Add logic for Account authorizations and improve tests

acme/api/revoke.go

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 package api
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
@@ -66,35 +68,36 @@ func (h *Handler) RevokeCert(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	serial := certToBeRevoked.SerialNumber.String()
-	existingCert, err := h.db.GetCertificateBySerial(ctx, serial)
+	dbCert, err := h.db.GetCertificateBySerial(ctx, serial)
 	if err != nil {
 		api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapErrorISE(err, "error retrieving certificate by serial"))
 		return
 	}
 
+	if !bytes.Equal(dbCert.Leaf.Raw, certToBeRevoked.Raw) {
+		// this should never happen
+		api.WriteError(w, acme.NewErrorISE("certificate raw bytes are not equal"))
+		return
+	}
+
 	if shouldCheckAccountFrom(jws) {
 		account, err := accountFromContext(ctx)
 		if err != nil {
 			api.WriteError(w, err)
 			return
 		}
-		if !account.IsValid() {
+		acmeErr := h.isAccountAuthorized(ctx, dbCert, certToBeRevoked, account)
-			api.WriteError(w, wrapUnauthorizedError(certToBeRevoked, fmt.Sprintf("account '%s' has status '%s'", account.ID, account.Status), nil))
+		if acmeErr != nil {
+			api.WriteError(w, acmeErr)
 			return
 		}
-		if existingCert.AccountID != account.ID { // TODO(hs): combine this check with the one below; ony one of the two has to be true
-			api.WriteError(w, wrapUnauthorizedError(certToBeRevoked, fmt.Sprintf("account '%s' does not own certificate '%s'", account.ID, existingCert.ID), nil))
-			return
-		}
-		// TODO(hs): check and implement "an account that holds authorizations for all of the identifiers in the certificate."
-		// In that case the certificate may not have been created by this account, but another account that was authorized before.
 	} else {
 		// if account doesn't need to be checked, the JWS should be verified to be signed by the
 		// private key that belongs to the public key in the certificate to be revoked.
 		_, err := jws.Verify(certToBeRevoked.PublicKey)
 		if err != nil {
 			// TODO(hs): possible to determine an error vs. unauthorized and thus provide an ISE vs. Unauthorized?
-			api.WriteError(w, wrapUnauthorizedError(certToBeRevoked, "verification of jws using certificate public key failed", err))
+			api.WriteError(w, wrapUnauthorizedError(certToBeRevoked, nil, "verification of jws using certificate public key failed", err))
 			return
 		}
 	}
@@ -137,6 +140,107 @@ func (h *Handler) RevokeCert(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	w.Write(nil)
 }
 
