neo-go/pkg/core/mempool/mem_pool.go

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package mempool
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
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"math/bits"
"sort"
"sync"
"github.com/holiman/uint256"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/core/mempoolevent"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/core/transaction"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/util"
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"go.uber.org/atomic"
)
var (
// ErrInsufficientFunds is returned when the Sender is not able to pay for
// the transaction being added irrespective of the other contents of the
// pool.
ErrInsufficientFunds = errors.New("insufficient funds")
// ErrConflict is returned when the transaction being added is incompatible
// with the contents of the memory pool (Sender doesn't have enough GAS
// to pay for all transactions in the pool).
ErrConflict = errors.New("conflicts: insufficient funds for all pooled tx")
// ErrDup is returned when the transaction being added is already present
// in the memory pool.
ErrDup = errors.New("already in the memory pool")
// ErrOOM is returned when the transaction just doesn't fit in the memory
// pool because of its capacity constraints.
ErrOOM = errors.New("out of memory")
// ErrConflictsAttribute is returned when the transaction conflicts with other transactions
// due to its (or theirs) Conflicts attributes.
ErrConflictsAttribute = errors.New("conflicts with memory pool due to Conflicts attribute")
// ErrOracleResponse is returned when the mempool already contains a transaction
// with the same oracle response ID and higher network fee.
ErrOracleResponse = errors.New("conflicts with memory pool due to OracleResponse attribute")
)
// item represents a transaction in the the Memory pool.
type item struct {
txn *transaction.Transaction
blockStamp uint32
data any
}
// items is a slice of an item.
type items []item
// utilityBalanceAndFees stores the sender's balance and overall fees of
// the sender's transactions which are currently in the mempool.
type utilityBalanceAndFees struct {
balance uint256.Int
feeSum uint256.Int
}
// Pool stores the unconfirmed transactions.
type Pool struct {
lock sync.RWMutex
verifiedMap map[util.Uint256]*transaction.Transaction
verifiedTxes items
fees map[util.Uint160]utilityBalanceAndFees
// conflicts is a map of the hashes of the transactions which are conflicting with the mempooled ones.
conflicts map[util.Uint256][]util.Uint256
// oracleResp contains the ids of oracle responses for the tx in the pool.
oracleResp map[uint64]util.Uint256
capacity int
feePerByte int64
payerIndex int
updateMetricsCb func(int)
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resendThreshold uint32
resendFunc func(*transaction.Transaction, any)
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// subscriptions for mempool events
subscriptionsEnabled bool
subscriptionsOn atomic.Bool
stopCh chan struct{}
events chan mempoolevent.Event
subCh chan chan<- mempoolevent.Event // there are no other events in mempool except Event, so no need in generic subscribers type
unsubCh chan chan<- mempoolevent.Event
}
func (p items) Len() int { return len(p) }
func (p items) Swap(i, j int) { p[i], p[j] = p[j], p[i] }
func (p items) Less(i, j int) bool { return p[i].CompareTo(p[j]) < 0 }
// CompareTo returns the difference between two items.
// difference < 0 implies p < otherP.
// difference = 0 implies p = otherP.
// difference > 0 implies p > otherP.
func (p item) CompareTo(otherP item) int {
pHigh := p.txn.HasAttribute(transaction.HighPriority)
otherHigh := otherP.txn.HasAttribute(transaction.HighPriority)
if pHigh && !otherHigh {
return 1
} else if !pHigh && otherHigh {
return -1
}
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// Fees sorted ascending.
if ret := int(p.txn.FeePerByte() - otherP.txn.FeePerByte()); ret != 0 {
return ret
}
return int(p.txn.NetworkFee - otherP.txn.NetworkFee)
}
// Count returns the total number of uncofirmed transactions.
func (mp *Pool) Count() int {
mp.lock.RLock()
defer mp.lock.RUnlock()
return mp.count()
}
// count is an internal unlocked version of Count.
func (mp *Pool) count() int {
return len(mp.verifiedTxes)
}
// ContainsKey checks if the transactions hash is in the Pool.
func (mp *Pool) ContainsKey(hash util.Uint256) bool {
mp.lock.RLock()
defer mp.lock.RUnlock()
return mp.containsKey(hash)
}
// containsKey is an internal unlocked version of ContainsKey.
