It directly affects node security and the default here MUST BE the safe choice
which is to do the verification. Otherwise it's just dangerous, absent any
VerifyBlocks configuration we'll get an insecure node. This option is not
supposed to be frequently used and it doesn't affect the ability to process
blocks, so breaking compatibility (in a safe manner) should be OK here.
HF_ prefix makes zero sense to me. If it's "hardfork", then it's in the
"Hardforks" section already. If it's "hotfix", then it made some sense back
when it was HF_2712_FixSyscallFees, but now it's codenamed anyway. So we can
drop it and have a cleaner config.
1. Initialization is performed via `Blockchain` methods.
2. Native Oracle contract updates list of oracle nodes
and in-fly requests in `PostPersist`.
3. RPC uses Oracle module directly.
part of #904
1. We now have MaxTransactionsPerBlock set in native Policy contract,
so this value should be used in (dbft).GetVerified method instead
of passing it as an argument.
2. Removed (dbft).WithTxPerBlock.
2. DBFT API has changed, so update it's version.
3. Removed MaxTransactionsPerBlock from node configuration, as we
have it set in native Policy contract.
There is no such thing as high/low priority transactions, as there are
no free transactions anymore and they are ordered by fees contained
in transaction itself.
Closes#1063.
Implement mempool and consensus block creation policies, almost the same as
SimplePolicy plugin for C# node provides with two caveats:
* HighPriorityTxType is not configured and hardcoded to ClaimType
* BlockedAccounts are not supported
Other than that it allows us to run successfuly as testnet CN, previously our
proposals were rejected because we were proposing blocks with oversized
transactions (that are rejected by PoolTx() now).
Mainnet and testnet configuration files are updated accordingly, but privnet
is left as is with no limits.
Configuration is currently attached to the Blockchain and so is the code that
does policying, it may be moved somewhere in the future, but it works for
now.
1) Make timeout a timeout, don't do magic ping counts.
2) Drop additional timer from the main peer's protocol loop, create it
dynamically and make it disconnect the peer.
3) Don't expose the ping counter to the outside, handle more logic inside the
Peer.
Relates to #430.
add pingInterval same as used in ref C# implementation with the same logic
add pingTimeout which is used to check whether pong received. If not -- drop the peer.
add pingLimit which is hardcoded to 4 in TCPPeer. It's limit for unsuccessful ping/pong calls (where pong wasn't received in pingTimeout interval)
