[#1157] tree: Make tree service use Bearer token's APE overrides

Signed-off-by: Airat Arifullin <a.arifullin@yadro.com>

cmd/frostfs-node/tree.go

@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ func initTreeService(c *cfg) {
 		tree.WithAuthorizedKeys(treeConfig.AuthorizedKeys()),
 		tree.WithMetrics(c.metricsCollector.TreeService()),
 		tree.WithAPERouter(c.cfgObject.cfgAccessPolicyEngine.accessPolicyEngine),
+		tree.WithNetmapState(c.cfgNetmap.state),
 	)
 
 	c.cfgGRPC.performAndSave(func(_ string, _ net.Listener, s *grpc.Server) {

pkg/services/tree/ape.go

@@ -2,18 +2,25 @@ package tree
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"strings"
 
 	"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/converter"
 	aperequest "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/request"
+	"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/router"
 	core "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/container"
+	"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/netmap"
+	"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/ape"
+	"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/bearer"
 	apistatus "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/client/status"
 	cnrSDK "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container"
 	"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/acl"
 	cid "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/id"
+	"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/user"
 	apechain "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/chain"
 	"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/engine"
 	commonschema "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/schema/common"
@@ -22,20 +29,25 @@ import (
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
 )
 
-func (s *Service) checkAPE(ctx context.Context, container *core.Container, cid cid.ID, operation acl.Op, role acl.Role, publicKey *keys.PublicKey) error {
+var (
-	namespace := ""
+	errInvalidTargetType        = errors.New("bearer token defines non-container target override")
-	cntNamespace, hasNamespace := strings.CutSuffix(cnrSDK.ReadDomain(container.Value).Zone(), ".ns")
+	errBearerExpired            = errors.New("bearer token has expired")
-	if hasNamespace {
+	errBearerInvalidSignature   = errors.New("bearer token has invalid signature")
-		namespace = cntNamespace
+	errBearerInvalidContainerID = errors.New("bearer token was created for another container")
-	}
+	errBearerNotSignedByOwner   = errors.New("bearer token is not signed by the container owner")
+	errBearerInvalidOwner       = errors.New("bearer token owner differs from the request sender")
+)
 
+func (s *Service) newAPERequest(ctx context.Context, namespace string,
+	cid cid.ID, operation acl.Op, role acl.Role, publicKey *keys.PublicKey,
+) (aperequest.Request, error) {
 	schemaMethod, err := converter.SchemaMethodFromACLOperation(operation)
 	if err != nil {
-		return apeErr(err)
+		return aperequest.Request{}, err
 	}
 	schemaRole, err := converter.SchemaRoleFromACLRole(role)
 	if err != nil {
-		return apeErr(err)
+		return aperequest.Request{}, err
 	}
 	reqProps := map[string]string{
 		nativeschema.PropertyKeyActorPublicKey: hex.EncodeToString(publicKey.Bytes()),
@@ -43,7 +55,7 @@ func (s *Service) checkAPE(ctx context.Context, container *core.Container, cid c
 	}
 	reqProps, err = s.fillWithUserClaimTags(reqProps, publicKey)
 	if err != nil {
-		return apeErr(err)
+		return aperequest.Request{}, err
 	}
 	if p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx); ok {
 		if tcpAddr, ok := p.Addr.(*net.TCPAddr); ok {
@@ -58,11 +70,96 @@ func (s *Service) checkAPE(ctx context.Context, container *core.Container, cid c
 		resourceName = fmt.Sprintf(nativeschema.ResourceFormatNamespaceContainerObjects, namespace, cid.EncodeToString())
 	}
 
