//go:build tpmsimulator // +build tpmsimulator package acme import ( "context" "crypto" "crypto/sha256" "crypto/x509" "crypto/x509/pkix" "encoding/asn1" "encoding/base64" "encoding/json" "encoding/pem" "errors" "fmt" "net/url" "testing" "github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2" "github.com/google/go-attestation/attest" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "go.step.sm/crypto/jose" "go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil" "go.step.sm/crypto/minica" "go.step.sm/crypto/tpm" "go.step.sm/crypto/tpm/simulator" tpmstorage "go.step.sm/crypto/tpm/storage" "go.step.sm/crypto/x509util" ) func newSimulatedTPM(t *testing.T) *tpm.TPM { t.Helper() tmpDir := t.TempDir() tpm, err := tpm.New(withSimulator(t), tpm.WithStore(tpmstorage.NewDirstore(tmpDir))) // TODO: provide in-memory storage implementation instead require.NoError(t, err) return tpm } func withSimulator(t *testing.T) tpm.NewTPMOption { t.Helper() var sim simulator.Simulator t.Cleanup(func() { if sim == nil { return } err := sim.Close() require.NoError(t, err) }) sim = simulator.New() err := sim.Open() require.NoError(t, err) return tpm.WithSimulator(sim) } func generateKeyID(t *testing.T, pub crypto.PublicKey) []byte { t.Helper() b, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub) require.NoError(t, err) hash := sha256.Sum256(b) return hash[:] } func mustAttestTPM(t *testing.T, keyAuthorization string, permanentIdentifiers []string) ([]byte, crypto.Signer, *x509.Certificate) { t.Helper() aca, err := minica.New( minica.WithName("TPM Testing"), minica.WithGetSignerFunc( func() (crypto.Signer, error) { return keyutil.GenerateSigner("RSA", "", 2048) }, ), ) require.NoError(t, err) // prepare simulated TPM and create an AK stpm := newSimulatedTPM(t) eks, err := stpm.GetEKs(context.Background()) require.NoError(t, err) ak, err := stpm.CreateAK(context.Background(), "first-ak") require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, ak) // extract the AK public key // TODO(hs): replace this when there's a simpler method to get the AK public key (e.g. ak.Public()) ap, err := ak.AttestationParameters(context.Background()) require.NoError(t, err) akp, err := attest.ParseAKPublic(attest.TPMVersion20, ap.Public) require.NoError(t, err) // create template and sign certificate for the AK public key keyID := generateKeyID(t, eks[0].Public()) template := &x509.Certificate{ PublicKey: akp.Public, } if len(permanentIdentifiers) == 0 { template.URIs = []*url.URL{ {Scheme: "urn", Opaque: "ek:sha256:" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(keyID)}, } } else { san := x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{ Type: x509util.PermanentIdentifierType, Value: permanentIdentifiers[0], // TODO(hs): multiple? } ext, err := createSubjectAltNameExtension(nil, nil, nil, nil, []x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{san}, true) require.NoError(t, err) template.ExtraExtensions = append(template.ExtraExtensions, pkix.Extension{ Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier(ext.ID), Critical: ext.Critical, Value: ext.Value, }, ) } akCert, err := aca.Sign(template) require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, akCert) // create a new key attested by the AK, while including // the key authorization bytes as qualifying data. keyAuthSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuthorization)) config := tpm.AttestKeyConfig{ Algorithm: "RSA", Size: 2048, QualifyingData: keyAuthSum[:], } key, err := stpm.AttestKey(context.Background(), "first-ak", "first-key", config) require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, key) require.Equal(t, "first-key", key.Name()) require.NotEqual(t, 0, len(key.Data())) require.Equal(t, "first-ak", key.AttestedBy()) require.True(t, key.WasAttested()) require.True(t, key.WasAttestedBy(ak)) signer, err := key.Signer(context.Background()) require.NoError(t, err) // prepare the attestation object with the AK certificate chain, // the attested key, its metadata and the signature signed by the // AK. params, err := key.CertificationParameters(context.Background()) require.NoError(t, err) attObj, err := cbor.Marshal(struct { Format string `json:"fmt"` AttStatement map[string]interface{} `json:"attStmt,omitempty"` }{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }) require.NoError(t, err) // marshal the ACME payload payload, err := json.Marshal(struct { AttObj string `json:"attObj"` }{ AttObj: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(attObj), }) require.NoError(t, err) return payload, signer, aca.Root } func