv, ok := item.(*provisioner.SCEP)
if !ok {
continue
}
old := scepProv.ChallengePassword
scepProv.ChallengePassword = "*** REDACTED ***"
defer func(p string) { //nolint:gocritic // defer in loop required to restore initial state of provisioners
scepProv.ChallengePassword = p
}(old)
}
var list = struct {
Provisioners []provisioner.Interface `json:"provisioners"`
Provisioners provisioner.List `json:"provisioners"`
NextCursor string `json:"nextCursor"`
}{
Provisioners: []provisioner.Interface(p.Provisioners),
NextCursor: p.NextCursor,
}
return json.Marshal(list)
}
// ProvisionerKeyResponse is the response object that returns the encrypted key
@ -291,7 +257,7 @@ func (h *caHandler) Route(r Router) {
// New creates a new RouterHandler with the CA endpoints.
//
// Deprecated: Use api.Route(r Router)
func New(Authority) RouterHandler {
func New(auth Authority) RouterHandler {
return &caHandler{}
}
@ -338,7 +304,7 @@ func Version(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
// Health is an HTTP handler that returns the status of the server.
func Health(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
func Health(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
render.JSON(w, HealthResponse{Status: "ok"})
}
@ -472,7 +438,7 @@ func logOtt(w http.ResponseWriter, token string) {
}
}
// LogCertificate adds certificate fields to the log message.
// LogCertificate add certificate fields to the log message.
func LogCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, cert *x509.Certificate) {
if rl, ok := w.(logging.ResponseLogger); ok {
m := map[string]interface{}{
@ -504,41 +470,6 @@ func LogCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, cert *x509.Certificate) {
}
}
// LogSSHCertificate adds SSH certificate fields to the log message.
func LogSSHCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, cert *ssh.Certificate) {
if rl, ok := w.(logging.ResponseLogger); ok {
mak := bytes.TrimSpace(ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(cert))
var certificate string
parts := strings.Split(string(mak), " ")
if len(parts) > 1 {
certificate = parts[1]
}
var userOrHost string
if cert.CertType == ssh.HostCert {
userOrHost = "host"
} else {
userOrHost = "user"
}
certificateType := fmt.Sprintf("%s %s certificate", parts[0], userOrHost) // e.g. ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com user certificate
m := map[string]interface{}{
"serial": cert.Serial,
"principals": cert.ValidPrincipals,
"valid-from": time.Unix(int64(cert.ValidAfter), 0).Format(time.RFC3339),
"valid-to": time.Unix(int64(cert.ValidBefore), 0).Format(time.RFC3339),
"certificate": certificate,
"certificate-type": certificateType,
}
fingerprint, err := sshutil.FormatFingerprint(mak, sshutil.DefaultFingerprint)
if err == nil {
fpParts := strings.Split(fingerprint, " ")
if len(fpParts) > 3 {
m["public-key"] = fmt.Sprintf("%s %s", fpParts[1], fpParts[len(fpParts)-1])
}
}
rl.WithFields(m)
}
}
// ParseCursor parses the cursor and limit from the request query params.
func ParseCursor(r *http.Request) (cursor string, limit int, err error) {
q := r.URL.Query()

View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/dsa" //nolint:staticcheck // support legacy algorithms
"crypto/dsa" //nolint
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
@ -28,15 +28,12 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
sassert "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
squarejose "gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
"github.com/smallstep/assert"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
@ -1567,122 +1564,3 @@ func mustCertificate(t *testing.T, pub, priv interface{}) *x509.Certificate {
}
return cert
}
func TestProvisionersResponse_MarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
k := map[string]any{
"use": "sig",
"kty": "EC",
"kid": "4UELJx8e0aS9m0CH3fZ0EB7D5aUPICb759zALHFejvc",
"crv": "P-256",
"alg": "ES256",
"x": "7ZdAAMZCFU4XwgblI5RfZouBi8lYmF6DlZusNNnsbm8",
"y": "sQr2JdzwD2fgyrymBEXWsxDxFNjjqN64qLLSbLdLZ9Y",
}
key := squarejose.JSONWebKey{}
b, err := json.Marshal(k)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
err = json.Unmarshal(b, &key)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
r := ProvisionersResponse{
Provisioners: provisioner.List{
&provisioner.SCEP{
Name: "scep",
Type: "scep",
ChallengePassword: "not-so-secret",
MinimumPublicKeyLength: 2048,
EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier: 2,
},
&provisioner.JWK{
EncryptedKey: "eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIiwicDJjIjoxMDAwMDAsInAycyI6IlhOdmYxQjgxSUlLMFA2NUkwcmtGTGcifQ.XaN9zcPQeWt49zchUDm34FECUTHfQTn_.tmNHPQDqR3ebsWfd.9WZr3YVdeOyJh36vvx0VlRtluhvYp4K7jJ1KGDr1qypwZ3ziBVSNbYYQ71du7fTtrnfG1wgGTVR39tWSzBU-zwQ5hdV3rpMAaEbod5zeW6SHd95H3Bvcb43YiiqJFNL5sGZzFb7FqzVmpsZ1efiv6sZaGDHtnCAL6r12UG5EZuqGfM0jGCZitUz2m9TUKXJL5DJ7MOYbFfkCEsUBPDm_TInliSVn2kMJhFa0VOe5wZk5YOuYM3lNYW64HGtbf-llN2Xk-4O9TfeSPizBx9ZqGpeu8pz13efUDT2WL9tWo6-0UE-CrG0bScm8lFTncTkHcu49_a5NaUBkYlBjEiw.thPcx3t1AUcWuEygXIY3Fg",
Key: &key,
Name: "step-cli",
Type: "JWK",
},
},
NextCursor: "next",
}
expected := map[string]any{
"provisioners": []map[string]any{
{
"type": "scep",
"name": "scep",
"challenge": "*** REDACTED ***",
"minimumPublicKeyLength": 2048,
"encryptionAlgorithmIdentifier": 2,
},
{
"type": "JWK",
"name": "step-cli",
"key": map[string]any{
"use": "sig",
"kty": "EC",
"kid": "4UELJx8e0aS9m0CH3fZ0EB7D5aUPICb759zALHFejvc",
"crv": "P-256",
"alg": "ES256",
"x": "7ZdAAMZCFU4XwgblI5RfZouBi8lYmF6DlZusNNnsbm8",
"y": "sQr2JdzwD2fgyrymBEXWsxDxFNjjqN64qLLSbLdLZ9Y",
},
"encryptedKey": "eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIiwicDJjIjoxMDAwMDAsInAycyI6IlhOdmYxQjgxSUlLMFA2NUkwcmtGTGcifQ.XaN9zcPQeWt49zchUDm34FECUTHfQTn_.tmNHPQDqR3ebsWfd.9WZr3YVdeOyJh36vvx0VlRtluhvYp4K7jJ1KGDr1qypwZ3ziBVSNbYYQ71du7fTtrnfG1wgGTVR39tWSzBU-zwQ5hdV3rpMAaEbod5zeW6SHd95H3Bvcb43YiiqJFNL5sGZzFb7FqzVmpsZ1efiv6sZaGDHtnCAL6r12UG5EZuqGfM0jGCZitUz2m9TUKXJL5DJ7MOYbFfkCEsUBPDm_TInliSVn2kMJhFa0VOe5wZk5YOuYM3lNYW64HGtbf-llN2Xk-4O9TfeSPizBx9ZqGpeu8pz13efUDT2WL9tWo6-0UE-CrG0bScm8lFTncTkHcu49_a5NaUBkYlBjEiw.thPcx3t1AUcWuEygXIY3Fg",
},
},
"nextCursor": "next",
}
expBytes, err := json.Marshal(expected)
sassert.NoError(t, err)
br, err := r.MarshalJSON()
sassert.NoError(t, err)
sassert.JSONEq(t, string(expBytes), string(br))
keyCopy := key
expList := provisioner.List{
&provisioner.SCEP{
Name: "scep",
Type: "scep",
ChallengePassword: "not-so-secret",
MinimumPublicKeyLength: 2048,
EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier: 2,
},
&provisioner.JWK{
EncryptedKey: "eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIiwicDJjIjoxMDAwMDAsInAycyI6IlhOdmYxQjgxSUlLMFA2NUkwcmtGTGcifQ.XaN9zcPQeWt49zchUDm34FECUTHfQTn_.tmNHPQDqR3ebsWfd.9WZr3YVdeOyJh36vvx0VlRtluhvYp4K7jJ1KGDr1qypwZ3ziBVSNbYYQ71du7fTtrnfG1wgGTVR39tWSzBU-zwQ5hdV3rpMAaEbod5zeW6SHd95H3Bvcb43YiiqJFNL5sGZzFb7FqzVmpsZ1efiv6sZaGDHtnCAL6r12UG5EZuqGfM0jGCZitUz2m9TUKXJL5DJ7MOYbFfkCEsUBPDm_TInliSVn2kMJhFa0VOe5wZk5YOuYM3lNYW64HGtbf-llN2Xk-4O9TfeSPizBx9ZqGpeu8pz13efUDT2WL9tWo6-0UE-CrG0bScm8lFTncTkHcu49_a5NaUBkYlBjEiw.thPcx3t1AUcWuEygXIY3Fg",
Key: &keyCopy,
Name: "step-cli",
Type: "JWK",
},
}
// MarshalJSON must not affect the struct properties itself
sassert.Equal(t, expList, r.Provisioners)
}
const (
fixtureECDSACertificate = `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 herman`
)
func TestLogSSHCertificate(t *testing.T) {
out, _, _, _, err := ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey([]byte(fixtureECDSACertificate))
require.NoError(t, err)
cert, ok := out.(*ssh.Certificate)
require.True(t, ok)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
rl := logging.NewResponseLogger(w)
LogSSHCertificate(rl, cert)
sassert.Equal(t, 200, w.Result().StatusCode)
fields := rl.Fields()
sassert.Equal(t, uint64(14376510277651266987), fields["serial"])
sassert.Equal(t, []string{"herman"}, fields["principals"])
sassert.Equal(t, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com user certificate", fields["certificate-type"])
sassert.Equal(t, time.Unix(1674129191, 0).Format(time.RFC3339), fields["valid-from"])
sassert.Equal(t, time.Unix(1674186851, 0).Format(time.RFC3339), fields["valid-to"])
sassert.Equal(t, "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", fields["certificate"])
sassert.Equal(t, "SHA256:RvkDPGwl/G9d7LUFm1kmWhvOD9I/moPq4yxcb0STwr0 (ECDSA-CERT)", fields["public-key"])
}

View file

@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ func CRL(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, formatAsPEM := r.URL.Query()["pem"]
if formatAsPEM {
w.Header().Add("Content-Type", "application/x-pem-file")
w.Header().Add("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=\"crl.pem\"")
_ = pem.Encode(w, &pem.Block{
pemBytes := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "X509 CRL",
Bytes: crlBytes,
})
w.Header().Add("Content-Type", "application/x-pem-file")
w.Header().Add("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=\"crl.pem\"")
w.Write(pemBytes)
} else {
w.Header().Add("Content-Type", "application/pkix-crl")
w.Header().Add("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=\"crl.der\"")

View file

@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
package render
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
@ -23,25 +24,14 @@ func JSON(w http.ResponseWriter, v interface{}) {
// JSONStatus sets the Content-Type of w to application/json unless one is
// specified.
func JSONStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, v interface{}, status int) {
var b bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&b).Encode(v); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
setContentTypeUnlessPresent(w, "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v); err != nil {
var errUnsupportedType *json.UnsupportedTypeError
if errors.As(err, &errUnsupportedType) {
panic(err)
}
var errUnsupportedValue *json.UnsupportedValueError
if errors.As(err, &errUnsupportedValue) {
panic(err)
}
var errMarshalError *json.MarshalerError
if errors.As(err, &errMarshalError) {
panic(err)
}
}
_, _ = b.WriteTo(w)
log.EnabledResponse(w, v)
}

View file

@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
package render
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"math"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
@ -28,43 +26,10 @@ func TestJSON(t *testing.T) {
assert.Empty(t, rw.Fields())
}
func TestJSONPanicsOnUnsupportedType(t *testing.T) {
jsonPanicTest[json.UnsupportedTypeError](t, make(chan struct{}))
}
func TestJSONPanicsOnUnsupportedValue(t *testing.T) {
jsonPanicTest[json.UnsupportedValueError](t, math.NaN())
}
func TestJSONPanicsOnMarshalerError(t *testing.T) {
var v erroneousJSONMarshaler
jsonPanicTest[json.MarshalerError](t, v)
}
type erroneousJSONMarshaler struct{}
func (erroneousJSONMarshaler) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
return nil, assert.AnError
}
func jsonPanicTest[T json.UnsupportedTypeError | json.UnsupportedValueError | json.MarshalerError](t *testing.T, v any) {
t.Helper()
defer func() {
var err error
if r := recover(); r == nil {
t.Fatal("expected panic")
} else if e, ok := r.(error); !ok {
t.Fatalf("did not panic with an error (%T)", r)
} else {
err = e
}
var e *T
assert.ErrorAs(t, err, &e)
}()
JSON(httptest.NewRecorder(), v)
func TestJSONPanics(t *testing.T) {
assert.Panics(t, func() {
JSON(httptest.NewRecorder(), make(chan struct{}))
})
}
type renderableError struct {

View file

@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ func Sign(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if len(certChainPEM) > 1 {
caPEM = certChainPEM[1]
}
LogCertificate(w, certChain[0])
render.JSONStatus(w, &SignResponse{
ServerPEM: certChainPEM[0],

View file

@ -338,7 +338,6 @@ func SSHSign(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
identityCertificate = certChainToPEM(certChain)
}
LogSSHCertificate(w, cert)
render.JSONStatus(w, &SSHSignResponse{
Certificate: SSHCertificate{cert},
AddUserCertificate: addUserCertificate,

View file

@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ func SSHRekey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
LogSSHCertificate(w, newCert)
render.JSONStatus(w, &SSHRekeyResponse{
Certificate: SSHCertificate{newCert},
IdentityCertificate: identity,

View file

@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ func SSHRenew(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
LogSSHCertificate(w, newCert)
render.JSONStatus(w, &SSHSignResponse{
Certificate: SSHCertificate{newCert},
IdentityCertificate: identity,

View file

@ -69,17 +69,17 @@ func NewACMEAdminResponder() ACMEAdminResponder {
}
// GetExternalAccountKeys writes the response for the EAB keys GET endpoint
func (h *acmeAdminResponder) GetExternalAccountKeys(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
func (h *acmeAdminResponder) GetExternalAccountKeys(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
render.Error(w, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorNotImplementedType, "this functionality is currently only available in Certificate Manager: https://u.step.sm/cm"))
}
// CreateExternalAccountKey writes the response for the EAB key POST endpoint
func (h *acmeAdminResponder) CreateExternalAccountKey(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
func (h *acmeAdminResponder) CreateExternalAccountKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
render.Error(w, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorNotImplementedType, "this functionality is currently only available in Certificate Manager: https://u.step.sm/cm"))
}
// DeleteExternalAccountKey writes the response for the EAB key DELETE endpoint
func (h *acmeAdminResponder) DeleteExternalAccountKey(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
func (h *acmeAdminResponder) DeleteExternalAccountKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
render.Error(w, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorNotImplementedType, "this functionality is currently only available in Certificate Manager: https://u.step.sm/cm"))
}

View file

@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ func validateWebhook(webhook *linkedca.Webhook) error {
// kind
switch webhook.Kind {
case linkedca.Webhook_ENRICHING, linkedca.Webhook_AUTHORIZING, linkedca.Webhook_SCEPCHALLENGE:
case linkedca.Webhook_ENRICHING, linkedca.Webhook_AUTHORIZING:
default:
return admin.NewError(admin.ErrorBadRequestType, "webhook kind %q is invalid", webhook.Kind)
return admin.NewError(admin.ErrorBadRequestType, "webhook kind is invalid")
}
return nil