func (mp *Pool) containsKey(hash util.Uint256) bool {
if _, ok := mp.verifiedMap[hash]; ok {
return true
}
return false
}
// HasConflicts returns true if the transaction is already in the pool or in the Conflicts attributes
// of the pooled transactions or has Conflicts attributes against the pooled transactions.
func (mp *Pool) HasConflicts(t *transaction.Transaction, fee Feer) bool {
mp.lock.RLock()
defer mp.lock.RUnlock()
if mp.containsKey(t.Hash()) {
return true
}
if fee.P2PSigExtensionsEnabled() {
// do not check sender's signature and fee
if _, ok := mp.conflicts[t.Hash()]; ok {
return true
}
for _, attr := range t.GetAttributes(transaction.ConflictsT) {
if mp.containsKey(attr.Value.(*transaction.Conflicts).Hash) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
// tryAddSendersFee tries to add system fee and network fee to the total sender`s fee in the mempool
// and returns false if both balance check is required and the sender does not have enough GAS to pay.
func (mp *Pool) tryAddSendersFee(tx *transaction.Transaction, feer Feer, needCheck bool) bool {
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payer := tx.Signers[mp.payerIndex].Account
senderFee, ok := mp.fees[payer]
if !ok {
_ = senderFee.balance.SetFromBig(feer.GetUtilityTokenBalance(payer))
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mp.fees[payer] = senderFee
}
if needCheck {
newFeeSum, err := checkBalance(tx, senderFee)
if err != nil {
return false
}
senderFee.feeSum = newFeeSum
} else {
senderFee.feeSum.AddUint64(&senderFee.feeSum, uint64(tx.SystemFee+tx.NetworkFee))
}
mp.fees[payer] = senderFee
return true
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}
// checkBalance returns a new cumulative fee balance for the account or an error in
// case the sender doesn't have enough GAS to pay for the transaction.
func checkBalance(tx *transaction.Transaction, balance utilityBalanceAndFees) (uint256.Int, error) {
var txFee uint256.Int
txFee.SetUint64(uint64(tx.SystemFee + tx.NetworkFee))
if balance.balance.Cmp(&txFee) < 0 {
return txFee, ErrInsufficientFunds
}
txFee.Add(&txFee, &balance.feeSum)
if balance.balance.Cmp(&txFee) < 0 {
return txFee, ErrConflict
}
return txFee, nil
}
// Add tries to add the given transaction to the Pool.
func (mp *Pool) Add(t *transaction.Transaction, fee Feer, data ...any) error {
var pItem = item{
txn: t,
blockStamp: fee.BlockHeight(),
}
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if data != nil {
pItem.data = data[0]
}
core: fix potential locking problem in mempool I think it should fix this issue mentioned in the #526: INFO[1456] blockchain persist completed blockHeight=63480 headerHeight=1810000 persistedBlocks=1 persistedKeys=4 took=740.7113ms fatal error: concurrent map read and map write goroutine 322 [running]: runtime.throw(0xc8a6dc, 0x21) /usr/local/go/src/runtime/panic.go:774 +0x72 fp=0xc003473958 sp=0xc003473928 pc=0x42e282 runtime.mapaccess2(0xb706a0, 0xc0001893b0, 0xc0034739c8, 0xc0028704e0, 0x3) /usr/local/go/src/runtime/map.go:470 +0x278 fp=0xc0034739a0 sp=0xc003473958 pc=0x40dc08 github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/core.MemPool.ContainsKey(0xc0001d0d20, 0xc0001893b0, 0xc0001893e0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, ...) /neo-go/pkg/core/mem_pool.go:92 +0xcb fp=0xc003473a30 sp=0xc0034739a0 pc=0x9326db github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/core.(*Blockchain).HasTransaction(0xc0001ca8c0, 0x49f0b45d430e441b, 0x553db79b7072821c, 0x28969518de11976, 0xba5100efddbe79d4, 0xc003473cd0) /neo-go/pkg/core/blockchain.go:803 +0xa1 fp=0xc003473b68 sp=0xc003473a30 pc=0x914b11 github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/core.Blockchainer.HasTransaction-fm(0x49f0b45d430e441b, 0x553db79b7072821c, 0x28969518de11976, 0xba5100efddbe79d4, 0xc005a5d388) /neo-go/pkg/core/blockchainer.go:28 +0x46 fp=0xc003473ba8 sp=0xc003473b68 pc=0x997326 github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/network.