* When returning NS for delegation point, we sign any DS Record or if not found we generate a NSEC proving absence of DS. This follow behaviour describe in rfc4035 (Section 3.1.4) * DS request at apex behave as before. * Fix edge case of requesting NSEC which prove that NSEC does not exist. Signed-off-by: Jeremiejig <me@jeremiejig.fr>
258 lines
6.6 KiB
Go
258 lines
6.6 KiB
Go
package dnssec
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import (
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/test"
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"github.com/coredns/coredns/request"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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)
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func TestZoneSigningBlackLies(t *testing.T) {
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d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
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defer rm1()
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defer rm2()
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m := testNxdomainMsg()
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state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
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m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
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if !section(m.Ns, 2) {
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t.Errorf("Authority section should have 2 sigs")
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}
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var nsec *dns.NSEC
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for _, r := range m.Ns {
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if r.Header().Rrtype == dns.TypeNSEC {
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nsec = r.(*dns.NSEC)
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}
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}
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if m.Rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
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t.Errorf("Expected rcode %d, got %d", dns.RcodeSuccess, m.Rcode)
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}
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if nsec == nil {
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t.Fatalf("Expected NSEC, got none")
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}
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if nsec.Hdr.Name != "ww.miek.nl." {
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t.Errorf("Expected %s, got %s", "ww.miek.nl.", nsec.Hdr.Name)
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}
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if nsec.NextDomain != "\\000.ww.miek.nl." {
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t.Errorf("Expected %s, got %s", "\\000.ww.miek.nl.", nsec.NextDomain)
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}
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}
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func TestBlackLiesNoError(t *testing.T) {
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d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
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defer rm1()
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defer rm2()
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m := testSuccessMsg()
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state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
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m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
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if m.Rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
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t.Errorf("Expected rcode %d, got %d", dns.RcodeSuccess, m.Rcode)
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}
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if len(m.Answer) != 2 {
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t.Errorf("Answer section should have 2 RRs")
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}
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sig, txt := false, false
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for _, rr := range m.Answer {
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if _, ok := rr.(*dns.RRSIG); ok {
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sig = true
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}
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if _, ok := rr.(*dns.TXT); ok {
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txt = true
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}
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}
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if !sig || !txt {
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t.Errorf("Expected RRSIG and TXT in answer section")
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}
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}
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func TestBlackLiesApexNsec(t *testing.T) {
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d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
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defer rm1()
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defer rm2()
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m := testNsecMsg()
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m.SetQuestion("miek.nl.", dns.TypeNSEC)
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state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
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m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
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if len(m.Ns) > 0 {
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t.Error("Authority section should be empty")
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}
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if len(m.Answer) != 2 {
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t.Errorf("Answer section should have 2 RRs")
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}
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sig, nsec := false, false
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for _, rr := range m.Answer {
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if _, ok := rr.(*dns.RRSIG); ok {
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sig = true
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}
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if rnsec, ok := rr.(*dns.NSEC); ok {
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nsec = true
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var bitpresent uint
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for _, typeBit := range rnsec.TypeBitMap {
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switch typeBit {
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case dns.TypeSOA:
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bitpresent |= 4
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case dns.TypeNSEC:
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bitpresent |= 1
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case dns.TypeRRSIG:
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bitpresent |= 2
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}
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}
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if bitpresent != 7 {
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t.Error("NSEC must have SOA, RRSIG and NSEC in its bitmap")
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}
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}
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}
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if !sig || !nsec {
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t.Errorf("Expected RRSIG and NSEC in answer section")
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}
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}
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func TestBlackLiesNsec(t *testing.T) {
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d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
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defer rm1()
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defer rm2()
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m := testNsecMsg()
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m.SetQuestion("www.miek.nl.", dns.TypeNSEC)
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state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
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m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
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if len(m.Ns) > 0 {
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t.Error("Authority section should be empty")
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}
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if len(m.Answer) != 2 {
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t.Errorf("Answer section should have 2 RRs")
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}
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sig, nsec := false, false
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for _, rr := range m.Answer {
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if _, ok := rr.(*dns.RRSIG); ok {
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sig = true
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}
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if rnsec, ok := rr.(*dns.NSEC); ok {
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nsec = true
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var bitpresent uint
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for _, typeBit := range rnsec.TypeBitMap {
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switch typeBit {
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case dns.TypeNSEC:
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bitpresent |= 1
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case dns.TypeRRSIG:
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bitpresent |= 2
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}
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}
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if bitpresent != 3 {
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t.Error("NSEC must have RRSIG and NSEC in its bitmap")
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}
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}
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}
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if !sig || !nsec {
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t.Errorf("Expected RRSIG and NSEC in answer section")
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}
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}
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func TestBlackLiesApexDS(t *testing.T) {
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d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
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defer rm1()
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defer rm2()
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m := testApexDSMsg()
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m.SetQuestion("miek.nl.", dns.TypeDS)
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state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
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m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
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if !section(m.Ns, 2) {
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t.Errorf("Authority section should have 2 sigs")
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}
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var nsec *dns.NSEC
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for _, r := range m.Ns {
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if r.Header().Rrtype == dns.TypeNSEC {
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nsec = r.(*dns.NSEC)
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}
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}
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if nsec == nil {
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t.Error("Expected NSEC, got none")
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} else if correctNsecForDS(nsec) {
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t.Error("NSEC DS at the apex zone should cover all apex type.")
