frostfs-node/pkg/services/tree/ape.go
Airat Arifullin 0c2b6f3dac [] ape: Make services use bearer chains fed router
* Refactor object and tree service - they should instantiate
  chain router cheking the bearer token. If there are no bearer
  token rules, then defaul chain router is used.
* Fix unit-tests.

Signed-off-by: Airat Arifullin <a.arifullin@yadro.com>
2024-07-05 18:26:48 +00:00

198 lines
7 KiB
Go

package tree
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"strings"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/converter"
aperequest "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/request"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/router"
core "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/container"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/netmap"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/ape"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/bearer"
apistatus "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/client/status"
cnrSDK "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/acl"
cid "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/id"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/user"
apechain "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/chain"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/engine"
commonschema "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/schema/common"
nativeschema "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/schema/native"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/crypto/keys"
"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
)
var (
errInvalidTargetType = errors.New("bearer token defines non-container target override")
errBearerExpired = errors.New("bearer token has expired")
errBearerInvalidSignature = errors.New("bearer token has invalid signature")
errBearerInvalidContainerID = errors.New("bearer token was created for another container")
errBearerNotSignedByOwner = errors.New("bearer token is not signed by the container owner")
errBearerInvalidOwner = errors.New("bearer token owner differs from the request sender")
)
func (s *Service) newAPERequest(ctx context.Context, namespace string,
cid cid.ID, operation acl.Op, role acl.Role, publicKey *keys.PublicKey,
) (aperequest.Request, error) {
schemaMethod, err := converter.SchemaMethodFromACLOperation(operation)
if err != nil {
return aperequest.Request{}, err
}
schemaRole, err := converter.SchemaRoleFromACLRole(role)
if err != nil {
return aperequest.Request{}, err
}
reqProps := map[string]string{
nativeschema.PropertyKeyActorPublicKey: hex.EncodeToString(publicKey.Bytes()),
nativeschema.PropertyKeyActorRole: schemaRole,
}
reqProps, err = s.fillWithUserClaimTags(reqProps, publicKey)
if err != nil {
return aperequest.Request{}, err
}
if p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx); ok {
if tcpAddr, ok := p.Addr.(*net.TCPAddr); ok {
reqProps[commonschema.PropertyKeyFrostFSSourceIP] = tcpAddr.IP.String()
}
}
var resourceName string
if namespace == "root" || namespace == "" {
resourceName = fmt.Sprintf(nativeschema.ResourceFormatRootContainerObjects, cid.EncodeToString())
} else {
resourceName = fmt.Sprintf(nativeschema.ResourceFormatNamespaceContainerObjects, namespace, cid.EncodeToString())
}
return aperequest.NewRequest(
schemaMethod,
aperequest.NewResource(resourceName, make(map[string]string)),
reqProps,
), nil
}
// isValidBearer checks whether bearer token was correctly signed by authorized
// entity. This method might be defined on whole ACL service because it will
// require fetching current epoch to check lifetime.
func isValidBearer(token *bearer.Token, ownerCnr user.ID, cntID cid.ID, publicKey *keys.PublicKey, st netmap.State) error {
if token == nil {
return nil
}
// First check token lifetime. Simplest verification.
if token.InvalidAt(st.CurrentEpoch()) {
return errBearerExpired
}
// Then check if bearer token is signed correctly.
if !token.VerifySignature() {
return errBearerInvalidSignature
}
// Check for ape overrides defined in the bearer token.
apeOverride := token.APEOverride()
if len(apeOverride.Chains) > 0 && apeOverride.Target.TargetType != ape.TargetTypeContainer {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errInvalidTargetType, apeOverride.Target.TargetType.ToV2().String())
}
// Then check if container is either empty or equal to the container in the request.
var targetCnr cid.ID
err := targetCnr.DecodeString(apeOverride.Target.Name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid cid format: %s", apeOverride.Target.Name)
}
if !cntID.Equals(targetCnr) {
return errBearerInvalidContainerID
}
// Then check if container owner signed this token.
if !bearer.ResolveIssuer(*token).Equals(ownerCnr) {
return errBearerNotSignedByOwner
}
// Then check if request sender has rights to use this token.
var usrSender user.ID
user.IDFromKey(&usrSender, (ecdsa.PublicKey)(*publicKey))
if !token.AssertUser(usrSender) {
return errBearerInvalidOwner
}
return nil
}
func (s *Service) checkAPE(ctx context.Context, bt *bearer.Token,
container *core.Container, cid cid.ID, operation acl.Op, role acl.Role, publicKey *keys.PublicKey,
) error {
namespace := ""
cntNamespace, hasNamespace := strings.CutSuffix(cnrSDK.ReadDomain(container.Value).Zone(), ".ns")
if hasNamespace {
namespace = cntNamespace
}
request, err := s.newAPERequest(ctx, namespace, cid, operation, role, publicKey)
if err != nil {
return apeErr(err)
}
var cr engine.ChainRouter
if bt != nil && !bt.Impersonate() {
if err := isValidBearer(bt, container.Value.Owner(), cid, publicKey, s.state); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("bearer validation error: %w", err)
}
cr, err = router.BearerChainFeedRouter(s.localOverrideStorage, s.morphChainStorage, bt.APEOverride())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create chain router error: %w", err)
}
} else {
cr = engine.NewDefaultChainRouterWithLocalOverrides(s.morphChainStorage, s.localOverrideStorage)
}
groups, err := aperequest.Groups(s.frostfsidSubjectProvider, publicKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get group ids: %w", err)
}
// Policy contract keeps group related chains as namespace-group pair.
for i := range groups {
groups[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", namespace, groups[i])
}
rt := engine.NewRequestTargetExtended(namespace, cid.EncodeToString(), fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", namespace, publicKey.Address()), groups)
status, found, err := cr.IsAllowed(apechain.Ingress, rt, request)
if err != nil {
return apeErr(err)
}
if found && status == apechain.Allow {
return nil
}
err = fmt.Errorf("access to operation %s is denied by access policy engine: %s", request.Operation(), status.String())
return apeErr(err)
}
func apeErr(err error) error {
errAccessDenied := &apistatus.ObjectAccessDenied{}
errAccessDenied.WriteReason(err.Error())
return errAccessDenied
}
// fillWithUserClaimTags fills ape request properties with user claim tags getting them from frostfsid contract by actor public key.
func (s *Service) fillWithUserClaimTags(reqProps map[string]string, publicKey *keys.PublicKey) (map[string]string, error) {
if reqProps == nil {
reqProps = make(map[string]string)
}
props, err := aperequest.FormFrostfsIDRequestProperties(s.frostfsidSubjectProvider, publicKey)
if err != nil {
return reqProps, err
}
for propertyName, properyValue := range props {
reqProps[propertyName] = properyValue
}
return reqProps, nil
}