+// isAccountAuthorized checks if an ACME account that was retrieved earlier is authorized
+// to revoke the certificate. An Account must always be valid in order to revoke a certificate.
+// In case the certificate retrieved from the database belongs to the Account, the Account is
+// authorized. If the certificate retrieved from the database doesn't belong to the Account,
+// the identifiers in the certificate are extracted and compared against the (valid) Authorizations
+// that are stored for the ACME Account. If these sets match, the Account is considered authorized
+// to revoke the certificate. If this check fails, the client will receive an unauthorized error.
+func (h *Handler) isAccountAuthorized(ctx context.Context, dbCert *acme.Certificate, certToBeRevoked *x509.Certificate, account *acme.Account) *acme.Error {
+	if !account.IsValid() {
+		return wrapUnauthorizedError(certToBeRevoked, nil, fmt.Sprintf("account '%s' has status '%s'", account.ID, account.Status), nil)
+	}
+	certificateBelongsToAccount := dbCert.AccountID == account.ID
+	if certificateBelongsToAccount {
+		return nil // return early; skip relatively expensive database check
+	}
+	requiredIdentifiers := extractIdentifiers(certToBeRevoked)
+	if len(requiredIdentifiers) == 0 {
+		return wrapUnauthorizedError(certToBeRevoked, nil, "cannot authorize revocation without providing identifiers to authorize", nil)
+	}
+	authzs, err := h.db.GetAuthorizationsByAccountID(ctx, account.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return acme.WrapErrorISE(err, "error retrieving authorizations for Account %s", account.ID)
+	}
+	authorizedIdentifiers := map[string]acme.Identifier{}
+	for _, authz := range authzs {
+		// Only valid Authorizations are included
+		if authz.Status != acme.StatusValid {
+			continue
+		}
+		authorizedIdentifiers[identifierKey(authz.Identifier)] = authz.Identifier
+	}
+	if len(authorizedIdentifiers) == 0 {
+		unauthorizedIdentifiers := []acme.Identifier{}
+		for _, identifier := range requiredIdentifiers {
+			unauthorizedIdentifiers = append(unauthorizedIdentifiers, identifier)
+		}
+		return wrapUnauthorizedError(certToBeRevoked, unauthorizedIdentifiers, fmt.Sprintf("account '%s' does not have valid authorizations", account.ID), nil)
+	}
+	unauthorizedIdentifiers := []acme.Identifier{}
+	for key := range requiredIdentifiers {
+		_, ok := authorizedIdentifiers[key]
+		if !ok {
+			unauthorizedIdentifiers = append(unauthorizedIdentifiers, requiredIdentifiers[key])
+		}
+	}
+	if len(unauthorizedIdentifiers) != 0 {
+		return wrapUnauthorizedError(certToBeRevoked, unauthorizedIdentifiers, fmt.Sprintf("account '%s' does not have authorizations for all identifiers", account.ID), nil)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// identifierKey creates a unique key for an ACME identifier using
+// the following format: ip|127.0.0.1; dns|*.example.com
+func identifierKey(identifier acme.Identifier) string {
+	if identifier.Type == acme.IP {
+		return "ip|" + identifier.Value
+	}
+	if identifier.Type == acme.DNS {
+		return "dns|" + identifier.Value
+	}
+	return "unsupported|" + identifier.Value
+}
+
+// extractIdentifiers extracts ACME identifiers from an x509 certificate and
+// creates a map from them. The map ensures that double SANs are deduplicated.
+// The Subject CommonName is included, because RFC8555 7.4 states that DNS
+// identifiers can come from either the CommonName or a DNS SAN or both. When
+// authorizing issuance, the DNS identifier must be in the request and will be
+// included in the validation (see Order.sans()) as of now. This means that the
+// CommonName will in fact have an authorization available.
+func extractIdentifiers(cert *x509.Certificate) map[string]acme.Identifier {
+	result := map[string]acme.Identifier{}
+	for _, name := range cert.DNSNames {
+		identifier := acme.Identifier{
+			Type:  acme.DNS,
+			Value: name,
+		}
+		result[identifierKey(identifier)] = identifier
+	}
+	for _, ip := range cert.IPAddresses {
+		identifier := acme.Identifier{
+			Type:  acme.IP,
+			Value: ip.String(),
+		}
+		result[identifierKey(identifier)] = identifier
+	}
+	// TODO(hs): should we include the CommonName or not?
+	if cert.Subject.CommonName != "" {
+		identifier := acme.Identifier{
+			// assuming only DNS can be in Common Name (RFC8555, 7.4); RFC8738
+			// IP Identifier Validation Extension does not state anything about this.
+			// This logic is in accordance with the logic in order.canonicalize()
+			Type:  acme.DNS,
+			Value: cert.Subject.CommonName,
+		}
+		result[identifierKey(identifier)] = identifier
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
 // wrapRevokeErr is a best effort implementation to transform an error during
 // revocation into an ACME error, so that clients can understand the error.
 func wrapRevokeErr(err error) *acme.Error {
@@ -149,15 +253,24 @@ func wrapRevokeErr(err error) *acme.Error {
 
 // unauthorizedError returns an ACME error indicating the request was
 // not authorized to revoke the certificate.
-func wrapUnauthorizedError(cert *x509.Certificate, msg string, err error) *acme.Error {
+func wrapUnauthorizedError(cert *x509.Certificate, unauthorizedIdentifiers []acme.Identifier, msg string, err error) *acme.Error {
 	var acmeErr *acme.Error
 	if err == nil {
 		acmeErr = acme.NewError(acme.ErrorUnauthorizedType, msg)
 	} else {
 		acmeErr = acme.WrapError(acme.ErrorUnauthorizedType, err, msg)
 	}
-	acmeErr.Status = http.StatusForbidden
+	acmeErr.Status = http.StatusForbidden // RFC8555 7.6 shows example with 403
-	acmeErr.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("No authorization provided for name %s", cert.Subject.String()) // TODO(hs): what about other SANs? When no Subject is in the certificate?
+
+	switch {
+	case len(unauthorizedIdentifiers) > 0:
+		identifier := unauthorizedIdentifiers[0] // picking the first; compound may be an option too?
+		acmeErr.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("No authorization provided for name %s", identifier.Value)
+	case cert.Subject.String() != "":
+		acmeErr.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("No authorization provided for name %s", cert.Subject.CommonName)
+	default:
+		acmeErr.Detail = "No authorization provided"
+	}
 
 	return acmeErr
 }

acme/db.go

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ type DB interface {
 	CreateAuthorization(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error
 	GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error)
 	UpdateAuthorization(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error
+	GetAuthorizationsByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*Authorization, error)
 
