To ensure that we only unmarshal the verified payload into the contained
manifest, we first copy the entire incoming buffer into Raw and then unmarshal
only the Payload portion of the incoming bytes. If the contents is later
verified, the caller can then be sure that the contents of the Manifest fields
can be trusted.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lehmann <aaron.lehmann@docker.com>
As we begin our march towards multi-arch, we must prepare for the reality of
multiple manifest schemas. This is the beginning of a set of changes to
facilitate this. We are both moving this package into its target position where
it may live peacefully next to other manfiest versions.
Signed-off-by: Stephen J Day <stephen.day@docker.com>
To provide easier access to digestible content, the paylaod has been made
accessible on the signed manifest type. This hides the specifics of the
interaction with libtrust with the caveat that signatures may be parsed twice.
We'll have to have a future look at the interface for manifest as we may be
making problematic architectural decisions. We'll visit this after the initial
release.
Signed-off-by: Stephen J Day <stephen.day@docker.com>
It was probably ill-advised to couple manifest signing and verification to
their respective types. This changeset simply changes them from methods to
functions. These might not even be in this package in the future.
Signed-off-by: Stephen J Day <stephen.day@docker.com>
Because manifests and their signatures are a discrete component of the
registry, we are moving the definitions into a separate package. This causes us
to lose some test coverage, but we can fill this in shortly. No changes have
been made to the external interfaces, but they are likely to come.
Signed-off-by: Stephen J Day <stephen.day@docker.com>
Stephen J Day
Hu Keping