-	request := aperequest.NewRequest(
+	return aperequest.NewRequest(
 		schemaMethod,
 		aperequest.NewResource(resourceName, make(map[string]string)),
 		reqProps,
-	)
+	), nil
+}
+
+// isValidBearer checks whether bearer token was correctly signed by authorized
+// entity. This method might be defined on whole ACL service because it will
+// require fetching current epoch to check lifetime.
+func isValidBearer(token *bearer.Token, ownerCnr user.ID, cntID cid.ID, publicKey *keys.PublicKey, st netmap.State) error {
+	if token == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// 1. First check token lifetime. Simplest verification.
+	if token.InvalidAt(st.CurrentEpoch()) {
+		return errBearerExpired
+	}
+
+	// 2. Then check if bearer token is signed correctly.
+	if !token.VerifySignature() {
+		return errBearerInvalidSignature
+	}
+
+	// 3. Then check if container is either empty or equal to the container in the request.
+	apeOverride := token.APEOverride()
+	if apeOverride.Target.TargetType != ape.TargetTypeContainer {
+		return errInvalidTargetType
+	}
+
+	var targetCnr cid.ID
+	err := targetCnr.DecodeString(apeOverride.Target.Name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid cid format: %s", apeOverride.Target.Name)
+	}
+	if !cntID.Equals(targetCnr) {
+		return errBearerInvalidContainerID
+	}
+
+	// 4. Then check if container owner signed this token.
+	if !bearer.ResolveIssuer(*token).Equals(ownerCnr) {
+		return errBearerNotSignedByOwner
+	}
+
+	// 5. Then check if request sender has rights to use this token.
+	var usrSender user.ID
+	user.IDFromKey(&usrSender, (ecdsa.PublicKey)(*publicKey))
+
+	if !token.AssertUser(usrSender) {
+		return errBearerInvalidOwner
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *Service) checkAPE(ctx context.Context, bt *bearer.Token,
+	container *core.Container, cid cid.ID, operation acl.Op, role acl.Role, publicKey *keys.PublicKey,
+) error {
+	namespace := ""
+	cntNamespace, hasNamespace := strings.CutSuffix(cnrSDK.ReadDomain(container.Value).Zone(), ".ns")
+	if hasNamespace {
+		namespace = cntNamespace
+	}
+
+	request, err := s.newAPERequest(ctx, namespace, cid, operation, role, publicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return apeErr(err)
+	}
+
+	if bt != nil && !bt.Impersonate() {
+		if err := isValidBearer(bt, container.Value.Owner(), cid, publicKey, s.state); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("bearer validation error: %w", err)
+		}
+		btRouter, err := router.SingleUseRouterWithBearerTokenChains([]bearer.APEOverride{bt.APEOverride()})
+		if err != nil {
+			return apeErr(err)
+		}
+		status, found, err := btRouter.IsAllowed(apechain.Ingress, engine.NewRequestTargetWithContainer(cid.EncodeToString()), request)
+		if err != nil {
+			return apeErr(err)
+		}
+		if found && status == apechain.Allow {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if status != apechain.NoRuleFound {
+			err = fmt.Errorf("access to operation %s is denied by access policy engine (bearer token): %s", request.Operation(), status.String())
+			return apeErr(err)
+		}
+	}
 
 	rt := engine.NewRequestTargetExtended(namespace, cid.EncodeToString(), fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", namespace, publicKey.Address()), nil)
 	status, found, err := s.router.IsAllowed(apechain.Ingress, rt, request)
@@ -72,7 +169,7 @@ func (s *Service) checkAPE(ctx context.Context, container *core.Container, cid c
 	if found && status == apechain.Allow {
 		return nil
 	}
-	err = fmt.Errorf("access to operation %s is denied by access policy engine: %s", schemaMethod, status.String())
+	err = fmt.Errorf("access to operation %s is denied by access policy engine: %s", request.Operation(), status.String())
 	return apeErr(err)
 }
 

pkg/services/tree/options.go

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ type cfg struct {
 	log                      *logger.Logger
 	key                      *ecdsa.PrivateKey
 	rawPub                   []byte
+	state                    netmap.State
 	nmSource                 netmap.Source
 	cnrSource                ContainerSource
 	frostfsidSubjectProvider frostfsidcore.SubjectProvider
@@ -156,3 +157,9 @@ func WithAPERouter(router policyengine.ChainRouter) Option {
 		c.router = router
 	}
 }
+
+func WithNetmapState(state netmap.State) Option {
+	return func(c *cfg) {
+		c.state = state
+	}
+}

pkg/services/tree/signature.go

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func (s *Service) verifyClient(ctx context.Context, req message, cid cidSDK.ID,
 	// FIXME(@aarifullin): tree service temporiraly performs APE checks on
 	// object verbs, because tree verbs have not been introduced yet.
 	if basicACL == 0x0 {
-		return s.checkAPE(ctx, cnr, cid, op, role, pubKey)
+		return s.checkAPE(ctx, bt, cnr, cid, op, role, pubKey)
 	}
 
 	if !basicACL.IsOpAllowed(op, role) {