View file

@ -180,26 +180,6 @@ func TestWebhookAdminResponder_CreateProvisionerWebhook(t *testing.T) {
statusCode: 400,
}
},
"fail/unsupported-webhook-kind": func(t *testing.T) test {
prov := &linkedca.Provisioner{
Name: "provName",
}
ctx := linkedca.NewContextWithProvisioner(context.Background(), prov)
adminErr := admin.NewError(admin.ErrorBadRequestType, `(line 5:13): invalid value for enum type: "UNSUPPORTED"`)
adminErr.Message = `(line 5:13): invalid value for enum type: "UNSUPPORTED"`
body := []byte(`
{
"name": "metadata",
"url": "https://example.com",
"kind": "UNSUPPORTED",
}`)
return test{
ctx: ctx,
body: body,
err: adminErr,
statusCode: 400,
}
},
"fail/auth.UpdateProvisioner-error": func(t *testing.T) test {
adm := &linkedca.Admin{
Subject: "step",

View file

@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func (dba *dbAdmin) clone() *dbAdmin {
return &u
}
func (db *DB) getDBAdminBytes(_ context.Context, id string) ([]byte, error) {
func (db *DB) getDBAdminBytes(ctx context.Context, id string) ([]byte, error) {
data, err := db.db.Get(adminsTable, []byte(id))
if nosql.IsErrNotFound(err) {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorNotFoundType, "admin %s not found", id)
@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func (db *DB) GetAdmin(ctx context.Context, id string) (*linkedca.Admin, error)
// GetAdmins retrieves and unmarshals all active (not deleted) admins
// from the database.
// TODO should we be paginating?
func (db *DB) GetAdmins(context.Context) ([]*linkedca.Admin, error) {
func (db *DB) GetAdmins(ctx context.Context) ([]*linkedca.Admin, error) {
dbEntries, err := db.db.List(adminsTable)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error loading admins")
@ -115,11 +115,13 @@ func (db *DB) GetAdmins(context.Context) ([]*linkedca.Admin, error) {
if errors.As(err, &ae) {
if ae.IsType(admin.ErrorDeletedType) || ae.IsType(admin.ErrorAuthorityMismatchType) {
continue
}
} else {
return nil, err
}
} else {
return nil, err
}
}
if adm.AuthorityId != db.authorityID {
continue
}

View file

@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ func New(db nosqlDB.DB, authorityID string) (*DB, error) {
// save writes the new data to the database, overwriting the old data if it
// existed.
func (db *DB) save(_ context.Context, id string, nu, old interface{}, typ string, table []byte) error {
func (db *DB) save(ctx context.Context, id string, nu, old interface{}, typ string, table []byte) error {
var (
err error
newB []byte

View file

@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func (dbap *dbAuthorityPolicy) convert() *linkedca.Policy {
return dbToLinked(dbap.Policy)
}
func (db *DB) getDBAuthorityPolicyBytes(_ context.Context, authorityID string) ([]byte, error) {
func (db *DB) getDBAuthorityPolicyBytes(ctx context.Context, authorityID string) ([]byte, error) {
data, err := db.db.Get(authorityPoliciesTable, []byte(authorityID))
if nosql.IsErrNotFound(err) {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorNotFoundType, "authority policy not found")

View file

@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (dbp *dbProvisioner) convert2linkedca() (*linkedca.Provisioner, error) {
}, nil
}
func (db *DB) getDBProvisionerBytes(_ context.Context, id string) ([]byte, error) {
func (db *DB) getDBProvisionerBytes(ctx context.Context, id string) ([]byte, error) {
data, err := db.db.Get(provisionersTable, []byte(id))
if nosql.IsErrNotFound(err) {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorNotFoundType, "provisioner %s not found", id)
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func (db *DB) GetProvisioner(ctx context.Context, id string) (*linkedca.Provisio
// GetProvisioners retrieves and unmarshals all active (not deleted) provisioners
// from the database.
func (db *DB) GetProvisioners(_ context.Context) ([]*linkedca.Provisioner, error) {
func (db *DB) GetProvisioners(ctx context.Context) ([]*linkedca.Provisioner, error) {
dbEntries, err := db.db.List(provisionersTable)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error loading provisioners")
@ -145,11 +145,13 @@ func (db *DB) GetProvisioners(_ context.Context) ([]*linkedca.Provisioner, error
if errors.As(err, &ae) {
if ae.IsType(admin.ErrorDeletedType) || ae.IsType(admin.ErrorAuthorityMismatchType) {
continue
}
} else {
return nil, err
}
} else {
return nil, err
}
}
if prov.AuthorityId != db.authorityID {
continue
}

View file

@ -545,6 +545,50 @@ func (a *Authority) init() error {
tmplVars.SSH.UserFederatedKeys = append(tmplVars.SSH.UserFederatedKeys, a.sshCAUserFederatedCerts...)
}
// Check if a KMS with decryption capability is required and available
if a.requiresDecrypter() {
if _, ok := a.keyManager.(kmsapi.Decrypter); !ok {
return errors.New("keymanager doesn't provide crypto.Decrypter")
}
}
// TODO: decide if this is a good approach for providing the SCEP functionality
// It currently mirrors the logic for the x509CAService
if a.requiresSCEPService() && a.scepService == nil {
var options scep.Options
// Read intermediate and create X509 signer and decrypter for default CAS.
options.CertificateChain, err = pemutil.ReadCertificateBundle(a.config.IntermediateCert)
if err != nil {
return err
}
options.CertificateChain = append(options.CertificateChain, a.rootX509Certs...)
options.Signer, err = a.keyManager.CreateSigner(&kmsapi.CreateSignerRequest{
SigningKey: a.config.IntermediateKey,
Password: a.password,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if km, ok := a.keyManager.(kmsapi.Decrypter); ok {
options.Decrypter, err = km.CreateDecrypter(&kmsapi.CreateDecrypterRequest{
DecryptionKey: a.config.IntermediateKey,
Password: a.password,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
a.scepService, err = scep.NewService(ctx, options)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// TODO: mimick the x509CAService GetCertificateAuthority here too?
}
if a.config.AuthorityConfig.EnableAdmin {
// Initialize step-ca Admin Database if it's not already initialized using
// WithAdminDB.
@ -640,50 +684,6 @@ func (a *Authority) init() error {
return err
}
// Check if a KMS with decryption capability is required and available
if a.requiresDecrypter() {
if _, ok := a.keyManager.(kmsapi.Decrypter); !ok {
return errors.New("keymanager doesn't provide crypto.Decrypter")
}
}
// TODO: decide if this is a good approach for providing the SCEP functionality
// It currently mirrors the logic for the x509CAService
if a.requiresSCEPService() && a.scepService == nil {
var options scep.Options
// Read intermediate and create X509 signer and decrypter for default CAS.
options.CertificateChain, err = pemutil.ReadCertificateBundle(a.config.IntermediateCert)
if err != nil {
return err
}
options.CertificateChain = append(options.CertificateChain, a.rootX509Certs...)
options.Signer, err = a.keyManager.CreateSigner(&kmsapi.CreateSignerRequest{
SigningKey: a.config.IntermediateKey,
Password: a.password,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if km, ok := a.keyManager.(kmsapi.Decrypter); ok {
options.Decrypter, err = km.CreateDecrypter(&kmsapi.CreateDecrypterRequest{
DecryptionKey: a.config.IntermediateKey,
Password: a.password,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
a.scepService, err = scep.NewService(ctx, options)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// TODO: mimick the x509CAService GetCertificateAuthority here too?
}
// Load X509 constraints engine.
//
// This is currently only available in CA mode.

View file

@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ func (a *Authority) authorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate)
}
// authorizeSSHCertificate returns an error if the given certificate is revoked.
func (a *Authority) authorizeSSHCertificate(_ context.Context, cert *ssh.Certificate) error {
func (a *Authority) authorizeSSHCertificate(ctx context.Context, cert *ssh.Certificate) error {
var err error
var isRevoked bool
@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ func (a *Authority) authorizeSSHRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error
// AuthorizeRenewToken validates the renew token and returns the leaf
// certificate in the x5cInsecure header.
func (a *Authority) AuthorizeRenewToken(_ context.Context, ott string) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
func (a *Authority) AuthorizeRenewToken(ctx context.Context, ott string) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
var claims jose.Claims
jwt, chain, err := jose.ParseX5cInsecure(ott, a.rootX509Certs)
if err != nil {

View file

@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ type Config struct {
CommonName string `json:"commonName,omitempty"`
CRL *CRLConfig `json:"crl,omitempty"`
SkipValidation bool `json:"-"`
NNSServer string `json:"nnsServer,omitempty"`
// Keeps record of the filename the Config is read from
loadedFromFilepath string
@ -183,7 +182,7 @@ func (c *AuthConfig) init() {
}
// Validate validates the authority configuration.
func (c *AuthConfig) Validate(provisioner.Audiences) error {
func (c *AuthConfig) Validate(audiences provisioner.Audiences) error {
if c == nil {
return errors.New("authority cannot be undefined")
}

View file

@ -381,19 +381,19 @@ func (c *linkedCaClient) IsSSHRevoked(serial string) (bool, error) {
return resp.Status != linkedca.RevocationStatus_ACTIVE, nil
}
func (c *linkedCaClient) CreateAuthorityPolicy(_ context.Context, _ *linkedca.Policy) error {
func (c *linkedCaClient) CreateAuthorityPolicy(ctx context.Context, policy *linkedca.Policy) error {
return errors.New("not implemented yet")
}
func (c *linkedCaClient) GetAuthorityPolicy(context.Context) (*linkedca.Policy, error) {
func (c *linkedCaClient) GetAuthorityPolicy(ctx context.Context) (*linkedca.Policy, error) {
return nil, errors.New("not implemented yet")
}
func (c *linkedCaClient) UpdateAuthorityPolicy(_ context.Context, _ *linkedca.Policy) error {
func (c *linkedCaClient) UpdateAuthorityPolicy(ctx context.Context, policy *linkedca.Policy) error {
return errors.New("not implemented yet")
}
func (c *linkedCaClient) DeleteAuthorityPolicy(context.Context) error {
func (c *linkedCaClient) DeleteAuthorityPolicy(ctx context.Context) error {
return errors.New("not implemented yet")
}

View file

@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ func (a *Authority) checkProvisionerPolicy(ctx context.Context, provName string,
// checkPolicy checks if a new or updated policy configuration results in the user
// locking themselves or other admins out of the CA.
func (a *Authority) checkPolicy(_ context.Context, currentAdmin *linkedca.Admin, otherAdmins []*linkedca.Admin, p *linkedca.Policy) error {
func (a *Authority) checkPolicy(ctx context.Context, currentAdmin *linkedca.Admin, otherAdmins []*linkedca.Admin, p *linkedca.Policy) error {
// convert the policy; return early if nil
policyOptions := authPolicy.LinkedToCertificates(p)
if policyOptions == nil {
@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ func isAllowed(engine authPolicy.X509Policy, sans []string) error {
if isNamePolicyError && policyErr.Reason == policy.NotAllowed {
return &PolicyError{
Typ: AdminLockOut,
Err: fmt.Errorf("the provided policy would lock out %s from the CA. Please create an x509 policy to include %s as an allowed DNS name", sans, sans),
Err: fmt.Errorf("the provided policy would lock out %s from the CA. Please update your policy to include %s as an allowed name", sans, sans),
}
}
return &PolicyError{

View file

@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ func TestAuthority_checkPolicy(t *testing.T) {
},
err: &PolicyError{
Typ: AdminLockOut,
Err: errors.New("the provided policy would lock out [step] from the CA. Please create an x509 policy to include [step] as an allowed DNS name"),
Err: errors.New("the provided policy would lock out [step] from the CA. Please update your policy to include [step] as an allowed name"),
},
}
},
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ func TestAuthority_checkPolicy(t *testing.T) {
},
err: &PolicyError{
Typ: AdminLockOut,
Err: errors.New("the provided policy would lock out [otherAdmin] from the CA. Please create an x509 policy to include [otherAdmin] as an allowed DNS name"),
Err: errors.New("the provided policy would lock out [otherAdmin] from the CA. Please update your policy to include [otherAdmin] as an allowed name"),
},
}
},

View file

@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ const (
TLS_ALPN_01 ACMEChallenge = "tls-alpn-01"
// DEVICE_ATTEST_01 is the device-attest-01 ACME challenge.
DEVICE_ATTEST_01 ACMEChallenge = "device-attest-01"
// NNS_01 is the nns-01 ACME challenge.
NNS_01 ACMEChallenge = "nns-01"
)
// String returns a normalized version of the challenge.
@ -38,7 +36,7 @@ func (c ACMEChallenge) String() string {
// Validate returns an error if the acme challenge is not a valid one.
func (c ACMEChallenge) Validate() error {
switch ACMEChallenge(c.String()) {
case HTTP_01, DNS_01, TLS_ALPN_01, DEVICE_ATTEST_01, NNS_01:
case HTTP_01, DNS_01, TLS_ALPN_01, DEVICE_ATTEST_01:
return nil
default:
return fmt.Errorf("acme challenge %q is not supported", c)
@ -50,7 +48,7 @@ func (c ACMEChallenge) Validate() error {
type ACMEAttestationFormat string
const (
// APPLE is the format used to enable device-attest-01 on Apple devices.
// APPLE is the format used to enable device-attest-01 on apple devices.
APPLE ACMEAttestationFormat = "apple"
// STEP is the format used to enable device-attest-01 on devices that
@ -59,7 +57,7 @@ const (
// TODO(mariano): should we rename this to something else.
STEP ACMEAttestationFormat = "step"
// TPM is the format used to enable device-attest-01 with TPMs.
// TPM is the format used to enable device-attest-01 on TPMs.
TPM ACMEAttestationFormat = "tpm"
)
@ -135,7 +133,7 @@ func (p *ACME) GetIDForToken() string {
}
// GetTokenID returns the identifier of the token.
func (p *ACME) GetTokenID(string) (string, error) {
func (p *ACME) GetTokenID(ott string) (string, error) {
return "", errors.New("acme provisioner does not implement GetTokenID")
}
@ -186,7 +184,7 @@ func (p *ACME) Init(config Config) (err error) {
}
// Parse attestation roots.
// The pool will be nil if there are no roots.
// The pool will be nil if the there are not roots.
if rest := p.AttestationRoots; len(rest) > 0 {
var block *pem.Block
var hasCert bool
@ -230,7 +228,7 @@ type ACMEIdentifier struct {
// AuthorizeOrderIdentifier verifies the provisioner is allowed to issue a
// certificate for an ACME Order Identifier.
func (p *ACME) AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(_ context.Context, identifier ACMEIdentifier) error {
func (p *ACME) AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(ctx context.Context, identifier ACMEIdentifier) error {
x509Policy := p.ctl.getPolicy().getX509()
// identifier is allowed if no policy is configured
@ -255,7 +253,7 @@ func (p *ACME) AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(_ context.Context, identifier ACMEIdenti
// AuthorizeSign does not do any validation, because all validation is handled
// in the ACME protocol. This method returns a list of modifiers / constraints
// on the resulting certificate.
func (p *ACME) AuthorizeSign(context.Context, string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *ACME) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
opts := []SignOption{
p,
// modifiers / withOptions
@ -276,7 +274,7 @@ func (p *ACME) AuthorizeSign(context.Context, string) ([]SignOption, error) {
// the CA. It can be used to authorize revocation of a certificate. With the
// ACME protocol, revocation authorization is specified and performed as part
// of the client/server interaction, so this is a no-op.
func (p *ACME) AuthorizeRevoke(context.Context, string) error {
func (p *ACME) AuthorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
return nil
}
@ -291,9 +289,9 @@ func (p *ACME) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) error
// IsChallengeEnabled checks if the given challenge is enabled. By default
// http-01, dns-01 and tls-alpn-01 are enabled, to disable any of them the
// Challenge provisioner property should have at least one element.
func (p *ACME) IsChallengeEnabled(_ context.Context, challenge ACMEChallenge) bool {
func (p *ACME) IsChallengeEnabled(ctx context.Context, challenge ACMEChallenge) bool {
enabledChallenges := []ACMEChallenge{
HTTP_01, DNS_01, TLS_ALPN_01, NNS_01,
HTTP_01, DNS_01, TLS_ALPN_01,
}
if len(p.Challenges) > 0 {
enabledChallenges = p.Challenges
@ -309,7 +307,7 @@ func (p *ACME) IsChallengeEnabled(_ context.Context, challenge ACMEChallenge) bo
// IsAttestationFormatEnabled checks if the given attestation format is enabled.
// By default apple, step and tpm are enabled, to disable any of them the
// AttestationFormat provisioner property should have at least one element.
func (p *ACME) IsAttestationFormatEnabled(_ context.Context, format ACMEAttestationFormat) bool {
func (p *ACME) IsAttestationFormatEnabled(ctx context.Context, format ACMEAttestationFormat) bool {
enabledFormats := []ACMEAttestationFormat{
APPLE, STEP, TPM,
}

