frostfs-node/pkg/services/object/acl/classifier.go
Alex Vanin ca552f53c6 [#115] Check session token validity
Malicious user can stole public session key and use
it by sending request from it's own scope. To prevent
this each session token is signed and signature private
key must be corresponded with owner id in token. Therefore
malicious node cannot impersonate request without private
key to sign token.

Signed-off-by: Alex Vanin <alexey@nspcc.ru>
2020-10-22 11:55:28 +03:00

217 lines
5.7 KiB
Go

package acl
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-api-go/pkg"
acl "github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-api-go/pkg/acl/eacl"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-api-go/pkg/container"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-api-go/pkg/netmap"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-api-go/pkg/owner"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-api-go/util/signature"
"github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-api-go/v2/session"
v2signature "github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-api-go/v2/signature"
crypto "github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-crypto"
core "github.com/nspcc-dev/neofs-node/pkg/core/netmap"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
)
type (
InnerRingFetcher interface {
InnerRingKeys() ([][]byte, error)
}
metaWithToken struct {
vheader *session.RequestVerificationHeader
token *session.SessionToken
}
SenderClassifier struct {
innerRing InnerRingFetcher
netmap core.Source
}
)
// fixme: update classifier constructor
func NewSenderClassifier(ir InnerRingFetcher, nm core.Source) SenderClassifier {
return SenderClassifier{
innerRing: ir,
netmap: nm,
}
}
func (c SenderClassifier) Classify(
req metaWithToken,
cid *container.ID,
cnr *container.Container) (acl.Role, []byte) {
if cid == nil {
// log there
return acl.RoleUnknown, nil
}
ownerID, ownerKey, err := requestOwner(req)
if err != nil || ownerID == nil || ownerKey == nil {
// log there
return acl.RoleUnknown, nil
}
ownerKeyInBytes := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(ownerKey)
// todo: get owner from neofs.id if present
// if request owner is the same as container owner, return RoleUser
if bytes.Equal(cnr.GetOwnerID().GetValue(), ownerID.ToV2().GetValue()) {
return acl.RoleUser, ownerKeyInBytes
}
isInnerRingNode, err := c.isInnerRingKey(ownerKeyInBytes)
if err != nil {
// log there
return acl.RoleUnknown, nil
} else if isInnerRingNode {
return acl.RoleSystem, ownerKeyInBytes
}
isContainerNode, err := c.isContainerKey(ownerKeyInBytes, cid.ToV2().GetValue(), cnr)
if err != nil {
// log there
return acl.RoleUnknown, nil
} else if isContainerNode {
return acl.RoleSystem, ownerKeyInBytes
}
// if none of above, return RoleOthers
return acl.RoleOthers, ownerKeyInBytes
}
func requestOwner(req metaWithToken) (*owner.ID, *ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
if req.vheader == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(ErrMalformedRequest, "nil verification header")
}
// if session token is presented, use it as truth source
if req.token.GetBody() != nil {
// verify signature of session token
return ownerFromToken(req.token)
}
// otherwise get original body signature
bodySignature := originalBodySignature(req.vheader)
if bodySignature == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(ErrMalformedRequest, "nil at body signature")
}
key := crypto.UnmarshalPublicKey(bodySignature.GetKey())
neo3wallet, err := owner.NEO3WalletFromPublicKey(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "can't create neo3 wallet")
}
// form user from public key
user := new(owner.ID)
user.SetNeo3Wallet(neo3wallet)
return user, key, nil
}
func originalBodySignature(v *session.RequestVerificationHeader) *pkg.Signature {
if v == nil {
return nil
}
for v.GetOrigin() != nil {
v = v.GetOrigin()
}
return pkg.NewSignatureFromV2(v.GetBodySignature())
}
func (c SenderClassifier) isInnerRingKey(owner []byte) (bool, error) {
innerRingKeys, err := c.innerRing.InnerRingKeys()
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
// if request owner key in the inner ring list, return RoleSystem
for i := range innerRingKeys {
if bytes.Equal(innerRingKeys[i], owner) {
return true, nil
}
}
return false, nil
}
func (c SenderClassifier) isContainerKey(
owner, cid []byte,
cnr *container.Container) (bool, error) {
// first check current netmap
nm, err := core.GetLatestNetworkMap(c.netmap)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
in, err := lookupKeyInContainer(nm, owner, cid, cnr)
if err != nil {
return false, err
} else if in {
return true, nil
}
// then check previous netmap, this can happen in-between epoch change
// when node migrates data from last epoch container
nm, err = core.GetPreviousNetworkMap(c.netmap)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return lookupKeyInContainer(nm, owner, cid, cnr)
}
func lookupKeyInContainer(
nm *netmap.Netmap,
owner, cid []byte,
cnr *container.Container) (bool, error) {
cnrNodes, err := nm.GetContainerNodes(cnr.GetPlacementPolicy(), cid)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
flatCnrNodes := cnrNodes.Flatten() // we need single array to iterate on
for i := range flatCnrNodes {
if bytes.Equal(flatCnrNodes[i].InfoV2.GetPublicKey(), owner) {
return true, nil
}
}
return false, nil
}
func ownerFromToken(token *session.SessionToken) (*owner.ID, *ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
// 1. First check signature of session token.
signWrapper := v2signature.StableMarshalerWrapper{SM: token.GetBody()}
if err := signature.VerifyDataWithSource(signWrapper, func() (key, sig []byte) {
tokenSignature := token.GetSignature()
return tokenSignature.GetKey(), tokenSignature.GetSign()
}); err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(ErrMalformedRequest, "invalid session token signature")
}
// 2. Then check if session token owner issued the session token
tokenIssuerKey := crypto.UnmarshalPublicKey(token.GetSignature().GetKey())
tokenIssuerWallet, err := owner.NEO3WalletFromPublicKey(tokenIssuerKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(ErrMalformedRequest, "invalid token issuer key")
}
if !bytes.Equal(token.GetBody().GetOwnerID().GetValue(), tokenIssuerWallet.Bytes()) {
// todo: in this case we can issue all owner keys from neofs.id and check once again
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(ErrMalformedRequest, "invalid session token owner")
}
return owner.NewIDFromV2(token.GetBody().GetOwnerID()), tokenIssuerKey, nil
}