distribution/registry/auth/token/token.go
Milos Gajdos 52d68216c0
feature: Bump go-jose and require signing algorithms in auth
This bumps go-jose to the latest available version: v4.0.3.
This slightly breaks the backwards compatibility with the existing
registry deployments but brings more security with it.

We now require the users to specify the list of token signing algorithms in
the configuration. We do strive to maintain the b/w compat by providing
a list of supported algorithms, though, this isn't something we
recommend due to security issues, see:
* https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/issues/64
* https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/pull/69

As part of this change we now return to the original flow of the token
signature validation:
1. X2C (tls) headers
2. JWKS
3. KeyID

Signed-off-by: Milos Gajdos <milosthegajdos@gmail.com>
2024-05-30 20:44:35 +01:00

315 lines
8.6 KiB
Go

package token
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4/jwt"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/distribution/distribution/v3/registry/auth"
)
const (
// TokenSeparator is the value which separates the header, claims, and
// signature in the compact serialization of a JSON Web Token.
TokenSeparator = "."
// Leeway is the Duration that will be added to NBF and EXP claim
// checks to account for clock skew as per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.5
Leeway = 60 * time.Second
)
var signingAlgorithms = map[string]jose.SignatureAlgorithm{
"EdDSA": jose.EdDSA,
"HS256": jose.HS256,
"HS384": jose.HS384,
"HS512": jose.HS512,
"RS256": jose.RS256,
"RS384": jose.RS384,
"RS512": jose.RS512,
"ES256": jose.ES256,
"ES384": jose.ES384,
"ES512": jose.ES512,
"PS256": jose.PS256,
"PS384": jose.PS384,
"PS512": jose.PS512,
}
var defaultSigningAlgorithms = []jose.SignatureAlgorithm{
jose.EdDSA,
jose.HS256,
jose.HS384,
jose.HS512,
jose.RS256,
jose.RS384,
jose.RS512,
jose.ES256,
jose.ES384,
jose.ES512,
jose.PS256,
jose.PS384,
jose.PS512,
}
// Errors used by token parsing and verification.
var (
ErrMalformedToken = errors.New("malformed token")
ErrInvalidToken = errors.New("invalid token")
)
// ResourceActions stores allowed actions on a named and typed resource.
type ResourceActions struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Class string `json:"class,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Actions []string `json:"actions"`
}
// ClaimSet describes the main section of a JSON Web Token.
type ClaimSet struct {
// Public claims
Issuer string `json:"iss"`
Subject string `json:"sub"`
Audience AudienceList `json:"aud"`
Expiration int64 `json:"exp"`
NotBefore int64 `json:"nbf"`
IssuedAt int64 `json:"iat"`
JWTID string `json:"jti"`
// Private claims
Access []*ResourceActions `json:"access"`
}
// Token is a JSON Web Token.
type Token struct {
Raw string
JWT *jwt.JSONWebToken
}
// VerifyOptions is used to specify
// options when verifying a JSON Web Token.
type VerifyOptions struct {
TrustedIssuers []string
AcceptedAudiences []string
Roots *x509.CertPool
TrustedKeys map[string]crypto.PublicKey
}
// NewToken parses the given raw token string
// and constructs an unverified JSON Web Token.
func NewToken(rawToken string, signingAlgs []jose.SignatureAlgorithm) (*Token, error) {
token, err := jwt.ParseSigned(rawToken, signingAlgs)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrMalformedToken
}
return &Token{
Raw: rawToken,
JWT: token,
}, nil
}
// Verify attempts to verify this token using the given options.
// Returns a nil error if the token is valid.
func (t *Token) Verify(verifyOpts VerifyOptions) (*ClaimSet, error) {
// Verify that the signing key is trusted.
signingKey, err := t.VerifySigningKey(verifyOpts)
if err != nil {
log.Infof("failed to verify token: %v", err)
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
}
// NOTE(milosgajdos): Claims both verifies the signature
// and returns the claims within the payload
var claims ClaimSet
err = t.JWT.Claims(signingKey, &claims)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Verify that the Issuer claim is a trusted authority.
if !contains(verifyOpts.TrustedIssuers, claims.Issuer) {
log.Infof("token from untrusted issuer: %q", claims.Issuer)
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
}
// Verify that the Audience claim is allowed.
if !containsAny(verifyOpts.AcceptedAudiences, claims.Audience) {
log.Infof("token intended for another audience: %v", claims.Audience)
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
}
// Verify that the token is currently usable and not expired.
currentTime := time.Now()
ExpWithLeeway := time.Unix(claims.Expiration, 0).Add(Leeway)
if currentTime.After(ExpWithLeeway) {
log.Infof("token not to be used after %s - currently %s", ExpWithLeeway, currentTime)
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