View file

@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ import (
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/webhook"
)
// awsIssuer is the string used as issuer in the generated tokens.
@ -74,14 +73,6 @@ const awsMetadataTokenTTLHeader = "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds" //nolin
// The fifth certificate is used in:
//
// me-south-1
//
// The sixth certificate is used in:
//
// me-central-1
//
// The seventh certificate is used in:
//
// ap-southeast-3
const awsCertificate = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIDIjCCAougAwIBAgIJAKnL4UEDMN/FMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGoxCzAJBgNV
BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpXYXNoaW5ndG9uMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdTZWF0dGxlMRgw
@ -163,34 +154,6 @@ DAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQBhkNTBIFgWFd+ZhC/LhRUY
4OjEiykmbEp6hlzQ79T0Tfbn5A4NYDI2icBP0+hmf6qSnIhwJF6typyd1yPK5Fqt
NTpxxcXmUKquX+pHmIkK1LKDO8rNE84jqxrxRsfDi6by82fjVYf2pgjJW8R1FAw+
mL5WQRFexbfB5aXhcMo0AA==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIICMzCCAZygAwIBAgIGAXbVDG2yMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMFwxCzAJBgNVBAYT
AlVTMRkwFwYDVQQIDBBXYXNoaW5ndG9uIFN0YXRlMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdTZWF0dGxl
MSAwHgYDVQQKDBdBbWF6b24gV2ViIFNlcnZpY2VzIExMQzAgFw0yMTAxMDYwMDE1
MzBaGA8yMjAwMDEwNjAwMTUzMFowXDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxGTAXBgNVBAgMEFdh
c2hpbmd0b24gU3RhdGUxEDAOBgNVBAcMB1NlYXR0bGUxIDAeBgNVBAoMF0FtYXpv
biBXZWIgU2VydmljZXMgTExDMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCn
CS/Vbt0gQ1ebWcur2hSO7PnJifE4OPxQ7RgSAlc4/spJp1sDP+ZrS0LO1ZJfKhXf
1R9S3AUwLnsc7b+IuVXdY5LK9RKqu64nyXP5dx170zoL8loEyCSuRR2fs+04i2Qs
WBVP+KFNAn7P5L1EHRjkgTO8kjNKviwRV+OkP9ab5wIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
BQUAA4GBAI4WUy6+DKh0JDSzQEZNyBgNlSoSuC2owtMxCwGB6nBfzzfcekWvs6eo
fLTSGovrReX7MtVgrcJBZjmPIentw5dWUs+87w/g9lNwUnUt0ZHYyh2tuBG6hVJu
UEwDJ/z3wDd6wQviLOTF3MITawt9P8siR1hXqLJNxpjRQFZrgHqi
-----END CERTIFICATE-----`
// awsSignatureAlgorithm is the signature algorithm used to verify the identity
@ -472,7 +435,7 @@ func (p *AWS) Init(config Config) (err error) {
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token and returns the sign options that
// will be used on certificate creation.
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
payload, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "aws.AuthorizeSign")
@ -522,11 +485,7 @@ func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, erro
commonNameValidator(payload.Claims.Subject),
newValidityValidator(p.ctl.Claimer.MinTLSCertDuration(), p.ctl.Claimer.MaxTLSCertDuration()),
newX509NamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getX509()),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(
data,
linkedca.Webhook_X509,
webhook.WithAuthorizationPrincipal(doc.InstanceID),
),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_X509),
), nil
}
@ -749,7 +708,7 @@ func (p *AWS) authorizeToken(token string) (*awsPayload, error) {
}
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns the list of SignOption for a SignSSH request.
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.AuthorizeSSHSign; ssh ca is disabled for aws provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}
@ -809,10 +768,6 @@ func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, e
// Ensure that all principal names are allowed
newSSHNamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getSSHHost(), nil),
// Call webhooks
p.ctl.newWebhookController(
data,
linkedca.Webhook_SSH,
webhook.WithAuthorizationPrincipal(doc.InstanceID),
),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_SSH),
), nil
}

View file

@ -20,19 +20,13 @@ import (
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/webhook"
)
// azureOIDCBaseURL is the base discovery url for Microsoft Azure tokens.
const azureOIDCBaseURL = "https://login.microsoftonline.com"
//nolint:gosec // azureIdentityTokenURL is the URL to get the identity token for an instance.
const azureIdentityTokenURL = "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token"
const azureIdentityTokenAPIVersion = "2018-02-01"
// azureInstanceComputeURL is the URL to get the instance compute metadata.
const azureInstanceComputeURL = "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance/compute/azEnvironment"
const azureIdentityTokenURL = "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fmanagement.azure.com%2F"
// azureDefaultAudience is the default audience used.
const azureDefaultAudience = "https://management.azure.com/"
@ -41,27 +35,15 @@ const azureDefaultAudience = "https://management.azure.com/"
// Using case insensitive as resourceGroups appears as resourcegroups.
var azureXMSMirIDRegExp = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)^/subscriptions/([^/]+)/resourceGroups/([^/]+)/providers/Microsoft.(Compute/virtualMachines|ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities)/([^/]+)$`)
// azureEnvironments is the list of all Azure environments.
var azureEnvironments = map[string]string{
"AzurePublicCloud": "https://management.azure.com/",
"AzureCloud": "https://management.azure.com/",
"AzureUSGovernmentCloud": "https://management.usgovcloudapi.net/",
"AzureUSGovernment": "https://management.usgovcloudapi.net/",
"AzureChinaCloud": "https://management.chinacloudapi.cn/",
"AzureGermanCloud": "https://management.microsoftazure.de/",
}
type azureConfig struct {
oidcDiscoveryURL string
identityTokenURL string
instanceComputeURL string
}
func newAzureConfig(tenantID string) *azureConfig {
return &azureConfig{
oidcDiscoveryURL: azureOIDCBaseURL + "/" + tenantID + "/.well-known/openid-configuration",
identityTokenURL: azureIdentityTokenURL,
instanceComputeURL: azureInstanceComputeURL,
}
}
@ -121,7 +103,6 @@ type Azure struct {
oidcConfig openIDConfiguration
keyStore *keyStore
ctl *Controller
environment string
}
// GetID returns the provisioner unique identifier.
@ -183,35 +164,14 @@ func (p *Azure) GetEncryptedKey() (kid, key string, ok bool) {
// GetIdentityToken retrieves from the metadata service the identity token and
// returns it.
func (p *Azure) GetIdentityToken(subject, caURL string) (string, error) {
_, _ = subject, caURL // unused input
// Initialize the config if this method is used from the cli.
p.assertConfig()
// default to AzurePublicCloud to keep existing behavior
identityTokenResource := azureEnvironments["AzurePublicCloud"]
var err error
p.environment, err = p.getAzureEnvironment()
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error getting azure environment")
}
if resource, ok := azureEnvironments[p.environment]; ok {
identityTokenResource = resource
}
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", p.config.identityTokenURL, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error creating request")
}
req.Header.Set("Metadata", "true")
query := req.URL.Query()
query.Add("resource", identityTokenResource)
query.Add("api-version", azureIdentityTokenAPIVersion)
req.URL.RawQuery = query.Encode()
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error getting identity token, are you in a Azure VM?")
@ -316,7 +276,7 @@ func (p *Azure) authorizeToken(token string) (*azurePayload, string, string, str
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token and returns the sign options that
// will be used on certificate creation.
func (p *Azure) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *Azure) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
_, name, group, subscription, identityObjectID, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "azure.AuthorizeSign")
@ -404,11 +364,7 @@ func (p *Azure) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, er
defaultPublicKeyValidator{},
newValidityValidator(p.ctl.Claimer.MinTLSCertDuration(), p.ctl.Claimer.MaxTLSCertDuration()),
newX509NamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getX509()),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(
data,
linkedca.Webhook_X509,
webhook.WithAuthorizationPrincipal(identityObjectID),
),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_X509),
), nil
}
@ -421,12 +377,12 @@ func (p *Azure) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) erro
}
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns the list of SignOption for a SignSSH request.
func (p *Azure) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *Azure) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("azure.AuthorizeSSHSign; sshCA is disabled for provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}
_, name, _, _, identityObjectID, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
_, name, _, _, _, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "azure.AuthorizeSSHSign")
}
@ -478,11 +434,7 @@ func (p *Azure) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption,
// Ensure that all principal names are allowed
newSSHNamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getSSHHost(), nil),
// Call webhooks
p.ctl.newWebhookController(
data,
linkedca.Webhook_SSH,
webhook.WithAuthorizationPrincipal(identityObjectID),
),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_SSH),
), nil
}
@ -492,37 +444,3 @@ func (p *Azure) assertConfig() {
p.config = newAzureConfig(p.TenantID)
}
}
// getAzureEnvironment returns the Azure environment for the current instance
func (p *Azure) getAzureEnvironment() (string, error) {
if p.environment != "" {
return p.environment, nil
}
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", p.config.instanceComputeURL, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error creating request")
}
req.Header.Add("Metadata", "True")
query := req.URL.Query()
query.Add("format", "text")
query.Add("api-version", "2021-02-01")
req.URL.RawQuery = query.Encode()
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error getting azure instance environment, are you in a Azure VM?")
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
b, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error reading azure environment response")
}
if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
return "", errors.Errorf("error getting azure environment: status=%d, response=%s", resp.StatusCode, b)
}
return string(b), nil
}

View file

@ -100,14 +100,7 @@ func TestAzure_GetIdentityToken(t *testing.T) {
time.Now(), &p1.keyStore.keySet.Keys[0])
assert.FatalError(t, err)
srvIdentity := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
wantResource := r.URL.Query().Get("want_resource")
resource := r.URL.Query().Get("resource")
if wantResource == "" || resource != wantResource {
http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Azure query param resource = %s, wantResource %s", resource, wantResource), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/bad-request":
http.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)
@ -118,27 +111,7 @@ func TestAzure_GetIdentityToken(t *testing.T) {
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"access_token":"%s"}`, t1)
}
}))
defer srvIdentity.Close()
srvInstance := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/bad-request":
http.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)
case "/AzureChinaCloud":
w.Header().Add("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.Write([]byte("AzureChinaCloud"))
case "/AzureGermanCloud":
w.Header().Add("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.Write([]byte("AzureGermanCloud"))
case "/AzureUSGovernmentCloud":
w.Header().Add("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.Write([]byte("AzureUSGovernmentCloud"))
default:
w.Header().Add("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.Write([]byte("AzurePublicCloud"))
}
}))
defer srvInstance.Close()
defer srv.Close()
type args struct {
subject string
@ -149,27 +122,18 @@ func TestAzure_GetIdentityToken(t *testing.T) {
azure *Azure
args args
identityTokenURL string
instanceComputeURL string
wantEnvironment string
want string
wantErr bool
}{
{"ok", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srvIdentity.URL, srvInstance.URL, "AzurePublicCloud", t1, false},
{"ok azure china", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srvIdentity.URL, srvInstance.URL, "AzurePublicCloud", t1, false},
{"ok azure germany", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srvIdentity.URL, srvInstance.URL, "AzureGermanCloud", t1, false},
{"ok azure us gov", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srvIdentity.URL, srvInstance.URL, "AzureUSGovernmentCloud", t1, false},
{"fail instance request", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srvIdentity.URL + "/bad-request", srvInstance.URL + "/bad-request", "AzurePublicCloud", "", true},
{"fail request", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srvIdentity.URL + "/bad-request", srvInstance.URL, "AzurePublicCloud", "", true},
{"fail unmarshal", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srvIdentity.URL + "/bad-json", srvInstance.URL, "AzurePublicCloud", "", true},
{"fail url", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, "://ca.smallstep.com", srvInstance.URL, "AzurePublicCloud", "", true},
{"fail connect", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, "foobarzar", srvInstance.URL, "AzurePublicCloud", "", true},
{"ok", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srv.URL, t1, false},
{"fail request", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srv.URL + "/bad-request", "", true},
{"fail unmarshal", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, srv.URL + "/bad-json", "", true},
{"fail url", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, "://ca.smallstep.com", "", true},
{"fail connect", p1, args{"subject", "caURL"}, "foobarzar", "", true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// reset environment between tests to avoid caching issues
p1.environment = ""
tt.azure.config.identityTokenURL = tt.identityTokenURL + "?want_resource=" + azureEnvironments[tt.wantEnvironment]
tt.azure.config.instanceComputeURL = tt.instanceComputeURL + "/" + tt.wantEnvironment
tt.azure.config.identityTokenURL = tt.identityTokenURL
got, err := tt.azure.GetIdentityToken(tt.args.subject, tt.args.caURL)
if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
t.Errorf("Azure.GetIdentityToken() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)

View file

@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/webhook"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
@ -78,7 +77,7 @@ func (c *Controller) AuthorizeSSHRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *ssh.Certificat
return DefaultAuthorizeSSHRenew(ctx, c, cert)
}
func (c *Controller) newWebhookController(templateData WebhookSetter, certType linkedca.Webhook_CertType, opts ...webhook.RequestBodyOption) *WebhookController {
func (c *Controller) newWebhookController(templateData WebhookSetter, certType linkedca.Webhook_CertType) *WebhookController {
client := c.webhookClient
if client == nil {
client = http.DefaultClient
@ -88,7 +87,6 @@ func (c *Controller) newWebhookController(templateData WebhookSetter, certType l
client: client,
webhooks: c.webhooks,
certType: certType,
options: opts,
}
}
@ -113,7 +111,7 @@ type AuthorizeSSHRenewFunc func(ctx context.Context, p *Controller, cert *ssh.Ce
// DefaultIdentityFunc return a default identity depending on the provisioner
// type. For OIDC email is always present and the usernames might
// contain empty strings.
func DefaultIdentityFunc(_ context.Context, p Interface, email string) (*Identity, error) {
func DefaultIdentityFunc(ctx context.Context, p Interface, email string) (*Identity, error) {
switch k := p.(type) {
case *OIDC:
// OIDC principals would be:
@ -142,7 +140,7 @@ func DefaultIdentityFunc(_ context.Context, p Interface, email string) (*Identit
// will return an error if the provisioner has the renewal disabled, if the
// certificate is not yet valid or if the certificate is expired and renew after
// expiry is disabled.
func DefaultAuthorizeRenew(_ context.Context, p *Controller, cert *x509.Certificate) error {
func DefaultAuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, p *Controller, cert *x509.Certificate) error {
if p.Claimer.IsDisableRenewal() {
return errs.Unauthorized("renew is disabled for provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}
@ -164,7 +162,7 @@ func DefaultAuthorizeRenew(_ context.Context, p *Controller, cert *x509.Certific
// will return an error if the provisioner has the renewal disabled, if the
// certificate is not yet valid or if the certificate is expired and renew after
// expiry is disabled.
func DefaultAuthorizeSSHRenew(_ context.Context, p *Controller, cert *ssh.Certificate) error {
func DefaultAuthorizeSSHRenew(ctx context.Context, p *Controller, cert *ssh.Certificate) error {
if p.Claimer.IsDisableRenewal() {
return errs.Unauthorized("renew is disabled for provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}