(*Server).handleInvCmd(0xc00018f680, 0xd9d980, 0xc00025e190, 0xc005a5d380, 0x0, 0x0) /neo-go/pkg/network/server.go:401 +0x3bb fp=0xc003473d38 sp=0xc003473ba8 pc=0x9924cb github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/network.(*Server).handleMessage(0xc00018f680, 0xd9d980, 0xc00025e190, 0xc007a0d050, 0x0, 0x0) /neo-go/pkg/network/server.go:582 +0x1ae fp=0xc003473da0 sp=0xc003473d38 pc=0x993bbe github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/network.(*TCPTransport).handleConn(0xc000228420, 0xd9b880, 0xc0001b6f00) /neo-go/pkg/network/tcp_transport.go:93 +0x202 fp=0xc003473fc8 sp=0xc003473da0 pc=0x996672 runtime.goexit() /usr/local/go/src/runtime/asm_amd64.s:1357 +0x1 fp=0xc003473fd0 sp=0xc003473fc8 pc=0x45b3e1 created by github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/network.(*TCPTransport).Dial /neo-go/pkg/network/tcp_transport.go:36 +0xb4 The problem is that we're modifying `unsortedTxn` under a reader lock.
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mp.lock.Lock()
if mp.containsKey(t.Hash()) {
core: fix potential locking problem in mempool I think it should fix this issue mentioned in the #526: INFO[1456] blockchain persist completed blockHeight=63480 headerHeight=1810000 persistedBlocks=1 persistedKeys=4 took=740.7113ms fatal error: concurrent map read and map write goroutine 322 [running]: runtime.throw(0xc8a6dc, 0x21) /usr/local/go/src/runtime/panic.go:774 +0x72 fp=0xc003473958 sp=0xc003473928 pc=0x42e282 runtime.mapaccess2(0xb706a0, 0xc0001893b0, 0xc0034739c8, 0xc0028704e0, 0x3) /usr/local/go/src/runtime/map.go:470 +0x278 fp=0xc0034739a0 sp=0xc003473958 pc=0x40dc08 github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/core.MemPool.ContainsKey(0xc0001d0d20, 0xc0001893b0, 0xc0001893e0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, ...) /neo-go/pkg/core/mem_pool.go:92 +0xcb fp=0xc003473a30 sp=0xc0034739a0 pc=0x9326db github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/core.(*Blockchain).HasTransaction(0xc0001ca8c0, 0x49f0b45d430e441b, 0x553db79b7072821c, 0x28969518de11976, 0xba5100efddbe79d4, 0xc003473cd0) /neo-go/pkg/core/blockchain.go:803 +0xa1 fp=0xc003473b68 sp=0xc003473a30 pc=0x914b11 github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/core.Blockchainer.HasTransaction-fm(0x49f0b45d430e441b, 0x553db79b7072821c, 0x28969518de11976, 0xba5100efddbe79d4, 0xc005a5d388) /neo-go/pkg/core/blockchainer.go:28 +0x46 fp=0xc003473ba8 sp=0xc003473b68 pc=0x997326 github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/network.(*Server).handleInvCmd(0xc00018f680, 0xd9d980, 0xc00025e190, 0xc005a5d380, 0x0, 0x0) /neo-go/pkg/network/server.go:401 +0x3bb fp=0xc003473d38 sp=0xc003473ba8 pc=0x9924cb github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/network.(*Server).handleMessage(0xc00018f680, 0xd9d980, 0xc00025e190, 0xc007a0d050, 0x0, 0x0) /neo-go/pkg/network/server.go:582 +0x1ae fp=0xc003473da0 sp=0xc003473d38 pc=0x993bbe github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/network.(*TCPTransport).handleConn(0xc000228420, 0xd9b880, 0xc0001b6f00) /neo-go/pkg/network/tcp_transport.go:93 +0x202 fp=0xc003473fc8 sp=0xc003473da0 pc=0x996672 runtime.goexit() /usr/local/go/src/runtime/asm_amd64.s:1357 +0x1 fp=0xc003473fd0 sp=0xc003473fc8 pc=0x45b3e1 created by github.com/CityOfZion/neo-go/pkg/network.(*TCPTransport).Dial /neo-go/pkg/network/tcp_transport.go:36 +0xb4 The problem is that we're modifying `unsortedTxn` under a reader lock.
