acid-ant/frostfs-node
1
0
Fork 0
forked from TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

[#1362] ape: Move common APE check logic to separate package

Browse source 
* Tree and object service have the same log for checking APE. So,
  this check should be moved to common package.

Signed-off-by: Airat Arifullin <a.arifullin@yadro.com>
This commit is contained in:
Airat Arifullin 2024-09-10 11:15:30 +03:00 committed by Evgenii Stratonikov
parent 92fe5d90f5
commit a812932984
4 changed files with 205 additions and 222 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

167
pkg/services/common/ape/checker.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
package ape
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"errors"
"fmt"
aperequest "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/request"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/router"
frostfsidcore "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/frostfsid"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/netmap"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/ape"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/bearer"
apistatus "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/client/status"
cid "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/id"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/user"
apechain "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/chain"
policyengine "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/engine"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/crypto/keys"
)
var (
errInvalidTargetType = errors.New("bearer token defines non-container target override")
errBearerExpired = errors.New("bearer token has expired")
errBearerInvalidSignature = errors.New("bearer token has invalid signature")
errBearerInvalidContainerID = errors.New("bearer token was created for another container")
errBearerNotSignedByOwner = errors.New("bearer token is not signed by the container owner")
errBearerInvalidOwner = errors.New("bearer token owner differs from the request sender")
)
type CheckPrm struct {
// Request is an APE-request that is checked by policy engine.
Request aperequest.Request
Namespace string
Container cid.ID
// An encoded container's owner user ID.
ContainerOwner user.ID
// PublicKey is public key of the request sender.
PublicKey *keys.PublicKey
// The request's bearer token. It is used in order to check APE overrides with the token.
BearerToken *bearer.Token
// If SoftAPECheck is set to true, then NoRuleFound is interpreted as allow.
SoftAPECheck bool
}
// CheckCore provides methods to perform the common logic of APE check.
type CheckCore interface {
// CheckAPE performs the common policy-engine check logic on a prepared request.
CheckAPE(prm CheckPrm) error
}
type checkerCoreImpl struct {
LocalOverrideStorage policyengine.LocalOverrideStorage
MorphChainStorage policyengine.MorphRuleChainStorageReader
FrostFSSubjectProvider frostfsidcore.SubjectProvider
State netmap.State
}
func New(localOverrideStorage policyengine.LocalOverrideStorage, morphChainStorage policyengine.MorphRuleChainStorageReader,
frostFSSubjectProvider frostfsidcore.SubjectProvider, state netmap.State) CheckCore {
return &checkerCoreImpl{
LocalOverrideStorage: localOverrideStorage,
MorphChainStorage: morphChainStorage,
FrostFSSubjectProvider: frostFSSubjectProvider,