View file

@ -4,18 +4,15 @@ import (
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"go.step.sm/crypto/pemutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/policy"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/webhook"
)
var trueValue = true
@ -452,39 +449,16 @@ func TestDefaultAuthorizeSSHRenew(t *testing.T) {
}
func Test_newWebhookController(t *testing.T) {
cert, err := pemutil.ReadCertificate("testdata/certs/x5c-leaf.crt", pemutil.WithFirstBlock())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
opts := []webhook.RequestBodyOption{webhook.WithX5CCertificate(cert)}
type args struct {
templateData WebhookSetter
certType linkedca.Webhook_CertType
opts []webhook.RequestBodyOption
}
tests := []struct {
name string
args args
want *WebhookController
}{
{"ok", args{x509util.TemplateData{"foo": "bar"}, linkedca.Webhook_X509, nil}, &WebhookController{
TemplateData: x509util.TemplateData{"foo": "bar"},
certType: linkedca.Webhook_X509,
client: http.DefaultClient,
}},
{"ok with options", args{x509util.TemplateData{"foo": "bar"}, linkedca.Webhook_SSH, opts}, &WebhookController{
TemplateData: x509util.TemplateData{"foo": "bar"},
certType: linkedca.Webhook_SSH,
client: http.DefaultClient,
options: opts,
}},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
c := &Controller{}
got := c.newWebhookController(tt.args.templateData, tt.args.certType, tt.args.opts...)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, tt.want) {
t.Errorf("newWebhookController() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
data := x509util.TemplateData{"foo": "bar"}
ctl := c.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_X509)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(ctl.TemplateData, data) {
t.Error("Failed to set templateData")
}
if ctl.certType != linkedca.Webhook_X509 {
t.Error("Failed to set certType")
}
if ctl.client == nil {
t.Error("Failed to set client")
}
}

View file

@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import (
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/webhook"
)
// gcpCertsURL is the url that serves Google OAuth2 public keys.
@ -170,8 +169,6 @@ func (p *GCP) GetIdentityURL(audience string) string {
// GetIdentityToken does an HTTP request to the identity url.
func (p *GCP) GetIdentityToken(subject, caURL string) (string, error) {
_ = subject // unused input
audience, err := generateSignAudience(caURL, p.GetIDForToken())
if err != nil {
return "", err
@ -223,7 +220,7 @@ func (p *GCP) Init(config Config) (err error) {
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token and returns the sign options that
// will be used on certificate creation.
func (p *GCP) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *GCP) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "gcp.AuthorizeSign")
@ -276,11 +273,7 @@ func (p *GCP) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, erro
defaultPublicKeyValidator{},
newValidityValidator(p.ctl.Claimer.MinTLSCertDuration(), p.ctl.Claimer.MaxTLSCertDuration()),
newX509NamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getX509()),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(
data,
linkedca.Webhook_X509,
webhook.WithAuthorizationPrincipal(ce.InstanceID),
),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_X509),
), nil
}
@ -387,7 +380,7 @@ func (p *GCP) authorizeToken(token string) (*gcpPayload, error) {
}
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns the list of SignOption for a SignSSH request.
func (p *GCP) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *GCP) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("gcp.AuthorizeSSHSign; sshCA is disabled for gcp provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}
@ -447,10 +440,6 @@ func (p *GCP) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, e
// Ensure that all principal names are allowed
newSSHNamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getSSHHost(), nil),
// Call webhooks
p.ctl.newWebhookController(
data,
linkedca.Webhook_SSH,
webhook.WithAuthorizationPrincipal(ce.InstanceID),
),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_SSH),
), nil
}

View file

@ -143,14 +143,14 @@ func (p *JWK) authorizeToken(token string, audiences []string) (*jwtPayload, err
// AuthorizeRevoke returns an error if the provisioner does not have rights to
// revoke the certificate with serial number in the `sub` property.
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
_, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Revoke)
// TODO(hs): authorize the SANs using x509 name policy allow/deny rules (also for other provisioners with AuthorizeRevoke)
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "jwk.AuthorizeRevoke")
}
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token.
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Sign)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "jwk.AuthorizeSign")
@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ func (p *JWK) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) error
}
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns the list of SignOption for a SignSSH request.
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("jwk.AuthorizeSSHSign; sshCA is disabled for jwk provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}
@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, e
}
// AuthorizeSSHRevoke returns nil if the token is valid, false otherwise.
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
_, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.SSHRevoke)
// TODO(hs): authorize the principals using SSH name policy allow/deny rules (also for other provisioners with AuthorizeSSHRevoke)
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "jwk.AuthorizeSSHRevoke")

View file

@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func (p *K8sSA) GetIDForToken() string {
}
// GetTokenID returns an unimplemented error and does not use the input ott.
func (p *K8sSA) GetTokenID(string) (string, error) {
func (p *K8sSA) GetTokenID(ott string) (string, error) {
return "", errors.New("not implemented")
}
@ -148,7 +148,6 @@ func (p *K8sSA) Init(config Config) (err error) {
// claims for case specific downstream parsing.
// e.g. a Sign request will auth/validate different fields than a Revoke request.
func (p *K8sSA) authorizeToken(token string, audiences []string) (*k8sSAPayload, error) {
_ = audiences // unused input
jwt, err := jose.ParseSigned(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err,
@ -208,13 +207,13 @@ func (p *K8sSA) authorizeToken(token string, audiences []string) (*k8sSAPayload,
// AuthorizeRevoke returns an error if the provisioner does not have rights to
// revoke the certificate with serial number in the `sub` property.
func (p *K8sSA) AuthorizeRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
func (p *K8sSA) AuthorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
_, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Revoke)
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "k8ssa.AuthorizeRevoke")
}
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token.
func (p *K8sSA) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *K8sSA) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Sign)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "k8ssa.AuthorizeSign")
@ -254,7 +253,7 @@ func (p *K8sSA) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) erro
}
// AuthorizeSSHSign validates an request for an SSH certificate.
func (p *K8sSA) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *K8sSA) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("k8ssa.AuthorizeSSHSign; sshCA is disabled for k8sSA provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}

View file

@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ func (p *Nebula) GetEncryptedKey() (kid, key string, ok bool) {
}
// AuthorizeSign returns the list of SignOption for a Sign request.
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
crt, claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Sign)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, e
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns the list of SignOption for a SignSSH request.
// Currently the Nebula provisioner only grants host SSH certificates.
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("ssh is disabled for nebula provisioner '%s'", p.Name)
}
@ -275,12 +275,12 @@ func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, crt *x509.Certificate) erro
}
// AuthorizeRevoke returns an error if the token is not valid.
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
return p.validateToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Revoke)
}
// AuthorizeSSHRevoke returns an error if SSH is disabled or the token is invalid.
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return errs.Unauthorized("ssh is disabled for nebula provisioner '%s'", p.Name)
}
@ -291,12 +291,12 @@ func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
}
// AuthorizeSSHRenew returns an unauthorized error.
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSSHRenew(context.Context, string) (*ssh.Certificate, error) {
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSSHRenew(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, error) {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("nebula provisioner does not support SSH renew")
}
// AuthorizeSSHRekey returns an unauthorized error.
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSSHRekey(context.Context, string) (*ssh.Certificate, []SignOption, error) {
func (p *Nebula) AuthorizeSSHRekey(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, []SignOption, error) {
return nil, nil, errs.Unauthorized("nebula provisioner does not support SSH rekey")
}

View file

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ func (p *noop) GetIDForToken() string {
return "noop"
}
func (p *noop) GetTokenID(string) (string, error) {
func (p *noop) GetTokenID(token string) (string, error) {
return "", nil
}
@ -33,35 +33,35 @@ func (p *noop) GetEncryptedKey() (kid, key string, ok bool) {
return "", "", false
}
func (p *noop) Init(Config) error {
func (p *noop) Init(config Config) error {
return nil
}
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSign(context.Context, string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
return []SignOption{p}, nil
}
func (p *noop) AuthorizeRenew(context.Context, *x509.Certificate) error {
func (p *noop) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) error {
return nil
}
func (p *noop) AuthorizeRevoke(context.Context, string) error {
func (p *noop) AuthorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
return nil
}
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSSHSign(context.Context, string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
return []SignOption{p}, nil
}
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSSHRenew(context.Context, string) (*ssh.Certificate, error) {
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSSHRenew(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, error) {
//nolint:nilnil // fine for noop
return nil, nil
}
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(context.Context, string) error {
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
return nil
}
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSSHRekey(context.Context, string) (*ssh.Certificate, []SignOption, error) {
func (p *noop) AuthorizeSSHRekey(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, []SignOption, error) {
return nil, []SignOption{}, nil
}

View file

@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ func (o *OIDC) ValidatePayload(p openIDPayload) error {
}
}
if !found {
return errs.Unauthorized("validatePayload: failed to validate oidc token payload: email %q is not allowed", p.Email)
return errs.Unauthorized("validatePayload: failed to validate oidc token payload: email is not allowed")
}
}
@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ func (o *OIDC) authorizeToken(token string) (*openIDPayload, error) {
// AuthorizeRevoke returns an error if the provisioner does not have rights to
// revoke the certificate with serial number in the `sub` property.
// Only tokens generated by an admin have the right to revoke a certificate.
func (o *OIDC) AuthorizeRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
func (o *OIDC) AuthorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
claims, err := o.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "oidc.AuthorizeRevoke")
@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ func (o *OIDC) AuthorizeRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
}
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token.
func (o *OIDC) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (o *OIDC) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
claims, err := o.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "oidc.AuthorizeSign")
@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ func (o *OIDC) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption
}
// AuthorizeSSHRevoke returns nil if the token is valid, false otherwise.
func (o *OIDC) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
func (o *OIDC) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
claims, err := o.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "oidc.AuthorizeSSHRevoke")

View file

@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"github.com/smallstep/assert"
@ -222,37 +221,39 @@ func TestOIDC_authorizeToken(t *testing.T) {
args args
code int
wantIssuer string
expErr error
wantErr bool
}{
{"ok1", p1, args{t1}, http.StatusOK, issuer, nil},
{"ok tenantid", p2, args{t2}, http.StatusOK, tenantIssuer, nil},
{"ok admin", p3, args{t3}, http.StatusOK, issuer, nil},
{"ok domain", p3, args{t4}, http.StatusOK, issuer, nil},
{"ok no email", p3, args{t5}, http.StatusOK, issuer, nil},
{"fail-domain", p3, args{failDomain}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", errors.New(`oidc.AuthorizeToken: validatePayload: failed to validate oidc token payload: email "name@example.com" is not allowed`)},
{"fail-key", p1, args{failKey}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", errors.New(`oidc.AuthorizeToken; cannot validate oidc token`)},
{"fail-token", p1, args{failTok}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", errors.New(`oidc.AuthorizeToken; error parsing oidc token: invalid character '~' looking for beginning of value`)},
{"fail-claims", p1, args{failClaims}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", errors.New(`oidc.AuthorizeToken; error parsing oidc token claims: invalid character '~' looking for beginning of value`)},
{"fail-issuer", p1, args{failIss}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", errors.New(`oidc.AuthorizeToken: validatePayload: failed to validate oidc token payload: square/go-jose/jwt: validation failed, invalid issuer claim (iss)`)},
{"fail-audience", p1, args{failAud}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", errors.New(`oidc.AuthorizeToken: validatePayload: failed to validate oidc token payload: square/go-jose/jwt: validation failed, invalid audience claim (aud)`)},
{"fail-signature", p1, args{failSig}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", errors.New(`oidc.AuthorizeToken; cannot validate oidc token`)},
{"fail-expired", p1, args{failExp}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", errors.New(`oidc.AuthorizeToken: validatePayload: failed to validate oidc token payload: square/go-jose/jwt: validation failed, token is expired (exp)`)},
{"fail-not-before", p1, args{failNbf}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", errors.New(`oidc.AuthorizeToken: validatePayload: failed to validate oidc token payload: square/go-jose/jwt: validation failed, token not valid yet (nbf)`)},
{"ok1", p1, args{t1}, http.StatusOK, issuer, false},
{"ok tenantid", p2, args{t2}, http.StatusOK, tenantIssuer, false},
{"ok admin", p3, args{t3}, http.StatusOK, issuer, false},
{"ok domain", p3, args{t4}, http.StatusOK, issuer, false},
{"ok no email", p3, args{t5}, http.StatusOK, issuer, false},
{"fail-domain", p3, args{failDomain}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", true},
{"fail-key", p1, args{failKey}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", true},
{"fail-token", p1, args{failTok}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", true},
{"fail-claims", p1, args{failClaims}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", true},
{"fail-issuer", p1, args{failIss}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", true},
{"fail-audience", p1, args{failAud}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", true},
{"fail-signature", p1, args{failSig}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", true},
{"fail-expired", p1, args{failExp}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", true},
{"fail-not-before", p1, args{failNbf}, http.StatusUnauthorized, "", true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := tt.prov.authorizeToken(tt.args.token)
if tt.expErr != nil {
require.Error(t, err)
require.EqualError(t, err, tt.expErr.Error())
if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
fmt.Println(tt)
t.Errorf("OIDC.Authorize() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
return
}
if err != nil {
var sc render.StatusCodedError
require.ErrorAs(t, err, &sc, "error does not implement StatusCodedError interface")
require.Equal(t, tt.code, sc.StatusCode())
require.Nil(t, got)
assert.Fatal(t, errors.As(err, &sc), "error does not implement StatusCodedError interface")
assert.Equals(t, sc.StatusCode(), tt.code)
assert.Nil(t, got)
} else {
require.NotNil(t, got)
require.Equal(t, tt.wantIssuer, got.Issuer)
assert.NotNil(t, got)
assert.Equals(t, got.Issuer, tt.wantIssuer)
}
})
}
@ -338,6 +339,8 @@ func TestOIDC_AuthorizeSign(t *testing.T) {
case *validityValidator:
assert.Equals(t, v.min, tt.prov.ctl.Claimer.MinTLSCertDuration())
assert.Equals(t, v.max, tt.prov.ctl.Claimer.MaxTLSCertDuration())
case emailOnlyIdentity:
assert.Equals(t, string(v), "name@smallstep.com")
case *x509NamePolicyValidator:
assert.Equals(t, nil, v.policyEngine)
case *WebhookController:

