Problem: transactions with wrong hashes are accepted to the chain if
consensus nodes are designated as Oracle nodes. The result is wrong
MerkleRoot for the accepted block. Consensus nodes got such blocks
right from the dbft and store them without errors, but if
non-consensus nodes are present in the network, they just can't accept
these "bad" blocks:
```
2021-11-29T12:56:40.533+0300 WARN blockQueue: failed adding block into the blockchain {"error": "invalid block: MerkleRoot mismatch (expected a866b57ad637934f7a7700e3635a549387e644970b42681d865a54c3b3a46122, calculated d465aafabaf4539a3f619d373d178eeeeab7acb9847e746e398706c8c1582bf8)", "blockHeight": 17, "nextIndex": 18}
```
This problem happens because of transaction hash caching. We can't set
transaction hash if transaction construction wasn't yet completed.
Problem:
```
--- FAIL: TestMemCachedPersist (0.07s)
--- FAIL: TestMemCachedPersist/BoltDBStore (0.07s)
testing.go:894: TempDir RemoveAll cleanup: remove C:\Users\Anna\AppData\Local\Temp\TestMemCachedPersist_BoltDBStore294966711\001\test_bolt_db: The process cannot access the file because it is being used by another process.
```
Solution:
Release the resources occupied by the DB.
We use 2 prefixes for storing items because of state synchronization.
This commit allows to parametrize dao with the default prefix.
Signed-off-by: Evgeniy Stratonikov <evgeniy@nspcc.ru>
b9be892bf9 has made Persist asynchronous which
is very effective in allowing the system to continue processing
blocks/transactions while flushing things to disk. It at the same time is very
dangerous in that if the disk is slow and it takes much time to flush KV set
(more than persisting interval), there might be even bigger new KV set in
MemCachedStore by the time it finishes. Even if the system immediately starts
to flush this new data set it (being bigger) can take more time than the
previous one. And while doing so a new data set will appear in memory,
potentially again bigger than this.
So we can easily end up with the system going out of control, consuming more
and more memory and taking more and more time to persist a single set of
data. To avoid this we need to detect such condition and just wait for Persist
to really finish its job and release the resources.
Everywhere it matters (and that's callExFromNative() now) it's incremented
already, so when we're doing Call() at the same time (and it's done to invoke
`_initialize` method) we're effectively double-incrementing it.
Standards are NEP-11 and NEP-17, not NEP11, not NEP17, not anything
else. Variable/function names of course can use whatever fits, but documents
and comments should be consistent wrt this.
Oracle responses must use the same set of signers as oracle requests even
though the transaction itself is signed by oracle nodes/contract.
We can probably improve interop.Context by removing Tx field completely and
adding more functionality to Container, but it's not very convenient for
VerifyWitness and will require adding more stub-like methods for Block, so Tx
is used for now (and we do have it in every relevant case).
I don't think it's possible with regular service functioning, but it happens
during testing because of pointer reuse:
WARNING: DATA RACE
Read at 0x00c003a0e3f0 by goroutine 114:
github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/services/notary.(*Notary).verifyIncompleteWitnesses()
/home/runner/work/neo-go/neo-go/pkg/services/notary/notary.go:441 +0x1dc
github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/services/notary.(*Notary).OnNewRequest()
/home/runner/work/neo-go/neo-go/pkg/services/notary/notary.go:188 +0x205
github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/core.TestNotary.func11()
/home/runner/work/neo-go/neo-go/pkg/core/notary_test.go:347 +0x612
github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/core.TestNotary()
/home/runner/work/neo-go/neo-go/pkg/core/notary_test.go:443 +0xe33
testing.tRunner()
/opt/hostedtoolcache/go/1.16.10/x64/src/testing/testing.go:1193 +0x202
Previous write at 0x00c003a0e3f0 by goroutine 104:
github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/services/notary.(*Notary).finalize()
/home/runner/work/neo-go/neo-go/pkg/services/notary/notary.go:338 +0x50a
github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/services/notary.(*Notary).PostPersist()
/home/runner/work/neo-go/neo-go/pkg/services/notary/notary.go:314 +0x297
github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/services/notary.(*Notary).Run()
/home/runner/work/neo-go/neo-go/pkg/services/notary/notary.go:169 +0x4a7
Serializing/deserializing the payload yields this:
Error: Received unexpected error:
both main and fallback transactions should have the same ValidUntil value
See neo-project/neo#2622. The implementation is somewhat asymmetric (and not
very efficient) for binary/JSON encoding/decoding, but it should be
sufficient.
Eventually this will be replaced by `pkg/neotest` invocations but for
now it allows us to remove NNS constants together with the tests.
Signed-off-by: Evgeniy Stratonikov <evgeniy@nspcc.ru>
Use circular buffer which is a bit more appropriate. The problem is that
priority queue accepts and stores equal items which wastes memory even in
normal usage scenario, but it's especially dangerous if the node is stuck for
some reason. In this case it'll accept from peers and put into queue the same
blocks again and again leaking memory up to OOM condition.
Notice that queue length calculation might be wrong in case circular buffer
wraps, but it's not very likely to happen (usually blocks not coming from the
queue are added by consensus and it's not very fast in doing so).