Test_deviceAttest01ValidateWithTPMSimulator(t *testing.T) { type args struct { ctx context.Context ch *Challenge db DB jwk *jose.JSONWebKey payload []byte } type test struct { args args wantErr *Error } tests := map[string]func(t *testing.T) test{ "ok/doTPMAttestationFormat-storeError": func(t *testing.T) test { jwk, keyAuth := mustAccountAndKeyAuthorization(t, "token") payload, _, root := mustAttestTPM(t, keyAuth, nil) // TODO: value(s) for AK cert? caRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: root.Raw}) ctx := NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), mustAttestationProvisioner(t, caRoot)) // parse payload, set invalid "ver", remarshal var p payloadType err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &p) require.NoError(t, err) attObj, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(p.AttObj) require.NoError(t, err) att := attestationObject{} err = cbor.Unmarshal(attObj, &att) require.NoError(t, err) att.AttStatement["ver"] = "bogus" attObj, err = cbor.Marshal(struct { Format string `json:"fmt"` AttStatement map[string]interface{} `json:"attStmt,omitempty"` }{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: att.AttStatement, }) require.NoError(t, err) payload, err = json.Marshal(struct { AttObj string `json:"attObj"` }{ AttObj: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(attObj), }) require.NoError(t, err) return test{ args: args{ ctx: ctx, jwk: jwk, ch: &Challenge{ ID: "chID", AuthorizationID: "azID", Token: "token", Type: "device-attest-01", Status: StatusPending, Value: "device.id.12345678", }, payload: payload, db: &MockDB{ MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) { assert.Equal(t, "azID", id) return &Authorization{ID: "azID"}, nil }, MockUpdateChallenge: func(ctx context.Context, updch *Challenge) error { assert.Equal(t, "chID", updch.ID) assert.Equal(t, "token", updch.Token) assert.Equal(t, StatusInvalid, updch.Status) assert.Equal(t, ChallengeType("device-attest-01"), updch.Type) assert.Equal(t, "device.id.12345678", updch.Value) err := NewError(ErrorBadAttestationStatementType, `version "bogus" is not supported`) assert.EqualError(t, updch.Error.Err, err.Err.Error()) assert.Equal(t, err.Type, updch.Error.Type) assert.Equal(t, err.Detail, updch.Error.Detail) assert.Equal(t, err.Status, updch.Error.Status) assert.Equal(t, err.Subproblems, updch.Error.Subproblems) return nil }, }, }, wantErr: nil, } }, "ok with invalid PermanentIdentifier SAN": func(t *testing.T) test { jwk, keyAuth := mustAccountAndKeyAuthorization(t, "token") payload, _, root := mustAttestTPM(t, keyAuth, []string{"device.id.12345678"}) // TODO: value(s) for AK cert? caRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: root.Raw}) ctx := NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), mustAttestationProvisioner(t, caRoot)) return test{ args: args{ ctx: ctx, jwk: jwk, ch: &Challenge{ ID: "chID", AuthorizationID: "azID", Token: "token", Type: "device-attest-01", Status: StatusPending, Value: "device.id.99999999", }, payload: payload, db: &MockDB{ MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) { assert.Equal(t, "azID", id) return &Authorization{ID: "azID"}, nil }, MockUpdateChallenge: func(ctx context.Context, updch *Challenge) error { assert.Equal(t, "chID", updch.ID) assert.Equal(t, "token", updch.Token) assert.Equal(t, StatusInvalid, updch.Status) assert.Equal(t, ChallengeType("device-attest-01"), updch.Type) assert.Equal(t, "device.id.99999999", updch.Value) err := NewError(ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, `permanent identifier does not match`). AddSubproblems(NewSubproblemWithIdentifier( ErrorMalformedType, Identifier{Type: "permanent-identifier", Value: "device.id.99999999"}, `challenge identifier "device.id.99999999" doesn't match any of the attested hardware identifiers ["device.id.12345678"]`, )) assert.EqualError(t, updch.Error.Err, err.Err.Error()) assert.Equal(t, err.Type, updch.Error.Type) assert.Equal(t, err.Detail, updch.Error.Detail) assert.Equal(t, err.Status, updch.Error.Status) assert.Equal(t, err.Subproblems, updch.Error.Subproblems) return nil }, }, }, wantErr: nil, } }, "ok": func(t *testing.T) test { jwk, keyAuth := mustAccountAndKeyAuthorization(t, "token") payload, signer, root := mustAttestTPM(t, keyAuth, nil) // TODO: value(s) for AK cert? caRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: root.Raw}) ctx := NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), mustAttestationProvisioner(t, caRoot)) return test{ args: args{ ctx: ctx, jwk: jwk, ch: &Challenge{ ID: "chID", AuthorizationID: "azID", Token: "token", Type: "device-attest-01", Status: StatusPending, Value: "device.id.12345678", }, payload: payload, db: &MockDB{ MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) { assert.Equal(t, "azID", id) return &Authorization{ID: "azID"}, nil }, MockUpdateAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error { fingerprint, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(signer.Public()) assert.NoError(t, err) assert.Equal(t, "azID", az.ID) assert.Equal(t, fingerprint, az.Fingerprint) return nil }, MockUpdateChallenge: func(ctx context.Context, updch *Challenge) error { assert.Equal(t, "chID", updch.ID) assert.Equal(t, "token", updch.Token) assert.Equal(t, StatusValid, updch.Status) assert.Equal(t, ChallengeType("device-attest-01"), updch.Type) assert.Equal(t, "device.id.12345678", updch.Value) return nil }, }, }, wantErr: nil, } }, "ok with PermanentIdentifier SAN": func(t *testing.T) test { jwk, keyAuth := mustAccountAndKeyAuthorization(t, "token") payload, signer, root := mustAttestTPM(t, keyAuth, []string{"device.id.12345678"}) // TODO: value(s) for AK cert? caRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: root.Raw}) ctx := NewProvisionerContext(context.Background(), mustAttestationProvisioner(t, caRoot)) return test{ args: args{ ctx: ctx, jwk: jwk, ch: &Challenge{ ID: "chID", AuthorizationID: "azID", Token: "token", Type: "device-attest-01", Status: StatusPending, Value: "device.id.12345678", }, payload: payload, db: &MockDB{ MockGetAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error) { assert.Equal(t, "azID", id) return &Authorization{ID: "azID"}, nil }, MockUpdateAuthorization: func(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error { fingerprint, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(signer.Public()) assert.NoError(t, err) assert.Equal(t, "azID", az.ID) assert.Equal(t, fingerprint, az.Fingerprint) return nil }, MockUpdateChallenge: func(ctx context.Context, updch *Challenge) error { assert.Equal(t, "chID", updch.ID) assert.Equal(t, "token", updch.Token) assert.Equal(t, StatusValid, updch.Status) assert.Equal(t, ChallengeType("device-attest-01"), updch.Type) assert.Equal(t, "device.id.12345678", updch.Value) return nil }, }, }, wantErr: nil, } }, } for name, run := range tests { t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { tc := run(t) if err := deviceAttest01Validate(tc.args.ctx, tc.args.ch, tc.args.db, tc.args.jwk, tc.args.payload); err != nil { assert.Error(t, tc.wantErr) assert.EqualError(t, err, tc.wantErr.Error()) return } assert.Nil(t, tc.wantErr) }) } } func newBadAttestationStatementError(msg string) *Error { return &Error{ Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badAttestationStatement", Status: 400, Err: errors.New(msg), } } func newInternalServerError(msg string) *Error { return &Error{ Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:serverInternal", Status: 500, Err: errors.New(msg), } } var ( oidPermanentIdentifier = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 3} oidHardwareModuleNameIdentifier = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 4} ) func Test_doTPMAttestationFormat(t *testing.T) { ctx := context.Background() aca, err := minica.New( minica.WithName("TPM Testing"), minica.WithGetSignerFunc( func() (crypto.Signer, error) { return keyutil.GenerateSigner("RSA", "", 2048) }, ), ) require.NoError(t, err) acaRoot := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: aca.Root.Raw}) // prepare simulated TPM and create an AK stpm := newSimulatedTPM(t) eks, err := stpm.GetEKs(context.Background()) require.NoError(t, err) ak, err := stpm.CreateAK(context.Background(), "first-ak") require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, ak) // extract the AK public key // TODO(hs): replace this when there's a simpler method to get the AK public key (e.g. ak.Public()) ap, err := ak.AttestationParameters(context.Background()) require.NoError(t, err) akp, err := attest.ParseAKPublic(attest.TPMVersion20, ap.Public) require.NoError(t, err) // create template and sign certificate for the AK public key keyID := generateKeyID(t, eks[0].Public()) template := &x509.Certificate{ PublicKey: akp.Public, URIs: []*url.URL{ {Scheme: "urn", Opaque: "ek:sha256:" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(keyID)}, }, } akCert, err := aca.Sign(template) require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, akCert) // generate a JWK and the key authorization value jwk, err := jose.GenerateJWK("EC", "P-256", "ES256", "sig", "", 0) require.NoError(t, err) keyAuthorization, err := KeyAuthorization("token", jwk) require.NoError(t, err) // create