View file

@ -10,9 +10,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
// Interface is the interface that all provisioner types must implement.
@ -298,43 +297,43 @@ type base struct{}
// AuthorizeSign returns an unimplemented error. Provisioners should overwrite
// this method if they will support authorizing tokens for signing x509 Certificates.
func (b *base) AuthorizeSign(context.Context, string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (b *base) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("provisioner.AuthorizeSign not implemented")
}
// AuthorizeRevoke returns an unimplemented error. Provisioners should overwrite
// this method if they will support authorizing tokens for revoking x509 Certificates.
func (b *base) AuthorizeRevoke(context.Context, string) error {
func (b *base) AuthorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
return errs.Unauthorized("provisioner.AuthorizeRevoke not implemented")
}
// AuthorizeRenew returns an unimplemented error. Provisioners should overwrite
// this method if they will support authorizing tokens for renewing x509 Certificates.
func (b *base) AuthorizeRenew(context.Context, *x509.Certificate) error {
func (b *base) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) error {
return errs.Unauthorized("provisioner.AuthorizeRenew not implemented")
}
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns an unimplemented error. Provisioners should overwrite
// this method if they will support authorizing tokens for signing SSH Certificates.
func (b *base) AuthorizeSSHSign(context.Context, string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (b *base) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("provisioner.AuthorizeSSHSign not implemented")
}
// AuthorizeRevoke returns an unimplemented error. Provisioners should overwrite
// this method if they will support authorizing tokens for revoking SSH Certificates.
func (b *base) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(context.Context, string) error {
func (b *base) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
return errs.Unauthorized("provisioner.AuthorizeSSHRevoke not implemented")
}
// AuthorizeSSHRenew returns an unimplemented error. Provisioners should overwrite
// this method if they will support authorizing tokens for renewing SSH Certificates.
func (b *base) AuthorizeSSHRenew(context.Context, string) (*ssh.Certificate, error) {
func (b *base) AuthorizeSSHRenew(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, error) {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("provisioner.AuthorizeSSHRenew not implemented")
}
// AuthorizeSSHRekey returns an unimplemented error. Provisioners should overwrite
// this method if they will support authorizing tokens for rekeying SSH Certificates.
func (b *base) AuthorizeSSHRekey(context.Context, string) (*ssh.Certificate, []SignOption, error) {
func (b *base) AuthorizeSSHRekey(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, []SignOption, error) {
return nil, nil, errs.Unauthorized("provisioner.AuthorizeSSHRekey not implemented")
}

View file

@ -2,16 +2,10 @@ package provisioner
import (
"context"
"crypto/subtle"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/webhook"
)
// SCEP is the SCEP provisioner type, an entity that can authorize the
@ -39,8 +33,8 @@ type SCEP struct {
Options *Options `json:"options,omitempty"`
Claims *Claims `json:"claims,omitempty"`
ctl *Controller
secretChallengePassword string
encryptionAlgorithm int
challengeValidationController *challengeValidationController
}
// GetID returns the provisioner unique identifier.
@ -73,7 +67,7 @@ func (s *SCEP) GetEncryptedKey() (string, string, bool) {
}
// GetTokenID returns the identifier of the token.
func (s *SCEP) GetTokenID(string) (string, error) {
func (s *SCEP) GetTokenID(ott string) (string, error) {
return "", errors.New("scep provisioner does not implement GetTokenID")
}
@ -88,67 +82,6 @@ func (s *SCEP) DefaultTLSCertDuration() time.Duration {
return s.ctl.Claimer.DefaultTLSCertDuration()
}
type challengeValidationController struct {
client *http.Client
webhooks []*Webhook
}
// newChallengeValidationController creates a new challengeValidationController
// that performs challenge validation through webhooks.
func newChallengeValidationController(client *http.Client, webhooks []*Webhook) *challengeValidationController {
scepHooks := []*Webhook{}
for _, wh := range webhooks {
if wh.Kind != linkedca.Webhook_SCEPCHALLENGE.String() {
continue
}
if !isCertTypeOK(wh) {
continue
}
scepHooks = append(scepHooks, wh)
}
return &challengeValidationController{
client: client,
webhooks: scepHooks,
}
}
var (
ErrSCEPChallengeInvalid = errors.New("webhook server did not allow request")
)
// Validate executes zero or more configured webhooks to
// validate the SCEP challenge. If at least one of them indicates
// the challenge value is accepted, validation succeeds. In
// that case, the other webhooks will be skipped. If none of
// the webhooks indicates the value of the challenge was accepted,
// an error is returned.
func (c *challengeValidationController) Validate(ctx context.Context, challenge, transactionID string) error {
for _, wh := range c.webhooks {
req := &webhook.RequestBody{
SCEPChallenge: challenge,
SCEPTransactionID: transactionID,
}
resp, err := wh.DoWithContext(ctx, c.client, req, nil) // TODO(hs): support templated URL? Requires some refactoring
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed executing webhook request: %w", err)
}
if resp.Allow {
return nil // return early when response is positive
}
}
return ErrSCEPChallengeInvalid
}
// isCertTypeOK returns whether or not the webhook can be used
// with the SCEP challenge validation webhook controller.
func isCertTypeOK(wh *Webhook) bool {
if wh.CertType == linkedca.Webhook_ALL.String() || wh.CertType == "" {
return true
}
return linkedca.Webhook_X509.String() == wh.CertType
}
// Init initializes and validates the fields of a SCEP type.
func (s *SCEP) Init(config Config) (err error) {
switch {
@ -158,6 +91,10 @@ func (s *SCEP) Init(config Config) (err error) {
return errors.New("provisioner name cannot be empty")
}
// Mask the actual challenge value, so it won't be marshaled
s.secretChallengePassword = s.ChallengePassword
s.ChallengePassword = "*** redacted ***"
// Default to 2048 bits minimum public key length (for CSRs) if not set
if s.MinimumPublicKeyLength == 0 {
s.MinimumPublicKeyLength = 2048
@ -172,11 +109,6 @@ func (s *SCEP) Init(config Config) (err error) {
return errors.New("only encryption algorithm identifiers from 0 to 4 are valid")
}
s.challengeValidationController = newChallengeValidationController(
config.WebhookClient,
s.GetOptions().GetWebhooks(),
)
// TODO: add other, SCEP specific, options?
s.ctl, err = NewController(s, s.Claims, config, s.Options)
@ -186,7 +118,7 @@ func (s *SCEP) Init(config Config) (err error) {
// AuthorizeSign does not do any verification, because all verification is handled
// in the SCEP protocol. This method returns a list of modifiers / constraints
// on the resulting certificate.
func (s *SCEP) AuthorizeSign(context.Context, string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (s *SCEP) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
return []SignOption{
s,
// modifiers / withOptions
@ -201,6 +133,11 @@ func (s *SCEP) AuthorizeSign(context.Context, string) ([]SignOption, error) {
}, nil
}
// GetChallengePassword returns the challenge password
func (s *SCEP) GetChallengePassword() string {
return s.secretChallengePassword
}
// GetCapabilities returns the CA capabilities
func (s *SCEP) GetCapabilities() []string {
return s.Capabilities
@ -219,43 +156,3 @@ func (s *SCEP) ShouldIncludeRootInChain() bool {
func (s *SCEP) GetContentEncryptionAlgorithm() int {
return s.encryptionAlgorithm
}
// ValidateChallenge validates the provided challenge. It starts by
// selecting the validation method to use, then performs validation
// according to that method.
func (s *SCEP) ValidateChallenge(ctx context.Context, challenge, transactionID string) error {
if s.challengeValidationController == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("provisioner %q wasn't initialized", s.Name)
}
switch s.selectValidationMethod() {
case validationMethodWebhook:
return s.challengeValidationController.Validate(ctx, challenge, transactionID)
default:
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(s.ChallengePassword), []byte(challenge)) == 0 {
return errors.New("invalid challenge password provided")
}
return nil
}
}
type validationMethod string
const (
validationMethodNone validationMethod = "none"
validationMethodStatic validationMethod = "static"
validationMethodWebhook validationMethod = "webhook"
)
// selectValidationMethod returns the method to validate SCEP
// challenges. If a webhook is configured with kind `SCEPCHALLENGE`,
// the webhook method will be used. If a challenge password is set,
// the static method is used. It will default to the `none` method.
func (s *SCEP) selectValidationMethod() validationMethod {
if len(s.challengeValidationController.webhooks) > 0 {
return validationMethodWebhook
}
if s.ChallengePassword != "" {
return validationMethodStatic
}
return validationMethodNone
}

View file

@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
package provisioner
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
)
func Test_challengeValidationController_Validate(t *testing.T) {
type request struct {
Challenge string `json:"scepChallenge"`
TransactionID string `json:"scepTransactionID"`
}
type response struct {
Allow bool `json:"allow"`
}
nokServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
req := &request{}
err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "not-allowed", req.Challenge)
assert.Equal(t, "transaction-1", req.TransactionID)
b, err := json.Marshal(response{Allow: false})
require.NoError(t, err)
w.WriteHeader(200)
w.Write(b)
}))
okServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
req := &request{}
err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "challenge", req.Challenge)
assert.Equal(t, "transaction-1", req.TransactionID)
b, err := json.Marshal(response{Allow: true})
require.NoError(t, err)
w.WriteHeader(200)
w.Write(b)
}))
type fields struct {
client *http.Client
webhooks []*Webhook
}
type args struct {
challenge string
transactionID string
}
tests := []struct {
name string
fields fields
args args
server *httptest.Server
expErr error
}{
{
name: "fail/no-webhook",
fields: fields{http.DefaultClient, nil},
args: args{"no-webhook", "transaction-1"},
expErr: errors.New("webhook server did not allow request"),
},
{
name: "fail/wrong-cert-type",
fields: fields{http.DefaultClient, []*Webhook{
{
Kind: linkedca.Webhook_SCEPCHALLENGE.String(),
CertType: linkedca.Webhook_SSH.String(),
},
}},
args: args{"wrong-cert-type", "transaction-1"},
expErr: errors.New("webhook server did not allow request"),
},
{
name: "fail/wrong-secret-value",
fields: fields{http.DefaultClient, []*Webhook{
{
ID: "webhook-id-1",
Name: "webhook-name-1",
Secret: "{{}}",
Kind: linkedca.Webhook_SCEPCHALLENGE.String(),
CertType: linkedca.Webhook_X509.String(),
URL: okServer.URL,
},
}},
args: args{
challenge: "wrong-secret-value",
transactionID: "transaction-1",
},
expErr: errors.New("failed executing webhook request: illegal base64 data at input byte 0"),
},
{
name: "fail/not-allowed",
fields: fields{http.DefaultClient, []*Webhook{
{
ID: "webhook-id-1",
Name: "webhook-name-1",
Secret: "MTIzNAo=",
Kind: linkedca.Webhook_SCEPCHALLENGE.String(),
CertType: linkedca.Webhook_X509.String(),
URL: nokServer.URL,
},
}},
args: args{
challenge: "not-allowed",
transactionID: "transaction-1",
},
server: nokServer,
expErr: errors.New("webhook server did not allow request"),
},
{
name: "ok",
fields: fields{http.DefaultClient, []*Webhook{
{
ID: "webhook-id-1",
Name: "webhook-name-1",
Secret: "MTIzNAo=",
Kind: linkedca.Webhook_SCEPCHALLENGE.String(),
CertType: linkedca.Webhook_X509.String(),
URL: okServer.URL,
},
}},
args: args{
challenge: "challenge",
transactionID: "transaction-1",
},
server: okServer,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
c := newChallengeValidationController(tt.fields.client, tt.fields.webhooks)
if tt.server != nil {
defer tt.server.Close()
}
ctx := context.Background()
err := c.Validate(ctx, tt.args.challenge, tt.args.transactionID)
if tt.expErr != nil {
assert.EqualError(t, err, tt.expErr.Error())
return
}
assert.NoError(t, err)
})
}
}
func TestController_isCertTypeOK(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, isCertTypeOK(&Webhook{CertType: linkedca.Webhook_X509.String()}))
assert.True(t, isCertTypeOK(&Webhook{CertType: linkedca.Webhook_ALL.String()}))
assert.True(t, isCertTypeOK(&Webhook{CertType: ""}))
assert.False(t, isCertTypeOK(&Webhook{CertType: linkedca.Webhook_SSH.String()}))
}
func Test_selectValidationMethod(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
p *SCEP
want validationMethod
}{
{"webhooks", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
Options: &Options{
Webhooks: []*Webhook{
{
Kind: linkedca.Webhook_SCEPCHALLENGE.String(),
},
},
},
}, "webhook"},
{"challenge", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
ChallengePassword: "pass",
}, "static"},
{"challenge-with-different-webhook", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
Options: &Options{
Webhooks: []*Webhook{
{
Kind: linkedca.Webhook_AUTHORIZING.String(),
},
},
},
ChallengePassword: "pass",
}, "static"},
{"none", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
}, "none"},
{"none-with-different-webhook", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
Options: &Options{
Webhooks: []*Webhook{
{
Kind: linkedca.Webhook_AUTHORIZING.String(),
},
},
},
}, "none"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := tt.p.Init(Config{Claims: globalProvisionerClaims})
require.NoError(t, err)
got := tt.p.selectValidationMethod()
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got)
})
}
}
func TestSCEP_ValidateChallenge(t *testing.T) {
type request struct {
Challenge string `json:"scepChallenge"`
TransactionID string `json:"scepTransactionID"`
}
type response struct {
Allow bool `json:"allow"`
}
okServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
req := &request{}
err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "webhook-challenge", req.Challenge)
assert.Equal(t, "webhook-transaction-1", req.TransactionID)
b, err := json.Marshal(response{Allow: true})
require.NoError(t, err)
w.WriteHeader(200)
w.Write(b)
}))
type args struct {
challenge string
transactionID string
}
tests := []struct {
name string
p *SCEP
server *httptest.Server
args args
expErr error
}{
{"ok/webhooks", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
Options: &Options{
Webhooks: []*Webhook{
{
ID: "webhook-id-1",
Name: "webhook-name-1",
Secret: "MTIzNAo=",
Kind: linkedca.Webhook_SCEPCHALLENGE.String(),
CertType: linkedca.Webhook_X509.String(),
URL: okServer.URL,
},
},
},
}, okServer, args{"webhook-challenge", "webhook-transaction-1"},
nil,
},
{"fail/webhooks-secret-configuration", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
Options: &Options{
Webhooks: []*Webhook{
{
ID: "webhook-id-1",
Name: "webhook-name-1",
Secret: "{{}}",
Kind: linkedca.Webhook_SCEPCHALLENGE.String(),
CertType: linkedca.Webhook_X509.String(),
URL: okServer.URL,
},
},
},
}, nil, args{"webhook-challenge", "webhook-transaction-1"},
errors.New("failed executing webhook request: illegal base64 data at input byte 0"),
},
{"ok/static-challenge", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
Options: &Options{},
ChallengePassword: "secret-static-challenge",
}, nil, args{"secret-static-challenge", "static-transaction-1"},
nil,
},
{"fail/wrong-static-challenge", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
Options: &Options{},
ChallengePassword: "secret-static-challenge",
}, nil, args{"the-wrong-challenge-secret", "static-transaction-1"},
errors.New("invalid challenge password provided"),
},
{"ok/no-challenge", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
Options: &Options{},
ChallengePassword: "",
}, nil, args{"", "static-transaction-1"},
nil,
},
{"fail/no-challenge-but-provided", &SCEP{
Name: "SCEP",
Type: "SCEP",
Options: &Options{},
ChallengePassword: "",
}, nil, args{"a-challenge-value", "static-transaction-1"},
errors.New("invalid challenge password provided"),
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if tt.server != nil {
defer tt.server.Close()
}
err := tt.p.Init(Config{Claims: globalProvisionerClaims, WebhookClient: http.DefaultClient})
require.NoError(t, err)
ctx := context.Background()
err = tt.p.ValidateChallenge(ctx, tt.args.challenge, tt.args.transactionID)
if tt.expErr != nil {
assert.EqualError(t, err, tt.expErr.Error())
return
}
assert.NoError(t, err)
})
}
}

