frostfs-node/pkg/services/object/ape/checker.go

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package ape
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"errors"
"fmt"
objectV2 "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-api-go/v2/object"
aperequest "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/request"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/router"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/container"
frostfsidcore "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/frostfsid"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/netmap"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/ape"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/bearer"
cid "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/id"
oid "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/object/id"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/user"
apechain "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/chain"
policyengine "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/engine"
nativeschema "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/schema/native"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/crypto/keys"
)
type checkerImpl struct {
chainRouter policyengine.ChainRouter
headerProvider HeaderProvider
frostFSIDClient frostfsidcore.SubjectProvider
nm netmap.Source
st netmap.State
cnrSource container.Source
nodePK []byte
}
func NewChecker(chainRouter policyengine.ChainRouter, headerProvider HeaderProvider, frostFSIDClient frostfsidcore.SubjectProvider, nm netmap.Source, st netmap.State, cnrSource container.Source, nodePK []byte) Checker {
return &checkerImpl{
chainRouter: chainRouter,
headerProvider: headerProvider,
frostFSIDClient: frostFSIDClient,
nm: nm,
st: st,
cnrSource: cnrSource,
nodePK: nodePK,
}
}
type Prm struct {
Namespace string
Container cid.ID
// Object ID is omitted for some methods.
Object *oid.ID
// If Header is set, then object attributes and properties will be parsed from
// a request/response's header.
Header *objectV2.Header
// Method must be represented only as a constant represented in native schema.
Method string
// Role must be representedonly as a constant represented in native schema.
Role string
// An encoded sender's public key string.
SenderKey string
// An encoded container's owner user ID.
ContainerOwner user.ID
// If SoftAPECheck is set to true, then NoRuleFound is interpreted as allow.
SoftAPECheck bool
// If true, object headers will not retrieved from storage engine.
WithoutHeaderRequest bool
// The request's bearer token. It is used in order to check APE overrides with the token.
BearerToken *bearer.Token
}
var (
errMissingOID = errors.New("object ID is not set")
errInvalidTargetType = errors.New("bearer token defines non-container target override")
errBearerExpired = errors.New("bearer token has expired")
errBearerInvalidSignature = errors.New("bearer token has invalid signature")
errBearerInvalidContainerID = errors.New("bearer token was created for another container")
errBearerNotSignedByOwner = errors.New("bearer token is not signed by the container owner")
errBearerInvalidOwner = errors.New("bearer token owner differs from the request sender")
)
// isValidBearer checks whether bearer token was correctly signed by authorized
// entity. This method might be defined on whole ACL service because it will
// require fetching current epoch to check lifetime.
func isValidBearer(token *bearer.Token, ownerCnr user.ID, containerID cid.ID, publicKey *keys.PublicKey, st netmap.State) error {
if token == nil {
return nil
}
// First check token lifetime. Simplest verification.
if token.InvalidAt(st.CurrentEpoch()) {
return errBearerExpired
}
// Then check if bearer token is signed correctly.
if !token.VerifySignature() {
return errBearerInvalidSignature
}
// Check for ape overrides defined in the bearer token.
apeOverride := token.APEOverride()
if len(apeOverride.Chains) > 0 && apeOverride.Target.TargetType != ape.TargetTypeContainer {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errInvalidTargetType, apeOverride.Target.TargetType.ToV2().String())
}
// Then check if container is either empty or equal to the container in the request.
var targetCnr cid.ID
err := targetCnr.DecodeString(apeOverride.Target.Name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid cid format: %s", apeOverride.Target.Name)
}
if !containerID.Equals(targetCnr) {
return errBearerInvalidContainerID
}
// Then check if container owner signed this token.
if !bearer.ResolveIssuer(*token).Equals(ownerCnr) {
return errBearerNotSignedByOwner
}
// Then check if request sender has rights to use this token.
var usrSender user.ID
user.IDFromKey(&usrSender, (ecdsa.PublicKey)(*publicKey))
if !token.AssertUser(usrSender) {
return errBearerInvalidOwner
}
return nil
}
// CheckAPE checks if a request or a response is permitted creating an ape request and passing
// it to chain router.
func (c *checkerImpl) CheckAPE(ctx context.Context, prm Prm) error {
// APE check is ignored for some inter-node requests.
if prm.Role == nativeschema.PropertyValueContainerRoleContainer {
return nil
} else if prm.Role == nativeschema.PropertyValueContainerRoleIR {
switch prm.Method {
case nativeschema.MethodGetObject,
nativeschema.MethodHeadObject,
nativeschema.MethodSearchObject,
nativeschema.MethodRangeObject,
nativeschema.MethodHashObject:
return nil
default:
}
}
r, err := c.newAPERequest(ctx, prm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create ape request: %w", err)
}
pub, err := keys.NewPublicKeyFromString(prm.SenderKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
groups, err := aperequest.Groups(c.frostFSIDClient, pub)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get group ids: %w", err)
}
// Policy contract keeps group related chains as namespace-group pair.
for i := range groups {
groups[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", prm.Namespace, groups[i])
}
if prm.BearerToken != nil && !prm.BearerToken.Impersonate() {
if err := isValidBearer(prm.BearerToken, prm.ContainerOwner, prm.Container, pub, c.st); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("bearer token validation error: %w", err)
}
btRouter, err := router.SingleUseRouterWithBearerTokenChains([]bearer.APEOverride{prm.BearerToken.APEOverride()})
if err != nil {
return err
}
status, found, err := btRouter.IsAllowed(apechain.Ingress, policyengine.NewRequestTargetWithContainer(prm.Container.EncodeToString()), r)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if found && status == apechain.Allow {
return nil
}
if status != apechain.NoRuleFound {
return fmt.Errorf("bearer token: method %s: %s", prm.Method, status)
}
}
rt := policyengine.NewRequestTargetExtended(prm.Namespace, prm.Container.EncodeToString(), fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", prm.Namespace, pub.Address()), groups)
status, ruleFound, err := c.chainRouter.IsAllowed(apechain.Ingress, rt, r)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !ruleFound && prm.SoftAPECheck || status == apechain.Allow {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("method %s: %s", prm.Method, status)
}