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mp.lock.Unlock()
return ErrDup
}
conflictsToBeRemoved, err := mp.checkTxConflicts(t, fee)
if err != nil {
mp.lock.Unlock()
return err
}
if attrs := t.GetAttributes(transaction.OracleResponseT); len(attrs) != 0 {
id := attrs[0].Value.(*transaction.OracleResponse).ID
h, ok := mp.oracleResp[id]
if ok {
if mp.verifiedMap[h].NetworkFee >= t.NetworkFee {
mp.lock.Unlock()
return ErrOracleResponse
}
mp.removeInternal(h, fee)
}
mp.oracleResp[id] = t.Hash()
}
if fee.P2PSigExtensionsEnabled() {
// Remove conflicting transactions.
for _, conflictingTx := range conflictsToBeRemoved {
mp.removeInternal(conflictingTx.Hash(), fee)
}
}
// Insert into a sorted array (from max to min, that could also be done
// using sort.Sort(sort.Reverse()), but it incurs more overhead. Notice
// also that we're searching for a position that is strictly more
// prioritized than our new item because we do expect a lot of
// transactions with the same priority and appending to the end of the
// slice is always more efficient.
n := sort.Search(len(mp.verifiedTxes), func(n int) bool {
return pItem.CompareTo(mp.verifiedTxes[n]) > 0
})
// We've reached our capacity already.
if len(mp.verifiedTxes) == mp.capacity {
// Less prioritized than the least prioritized we already have, won't fit.
if n == len(mp.verifiedTxes) {
mp.lock.Unlock()
return ErrOOM
}
// Ditch the last one.
unlucky := mp.verifiedTxes[len(mp.verifiedTxes)-1]
delete(mp.verifiedMap, unlucky.txn.Hash())
if fee.P2PSigExtensionsEnabled() {
mp.removeConflictsOf(unlucky.txn)
}
if attrs := unlucky.txn.GetAttributes(transaction.OracleResponseT); len(attrs) != 0 {
delete(mp.oracleResp, attrs[0].Value.(*transaction.OracleResponse).ID)
}
mp.verifiedTxes[len(mp.verifiedTxes)-1] = pItem
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if mp.subscriptionsOn.Load() {
mp.events <- mempoolevent.Event{
Type: mempoolevent.TransactionRemoved,
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Tx: unlucky.txn,
Data: unlucky.data,
}
}
} else {
mp.verifiedTxes = append(mp.verifiedTxes, pItem)
}
if n != len(mp.verifiedTxes)-1 {
copy(mp.verifiedTxes[n+1:], mp.verifiedTxes[n:])
mp.verifiedTxes[n] = pItem
}
mp.verifiedMap[t.Hash()] = t
if fee.P2PSigExtensionsEnabled() {
// Add conflicting hashes to the mp.conflicts list.
for _, attr := range t.GetAttributes(transaction.ConflictsT) {
hash := attr.Value.(*transaction.Conflicts).Hash
mp.conflicts[hash] = append(mp.conflicts[hash], t.Hash())
}
}
// we already checked balance in checkTxConflicts, so don't need to check again
mp.tryAddSendersFee(pItem.txn, fee, false)
if mp.updateMetricsCb != nil {
mp.updateMetricsCb(len(mp.verifiedTxes))
}
mp.lock.Unlock()
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if mp.subscriptionsOn.Load() {
mp.events <- mempoolevent.Event{
Type: mempoolevent.TransactionAdded,
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Tx: pItem.txn,
Data: pItem.data,
}
}
return nil
}
// Remove removes an item from the mempool if it exists there (and does
// nothing if it doesn't).
func (mp *Pool) Remove(hash util.Uint256, feer Feer) {
mp.lock.Lock()
mp.removeInternal(hash, feer)
mp.lock.Unlock()
}
// removeInternal is an internal unlocked representation of Remove.
func (mp *Pool) removeInternal(hash util.Uint256, feer Feer) {
if tx, ok := mp.verifiedMap[hash]; ok {
var num int
delete(mp.verifiedMap, hash)
for num = range mp.verifiedTxes {
if hash.Equals(mp.verifiedTxes[num].txn.Hash()) {
break
}
}
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itm := mp.verifiedTxes[num]
if num < len(mp.verifiedTxes)-1 {
mp.verifiedTxes = append(mp.verifiedTxes[:num], mp.verifiedTxes[num+1:]...)