View file

@ -83,6 +83,31 @@ type AttestationData struct {
PermanentIdentifier string
}
// emailOnlyIdentity is a CertificateRequestValidator that checks that the only
// SAN provided is the given email address.
type emailOnlyIdentity string
func (e emailOnlyIdentity) Valid(req *x509.CertificateRequest) error {
switch {
case len(req.DNSNames) > 0:
return errs.Forbidden("certificate request cannot contain DNS names")
case len(req.IPAddresses) > 0:
return errs.Forbidden("certificate request cannot contain IP addresses")
case len(req.URIs) > 0:
return errs.Forbidden("certificate request cannot contain URIs")
case len(req.EmailAddresses) == 0:
return errs.Forbidden("certificate request does not contain any email address")
case len(req.EmailAddresses) > 1:
return errs.Forbidden("certificate request contains too many email addresses")
case req.EmailAddresses[0] == "":
return errs.Forbidden("certificate request cannot contain an empty email address")
case req.EmailAddresses[0] != string(e):
return errs.Forbidden("certificate request does not contain the valid email address - got %s, want %s", req.EmailAddresses[0], e)
default:
return nil
}
}
// defaultPublicKeyValidator validates the public key of a certificate request.
type defaultPublicKeyValidator struct{}

View file

@ -16,6 +16,38 @@ import (
"go.step.sm/crypto/pemutil"
)
func Test_emailOnlyIdentity_Valid(t *testing.T) {
uri, err := url.Parse("https://example.com/1.0/getUser")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
type args struct {
req *x509.CertificateRequest
}
tests := []struct {
name string
e emailOnlyIdentity
args args
wantErr bool
}{
{"ok", "name@smallstep.com", args{&x509.CertificateRequest{EmailAddresses: []string{"name@smallstep.com"}}}, false},
{"DNSNames", "name@smallstep.com", args{&x509.CertificateRequest{DNSNames: []string{"foo.bar.zar"}}}, true},
{"IPAddresses", "name@smallstep.com", args{&x509.CertificateRequest{IPAddresses: []net.IP{net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1)}}}, true},
{"URIs", "name@smallstep.com", args{&x509.CertificateRequest{URIs: []*url.URL{uri}}}, true},
{"no-emails", "name@smallstep.com", args{&x509.CertificateRequest{EmailAddresses: []string{}}}, true},
{"empty-email", "", args{&x509.CertificateRequest{EmailAddresses: []string{""}}}, true},
{"multiple-emails", "name@smallstep.com", args{&x509.CertificateRequest{EmailAddresses: []string{"name@smallstep.com", "foo@smallstep.com"}}}, true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if err := tt.e.Valid(tt.args.req); (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
t.Errorf("emailOnlyIdentity.Valid() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
func Test_defaultPublicKeyValidator_Valid(t *testing.T) {
_shortRSA, err := pemutil.Read("./testdata/certs/short-rsa.csr")
assert.FatalError(t, err)

View file

@ -125,6 +125,35 @@ func (o SignSSHOptions) match(got SignSSHOptions) error {
return nil
}
// sshCertPrincipalsModifier is an SSHCertModifier that sets the
// principals to the SSH certificate.
type sshCertPrincipalsModifier []string
// Modify the ValidPrincipals value of the cert.
func (o sshCertPrincipalsModifier) Modify(cert *ssh.Certificate, _ SignSSHOptions) error {
cert.ValidPrincipals = []string(o)
return nil
}
// sshCertKeyIDModifier is an SSHCertModifier that sets the given
// Key ID in the SSH certificate.
type sshCertKeyIDModifier string
func (m sshCertKeyIDModifier) Modify(cert *ssh.Certificate, _ SignSSHOptions) error {
cert.KeyId = string(m)
return nil
}
// sshCertTypeModifier is an SSHCertModifier that sets the
// certificate type.
type sshCertTypeModifier string
// Modify sets the CertType for the ssh certificate.
func (m sshCertTypeModifier) Modify(cert *ssh.Certificate, _ SignSSHOptions) error {
cert.CertType = sshCertTypeUInt32(string(m))
return nil
}
// sshCertValidAfterModifier is an SSHCertModifier that sets the
// ValidAfter in the SSH certificate.
type sshCertValidAfterModifier uint64
@ -143,6 +172,51 @@ func (m sshCertValidBeforeModifier) Modify(cert *ssh.Certificate, _ SignSSHOptio
return nil
}
// sshCertDefaultsModifier implements a SSHCertModifier that
// modifies the certificate with the given options if they are not set.
type sshCertDefaultsModifier SignSSHOptions
// Modify implements the SSHCertModifier interface.
func (m sshCertDefaultsModifier) Modify(cert *ssh.Certificate, _ SignSSHOptions) error {
if cert.CertType == 0 {
cert.CertType = sshCertTypeUInt32(m.CertType)
}
if len(cert.ValidPrincipals) == 0 {
cert.ValidPrincipals = m.Principals
}
if cert.ValidAfter == 0 && !m.ValidAfter.IsZero() {
cert.ValidAfter = uint64(m.ValidAfter.Unix())
}
if cert.ValidBefore == 0 && !m.ValidBefore.IsZero() {
cert.ValidBefore = uint64(m.ValidBefore.Unix())
}
return nil
}
// sshDefaultExtensionModifier implements an SSHCertModifier that sets
// the default extensions in an SSH certificate.
type sshDefaultExtensionModifier struct{}
func (m *sshDefaultExtensionModifier) Modify(cert *ssh.Certificate, _ SignSSHOptions) error {
switch cert.CertType {
// Default to no extensions for HostCert.
case ssh.HostCert:
return nil
case ssh.UserCert:
if cert.Extensions == nil {
cert.Extensions = make(map[string]string)
}
cert.Extensions["permit-X11-forwarding"] = ""
cert.Extensions["permit-agent-forwarding"] = ""
cert.Extensions["permit-port-forwarding"] = ""
cert.Extensions["permit-pty"] = ""
cert.Extensions["permit-user-rc"] = ""
return nil
default:
return errs.BadRequest("ssh certificate has an unknown type '%d'", cert.CertType)
}
}
// sshDefaultDuration is an SSHCertModifier that sets the certificate
// ValidAfter and ValidBefore if they have not been set. It will fail if a
// CertType has not been set or is not valid.
@ -311,7 +385,7 @@ type sshCertDefaultValidator struct{}
// Valid returns an error if the given certificate does not contain the
// necessary fields. We skip ValidPrincipals and Extensions as with custom
// templates you can set them empty.
func (v *sshCertDefaultValidator) Valid(cert *ssh.Certificate, _ SignSSHOptions) error {
func (v *sshCertDefaultValidator) Valid(cert *ssh.Certificate, o SignSSHOptions) error {
switch {
case len(cert.Nonce) == 0:
return errs.Forbidden("ssh certificate nonce cannot be empty")
@ -346,7 +420,7 @@ type sshDefaultPublicKeyValidator struct{}
// TODO: this is the only validator that checks the key type. We should execute
// this before the signing. We should add a new validations interface or extend
// SSHCertOptionsValidator with the key.
func (v sshDefaultPublicKeyValidator) Valid(cert *ssh.Certificate, _ SignSSHOptions) error {
func (v sshDefaultPublicKeyValidator) Valid(cert *ssh.Certificate, o SignSSHOptions) error {
if cert.Key == nil {
return errs.BadRequest("ssh certificate key cannot be nil")
}

View file

@ -202,6 +202,97 @@ func TestSSHOptions_Match(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func Test_sshCertPrincipalsModifier_Modify(t *testing.T) {
type test struct {
modifier sshCertPrincipalsModifier
cert *ssh.Certificate
expected []string
}
tests := map[string]func() test{
"ok": func() test {
a := []string{"foo", "bar"}
return test{
modifier: sshCertPrincipalsModifier(a),
cert: new(ssh.Certificate),
expected: a,
}
},
}
for name, run := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
tc := run()
if assert.Nil(t, tc.modifier.Modify(tc.cert, SignSSHOptions{})) {
assert.Equals(t, tc.cert.ValidPrincipals, tc.expected)
}
})
}
}
func Test_sshCertKeyIDModifier_Modify(t *testing.T) {
type test struct {
modifier sshCertKeyIDModifier
cert *ssh.Certificate
expected string
}
tests := map[string]func() test{
"ok": func() test {
a := "foo"
return test{
modifier: sshCertKeyIDModifier(a),
cert: new(ssh.Certificate),
expected: a,
}
},
}
for name, run := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
tc := run()
if assert.Nil(t, tc.modifier.Modify(tc.cert, SignSSHOptions{})) {
assert.Equals(t, tc.cert.KeyId, tc.expected)
}
})
}
}
func Test_sshCertTypeModifier_Modify(t *testing.T) {
type test struct {
modifier sshCertTypeModifier
cert *ssh.Certificate
expected uint32
}
tests := map[string]func() test{
"ok/user": func() test {
return test{
modifier: sshCertTypeModifier("user"),
cert: new(ssh.Certificate),
expected: ssh.UserCert,
}
},
"ok/host": func() test {
return test{
modifier: sshCertTypeModifier("host"),
cert: new(ssh.Certificate),
expected: ssh.HostCert,
}
},
"ok/default": func() test {
return test{
modifier: sshCertTypeModifier("foo"),
cert: new(ssh.Certificate),
expected: 0,
}
},
}
for name, run := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
tc := run()
if assert.Nil(t, tc.modifier.Modify(tc.cert, SignSSHOptions{})) {
assert.Equals(t, tc.cert.CertType, tc.expected)
}
})
}
}
func Test_sshCertValidAfterModifier_Modify(t *testing.T) {
type test struct {
modifier sshCertValidAfterModifier
@ -227,6 +318,176 @@ func Test_sshCertValidAfterModifier_Modify(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func Test_sshCertDefaultsModifier_Modify(t *testing.T) {
type test struct {
modifier sshCertDefaultsModifier
cert *ssh.Certificate
valid func(*ssh.Certificate)
}
tests := map[string]func() test{
"ok/changes": func() test {
n := time.Now()
va := NewTimeDuration(n.Add(1 * time.Minute))
vb := NewTimeDuration(n.Add(5 * time.Minute))
so := SignSSHOptions{
Principals: []string{"foo", "bar"},
CertType: "host",
ValidAfter: va,
ValidBefore: vb,
}
return test{
modifier: sshCertDefaultsModifier(so),
cert: new(ssh.Certificate),
valid: func(cert *ssh.Certificate) {
assert.Equals(t, cert.ValidPrincipals, so.Principals)
assert.Equals(t, cert.CertType, uint32(ssh.HostCert))
assert.Equals(t, cert.ValidAfter, uint64(so.ValidAfter.RelativeTime(time.Now()).Unix()))
assert.Equals(t, cert.ValidBefore, uint64(so.ValidBefore.RelativeTime(time.Now()).Unix()))
},
}
},
"ok/no-changes": func() test {
n := time.Now()
so := SignSSHOptions{
Principals: []string{"foo", "bar"},
CertType: "host",
ValidAfter: NewTimeDuration(n.Add(15 * time.Minute)),
ValidBefore: NewTimeDuration(n.Add(25 * time.Minute)),
}
return test{
modifier: sshCertDefaultsModifier(so),
cert: &ssh.Certificate{
CertType: uint32(ssh.UserCert),
ValidPrincipals: []string{"zap", "zoop"},
ValidAfter: 15,
ValidBefore: 25,
},
valid: func(cert *ssh.Certificate) {
assert.Equals(t, cert.ValidPrincipals, []string{"zap", "zoop"})
assert.Equals(t, cert.CertType, uint32(ssh.UserCert))
assert.Equals(t, cert.ValidAfter, uint64(15))
assert.Equals(t, cert.ValidBefore, uint64(25))
},
}
},
}
for name, run := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
tc := run()
if assert.Nil(t, tc.modifier.Modify(tc.cert, SignSSHOptions{})) {
tc.valid(tc.cert)
}
})
}
}
func Test_sshDefaultExtensionModifier_Modify(t *testing.T) {
type test struct {
modifier sshDefaultExtensionModifier
cert *ssh.Certificate
valid func(*ssh.Certificate)
err error
}
tests := map[string]func() test{
"fail/unexpected-cert-type": func() test {
cert := &ssh.Certificate{CertType: 3}
return test{
modifier: sshDefaultExtensionModifier{},
cert: cert,
err: errors.New("ssh certificate has an unknown type '3'"),
}
},
"ok/host": func() test {
cert := &ssh.Certificate{CertType: ssh.HostCert}
return test{
modifier: sshDefaultExtensionModifier{},
cert: cert,
valid: func(cert *ssh.Certificate) {
assert.Len(t, 0, cert.Extensions)
},
}
},
"ok/user/extensions-exists": func() test {
cert := &ssh.Certificate{CertType: ssh.UserCert, Permissions: ssh.Permissions{Extensions: map[string]string{
"foo": "bar",
}}}
return test{
modifier: sshDefaultExtensionModifier{},
cert: cert,
valid: func(cert *ssh.Certificate) {
val, ok := cert.Extensions["foo"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "bar")
val, ok = cert.Extensions["permit-X11-forwarding"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
val, ok = cert.Extensions["permit-agent-forwarding"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
val, ok = cert.Extensions["permit-port-forwarding"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
val, ok = cert.Extensions["permit-pty"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
val, ok = cert.Extensions["permit-user-rc"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
},
}
},
"ok/user/no-extensions": func() test {
return test{
modifier: sshDefaultExtensionModifier{},
cert: &ssh.Certificate{CertType: ssh.UserCert},
valid: func(cert *ssh.Certificate) {
_, ok := cert.Extensions["foo"]
assert.False(t, ok)
val, ok := cert.Extensions["permit-X11-forwarding"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
val, ok = cert.Extensions["permit-agent-forwarding"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
val, ok = cert.Extensions["permit-port-forwarding"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
val, ok = cert.Extensions["permit-pty"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
val, ok = cert.Extensions["permit-user-rc"]
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equals(t, val, "")
},
}
},
}
for name, run := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
tc := run()
if err := tc.modifier.Modify(tc.cert, SignSSHOptions{}); err != nil {
if assert.NotNil(t, tc.err) {
assert.HasPrefix(t, err.Error(), tc.err.Error())
}
} else {
if assert.Nil(t, tc.err) {
tc.valid(tc.cert)
}
}
})
}
}
func Test_sshCertDefaultValidator_Valid(t *testing.T) {
pub, _, err := keyutil.GenerateDefaultKeyPair()
assert.FatalError(t, err)

View file

@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func (p *SSHPOP) authorizeToken(token string, audiences []string, checkValidity
// AuthorizeSSHRevoke validates the authorization token and extracts/validates
// the SSH certificate from the ssh-pop header.
func (p *SSHPOP) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
func (p *SSHPOP) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.SSHRevoke, true)
if err != nil {
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "sshpop.AuthorizeSSHRevoke")
@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ func (p *SSHPOP) AuthorizeSSHRenew(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Cert
// AuthorizeSSHRekey validates the authorization token and extracts/validates
// the SSH certificate from the ssh-pop header.
func (p *SSHPOP) AuthorizeSSHRekey(_ context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, []SignOption, error) {
func (p *SSHPOP) AuthorizeSSHRekey(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, []SignOption, error) {
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.SSHRekey, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "sshpop.AuthorizeSSHRekey")

View file

@ -665,9 +665,6 @@ func generateAzureWithServer() (*Azure, *httptest.Server, error) {
AccessToken: tok,
})
}
case "/metadata/instance/compute/azEnvironment":
w.Header().Add("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.Write([]byte("AzurePublicCloud"))
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
@ -675,7 +672,6 @@ func generateAzureWithServer() (*Azure, *httptest.Server, error) {
srv.Start()
az.config.oidcDiscoveryURL = srv.URL + "/" + az.TenantID + "/.well-known/openid-configuration"
az.config.identityTokenURL = srv.URL + "/metadata/identity/oauth2/token"
az.config.instanceComputeURL = srv.URL + "/metadata/instance/compute/azEnvironment"
return az, srv, nil
}

