distribution/registry/storage/signedmanifesthandler.go
Derek McGowan b34e571bff Add option to disable signatures
Add option for specifying trust key for signing schema1 manifests.
Since schema1 signature key identifiers are not verified anywhere and deprecated, storing signatures is no longer a requirement.
Furthermore in schema2 there is no signature, requiring the registry to already add signatures to generated schema1 manifests.

Signed-off-by: Derek McGowan <derek@mcgstyle.net> (github: dmcgowan)
2016-02-10 15:20:39 -08:00

167 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

package storage
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"github.com/docker/distribution"
"github.com/docker/distribution/context"
"github.com/docker/distribution/digest"
"github.com/docker/distribution/manifest/schema1"
"github.com/docker/distribution/reference"
"github.com/docker/libtrust"
)
// signedManifestHandler is a ManifestHandler that covers schema1 manifests. It
// can unmarshal and put schema1 manifests that have been signed by libtrust.
type signedManifestHandler struct {
repository *repository
blobStore *linkedBlobStore
ctx context.Context
signatures *signatureStore
}
var _ ManifestHandler = &signedManifestHandler{}
func (ms *signedManifestHandler) Unmarshal(ctx context.Context, dgst digest.Digest, content []byte) (distribution.Manifest, error) {
context.GetLogger(ms.ctx).Debug("(*signedManifestHandler).Unmarshal")
var (
signatures [][]byte
err error
)
if ms.repository.schema1SignaturesEnabled {
// Fetch the signatures for the manifest
signatures, err = ms.signatures.Get(dgst)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
jsig, err := libtrust.NewJSONSignature(content, signatures...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if ms.repository.schema1SigningKey != nil {
if err := jsig.Sign(ms.repository.schema1SigningKey); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
} else if !ms.repository.schema1SignaturesEnabled {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing signing key with signature store disabled")
}
// Extract the pretty JWS
raw, err := jsig.PrettySignature("signatures")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var sm schema1.SignedManifest
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &sm); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &sm, nil
}
func (ms *signedManifestHandler) Put(ctx context.Context, manifest distribution.Manifest, skipDependencyVerification bool) (digest.Digest, error) {
context.GetLogger(ms.ctx).Debug("(*signedManifestHandler).Put")
sm, ok := manifest.(*schema1.SignedManifest)
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("non-schema1 manifest put to signedManifestHandler: %T", manifest)
}
if err := ms.verifyManifest(ms.ctx, *sm, skipDependencyVerification); err != nil {
return "", err
}
mt := schema1.MediaTypeManifest
payload := sm.Canonical
revision, err := ms.blobStore.Put(ctx, mt, payload)
if err != nil {
context.GetLogger(ctx).Errorf("error putting payload into blobstore: %v", err)
return "", err
}
// Link the revision into the repository.
if err := ms.blobStore.linkBlob(ctx, revision); err != nil {
return "", err
}
if ms.repository.schema1SignaturesEnabled {
// Grab each json signature and store them.
signatures, err := sm.Signatures()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if err := ms.signatures.Put(revision.Digest, signatures...); err != nil {
return "", err
}
}
return revision.Digest, nil
}
// verifyManifest ensures that the manifest content is valid from the
// perspective of the registry. It ensures that the signature is valid for the
// enclosed payload. As a policy, the registry only tries to store valid
// content, leaving trust policies of that content up to consumers.
func (ms *signedManifestHandler) verifyManifest(ctx context.Context, mnfst schema1.SignedManifest, skipDependencyVerification bool) error {
var errs distribution.ErrManifestVerification
if len(mnfst.Name) > reference.NameTotalLengthMax {
errs = append(errs,
distribution.ErrManifestNameInvalid{
Name: mnfst.Name,
Reason: fmt.Errorf("manifest name must not be more than %v characters", reference.NameTotalLengthMax),
})
}
if !reference.NameRegexp.MatchString(mnfst.Name) {
errs = append(errs,
distribution.ErrManifestNameInvalid{
Name: mnfst.Name,
Reason: fmt.Errorf("invalid manifest name format"),
})
}
if len(mnfst.History) != len(mnfst.FSLayers) {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("mismatched history and fslayer cardinality %d != %d",
len(mnfst.History), len(mnfst.FSLayers)))
}
if _, err := schema1.Verify(&mnfst); err != nil {
switch err {
case libtrust.ErrMissingSignatureKey, libtrust.ErrInvalidJSONContent, libtrust.ErrMissingSignatureKey:
errs = append(errs, distribution.ErrManifestUnverified{})
default:
if err.Error() == "invalid signature" { // TODO(stevvooe): This should be exported by libtrust
errs = append(errs, distribution.ErrManifestUnverified{})
} else {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
}
if !skipDependencyVerification {
for _, fsLayer := range mnfst.References() {
_, err := ms.repository.Blobs(ctx).Stat(ctx, fsLayer.Digest)
if err != nil {
if err != distribution.ErrBlobUnknown {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
// On error here, we always append unknown blob errors.
errs = append(errs, distribution.ErrManifestBlobUnknown{Digest: fsLayer.Digest})
}
}
}
if len(errs) != 0 {
return errs
}
return nil
}