State: state,
}
}
// CheckAPE performs the common policy-engine check logic on a prepared request.
func (c *checkerCoreImpl) CheckAPE(prm CheckPrm) error {
var cr policyengine.ChainRouter
if prm.BearerToken != nil && !prm.BearerToken.Impersonate() {
var err error
if err = isValidBearer(prm.BearerToken, prm.ContainerOwner, prm.Container, prm.PublicKey, c.State); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("bearer validation error: %w", err)
}
cr, err = router.BearerChainFeedRouter(c.LocalOverrideStorage, c.MorphChainStorage, prm.BearerToken.APEOverride())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create chain router error: %w", err)
}
} else {
cr = policyengine.NewDefaultChainRouterWithLocalOverrides(c.MorphChainStorage, c.LocalOverrideStorage)
}
groups, err := aperequest.Groups(c.FrostFSSubjectProvider, prm.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get group ids: %w", err)
}
// Policy contract keeps group related chains as namespace-group pair.
for i := range groups {
groups[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", prm.Namespace, groups[i])
}
rt := policyengine.NewRequestTargetExtended(prm.Namespace, prm.Container.EncodeToString(), fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", prm.Namespace, prm.PublicKey.Address()), groups)
status, found, err := cr.IsAllowed(apechain.Ingress, rt, prm.Request)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !found && prm.SoftAPECheck || status == apechain.Allow {
return nil
}
err = fmt.Errorf("access to operation %s is denied by access policy engine: %s", prm.Request.Operation(), status.String())
return apeErr(err)
}
func apeErr(err error) error {
errAccessDenied := &apistatus.ObjectAccessDenied{}
errAccessDenied.WriteReason(err.Error())
return errAccessDenied
}
// isValidBearer checks whether bearer token was correctly signed by authorized
// entity. This method might be defined on whole ACL service because it will
// require fetching current epoch to check lifetime.
func isValidBearer(token *bearer.Token, ownerCnr user.ID, cntID cid.ID, publicKey *keys.PublicKey, st netmap.State) error {
if token == nil {
return nil
}
// First check token lifetime. Simplest verification.
if token.InvalidAt(st.CurrentEpoch()) {
return errBearerExpired
}
// Then check if bearer token is signed correctly.
if !token.VerifySignature() {
return errBearerInvalidSignature
}
// Check for ape overrides defined in the bearer token.
apeOverride := token.APEOverride()
if len(apeOverride.Chains) > 0 && apeOverride.Target.TargetType != ape.TargetTypeContainer {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errInvalidTargetType, apeOverride.Target.TargetType.ToV2().String())
}
// Then check if container is either empty or equal to the container in the request.
var targetCnr cid.ID
err := targetCnr.DecodeString(apeOverride.Target.Name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid cid format: %s", apeOverride.Target.Name)
}
if !cntID.Equals(targetCnr) {
return errBearerInvalidContainerID
}
// Then check if container owner signed this token.
if !bearer.ResolveIssuer(*token).Equals(ownerCnr) {
return errBearerNotSignedByOwner
}
// Then check if request sender has rights to use this token.
var usrSender user.ID
user.IDFromKey(&usrSender, (ecdsa.PublicKey)(*publicKey))
if !token.AssertUser(usrSender) {
return errBearerInvalidOwner
}
return nil
}