View file

@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ type WebhookController struct {
client *http.Client
webhooks []*Webhook
certType linkedca.Webhook_CertType
options []webhook.RequestBodyOption
TemplateData WebhookSetter
}
@ -40,14 +39,6 @@ func (wc *WebhookController) Enrich(req *webhook.RequestBody) error {
if wc == nil {
return nil
}
// Apply extra options in the webhook controller
for _, fn := range wc.options {
if err := fn(req); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, wh := range wc.webhooks {
if wh.Kind != linkedca.Webhook_ENRICHING.String() {
continue
@ -72,14 +63,6 @@ func (wc *WebhookController) Authorize(req *webhook.RequestBody) error {
if wc == nil {
return nil
}
// Apply extra options in the webhook controller
for _, fn := range wc.options {
if err := fn(req); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, wh := range wc.webhooks {
if wh.Kind != linkedca.Webhook_AUTHORIZING.String() {
continue
@ -124,13 +107,6 @@ type Webhook struct {
}
func (w *Webhook) Do(client *http.Client, reqBody *webhook.RequestBody, data any) (*webhook.ResponseBody, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second*10)
defer cancel()
return w.DoWithContext(ctx, client, reqBody, data)
}
func (w *Webhook) DoWithContext(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, reqBody *webhook.RequestBody, data any) (*webhook.ResponseBody, error) {
tmpl, err := template.New("url").Funcs(templates.StepFuncMap()).Parse(w.URL)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -153,6 +129,8 @@ func (w *Webhook) DoWithContext(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, reqBod
reqBody.Token = tmpl[sshutil.TokenKey]
}
*/
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second*10)
defer cancel()
reqBody.Timestamp = time.Now()

View file

@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ import (
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/smallstep/assert"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/webhook"
"go.step.sm/crypto/pemutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
)
@ -98,18 +96,12 @@ func TestWebhookController_isCertTypeOK(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestWebhookController_Enrich(t *testing.T) {
cert, err := pemutil.ReadCertificate("testdata/certs/x5c-leaf.crt", pemutil.WithFirstBlock())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
type test struct {
ctl *WebhookController
req *webhook.RequestBody
responses []*webhook.ResponseBody
expectErr bool
expectTemplateData any
assertRequest func(t *testing.T, req *webhook.RequestBody)
}
tests := map[string]test{
"ok/no enriching webhooks": {
@ -178,29 +170,6 @@ func TestWebhookController_Enrich(t *testing.T) {
},
},
},
"ok/with options": {
ctl: &WebhookController{
client: http.DefaultClient,
webhooks: []*Webhook{{Name: "people", Kind: "ENRICHING"}},
TemplateData: x509util.TemplateData{},
options: []webhook.RequestBodyOption{webhook.WithX5CCertificate(cert)},
},
req: &webhook.RequestBody{},
responses: []*webhook.ResponseBody{{Allow: true, Data: map[string]any{"role": "bar"}}},
expectErr: false,
expectTemplateData: x509util.TemplateData{"Webhooks": map[string]any{"people": map[string]any{"role": "bar"}}},
assertRequest: func(t *testing.T, req *webhook.RequestBody) {
key, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
assert.Equals(t, &webhook.X5CCertificate{
Raw: cert.Raw,
PublicKey: key,
PublicKeyAlgorithm: cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm.String(),
NotBefore: cert.NotBefore,
NotAfter: cert.NotAfter,
}, req.X5CCertificate)
},
},
"deny": {
ctl: &WebhookController{
client: http.DefaultClient,
@ -212,20 +181,6 @@ func TestWebhookController_Enrich(t *testing.T) {
expectErr: true,
expectTemplateData: x509util.TemplateData{},
},
"fail/with options": {
ctl: &WebhookController{
client: http.DefaultClient,
webhooks: []*Webhook{{Name: "people", Kind: "ENRICHING"}},
TemplateData: x509util.TemplateData{},
options: []webhook.RequestBodyOption{webhook.WithX5CCertificate(&x509.Certificate{
PublicKey: []byte("bad"),
})},
},
req: &webhook.RequestBody{},
responses: []*webhook.ResponseBody{{Allow: false}},
expectErr: true,
expectTemplateData: x509util.TemplateData{},
},
}
for name, test := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
@ -245,25 +200,16 @@ func TestWebhookController_Enrich(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("Got err %v, want %v", err, test.expectErr)
}
assert.Equals(t, test.expectTemplateData, test.ctl.TemplateData)
if test.assertRequest != nil {
test.assertRequest(t, test.req)
}
})
}
}
func TestWebhookController_Authorize(t *testing.T) {
cert, err := pemutil.ReadCertificate("testdata/certs/x5c-leaf.crt", pemutil.WithFirstBlock())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
type test struct {
ctl *WebhookController
req *webhook.RequestBody
responses []*webhook.ResponseBody
expectErr bool
assertRequest func(t *testing.T, req *webhook.RequestBody)
}
tests := map[string]test{
"ok/no enriching webhooks": {
@ -294,27 +240,6 @@ func TestWebhookController_Authorize(t *testing.T) {
responses: []*webhook.ResponseBody{{Allow: false}},
expectErr: false,
},
"ok/with options": {
ctl: &WebhookController{
client: http.DefaultClient,
webhooks: []*Webhook{{Name: "people", Kind: "AUTHORIZING"}},
options: []webhook.RequestBodyOption{webhook.WithX5CCertificate(cert)},
},
req: &webhook.RequestBody{},
responses: []*webhook.ResponseBody{{Allow: true}},
expectErr: false,
assertRequest: func(t *testing.T, req *webhook.RequestBody) {
key, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
assert.Equals(t, &webhook.X5CCertificate{
Raw: cert.Raw,
PublicKey: key,
PublicKeyAlgorithm: cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm.String(),
NotBefore: cert.NotBefore,
NotAfter: cert.NotAfter,
}, req.X5CCertificate)
},
},
"deny": {
ctl: &WebhookController{
client: http.DefaultClient,
@ -324,18 +249,6 @@ func TestWebhookController_Authorize(t *testing.T) {
responses: []*webhook.ResponseBody{{Allow: false}},
expectErr: true,
},
"fail/with options": {
ctl: &WebhookController{
client: http.DefaultClient,
webhooks: []*Webhook{{Name: "people", Kind: "AUTHORIZING"}},
options: []webhook.RequestBodyOption{webhook.WithX5CCertificate(&x509.Certificate{
PublicKey: []byte("bad"),
})},
},
req: &webhook.RequestBody{},
responses: []*webhook.ResponseBody{{Allow: false}},
expectErr: true,
},
}
for name, test := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
@ -354,9 +267,6 @@ func TestWebhookController_Authorize(t *testing.T) {
if (err != nil) != test.expectErr {
t.Fatalf("Got err %v, want %v", err, test.expectErr)
}
if test.assertRequest != nil {
test.assertRequest(t, test.req)
}
})
}
}

View file

@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import (
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/webhook"
)
// x5cPayload extends jwt.Claims with step attributes.
@ -188,13 +187,13 @@ func (p *X5C) authorizeToken(token string, audiences []string) (*x5cPayload, err
// AuthorizeRevoke returns an error if the provisioner does not have rights to
// revoke the certificate with serial number in the `sub` property.
func (p *X5C) AuthorizeRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
func (p *X5C) AuthorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
_, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Revoke)
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "x5c.AuthorizeRevoke")
}
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token.
func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Sign)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "x5c.AuthorizeSign")
@ -216,8 +215,7 @@ func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, erro
// The X509 certificate will be available using the template variable
// AuthorizationCrt. For example {{ .AuthorizationCrt.DNSNames }} can be
// used to get all the domains.
x5cLeaf := claims.chains[0][0]
data.SetAuthorizationCertificate(x5cLeaf)
data.SetAuthorizationCertificate(claims.chains[0][0])
templateOptions, err := TemplateOptions(p.Options, data)
if err != nil {
@ -240,7 +238,7 @@ func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, erro
newProvisionerExtensionOption(TypeX5C, p.Name, ""),
profileLimitDuration{
p.ctl.Claimer.DefaultTLSCertDuration(),
x5cLeaf.NotBefore, x5cLeaf.NotAfter,
claims.chains[0][0].NotBefore, claims.chains[0][0].NotAfter,
},
// validators
commonNameValidator(claims.Subject),
@ -248,12 +246,7 @@ func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, erro
defaultPublicKeyValidator{},
newValidityValidator(p.ctl.Claimer.MinTLSCertDuration(), p.ctl.Claimer.MaxTLSCertDuration()),
newX509NamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getX509()),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(
data,
linkedca.Webhook_X509,
webhook.WithX5CCertificate(x5cLeaf),
webhook.WithAuthorizationPrincipal(x5cLeaf.Subject.CommonName),
),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_X509),
}, nil
}
@ -263,7 +256,7 @@ func (p *X5C) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) error
}
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns the list of SignOption for a SignSSH request.
func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("x5c.AuthorizeSSHSign; sshCA is disabled for x5c provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}
@ -312,8 +305,7 @@ func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, e
// The X509 certificate will be available using the template variable
// AuthorizationCrt. For example {{ .AuthorizationCrt.DNSNames }} can be
// used to get all the domains.
x5cLeaf := claims.chains[0][0]
data.SetAuthorizationCertificate(x5cLeaf)
data.SetAuthorizationCertificate(claims.chains[0][0])
templateOptions, err := TemplateSSHOptions(p.Options, data)
if err != nil {
@ -333,7 +325,7 @@ func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, e
return append(signOptions,
p,
// Checks the validity bounds, and set the validity if has not been set.
&sshLimitDuration{p.ctl.Claimer, x5cLeaf.NotAfter},
&sshLimitDuration{p.ctl.Claimer, claims.chains[0][0].NotAfter},
// Validate public key.
&sshDefaultPublicKeyValidator{},
// Validate the validity period.
@ -343,11 +335,6 @@ func (p *X5C) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, e
// Ensure that all principal names are allowed
newSSHNamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getSSHHost(), p.ctl.getPolicy().getSSHUser()),
// Call webhooks
p.ctl.newWebhookController(
data,
linkedca.Webhook_SSH,
webhook.WithX5CCertificate(x5cLeaf),
webhook.WithAuthorizationPrincipal(x5cLeaf.Subject.CommonName),
),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_SSH),
), nil
}

View file

@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/crypto/pemutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/randutil"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"github.com/smallstep/assert"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/api/render"
@ -498,8 +497,6 @@ func TestX5C_AuthorizeSign(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equals(t, nil, v.policyEngine)
case *WebhookController:
assert.Len(t, 0, v.webhooks)
assert.Equals(t, linkedca.Webhook_X509, v.certType)
assert.Len(t, 2, v.options)
default:
assert.FatalError(t, fmt.Errorf("unexpected sign option of type %T", v))
}
@ -793,6 +790,8 @@ func TestX5C_AuthorizeSSHSign(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equals(t, int64(v), tc.claims.Step.SSH.ValidAfter.RelativeTime(nw).Unix())
case sshCertValidBeforeModifier:
assert.Equals(t, int64(v), tc.claims.Step.SSH.ValidBefore.RelativeTime(nw).Unix())
case sshCertDefaultsModifier:
assert.Equals(t, SignSSHOptions(v), SignSSHOptions{CertType: SSHUserCert})
case *sshLimitDuration:
assert.Equals(t, v.Claimer, tc.p.ctl.Claimer)
assert.Equals(t, v.NotAfter, x5cCerts[0].NotAfter)
@ -804,8 +803,6 @@ func TestX5C_AuthorizeSSHSign(t *testing.T) {
case *sshDefaultPublicKeyValidator, *sshCertDefaultValidator, sshCertificateOptionsFunc:
case *WebhookController:
assert.Len(t, 0, v.webhooks)
assert.Equals(t, linkedca.Webhook_SSH, v.certType)
assert.Len(t, 2, v.options)
default:
assert.FatalError(t, fmt.Errorf("unexpected sign option of type %T", v))
}

View file

@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ func ProvisionerToLinkedca(p provisioner.Interface) (*linkedca.Provisioner, erro
Data: &linkedca.ProvisionerDetails_SCEP{
SCEP: &linkedca.SCEPProvisioner{
ForceCn: p.ForceCN,
Challenge: p.ChallengePassword,
Challenge: p.GetChallengePassword(),
Capabilities: p.Capabilities,
MinimumPublicKeyLength: int32(p.MinimumPublicKeyLength),
IncludeRoot: p.IncludeRoot,

View file

@ -9,17 +9,14 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/smallstep/assert"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/api/render"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/admin"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/db"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
)
func TestGetEncryptedKey(t *testing.T) {
@ -32,9 +29,9 @@ func TestGetEncryptedKey(t *testing.T) {
tests := map[string]func(t *testing.T) *ek{
"ok": func(t *testing.T) *ek {
c, err := LoadConfiguration("../ca/testdata/ca.json")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
a, err := New(c)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
return &ek{
a: a,
kid: c.AuthorityConfig.Provisioners[1].(*provisioner.JWK).Key.KeyID,
@ -42,9 +39,9 @@ func TestGetEncryptedKey(t *testing.T) {
},
"fail-not-found": func(t *testing.T) *ek {
c, err := LoadConfiguration("../ca/testdata/ca.json")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
a, err := New(c)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
return &ek{
a: a,
kid: "foo",
@ -98,16 +95,9 @@ func TestGetProvisioners(t *testing.T) {
tests := map[string]func(t *testing.T) *gp{
"ok": func(t *testing.T) *gp {
c, err := LoadConfiguration("../ca/testdata/ca.json")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
a, err := New(c)
require.NoError(t, err)
return &gp{a: a}
},
"ok/rsa": func(t *testing.T) *gp {
c, err := LoadConfiguration("../ca/testdata/rsaca.json")
require.NoError(t, err)
a, err := New(c)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
return &gp{a: a}
},
}
@ -121,13 +111,13 @@ func TestGetProvisioners(t *testing.T) {
if assert.NotNil(t, tc.err) {
var sc render.StatusCodedError
if assert.True(t, errors.As(err, &sc), "error does not implement StatusCodedError interface") {
assert.Equals(t, tc.code, sc.StatusCode())
assert.Equals(t, sc.StatusCode(), tc.code)
}
assert.HasPrefix(t, tc.err.Error(), err.Error())
assert.HasPrefix(t, err.Error(), tc.err.Error())
}
} else {
if assert.Nil(t, tc.err) {
assert.Equals(t, tc.a.config.AuthorityConfig.Provisioners, ps)
assert.Equals(t, ps, tc.a.config.AuthorityConfig.Provisioners)
assert.Equals(t, "", next)
}
}
@ -137,20 +127,20 @@ func TestGetProvisioners(t *testing.T) {
func TestAuthority_LoadProvisionerByCertificate(t *testing.T) {
_, priv, err := keyutil.GenerateDefaultKeyPair()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
csr := getCSR(t, priv)
sign := func(a *Authority, extraOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) *x509.Certificate {
key, err := jose.ReadKey("testdata/secrets/step_cli_key_priv.jwk", jose.WithPassword([]byte("pass")))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
token, err := generateToken("smallstep test", "step-cli", testAudiences.Sign[0], []string{"test.smallstep.com"}, time.Now(), key)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
ctx := provisioner.NewContextWithMethod(context.Background(), provisioner.SignMethod)
opts, err := a.Authorize(ctx, token)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
opts = append(opts, extraOpts...)
certs, err := a.Sign(csr, provisioner.SignOptions{}, opts...)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
return certs[0]
}
getProvisioner := func(a *Authority, name string) provisioner.Interface {
@ -179,7 +169,9 @@ func TestAuthority_LoadProvisionerByCertificate(t *testing.T) {
},
MGetCertificateData: func(serialNumber string) (*db.CertificateData, error) {
p, err := a1.LoadProvisionerByName("dev")
require.NoError(t, err)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return &db.CertificateData{
Provisioner: &db.ProvisionerData{
ID: p.GetID(),
@ -194,7 +186,9 @@ func TestAuthority_LoadProvisionerByCertificate(t *testing.T) {
a2.adminDB = &mockAdminDB{
MGetCertificateData: (func(s string) (*db.CertificateData, error) {
p, err := a2.LoadProvisionerByName("dev")
require.NoError(t, err)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return &db.CertificateData{
Provisioner: &db.ProvisionerData{
ID: p.GetID(),