a new key attested by the AK, while including // the key authorization bytes as qualifying data. keyAuthSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuthorization)) config := tpm.AttestKeyConfig{ Algorithm: "RSA", Size: 2048, QualifyingData: keyAuthSum[:], } key, err := stpm.AttestKey(context.Background(), "first-ak", "first-key", config) require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, key) params, err := key.CertificationParameters(context.Background()) require.NoError(t, err) signer, err := key.Signer(context.Background()) require.NoError(t, err) fingerprint, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(signer.Public()) require.NoError(t, err) // attest another key and get its certification parameters anotherKey, err := stpm.AttestKey(context.Background(), "first-ak", "another-key", config) require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, key) anotherKeyParams, err := anotherKey.CertificationParameters(context.Background()) require.NoError(t, err) type args struct { ctx context.Context prov Provisioner ch *Challenge jwk *jose.JSONWebKey att *attestationObject } tests := []struct { name string args args want *tpmAttestationData expErr *Error }{ {"ok", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, nil}, {"fail ver not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("ver not present")}, {"fail ver type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": []interface{}{}, "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("ver not present")}, {"fail bogus ver", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "bogus", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError(`version "bogus" is not supported`)}, {"fail x5c not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c not present")}, {"fail x5c type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": [][]byte{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c not present")}, {"fail x5c empty", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is empty")}, {"fail leaf type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "step", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{"leaf", aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is malformed")}, {"fail leaf parse", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "step", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw[:100], aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is malformed: x509: malformed certificate")}, {"fail intermediate type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "step", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, "intermediate"}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is malformed")}, {"fail intermediate parse", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "step", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw[:100]}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is malformed: x509: malformed certificate")}, {"fail roots", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, nil), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newInternalServerError("no root CA bundle available to verify the attestation certificate")}, {"fail verify", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "step", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("x5c is not valid: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority")}, {"fail pubArea not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid pubArea in attestation statement")}, {"fail pubArea type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": []interface{}{}, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid pubArea in attestation statement")}, {"fail pubArea empty", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": []byte{}, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("pubArea is empty")}, {"fail sig not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid sig in attestation statement")}, {"fail sig type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": []interface{}{}, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid sig in attestation statement")}, {"fail sig empty", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": []byte{}, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("sig is empty")}, {"fail certInfo not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid certInfo in attestation statement")}, {"fail certInfo type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": []interface{}{}, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid certInfo in attestation statement")}, {"fail certInfo empty", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": []byte{}, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("certInfo is empty")}, {"fail alg not present", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid alg in attestation statement")}, {"fail alg type", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(0), // invalid alg "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid alg 0 in attestation statement")}, {"fail attestation verification", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": anotherKeyParams.