 	CreateCertificate(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error
 	GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Certificate, error)
@@ -51,9 +52,10 @@ type MockDB struct {
 	MockCreateNonce func(ctx context.Context) (Nonce, error)
 	MockDeleteNonce func(ctx context.Context, nonce Nonce) error
 
-	MockCreateAuthorization func(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error
+	MockCreateAuthorization          func(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error
-	MockGetAuthorization    func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error)
+	MockGetAuthorization             func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Authorization, error)
-	MockUpdateAuthorization func(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error
+	MockUpdateAuthorization          func(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) error
+	MockGetAuthorizationsByAccountID func(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*Authorization, error)
 
 	MockCreateCertificate      func(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error
 	MockGetCertificate         func(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Certificate, error)
@@ -162,6 +164,16 @@ func (m *MockDB) UpdateAuthorization(ctx context.Context, az *Authorization) err
 	return m.MockError
 }
 
+// GetAuthorizationsByAccountID mock
+func (m *MockDB) GetAuthorizationsByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*Authorization, error) {
+	if m.MockGetAuthorizationsByAccountID != nil {
+		return m.MockGetAuthorizationsByAccountID(ctx, accountID)
+	} else if m.MockError != nil {
+		return nil, m.MockError
+	}
+	return nil, m.MockError
+}
+
 // CreateCertificate mock
 func (m *MockDB) CreateCertificate(ctx context.Context, cert *Certificate) error {
 	if m.MockCreateCertificate != nil {

acme/db/nosql/authz.go

@@ -116,3 +116,37 @@ func (db *DB) UpdateAuthorization(ctx context.Context, az *acme.Authorization) e
 	nu.Error = az.Error
 	return db.save(ctx, old.ID, nu, old, "authz", authzTable)
 }
+
+// GetAuthorizationsByAccountID retrieves and unmarshals ACME authz types from the database.
+func (db *DB) GetAuthorizationsByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*acme.Authorization, error) {
+	entries, err := db.db.List(authzTable)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "error listing authz")
+	}
+	authzs := []*acme.Authorization{}
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		dbaz := new(dbAuthz)
+		if err = json.Unmarshal(entry.Value, dbaz); err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "error unmarshaling dbAuthz key '%s' into dbAuthz struct", string(entry.Key))
+		}
+		// Filter out all dbAuthzs that don't belong to the accountID. This
+		// could be made more efficient with additional data structures mapping the
+		// Account ID to authorizations. Not trivial to do, though.
+		if dbaz.AccountID != accountID {
+			continue
+		}
+		authzs = append(authzs, &acme.Authorization{
+			ID:         dbaz.ID,
+			AccountID:  dbaz.AccountID,
+			Identifier: dbaz.Identifier,
+			Status:     dbaz.Status,
+			Challenges: nil, // challenges not required for current use case
+			Wildcard:   dbaz.Wildcard,
+			ExpiresAt:  dbaz.ExpiresAt,
+			Token:      dbaz.Token,
+			Error:      dbaz.Error,
+		})
+	}
+
+	return authzs, nil
+}