123
pkg/services/object/ape/checker.go
View file

@ -2,47 +2,39 @@ package ape
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"errors"
"fmt"
objectV2 "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-api-go/v2/object"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-api-go/v2/session"
aperequest "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/request"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/router"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/container"
frostfsidcore "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/frostfsid"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/netmap"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/ape"
checkercore "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/services/common/ape"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/bearer"
cid "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/id"
oid "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/object/id"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/user"
apechain "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/chain"
policyengine "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/engine"
nativeschema "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/schema/native"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/crypto/keys"
)
type checkerImpl struct {
localOverrideStorage policyengine.LocalOverrideStorage
morphChainStorage policyengine.MorphRuleChainStorageReader
headerProvider HeaderProvider
checkerCore checkercore.CheckCore
frostFSIDClient frostfsidcore.SubjectProvider
headerProvider HeaderProvider
nm netmap.Source
st netmap.State
cnrSource container.Source
nodePK []byte
}
func NewChecker(localOverrideStorage policyengine.LocalOverrideStorage, morphChainStorage policyengine.MorphRuleChainStorageReader, headerProvider HeaderProvider, frostFSIDClient frostfsidcore.SubjectProvider, nm netmap.Source, st netmap.State, cnrSource container.Source, nodePK []byte) Checker {
return &checkerImpl{
localOverrideStorage: localOverrideStorage,
morphChainStorage: morphChainStorage,
headerProvider: headerProvider,
checkerCore: checkercore.New(localOverrideStorage, morphChainStorage, frostFSIDClient, st),
frostFSIDClient: frostFSIDClient,
headerProvider: headerProvider,
nm: nm,
st: st,
cnrSource: cnrSource,
nodePK: nodePK,
}
@ -85,68 +77,9 @@ type Prm struct {
XHeaders []session.XHeader
}
var (
errMissingOID = errors.New("object ID is not set")
errInvalidTargetType = errors.New("bearer token defines non-container target override")
errBearerExpired = errors.New("bearer token has expired")
errBearerInvalidSignature = errors.New("bearer token has invalid signature")
errBearerInvalidContainerID = errors.New("bearer token was created for another container")
errBearerNotSignedByOwner = errors.New("bearer token is not signed by the container owner")
errBearerInvalidOwner = errors.New("bearer token owner differs from the request sender")
)
var errMissingOID = errors.New("object ID is not set")
// isValidBearer checks whether bearer token was correctly signed by authorized
// entity. This method might be defined on whole ACL service because it will
// require fetching current epoch to check lifetime.
func isValidBearer(token *bearer.Token, ownerCnr user.ID, containerID cid.ID, publicKey *keys.PublicKey, st netmap.State) error {
if token == nil {
return nil
}
// First check token lifetime. Simplest verification.
if token.InvalidAt(st.CurrentEpoch()) {
return errBearerExpired
}
// Then check if bearer token is signed correctly.
if !token.VerifySignature() {
return errBearerInvalidSignature
}
// Check for ape overrides defined in the bearer token.
apeOverride := token.APEOverride()
if len(apeOverride.Chains) > 0 && apeOverride.Target.TargetType != ape.TargetTypeContainer {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errInvalidTargetType, apeOverride.Target.TargetType.ToV2().String())
}
// Then check if container is either empty or equal to the container in the request.
var targetCnr cid.ID
err := targetCnr.DecodeString(apeOverride.Target.Name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid cid format: %s", apeOverride.Target.Name)
}
if !containerID.Equals(targetCnr) {
return errBearerInvalidContainerID
}
// Then check if container owner signed this token.
if !bearer.ResolveIssuer(*token).Equals(ownerCnr) {
return errBearerNotSignedByOwner
}
// Then check if request sender has rights to use this token.
var usrSender user.ID
user.IDFromKey(&usrSender, (ecdsa.PublicKey)(*publicKey))
if !token.AssertUser(usrSender) {
return errBearerInvalidOwner
}
return nil
}
// CheckAPE checks if a request or a response is permitted creating an ape request and passing
// it to chain router.
// CheckAPE prepares an APE-request and checks if it is permitted by policies.
func (c *checkerImpl) CheckAPE(ctx context.Context, prm Prm) error {
// APE check is ignored for some inter-node requests.
if prm.Role == nativeschema.PropertyValueContainerRoleContainer {
@ -171,38 +104,14 @@ func (c *checkerImpl) CheckAPE(ctx context.Context, prm Prm) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
groups, err := aperequest.Groups(c.frostFSIDClient, pub)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get group ids: %w", err)
}
// Policy contract keeps group related chains as namespace-group pair.
for i := range groups {
groups[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", prm.Namespace, groups[i])
}
var cr policyengine.ChainRouter
if prm.BearerToken != nil && !prm.BearerToken.Impersonate() {
if err := isValidBearer(prm.BearerToken, prm.ContainerOwner, prm.Container, pub, c.st); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("bearer token validation error: %w", err)
}
cr, err = router.BearerChainFeedRouter(c.localOverrideStorage, c.morphChainStorage, prm.BearerToken.APEOverride())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create chain router error: %w", err)
}
} else {
cr = policyengine.NewDefaultChainRouterWithLocalOverrides(c.morphChainStorage, c.localOverrideStorage)
}
rt := policyengine.NewRequestTargetExtended(prm.Namespace, prm.Container.EncodeToString(), fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", prm.Namespace, pub.Address()), groups)
status, ruleFound, err := cr.IsAllowed(apechain.Ingress, rt, r)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !ruleFound && prm.SoftAPECheck || status == apechain.Allow {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("method %s: %s", prm.Method, status)
return c.checkerCore.CheckAPE(checkercore.CheckPrm{
Request: r,
PublicKey: pub,
Namespace: prm.Method,
Container: prm.Container,
ContainerOwner: prm.ContainerOwner,
BearerToken: prm.BearerToken,
SoftAPECheck: prm.SoftAPECheck,
})
}