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("invalid certification parameters: certification refers to a different key")}, {"fail keyAuthorization", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "token"}, &jose.JSONWebKey{Key: []byte("not an asymmetric key")}, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // RS256 "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newInternalServerError("failed creating key auth digest: error generating JWK thumbprint: square/go-jose: unknown key type '[]uint8'")}, {"fail different keyAuthorization", args{ctx, mustAttestationProvisioner(t, acaRoot), &Challenge{Token: "aDifferentToken"}, jwk, &attestationObject{ Format: "tpm", AttStatement: map[string]interface{}{ "ver": "2.0", "x5c": []interface{}{akCert.Raw, aca.Intermediate.Raw}, "alg": int64(-257), // "sig": params.CreateSignature, "certInfo": params.CreateAttestation, "pubArea": params.Public, }, }}, nil, newBadAttestationStatementError("key authorization does not match")}, } for _, tt := range tests { t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { got, err := doTPMAttestationFormat(tt.args.ctx, tt.args.prov, tt.args.ch, tt.args.jwk, tt.args.att) if tt.expErr != nil { var ae *Error if assert.True(t, errors.As(err, &ae)) { assert.EqualError(t, err, tt.expErr.Error()) assert.Equal(t, ae.StatusCode(), tt.expErr.StatusCode()) assert.Equal(t, ae.Type, tt.expErr.Type) } assert.Nil(t, got) return } assert.NoError(t, err) if assert.NotNil(t, got) { assert.Equal(t, akCert, got.Certificate) assert.Equal(t, [][]*x509.Certificate{ { akCert, aca.Intermediate, aca.Root, }, }, got.VerifiedChains) assert.Equal(t, fingerprint, got.Fingerprint) assert.Empty(t, got.PermanentIdentifiers) // currently expected to be always empty } }) } } // createSubjectAltNameExtension will construct an Extension containing all // SubjectAlternativeNames held in a Certificate. It implements more types than // the golang x509 library, so it is used whenever OtherName or RegisteredID // type SANs are present in the certificate. // // See also https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280.html#section-4.2.1.6 // // TODO(hs): this was copied from go.step.sm/crypto/x509util to make it easier // to create the SAN extension for testing purposes. Should it be exposed instead? func createSubjectAltNameExtension(dnsNames, emailAddresses x509util.MultiString, ipAddresses x509util.MultiIP, uris x509util.MultiURL, sans []x509util.SubjectAlternativeName, subjectIsEmpty bool) (x509util.Extension, error) { var zero x509util.Extension var rawValues []asn1.RawValue for _, dnsName := range dnsNames { rawValue, err := x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{ Type: x509util.DNSType, Value: dnsName, }.RawValue() if err != nil { return zero, err } rawValues = append(rawValues, rawValue) } for _, emailAddress := range emailAddresses { rawValue, err := x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{ Type: x509util.EmailType, Value: emailAddress, }.RawValue() if err != nil { return zero, err } rawValues = append(rawValues, rawValue) } for _, ip := range ipAddresses { rawValue, err := x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{ Type: x509util.IPType, Value: ip.String(), }.RawValue() if err != nil { return zero, err } rawValues = append(rawValues, rawValue) } for _, uri := range uris { rawValue, err := x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{ Type: x509util.URIType, Value: uri.String(), }.RawValue() if err != nil { return zero, err } rawValues = append(rawValues, rawValue) } for _, san := range sans { rawValue, err := san.RawValue() if err != nil { return zero, err } rawValues = append(rawValues, rawValue) } // Now marshal the rawValues into the ASN1 sequence, and create an Extension object to hold the extension rawBytes, err := asn1.Marshal(rawValues) if err != nil { return zero, fmt.Errorf("error marshaling SubjectAlternativeName extension to ASN1: %w", err) } return x509util.Extension{ ID: x509util.ObjectIdentifier(oidSubjectAlternativeName), Critical: subjectIsEmpty, Value: rawBytes, }, nil }