acme/db/nosql/authz_test.go

@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@ package nosql
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
 	"github.com/pkg/errors"
 	"github.com/smallstep/assert"
 	"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
@@ -614,3 +616,154 @@ func TestDB_UpdateAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestDB_GetAuthorizationsByAccountID(t *testing.T) {
+	azID := "azID"
+	accountID := "accountID"
+	type test struct {
+		db      nosql.DB
+		err     error
+		acmeErr *acme.Error
+		authzs  []*acme.Authorization
+	}
+	var tests = map[string]func(t *testing.T) test{
+		"fail/db.List-error": func(t *testing.T) test {
+			return test{
+				db: &db.MockNoSQLDB{
+					MList: func(bucket []byte) ([]*nosqldb.Entry, error) {
+						assert.Equals(t, bucket, authzTable)
+						return nil, errors.New("force")
+					},
+				},
+				err: errors.New("error listing authz: force"),
+			}
+		},
+		"fail/unmarshal": func(t *testing.T) test {
+			b := []byte(`{malformed}`)
+			return test{
+				db: &db.MockNoSQLDB{
+					MList: func(bucket []byte) ([]*nosqldb.Entry, error) {
+						assert.Equals(t, bucket, authzTable)
+						return []*nosqldb.Entry{
+							{
+								Bucket: bucket,
+								Key:    []byte(azID),
+								Value:  b,
+							},
+						}, nil
+					},
+				},
+				authzs: nil,
+				err:    fmt.Errorf("error unmarshaling dbAuthz key '%s' into dbAuthz struct", azID),
+			}
+		},
+		"ok": func(t *testing.T) test {
+			now := clock.Now()
+			dbaz := &dbAuthz{
+				ID:        azID,
+				AccountID: accountID,
+				Identifier: acme.Identifier{
+					Type:  "dns",
+					Value: "test.ca.smallstep.com",
+				},
+				Status:       acme.StatusValid,
+				Token:        "token",
+				CreatedAt:    now,
+				ExpiresAt:    now.Add(5 * time.Minute),
+				ChallengeIDs: []string{"foo", "bar"},
+				Wildcard:     true,
+			}
+			b, err := json.Marshal(dbaz)
+			assert.FatalError(t, err)
+
+			return test{
+				db: &db.MockNoSQLDB{
+					MList: func(bucket []byte) ([]*nosqldb.Entry, error) {
+						assert.Equals(t, bucket, authzTable)
+						return []*nosqldb.Entry{
+							{
+								Bucket: bucket,
+								Key:    []byte(azID),
+								Value:  b,
+							},
+						}, nil
+					},
+				},
+				authzs: []*acme.Authorization{
+					{
+						ID:         dbaz.ID,
+						AccountID:  dbaz.AccountID,
+						Token:      dbaz.Token,
+						Identifier: dbaz.Identifier,
+						Status:     dbaz.Status,
+						Challenges: nil,
+						Wildcard:   dbaz.Wildcard,
+						ExpiresAt:  dbaz.ExpiresAt,
+						Error:      dbaz.Error,
+					},
+				},
+			}
+		},
+		"ok/skip-different-account": func(t *testing.T) test {
+			now := clock.Now()
+			dbaz := &dbAuthz{
+				ID:        azID,
+				AccountID: "differentAccountID",
+				Identifier: acme.Identifier{
+					Type:  "dns",
+					Value: "test.ca.smallstep.com",
+				},
+				Status:       acme.StatusValid,
+				Token:        "token",
+				CreatedAt:    now,
+				ExpiresAt:    now.Add(5 * time.Minute),
+				ChallengeIDs: []string{"foo", "bar"},
+				Wildcard:     true,
+			}
+			b, err := json.Marshal(dbaz)
+			assert.FatalError(t, err)
+
+			return test{
+				db: &db.MockNoSQLDB{
+					MList: func(bucket []byte) ([]*nosqldb.Entry, error) {
+						assert.Equals(t, bucket, authzTable)
+						return []*nosqldb.Entry{
+							{
+								Bucket: bucket,
+								Key:    []byte(azID),
+								Value:  b,
+							},
+						}, nil
+					},
+				},
+				authzs: []*acme.Authorization{},
+			}
+		},
+	}
+	for name, run := range tests {
+		tc := run(t)
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			d := DB{db: tc.db}
+			if azs, err := d.GetAuthorizationsByAccountID(context.Background(), accountID); err != nil {
+				switch k := err.(type) {
+				case *acme.Error:
+					if assert.NotNil(t, tc.acmeErr) {
+						assert.Equals(t, k.Type, tc.acmeErr.Type)
+						assert.Equals(t, k.Detail, tc.acmeErr.Detail)
+						assert.Equals(t, k.Status, tc.acmeErr.Status)
+						assert.Equals(t, k.Err.Error(), tc.acmeErr.Err.Error())
+						assert.Equals(t, k.Detail, tc.acmeErr.Detail)
+					}
+				default:
+					if assert.NotNil(t, tc.err) {
+						assert.HasPrefix(t, err.Error(), tc.err.Error())
+					}
+				}
+			} else if assert.Nil(t, tc.err) {
+				if !cmp.Equal(azs, tc.authzs) {
+					t.Errorf("db.GetAuthorizationsByAccountID() diff =\n%s", cmp.Diff(azs, tc.authzs))
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

acme/order.go

@@ -290,6 +290,9 @@ func canonicalize(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (canonicalized *x509.Certificate
 	// MUST appear either in the commonName portion of the requested subject
 	// name or in an extensionRequest attribute [RFC2985] requesting a
 	// subjectAltName extension, or both.
+	// TODO(hs): we might want to check if the CommonName is in fact a DNS (and cannot
+	// be parsed as IP). This is related to https://github.com/smallstep/cli/pull/576
+	// (ACME IP SANS)
 	if csr.Subject.CommonName != "" {
 		// nolint:gocritic
 		canonicalized.DNSNames = append(csr.DNSNames, csr.Subject.CommonName)

go.mod

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/go-kit/kit v0.10.0 // indirect
 	github.com/go-piv/piv-go v1.7.0
 	github.com/golang/mock v1.6.0
+	github.com/google/go-cmp v0.5.6
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.3.0
 	github.com/googleapis/gax-go/v2 v2.0.5
 	github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.2 // indirect