} else if num == len(mp.verifiedTxes)-1 {
mp.verifiedTxes = mp.verifiedTxes[:num]
}
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payer := itm.txn.Signers[mp.payerIndex].Account
senderFee := mp.fees[payer]
senderFee.feeSum.SubUint64(&senderFee.feeSum, uint64(tx.SystemFee+tx.NetworkFee))
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mp.fees[payer] = senderFee
if feer.P2PSigExtensionsEnabled() {
// remove all conflicting hashes from mp.conflicts list
mp.removeConflictsOf(tx)
}
if attrs := tx.GetAttributes(transaction.OracleResponseT); len(attrs) != 0 {
delete(mp.oracleResp, attrs[0].Value.(*transaction.OracleResponse).ID)
}
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if mp.subscriptionsOn.Load() {
mp.events <- mempoolevent.Event{
Type: mempoolevent.TransactionRemoved,
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Tx: itm.txn,
Data: itm.data,
}
}
}
if mp.updateMetricsCb != nil {
mp.updateMetricsCb(len(mp.verifiedTxes))
}
}
// RemoveStale filters verified transactions through the given function keeping
// only the transactions for which it returns true result. It's used to quickly
// drop a part of the mempool that is now invalid after the block acceptance.
func (mp *Pool) RemoveStale(isOK func(*transaction.Transaction) bool, feer Feer) {
mp.lock.Lock()
policyChanged := mp.loadPolicy(feer)
// We can reuse already allocated slice
// because items are iterated one-by-one in increasing order.
newVerifiedTxes := mp.verifiedTxes[:0]
mp.fees = make(map[util.Uint160]utilityBalanceAndFees) // it'd be nice to reuse existing map, but we can't easily clear it
if feer.P2PSigExtensionsEnabled() {
mp.conflicts = make(map[util.Uint256][]util.Uint256)
}
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height := feer.BlockHeight()
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var (
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staleItems []item
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)
for _, itm := range mp.verifiedTxes {
if isOK(itm.txn) && mp.checkPolicy(itm.txn, policyChanged) && mp.tryAddSendersFee(itm.txn, feer, true) {
newVerifiedTxes = append(newVerifiedTxes, itm)
if feer.P2PSigExtensionsEnabled() {
for _, attr := range itm.txn.GetAttributes(transaction.ConflictsT) {
hash := attr.Value.(*transaction.Conflicts).Hash
mp.conflicts[hash] = append(mp.conflicts[hash], itm.txn.Hash())
}
}
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if mp.resendThreshold != 0 {
// item is resent at resendThreshold, 2*resendThreshold, 4*resendThreshold ...
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// so quotient must be a power of two.
diff := (height - itm.blockStamp)
if diff%mp.resendThreshold == 0 && bits.OnesCount32(diff/mp.resendThreshold) == 1 {
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staleItems = append(staleItems, itm)
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}
}
} else {
delete(mp.verifiedMap, itm.txn.Hash())
if attrs := itm.txn.GetAttributes(transaction.OracleResponseT); len(attrs) != 0 {
delete(mp.oracleResp, attrs[0].Value.(*transaction.OracleResponse).ID)
}
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if mp.subscriptionsOn.Load() {
mp.events <- mempoolevent.Event{
Type: mempoolevent.TransactionRemoved,
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Tx: itm.txn,
Data: itm.data,
}
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}
}
}
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if len(staleItems) != 0 {
go mp.resendStaleItems(staleItems)
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}
mp.verifiedTxes = newVerifiedTxes
mp.lock.Unlock()
}
// loadPolicy updates feePerByte field and returns whether the policy has been
// changed.