View file

@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ func (a *Authority) GetSSHFederation(context.Context) (*config.SSHKeys, error) {
}
// GetSSHConfig returns rendered templates for clients (user) or servers (host).
func (a *Authority) GetSSHConfig(_ context.Context, typ string, data map[string]string) ([]templates.Output, error) {
func (a *Authority) GetSSHConfig(ctx context.Context, typ string, data map[string]string) ([]templates.Output, error) {
if a.sshCAUserCertSignKey == nil && a.sshCAHostCertSignKey == nil {
return nil, errs.NotFound("getSSHConfig: ssh is not configured")
}
@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ func (a *Authority) GetSSHBastion(ctx context.Context, user, hostname string) (*
}
// SignSSH creates a signed SSH certificate with the given public key and options.
func (a *Authority) SignSSH(_ context.Context, key ssh.PublicKey, opts provisioner.SignSSHOptions, signOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) (*ssh.Certificate, error) {
func (a *Authority) SignSSH(ctx context.Context, key ssh.PublicKey, opts provisioner.SignSSHOptions, signOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) (*ssh.Certificate, error) {
var (
certOptions []sshutil.Option
mods []provisioner.SSHCertModifier
@ -663,7 +663,11 @@ func callEnrichingWebhooksSSH(webhookCtl webhookController, cr sshutil.Certifica
if err != nil {
return err
}
return webhookCtl.Enrich(whEnrichReq)
if err := webhookCtl.Enrich(whEnrichReq); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func callAuthorizingWebhooksSSH(webhookCtl webhookController, cert *sshutil.Certificate, certTpl *ssh.Certificate) error {
@ -676,5 +680,9 @@ func callAuthorizingWebhooksSSH(webhookCtl webhookController, cert *sshutil.Cert
if err != nil {
return err
}
return webhookCtl.Authorize(whAuthBody)
if err := webhookCtl.Authorize(whAuthBody); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}

View file

@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func (m sshTestModifier) Modify(cert *ssh.Certificate, _ provisioner.SignSSHOpti
type sshTestCertModifier string
func (m sshTestCertModifier) Modify(*ssh.Certificate, provisioner.SignSSHOptions) error {
func (m sshTestCertModifier) Modify(cert *ssh.Certificate, opts provisioner.SignSSHOptions) error {
if m == "" {
return nil
}
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func (m sshTestCertModifier) Modify(*ssh.Certificate, provisioner.SignSSHOptions
type sshTestCertValidator string
func (v sshTestCertValidator) Valid(*ssh.Certificate, provisioner.SignSSHOptions) error {
func (v sshTestCertValidator) Valid(crt *ssh.Certificate, opts provisioner.SignSSHOptions) error {
if v == "" {
return nil
}
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ func (v sshTestCertValidator) Valid(*ssh.Certificate, provisioner.SignSSHOptions
type sshTestOptionsValidator string
func (v sshTestOptionsValidator) Valid(provisioner.SignSSHOptions) error {
func (v sshTestOptionsValidator) Valid(opts provisioner.SignSSHOptions) error {
if v == "" {
return nil
}
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func (v sshTestOptionsValidator) Valid(provisioner.SignSSHOptions) error {
type sshTestOptionsModifier string
func (m sshTestOptionsModifier) Modify(*ssh.Certificate, provisioner.SignSSHOptions) error {
func (m sshTestOptionsModifier) Modify(cert *ssh.Certificate, opts provisioner.SignSSHOptions) error {
if m == "" {
return nil
}

View file

@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ func (a *Authority) isAllowedToSignX509Certificate(cert *x509.Certificate) error
// AreSANsAllowed evaluates the provided sans against the
// authority X.509 policy.
func (a *Authority) AreSANsAllowed(_ context.Context, sans []string) error {
func (a *Authority) AreSANsAllowed(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error {
return a.policyEngine.AreSANsAllowed(sans)
}
@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ func (a *Authority) GenerateCertificateRevocationList() error {
// Note that this is currently using the port 443 by default.
if b, err := marshalDistributionPoint(fullName, false); err == nil {
revocationList.ExtraExtensions = []pkix.Extension{
{Id: oidExtensionIssuingDistributionPoint, Critical: true, Value: b},
{Id: oidExtensionIssuingDistributionPoint, Value: b},
}
}
@ -969,7 +969,11 @@ func callEnrichingWebhooksX509(webhookCtl webhookController, attData *provisione
if err != nil {
return err
}
return webhookCtl.Enrich(whEnrichReq)
if err := webhookCtl.Enrich(whEnrichReq); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func callAuthorizingWebhooksX509(webhookCtl webhookController, cert *x509util.Certificate, leaf *x509.Certificate, attData *provisioner.AttestationData) error {
@ -989,5 +993,9 @@ func callAuthorizingWebhooksX509(webhookCtl webhookController, cert *x509util.Ce
if err != nil {
return err
}
return webhookCtl.Authorize(whAuthBody)
if err := webhookCtl.Authorize(whAuthBody); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}

View file

@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ func TestAuthority_Renew(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t, reflect.DeepEqual(ext1, ext2))
}
continue
}
} else {
found := false
for _, ext2 := range leaf.Extensions {
if reflect.DeepEqual(ext1, ext2) {
@ -1159,6 +1159,7 @@ func TestAuthority_Renew(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
}
realIntermediate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(authIssuer.Raw)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
@ -1362,7 +1363,7 @@ func TestAuthority_Rekey(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t, reflect.DeepEqual(ext1, ext2))
}
continue
}
} else {
found := false
for _, ext2 := range leaf.Extensions {
if reflect.DeepEqual(ext1, ext2) {
@ -1375,6 +1376,7 @@ func TestAuthority_Rekey(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
}
realIntermediate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(authIssuer.Raw)
assert.FatalError(t, err)
@ -1934,14 +1936,14 @@ func TestAuthority_CRL(t *testing.T) {
tc := f()
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
if crlBytes, err := tc.auth.GetCertificateRevocationList(); err == nil {
crl, parseErr := x509.ParseRevocationList(crlBytes)
crl, parseErr := x509.ParseCRL(crlBytes)
if parseErr != nil {
t.Errorf("x509.ParseCertificateRequest() error = %v, wantErr %v", parseErr, nil)
return
}
var cmpList []string
for _, c := range crl.RevokedCertificates {
for _, c := range crl.TBSCertList.RevokedCertificates {
cmpList = append(cmpList, c.SerialNumber.String())
}

View file

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type mockWebhookController struct {
var _ webhookController = &mockWebhookController{}
func (wc *mockWebhookController) Enrich(*webhook.RequestBody) error {
func (wc *mockWebhookController) Enrich(req *webhook.RequestBody) error {
for key, data := range wc.respData {
wc.templateData.SetWebhook(key, data)
}
@ -22,6 +22,6 @@ func (wc *mockWebhookController) Enrich(*webhook.RequestBody) error {
return wc.enrichErr
}
func (wc *mockWebhookController) Authorize(*webhook.RequestBody) error {
func (wc *mockWebhookController) Authorize(req *webhook.RequestBody) error {
return wc.authorizeErr
}

View file

@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ retry:
}
// GetAdmins returns all admins from the GET /admin/admins request to the CA.
func (c *AdminClient) GetAdmins(...AdminOption) ([]*linkedca.Admin, error) {
func (c *AdminClient) GetAdmins(opts ...AdminOption) ([]*linkedca.Admin, error) {
var (
cursor = ""
admins = []*linkedca.Admin{}
@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ retry:
}
// GetProvisioners returns all admins from the GET /admin/admins request to the CA.
func (c *AdminClient) GetProvisioners(...AdminOption) (provisioner.List, error) {
func (c *AdminClient) GetProvisioners(opts ...AdminOption) (provisioner.List, error) {
var (
cursor = ""
provs = provisioner.List{}

View file

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func newLocalListener() net.Listener {
return l
}
func setMinCertDuration(time.Duration) func() {
func setMinCertDuration(d time.Duration) func() {
tmp := minCertDuration
minCertDuration = 1 * time.Second
return func() {
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func startCABootstrapServer() *httptest.Server {
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
baseContext := buildContext(ca.auth, nil, nil, nil, "")
baseContext := buildContext(ca.auth, nil, nil, nil)
srv.Config.Handler = ca.srv.Handler
srv.Config.BaseContext = func(net.Listener) context.Context {
return baseContext
@ -606,13 +606,7 @@ func doReload(ca *CA) error {
}
// Use same address in new server
newCA.srv.Addr = ca.srv.Addr
if err := ca.srv.Reload(newCA.srv); err != nil {
return err
}
// Wait a few ms until the http server calls listener.Accept()
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
return nil
return ca.srv.Reload(newCA.srv)
}
func TestBootstrapListener(t *testing.T) {

View file

@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"reflect"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
@ -46,7 +45,6 @@ type options struct {
sshHostPassword []byte
sshUserPassword []byte
database db.AuthDB
nnsServer string
}
func (o *options) apply(opts []Option) {
@ -119,12 +117,6 @@ func WithQuiet(quiet bool) Option {
}
}
func WithNNSServer(nnsServer string) Option {
return func(o *options) {
o.nnsServer = nnsServer
}
}
// CA is the type used to build the complete certificate authority. It builds
// the HTTP server, set ups the middlewares and the HTTP handlers.
type CA struct {
@ -134,7 +126,6 @@ type CA struct {
insecureSrv *server.Server
opts *options
renewer *TLSRenewer
compactStop chan struct{}
}
// New creates and initializes the CA with the given configuration and options.
@ -142,7 +133,6 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, opts ...Option) (*CA, error) {
ca := &CA{
config: cfg,
opts: new(options),
compactStop: make(chan struct{}),
}
ca.opts.apply(opts)
return ca.Init(cfg)
@ -203,11 +193,7 @@ func (ca *CA) Init(cfg *config.Config) (*CA, error) {
api.Route(r)
})
// Mount the CRL to the insecure mux
insecureMux.Get("/crl", api.CRL)
insecureMux.Get("/1.0/crl", api.CRL)
// Add ACME api endpoints in /acme and /1.0/acme
//Add ACME api endpoints in /acme and /1.0/acme
dns := cfg.DNSNames[0]
u, err := url.Parse("https://" + cfg.Address)
if err != nil {
@ -287,7 +273,6 @@ func (ca *CA) Init(cfg *config.Config) (*CA, error) {
// helpful routine for logging all routes
//dumpRoutes(mux)
//dumpRoutes(insecureMux)
// Add monitoring if configured
if len(cfg.Monitoring) > 0 {
@ -309,16 +294,8 @@ func (ca *CA) Init(cfg *config.Config) (*CA, error) {
insecureHandler = logger.Middleware(insecureHandler)
}
var nnsServer string
if len(ca.opts.nnsServer) > 0 {
nnsServer = ca.opts.nnsServer
} else if len(ca.config.NNSServer) > 0 {
nnsServer = ca.config.NNSServer
} else {
return nil, errors.New("error configuring ACME NNS context: no URL of the NNS server provided")
}
// Create context with all the necessary values.
baseContext := buildContext(auth, scepAuthority, acmeDB, acmeLinker, nnsServer)
baseContext := buildContext(auth, scepAuthority, acmeDB, acmeLinker)
ca.srv = server.New(cfg.Address, handler, tlsConfig)
ca.srv.BaseContext = func(net.Listener) context.Context {
@ -327,7 +304,7 @@ func (ca *CA) Init(cfg *config.Config) (*CA, error) {
// only start the insecure server if the insecure address is configured
// and, currently, also only when it should serve SCEP endpoints.
if ca.shouldServeInsecureServer() {
if ca.shouldServeSCEPEndpoints() && cfg.InsecureAddress != "" {
// TODO: instead opt for having a single server.Server but two
// http.Servers handling the HTTP and HTTPS handler? The latter
// will probably introduce more complexity in terms of graceful
@ -341,26 +318,8 @@ func (ca *CA) Init(cfg *config.Config) (*CA, error) {
return ca, nil
}
// shouldServeInsecureServer returns whether or not the insecure
// server should also be started. This is (currently) only the case
// if the insecure address has been configured AND when a SCEP
// provisioner is configured or when a CRL is configured.
func (ca *CA) shouldServeInsecureServer() bool {
switch {
case ca.config.InsecureAddress == "":
return false
case ca.shouldServeSCEPEndpoints():
return true
case ca.config.CRL.IsEnabled():
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// buildContext builds the server base context.
func buildContext(a *authority.Authority, scepAuthority *scep.Authority, acmeDB acme.DB, acmeLinker acme.Linker,
nnsServer string) context.Context {
func buildContext(a *authority.Authority, scepAuthority *scep.Authority, acmeDB acme.DB, acmeLinker acme.Linker) context.Context {
ctx := authority.NewContext(context.Background(), a)
if authDB := a.GetDatabase(); authDB != nil {
ctx = db.NewContext(ctx, authDB)
@ -372,7 +331,7 @@ func buildContext(a *authority.Authority, scepAuthority *scep.Authority, acmeDB
ctx = scep.NewContext(ctx, scepAuthority)
}
if acmeDB != nil {
ctx = acme.NewContext(ctx, acmeDB, acme.NewClient(), acmeLinker, nil, nnsServer)
ctx = acme.NewContext(ctx, acmeDB, acme.NewClient(), acmeLinker, nil)
}
return ctx
}
@ -411,12 +370,6 @@ func (ca *CA) Run() error {
}
}
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
ca.runCompactJob()
}()
if ca.insecureSrv != nil {
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
@ -441,7 +394,6 @@ func (ca *CA) Run() error {
// Stop stops the CA calling to the server Shutdown method.
func (ca *CA) Stop() error {
close(ca.compactStop)
ca.renewer.Stop()
if err := ca.auth.Shutdown(); err != nil {
log.Printf("error stopping ca.Authority: %+v\n", err)
@ -488,7 +440,6 @@ func (ca *CA) Reload() error {
WithQuiet(ca.opts.quiet),
WithConfigFile(ca.opts.configFile),
WithDatabase(ca.auth.GetDatabase()),
WithNNSServer(ca.opts.nnsServer),
)
if err != nil {
logContinue("Reload failed because the CA with new configuration could not be initialized.")
@ -625,39 +576,3 @@ func (ca *CA) getConfigFileOutput() string {
}
return "loaded from token"
}
// runCompactJob will run the value log garbage collector if the nosql database
// supports it.
func (ca *CA) runCompactJob() {
caDB, ok := ca.auth.GetDatabase().(*db.DB)
if !ok {
return
}
compactor, ok := caDB.DB.(nosql.Compactor)
if !ok {
return
}
// Compact database at start.
runCompact(compactor)
// Compact database every minute.
ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Minute)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ca.compactStop:
return
case <-ticker.C:
runCompact(compactor)
}
}
}
// runCompact executes the compact job until it returns an error.
func runCompact(c nosql.Compactor) {
for err := error(nil); err == nil; {
err = c.Compact(0.7)
}
}

View file

@ -671,6 +671,10 @@ retry:
if err != nil {
return nil, clientError(err)
}
if resp.StatusCode == 404 {
defer resp.Body.Close()
return nil, errs.BadRequest("a root certificate with that fingerprint was not found")
}
if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
if !retried && c.retryOnError(resp) { //nolint:contextcheck // deeply nested context; retry using the same context
retried = true

View file

@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ func parseCertificate(data string) *x509.Certificate {
return cert
}
func parseCertificateRequest(string) *x509.CertificateRequest {
func parseCertificateRequest(data string) *x509.CertificateRequest {
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(csrPEM))
if block == nil {
panic("failed to parse certificate request PEM")

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