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}
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}
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func TestBlackLiesDS(t *testing.T) {
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d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
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defer rm1()
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defer rm2()
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m := testApexDSMsg()
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m.SetQuestion("sub.miek.nl.", dns.TypeDS)
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state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
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m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
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if !section(m.Ns, 2) {
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t.Errorf("Authority section should have 2 sigs")
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}
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var nsec *dns.NSEC
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for _, r := range m.Ns {
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if r.Header().Rrtype == dns.TypeNSEC {
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nsec = r.(*dns.NSEC)
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}
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}
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if nsec == nil {
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t.Error("Expected NSEC, got none")
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} else if !correctNsecForDS(nsec) {
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t.Error("NSEC DS should cover delegation type only.")
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}
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}
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func correctNsecForDS(nsec *dns.NSEC) bool {
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var bitmask uint
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/* Coherent TypeBitMap for NSEC of DS should contain at least:
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* {TypeNS, TypeNSEC, TypeRRSIG} and no SOA.
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* Any missing type will confuse resolver because
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* it will prove that the dns query cannot be a delegation point,
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* which will break trust resolution for unsigned delegated domain.
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* No SOA is obvious for none apex query.
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*/
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for _, typeBitmask := range nsec.TypeBitMap {
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switch typeBitmask {
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case dns.TypeNS:
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bitmask |= 1
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case dns.TypeNSEC:
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bitmask |= 2
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case dns.TypeRRSIG:
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bitmask |= 4
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case dns.TypeSOA:
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return false
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}
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}
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return bitmask == 7
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}
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func testNxdomainMsg() *dns.Msg {
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return &dns.Msg{MsgHdr: dns.MsgHdr{Rcode: dns.RcodeNameError},
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Question: []dns.Question{{Name: "ww.miek.nl.", Qclass: dns.ClassINET, Qtype: dns.TypeTXT}},
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Ns: []dns.RR{test.SOA("miek.nl. 1800 IN SOA linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1461471181 14400 3600 604800 14400")},
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}
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}
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func testSuccessMsg() *dns.Msg {
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return &dns.Msg{MsgHdr: dns.MsgHdr{Rcode: dns.RcodeSuccess},
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Question: []dns.Question{{Name: "www.miek.nl.", Qclass: dns.ClassINET, Qtype: dns.TypeTXT}},
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Answer: []dns.RR{test.TXT(`www.miek.nl. 1800 IN TXT "response"`)},
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}
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}
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func testNsecMsg() *dns.Msg {
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return &dns.Msg{MsgHdr: dns.MsgHdr{Rcode: dns.RcodeNameError},
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Question: []dns.Question{{Name: "www.miek.nl.", Qclass: dns.ClassINET, Qtype: dns.TypeNSEC}},
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Ns: []dns.RR{test.SOA("miek.nl. 1800 IN SOA linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1461471181 14400 3600 604800 14400")},
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}
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}
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func testApexDSMsg() *dns.Msg {
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return &dns.Msg{MsgHdr: dns.MsgHdr{Rcode: dns.RcodeNameError},
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Question: []dns.Question{{Name: "miek.nl.", Qclass: dns.ClassINET, Qtype: dns.TypeDS}},
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Ns: []dns.RR{test.SOA("miek.nl. 1800 IN SOA linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1461471181 14400 3600 604800 14400")},
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}
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}
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