func (mp *Pool) loadPolicy(feer Feer) bool {
newFeePerByte := feer.FeePerByte()
if newFeePerByte > mp.feePerByte {
mp.feePerByte = newFeePerByte
return true
}
return false
}
// checkPolicy checks whether the transaction fits the policy.
func (mp *Pool) checkPolicy(tx *transaction.Transaction, policyChanged bool) bool {
if !policyChanged || tx.FeePerByte() >= mp.feePerByte {
return true
}
return false
}
// New returns a new Pool struct.
func New(capacity int, payerIndex int, enableSubscriptions bool, updateMetricsCb func(int)) *Pool {
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mp := &Pool{
verifiedMap: make(map[util.Uint256]*transaction.Transaction, capacity),
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verifiedTxes: make([]item, 0, capacity),
capacity: capacity,
payerIndex: payerIndex,
fees: make(map[util.Uint160]utilityBalanceAndFees),
conflicts: make(map[util.Uint256][]util.Uint256),
oracleResp: make(map[uint64]util.Uint256),
subscriptionsEnabled: enableSubscriptions,
stopCh: make(chan struct{}),
events: make(chan mempoolevent.Event),
subCh: make(chan chan<- mempoolevent.Event),
unsubCh: make(chan chan<- mempoolevent.Event),
updateMetricsCb: updateMetricsCb,
}
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mp.subscriptionsOn.Store(false)
return mp
}
// SetResendThreshold sets a threshold after which the transaction will be considered stale
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// and returned for retransmission by `GetStaleTransactions`.
func (mp *Pool) SetResendThreshold(h uint32, f func(*transaction.Transaction, any)) {
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mp.lock.Lock()
defer mp.lock.Unlock()
mp.resendThreshold = h
mp.resendFunc = f
}
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func (mp *Pool) resendStaleItems(items []item) {
for i := range items {
mp.resendFunc(items[i].txn, items[i].data)
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}
}
// TryGetValue returns a transaction and its fee if it exists in the memory pool.
func (mp *Pool) TryGetValue(hash util.Uint256) (*transaction.Transaction, bool) {
mp.lock.RLock()
defer mp.lock.RUnlock()
if tx, ok := mp.verifiedMap[hash]; ok {
return tx, ok
}
return nil, false
}
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// TryGetData returns data associated with the specified transaction if it exists in the memory pool.
func (mp *Pool) TryGetData(hash util.Uint256) (any, bool) {
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mp.lock.RLock()
defer mp.lock.RUnlock()
if tx, ok := mp.verifiedMap[hash]; ok {
itm := item{txn: tx}
n := sort.Search(len(mp.verifiedTxes), func(n int) bool {
return itm.CompareTo(mp.verifiedTxes[n]) >= 0
})
if n < len(mp.verifiedTxes) {
for i := n; i < len(mp.verifiedTxes); i++ { // items may have equal priority, so `n` is the left bound of the items which are as prioritized as the desired `itm`.
if mp.verifiedTxes[i].txn.Hash() == hash {
return mp.verifiedTxes[i].data, ok
}
if itm.CompareTo(mp.verifiedTxes[i]) != 0 {
break
}
}
}
}
return nil, false
}
// GetVerifiedTransactions returns a slice of transactions with their fees.
func (mp *Pool) GetVerifiedTransactions() []*transaction.Transaction {
mp.lock.RLock()
defer mp.lock.RUnlock()
var t = make([]*transaction.Transaction, len(mp.verifiedTxes))
for i := range mp.verifiedTxes {
t[i] = mp.verifiedTxes[i].txn
}
return t
}
// checkTxConflicts is an internal unprotected version of Verify. It takes into
// consideration conflicting transactions which are about to be removed from mempool.
func (mp *Pool) checkTxConflicts(tx *transaction.Transaction, fee Feer) ([]*transaction.Transaction, error) {
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payer := tx.Signers[mp.payerIndex].Account
actualSenderFee, ok := mp.fees[payer]
if !ok {
actualSenderFee.balance.SetFromBig(fee.GetUtilityTokenBalance(payer))
}
var expectedSenderFee utilityBalanceAndFees
// Check Conflicts attributes.
var (
conflictsToBeRemoved []*transaction.Transaction
conflictingFee int64
)
if fee.P2PSigExtensionsEnabled() {
// Step 1: check if `tx` was in attributes of mempooled transactions.