}
NotBeforeWithLeeway := time.Unix(claims.NotBefore, 0).Add(-Leeway)
if currentTime.Before(NotBeforeWithLeeway) {
log.Infof("token not to be used before %s - currently %s", NotBeforeWithLeeway, currentTime)
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
}
return &claims, nil
}
// VerifySigningKey attempts to verify and return the signing key which was used to sign the token.
func (t *Token) VerifySigningKey(verifyOpts VerifyOptions) (signingKey crypto.PublicKey, err error) {
if len(t.JWT.Headers) == 0 {
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
}
// NOTE(milosgajdos): docker auth spec does not seem to
// support tokens signed by multiple signatures so we are
// verifying the first one in the list only at the moment.
header := t.JWT.Headers[0]
signingKey, err = verifyCertChain(header, verifyOpts.Roots)
// NOTE(milosgajdos): if the x5c header is missing
// the token may have been signed by a JWKS.
if err != nil && err != jose.ErrMissingX5cHeader {
return
}
switch {
case header.JSONWebKey != nil:
signingKey, err = verifyJWK(header, verifyOpts)
case len(header.KeyID) > 0:
signingKey = verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[header.KeyID]
if signingKey == nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("token signed by untrusted key with ID: %q", header.KeyID)
}
default:
err = ErrInvalidToken
}
return
}
func verifyCertChain(header jose.Header, roots *x509.CertPool) (signingKey crypto.PublicKey, err error) {
verifyOpts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: roots,
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny},
}
// TODO: this call returns certificate chains which we ignore for now, but
// we should check them for revocations if we have the ability later.
chains, err := header.Certificates(verifyOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
signingKey = getCertPubKey(chains)
return
}
func verifyJWK(header jose.Header, verifyOpts VerifyOptions) (signingKey crypto.PublicKey, err error) {
jwk := header.JSONWebKey
signingKey = jwk.Key
// Check to see if the key includes a certificate chain.
if len(jwk.Certificates) == 0 {
// The JWK should be one of the trusted root keys.
if _, trusted := verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[jwk.KeyID]; !trusted {
return nil, errors.New("untrusted JWK with no certificate chain")
}
// The JWK is one of the trusted keys.
return
}
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: verifyOpts.Roots,
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny},
}
leaf := jwk.Certificates[0]
if opts.Intermediates == nil {
opts.Intermediates = x509.NewCertPool()
for _, intermediate := range jwk.Certificates[1:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(intermediate)
}
}
// TODO: this call returns certificate chains which we ignore for now, but
// we should check them for revocations if we have the ability later.
chains, err := leaf.Verify(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
signingKey = getCertPubKey(chains)
return
}
func getCertPubKey(chains [][]*x509.Certificate) crypto.PublicKey {
// NOTE(milosgajdos): if there are no certificates
// header.Certificates call above returns error, so we are
// guaranteed to get at least one certificate chain.
// We pick the leaf certificate chain.
chain := chains[0]
// NOTE(milosgajdos): header.Certificates call returns the result
// of leafCert.Verify which is a call to x509.Certificate.Verify.
// If successful, it returns one or more chains where the first
// element of the chain is x5c and the last element is from opts.Roots.
// See: https://pkg.go.dev/crypto/x509#Certificate.Verify
cert := chain[0]
// NOTE: we dont have to verify that the public key in the leaf cert
// *is* the signing key: if it's not the signing then token claims
// verification with this key fails
return cert.PublicKey.(crypto.PublicKey)
}
// accessSet returns a set of actions available for the resource
// actions listed in the `access` section of this token.
func (c *ClaimSet) accessSet() accessSet {
accessSet := make(accessSet, len(c.Access))
for _, resourceActions := range c.Access {
resource := auth.Resource{
Type: resourceActions.Type,
Name: resourceActions.Name,
}
set, exists := accessSet[resource]
if !exists {
set = newActionSet()
accessSet[resource] = set
}
for _, action := range resourceActions.Actions {
set.add(action)
}
}
return accessSet
}
func (c *ClaimSet) resources() []auth.Resource {
resourceSet := map[auth.Resource]struct{}{}
for _, resourceActions := range c.Access {
resource := auth.Resource{
Type: resourceActions.Type,
Class: resourceActions.Class,
Name: resourceActions.Name,
}
resourceSet[resource] = struct{}{}
}
resources := make([]auth.Resource, 0, len(resourceSet))
for resource := range resourceSet {
resources = append(resources, resource)
}
return resources
}