116
pkg/services/tree/ape.go
View file

@ -2,42 +2,25 @@ package tree
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"strings"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/converter"
aperequest "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/request"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/ape/router"
core "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/container"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/core/netmap"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/ape"
checkercore "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/services/common/ape"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/bearer"
apistatus "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/client/status"
cnrSDK "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/acl"
cid "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/id"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/user"
apechain "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/chain"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/pkg/engine"
commonschema "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/schema/common"
nativeschema "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/policy-engine/schema/native"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neo-go/pkg/crypto/keys"
"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
)
var (
errInvalidTargetType = errors.New("bearer token defines non-container target override")
errBearerExpired = errors.New("bearer token has expired")
errBearerInvalidSignature = errors.New("bearer token has invalid signature")
errBearerInvalidContainerID = errors.New("bearer token was created for another container")
errBearerNotSignedByOwner = errors.New("bearer token is not signed by the container owner")
errBearerInvalidOwner = errors.New("bearer token owner differs from the request sender")
)
func (s *Service) newAPERequest(ctx context.Context, namespace string,
cid cid.ID, operation acl.Op, role acl.Role, publicKey *keys.PublicKey,
) (aperequest.Request, error) {
@ -77,56 +60,6 @@ func (s *Service) newAPERequest(ctx context.Context, namespace string,
), nil
}
// isValidBearer checks whether bearer token was correctly signed by authorized
// entity. This method might be defined on whole ACL service because it will
// require fetching current epoch to check lifetime.
func isValidBearer(token *bearer.Token, ownerCnr user.ID, cntID cid.ID, publicKey *keys.PublicKey, st netmap.State) error {
if token == nil {
return nil
}
// First check token lifetime. Simplest verification.
if token.InvalidAt(st.CurrentEpoch()) {
return errBearerExpired
}
// Then check if bearer token is signed correctly.
if !token.VerifySignature() {
return errBearerInvalidSignature
}
// Check for ape overrides defined in the bearer token.
apeOverride := token.APEOverride()
if len(apeOverride.Chains) > 0 && apeOverride.Target.TargetType != ape.TargetTypeContainer {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errInvalidTargetType, apeOverride.Target.TargetType.ToV2().String())
}
// Then check if container is either empty or equal to the container in the request.
var targetCnr cid.ID
err := targetCnr.DecodeString(apeOverride.Target.Name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid cid format: %s", apeOverride.Target.Name)
}
if !cntID.Equals(targetCnr) {
return errBearerInvalidContainerID
}
// Then check if container owner signed this token.
if !bearer.ResolveIssuer(*token).Equals(ownerCnr) {
return errBearerNotSignedByOwner
}
// Then check if request sender has rights to use this token.
var usrSender user.ID
user.IDFromKey(&usrSender, (ecdsa.PublicKey)(*publicKey))
if !token.AssertUser(usrSender) {
return errBearerInvalidOwner
}
return nil
}
func (s *Service) checkAPE(ctx context.Context, bt *bearer.Token,
container *core.Container, cid cid.ID, operation acl.Op, role acl.Role, publicKey *keys.PublicKey,
) error {
@ -141,45 +74,14 @@ func (s *Service) checkAPE(ctx context.Context, bt *bearer.Token,
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create ape request: %w", err)
}
var cr engine.ChainRouter
if bt != nil && !bt.Impersonate() {
if err := isValidBearer(bt, container.Value.Owner(), cid, publicKey, s.state); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("bearer validation error: %w", err)
}
cr, err = router.BearerChainFeedRouter(s.localOverrideStorage, s.morphChainStorage, bt.APEOverride())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create chain router error: %w", err)
}
} else {
cr = engine.NewDefaultChainRouterWithLocalOverrides(s.morphChainStorage, s.localOverrideStorage)
}
groups, err := aperequest.Groups(s.frostfsidSubjectProvider, publicKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get group ids: %w", err)
}
// Policy contract keeps group related chains as namespace-group pair.
for i := range groups {
groups[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", namespace, groups[i])
}
rt := engine.NewRequestTargetExtended(namespace, cid.EncodeToString(), fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", namespace, publicKey.Address()), groups)
status, found, err := cr.IsAllowed(apechain.Ingress, rt, request)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if found && status == apechain.Allow {
return nil
}
err = fmt.Errorf("access to operation %s is denied by access policy engine: %s", request.Operation(), status.String())
return apeErr(err)
}
func apeErr(err error) error {
errAccessDenied := &apistatus.ObjectAccessDenied{}
errAccessDenied.WriteReason(err.Error())
return errAccessDenied
return s.apeChecker.CheckAPE(checkercore.CheckPrm{
Request: request,
Namespace: namespace,
Container: cid,
PublicKey: publicKey,
BearerToken: bt,
SoftAPECheck: false,
})
}
// fillWithUserClaimTags fills ape request properties with user claim tags getting them from frostfsid contract by actor public key.

5
pkg/services/tree/service.go
View file

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/local_object_storage/pilorama"
checkercore "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/services/common/ape"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-node/pkg/util/logger"
"git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/acl"
cidSDK "git.frostfs.info/TrueCloudLab/frostfs-sdk-go/container/id"
@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ type Service struct {
initialSyncDone atomic.Bool
apeChecker checkercore.CheckCore
// cnrMap contains existing (used) container IDs.
cnrMap map[cidSDK.ID]struct{}
// cnrMapMtx protects cnrMap
@ -72,6 +75,8 @@ func New(opts ...Option) *Service {
s.syncChan = make(chan struct{})
s.syncPool, _ = ants.NewPool(defaultSyncWorkerCount)
s.apeChecker = checkercore.New(s.localOverrideStorage, s.morphChainStorage, s.frostfsidSubjectProvider, s.state)
return &s
}