package scep import ( "context" "crypto" "crypto/x509" "errors" "fmt" microx509util "github.com/micromdm/scep/v2/cryptoutil/x509util" microscep "github.com/micromdm/scep/v2/scep" "go.mozilla.org/pkcs7" "go.step.sm/crypto/x509util" "github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner" ) // Authority is the layer that handles all SCEP interactions. type Authority struct { service *Service // TODO: refactor, so that this is not required signAuth SignAuthority } type authorityKey struct{} // NewContext adds the given authority to the context. func NewContext(ctx context.Context, a *Authority) context.Context { return context.WithValue(ctx, authorityKey{}, a) } // FromContext returns the current authority from the given context. func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (a *Authority, ok bool) { a, ok = ctx.Value(authorityKey{}).(*Authority) return } // MustFromContext returns the current authority from the given context. It will // panic if the authority is not in the context. func MustFromContext(ctx context.Context) *Authority { if a, ok := FromContext(ctx); !ok { panic("scep authority is not in the context") } else { return a } } // AuthorityOptions required to create a new SCEP Authority. type AuthorityOptions struct { // Service provides the roots, intermediates, the signer and the (default) // decrypter to the SCEP Authority. Service *Service } // SignAuthority is the interface for a signing authority type SignAuthority interface { Sign(cr *x509.CertificateRequest, opts provisioner.SignOptions, signOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) LoadProvisionerByName(string) (provisioner.Interface, error) } // New returns a new Authority that implements the SCEP interface. func New(signAuth SignAuthority, ops AuthorityOptions) (*Authority, error) { authority := &Authority{ signAuth: signAuth, service: ops.Service, } return authority, nil } // Validate validates if the SCEP Authority has a valid configuration. // The validation includes a check if a decrypter is available, either // an authority wide decrypter, or a provisioner specific decrypter. func (a *Authority) Validate() error { noDefaultDecrypterAvailable := a.service.defaultDecrypter == nil for _, name := range a.service.scepProvisionerNames { p, err := a.LoadProvisionerByName(name) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed loading provisioner %q: %w", name, err) } if scepProv, ok := p.(*provisioner.SCEP); ok { cert, decrypter := scepProv.GetDecrypter() // TODO: return sentinel/typed error, to be able to ignore/log these cases during init? if cert == nil && noDefaultDecrypterAvailable { return fmt.Errorf("SCEP provisioner %q does not have a decrypter certificate", name) } if decrypter == nil && noDefaultDecrypterAvailable { return fmt.Errorf("SCEP provisioner %q does not have decrypter", name) } } } return nil } var ( // TODO: check the default capabilities; https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8894#section-3.5.2 defaultCapabilities = []string{ "Renewal", // NOTE: removing this will result in macOS SCEP client stating the server doesn't support renewal, but it uses PKCSreq to do so. "SHA-1", "SHA-256", "AES", "DES3", "SCEPStandard", "POSTPKIOperation", } ) // LoadProvisionerByName calls out to the SignAuthority interface to load a // provisioner by name. func (a *Authority) LoadProvisionerByName(name string) (provisioner.Interface, error) { return a.signAuth.LoadProvisionerByName(name) } // GetCACertificates returns the certificate (chain) for the CA. // // This methods returns the "SCEP Server (RA)" certificate, the issuing CA up to and excl. the root. // Some clients do need the root certificate however; also see: https://github.com/openxpki/openxpki/issues/73 // // In case a provisioner specific decrypter is available, this is used as the "SCEP Server (RA)" certificate // instead of the CA intermediate directly. This uses a distinct instance of a KMS for doing the SCEp key // operations, so that RSA can be used for just SCEP. // // Using an RA does not seem to exist in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8894, but is mentioned in // https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nourse-scep-21.html. func (a *Authority) GetCACertificates(ctx context.Context) (certs []*x509.Certificate, err error) { p, err := provisionerFromContext(ctx) if err != nil { return } // if a provisioner specific RSA decrypter is available, it is returned as // the first certificate. if decrypterCertificate, _ := p.GetDecrypter(); decrypterCertificate != nil { certs = append(certs, decrypterCertificate) } // TODO: ensure logic, so that signer is first intermediate and that // there are no doubles certificates. //certs = append(certs, a.service.signerCertificate) certs = append(certs, a.service.intermediates...) // the CA roots are added for completeness. Clients are responsible // to select the right cert(s) to store and use. if p.ShouldIncludeRootInChain() { certs = append(certs, a.service.roots...) } return certs, nil } // DecryptPKIEnvelope decrypts an enveloped message func (a *Authority) DecryptPKIEnvelope(ctx context.Context, msg *PKIMessage) error { p7c, err := pkcs7.Parse(msg.P7.Content) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error parsing pkcs7 content: %w", err) } cert, pkey, err := a.selectDecrypter(ctx) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed selecting decrypter: %w", err) } envelope, err := p7c.Decrypt(cert, pkey) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error decrypting encrypted pkcs7 content: %w", err) } msg.pkiEnvelope = envelope switch msg.MessageType { case microscep.CertRep: certs, err := microscep.CACerts(msg.pkiEnvelope) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error extracting CA certs from pkcs7 degenerate data: %w", err) } msg.CertRepMessage.Certificate = certs[0] return nil case microscep.PKCSReq, microscep.UpdateReq, microscep.RenewalReq: csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(msg.pkiEnvelope) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("parse CSR from pkiEnvelope: %w", err) } if err := csr.CheckSignature(); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("invalid CSR signature; %w", err) } // check for challengePassword cp, err := microx509util.ParseChallengePassword(msg.pkiEnvelope) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("parse challenge password in pkiEnvelope: %w", err) } msg.CSRReqMessage = µscep.CSRReqMessage{ RawDecrypted: msg.pkiEnvelope, CSR: csr, ChallengePassword: cp, } return nil case microscep.GetCRL, microscep.GetCert, microscep.CertPoll: return errors.New("not implemented") } return nil } func (a *Authority) selectDecrypter(ctx context.Context) (cert *x509.Certificate, pkey crypto.PrivateKey, err error) { p, err := provisionerFromContext(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } // return provisioner specific decrypter, if available if cert, pkey = p.GetDecrypter(); cert != nil && pkey != nil { return } // fallback to the CA wide decrypter cert = a.service.signerCertificate pkey = a.service.defaultDecrypter return } // SignCSR creates an x509.Certificate based on a CSR template and Cert Authority credentials // returns a new PKIMessage with CertRep data func (a *Authority) SignCSR(ctx context.Context, csr *x509.CertificateRequest, msg *PKIMessage) (*PKIMessage, error) { // TODO: intermediate storage of the request? In SCEP it's possible to request a csr/certificate // to be signed, which can be performed asynchronously / out-of-band. In that case a client can // poll for the status. It seems to be similar as what can happen in ACME, so might want to model // the implementation after the one in the ACME authority. Requires storage, etc. p, err := provisionerFromContext(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, err } // check if CSRReqMessage has already been decrypted if msg.CSRReqMessage.CSR == nil { if err := a.DecryptPKIEnvelope(ctx, msg); err != nil { return nil, err } csr = msg.CSRReqMessage.CSR } // Template data sans := []string{} sans = append(sans, csr.DNSNames...) sans = append(sans, csr.EmailAddresses...) for _, v := range csr.IPAddresses { sans = append(sans, v.String()) } for _, v := range csr.URIs { sans = append(sans, v.String()) } if len(sans) == 0 { sans = append(sans, csr.Subject.CommonName) } data := x509util.CreateTemplateData(csr.Subject.CommonName, sans) data.SetCertificateRequest(csr) data.SetSubject(x509util.Subject{ Country: csr.Subject.Country, Organization: csr.Subject.Organization, OrganizationalUnit: csr.Subject.OrganizationalUnit, Locality: csr.Subject.Locality, Province: csr.Subject.Province, StreetAddress: csr.Subject.StreetAddress, PostalCode: csr.Subject.PostalCode, SerialNumber: csr.Subject.SerialNumber, CommonName: csr.Subject.CommonName, }) // Get authorizations from the SCEP provisioner. ctx = provisioner.NewContextWithMethod(ctx, provisioner.SignMethod) signOps, err := p.AuthorizeSign(ctx, "") if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error retrieving authorization options from SCEP provisioner: %w", err) } // Unlike most of the provisioners, scep's AuthorizeSign method doesn't // define the templates, and the template data used in WebHooks is not // available. for _, signOp := range signOps { if wc, ok := signOp.(*provisioner.WebhookController); ok { wc.TemplateData = data } } opts := provisioner.SignOptions{} templateOptions, err := provisioner.TemplateOptions(p.GetOptions(), data) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error creating template options from SCEP provisioner: %w", err) } signOps = append(signOps, templateOptions) certChain, err := a.signAuth.Sign(csr, opts, signOps...) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error generating certificate for order: %w", err) } // take the issued certificate (only); https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8894#section-3.3.2 cert := certChain[0] // and create a degenerate cert structure deg, err := microscep.DegenerateCertificates([]*x509.Certificate{cert}) if err != nil { return nil, err } // apparently the pkcs7 library uses a global default setting for the content encryption // algorithm to use when en- or decrypting data. We need to restore the current setting after // the cryptographic operation, so that other usages of the library are not influenced by // this call to Encrypt(). We are not required to use the same algorithm the SCEP client uses. encryptionAlgorithmToRestore := pkcs7.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm pkcs7.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm = p.GetContentEncryptionAlgorithm() e7, err := pkcs7.Encrypt(deg, msg.P7.Certificates) if err != nil { return nil, err } pkcs7.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm = encryptionAlgorithmToRestore // PKIMessageAttributes to be signed config := pkcs7.SignerInfoConfig{ ExtraSignedAttributes: []pkcs7.Attribute{ { Type: oidSCEPtransactionID, Value: msg.TransactionID, }, { Type: oidSCEPpkiStatus, Value: microscep.SUCCESS, }, { Type: oidSCEPmessageType, Value: microscep.CertRep, }, { Type: oidSCEPrecipientNonce, Value: msg.SenderNonce, }, { Type: oidSCEPsenderNonce, Value: msg.SenderNonce, }, }, } signedData, err := pkcs7.NewSignedData(e7) if err != nil { return nil, err } // add the certificate into the signed data type // this cert must be added before the signedData because the recipient will expect it // as the first certificate in the array signedData.AddCertificate(cert) authCert := a.service.signerCertificate signer := a.service.signer // sign the attributes if err := signedData.AddSigner(authCert, signer, config); err != nil { return nil, err } certRepBytes, err := signedData.Finish() if err != nil { return nil, err } cr := &CertRepMessage{ PKIStatus: microscep.SUCCESS, RecipientNonce: microscep.RecipientNonce(msg.SenderNonce), Certificate: cert, degenerate: deg, } // create a CertRep message from the original crepMsg := &PKIMessage{ Raw: certRepBytes, TransactionID: msg.TransactionID, MessageType: microscep.CertRep, CertRepMessage: cr, } return crepMsg, nil } // CreateFailureResponse creates an appropriately signed reply for PKI operations func (a *Authority) CreateFailureResponse(_ context.Context, _ *x509.CertificateRequest, msg *PKIMessage, info FailInfoName, infoText string) (*PKIMessage, error) { config := pkcs7.SignerInfoConfig{ ExtraSignedAttributes: []pkcs7.Attribute{ { Type: oidSCEPtransactionID, Value: msg.TransactionID, }, { Type: oidSCEPpkiStatus, Value: microscep.FAILURE, }, { Type: oidSCEPfailInfo, Value: info, }, { Type: oidSCEPfailInfoText, Value: infoText, }, { Type: oidSCEPmessageType, Value: microscep.CertRep, }, { Type: oidSCEPsenderNonce, Value: msg.SenderNonce, }, { Type: oidSCEPrecipientNonce, Value: msg.SenderNonce, }, }, } signedData, err := pkcs7.NewSignedData(nil) if err != nil { return nil, err } // sign the attributes if err := signedData.AddSigner(a.service.signerCertificate, a.service.signer, config); err != nil { return nil, err } certRepBytes, err := signedData.Finish() if err != nil { return nil, err } cr := &CertRepMessage{ PKIStatus: microscep.FAILURE, FailInfo: microscep.FailInfo(info), RecipientNonce: microscep.RecipientNonce(msg.SenderNonce), } // create a CertRep message from the original crepMsg := &PKIMessage{ Raw: certRepBytes, TransactionID: msg.TransactionID, MessageType: microscep.CertRep, CertRepMessage: cr, } return crepMsg, nil } // GetCACaps returns the CA capabilities func (a *Authority) GetCACaps(ctx context.Context) []string { p, err := provisionerFromContext(ctx) if err != nil { return defaultCapabilities } caps := p.GetCapabilities() if len(caps) == 0 { return defaultCapabilities } // TODO: validate the caps? Ensure they are the right format according to RFC? // TODO: ensure that the capabilities are actually "enforced"/"verified" in code too: // check that only parts of the spec are used in the implementation belonging to the capabilities. // For example for renewals, which we could disable in the provisioner, should then also // not be reported in cacaps operation. return caps } func (a *Authority) ValidateChallenge(ctx context.Context, challenge, transactionID string) error { p, err := provisionerFromContext(ctx) if err != nil { return err } return p.ValidateChallenge(ctx, challenge, transactionID) }