if conflictingHashes, ok := mp.conflicts[tx.Hash()]; ok {
for _, hash := range conflictingHashes {
existingTx := mp.verifiedMap[hash]
if existingTx.HasSigner(payer) {
conflictingFee += existingTx.NetworkFee
}
conflictsToBeRemoved = append(conflictsToBeRemoved, existingTx)
}
}
// Step 2: check if mempooled transactions were in `tx`'s attributes.
conflictsAttrs := tx.GetAttributes(transaction.ConflictsT)
if len(conflictsAttrs) != 0 {
txSigners := make(map[util.Uint160]struct{}, len(tx.Signers))
for _, s := range tx.Signers {
txSigners[s.Account] = struct{}{}
}
for _, attr := range conflictsAttrs {
hash := attr.Value.(*transaction.Conflicts).Hash
existingTx, ok := mp.verifiedMap[hash]
if !ok {
continue
}
var signerOK bool
for _, s := range existingTx.Signers {
if _, ok := txSigners[s.Account]; ok {
signerOK = true
break
}
}
if !signerOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: not signed by a signer of conflicting transaction %s", ErrConflictsAttribute, existingTx.Hash().StringBE())
}
conflictingFee += existingTx.NetworkFee
conflictsToBeRemoved = append(conflictsToBeRemoved, existingTx)
}
}
if conflictingFee != 0 && tx.NetworkFee <= conflictingFee {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: conflicting transactions have bigger or equal network fee: %d vs %d", ErrConflictsAttribute, tx.NetworkFee, conflictingFee)
}
// Step 3: take into account sender's conflicting transactions before balance check.
expectedSenderFee = actualSenderFee
for _, conflictingTx := range conflictsToBeRemoved {
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if conflictingTx.Signers[mp.payerIndex].Account.Equals(payer) {
expectedSenderFee.feeSum.SubUint64(&expectedSenderFee.feeSum, uint64(conflictingTx.SystemFee+conflictingTx.NetworkFee))
}
}
} else {
expectedSenderFee = actualSenderFee
}
_, err := checkBalance(tx, expectedSenderFee)
return conflictsToBeRemoved, err
}
// Verify checks if the Sender of the tx is able to pay for it (and all the other
// transactions in the pool). If yes, the transaction tx is a valid
// transaction and the function returns true. If no, the transaction tx is
// considered to be invalid, the function returns false.
func (mp *Pool) Verify(tx *transaction.Transaction, feer Feer) bool {
mp.lock.RLock()
defer mp.lock.RUnlock()
_, err := mp.checkTxConflicts(tx, feer)
return err == nil
}
// removeConflictsOf removes the hash of the given transaction from the conflicts list
// for each Conflicts attribute.
func (mp *Pool) removeConflictsOf(tx *transaction.Transaction) {
// remove all conflicting hashes from mp.conflicts list
for _, attr := range tx.GetAttributes(transaction.ConflictsT) {
conflictsHash := attr.Value.(*transaction.Conflicts).Hash
if len(mp.conflicts[conflictsHash]) == 1 {
delete(mp.conflicts, conflictsHash)
continue
}
for i, existingHash := range mp.conflicts[conflictsHash] {
if existingHash == tx.Hash() {
// tx.Hash can occur in the conflicting hashes array only once, because we can't add the same transaction to the mempol twice
mp.conflicts[conflictsHash] = append(mp.conflicts[conflictsHash][:i], mp.conflicts[conflictsHash][i+1:]...)
break
}
}
}
}
// IterateVerifiedTransactions iterates through verified transactions and invokes
// function `cont`. Iterations continue while the function `cont` returns true.
// Function `cont` is executed within a read-locked memory pool,
// thus IterateVerifiedTransactions will block any write mempool operation,
// use it with care. Do not modify transaction or data via `cont`.
func (mp *Pool) IterateVerifiedTransactions(cont func(tx *transaction.Transaction, data any) bool) {
mp.lock.RLock()
defer mp.lock.RUnlock()
for i := range mp.verifiedTxes {
if !cont(mp.verifiedTxes[i].txn, mp.verifiedTxes[i].data) {
return
}
}
}