forked from TrueCloudLab/certificates
fe04f93d7f
There are some changes that manually edited, for example using '-' as default list and grouping imports.
769 lines
26 KiB
Go
769 lines
26 KiB
Go
package provisioner
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/pkg/errors"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/sshutil"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
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)
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// awsIssuer is the string used as issuer in the generated tokens.
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const awsIssuer = "ec2.amazonaws.com"
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// awsIdentityURL is the url used to retrieve the instance identity document.
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const awsIdentityURL = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document"
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// awsSignatureURL is the url used to retrieve the instance identity signature.
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const awsSignatureURL = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/signature"
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// awsAPITokenURL is the url used to get the IMDSv2 API token
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const awsAPITokenURL = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token"
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// awsAPITokenTTL is the default TTL to use when requesting IMDSv2 API tokens
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// -- we keep this short-lived since we get a new token with every call to readURL()
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const awsAPITokenTTL = "30"
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// awsMetadataTokenHeader is the header that must be passed with every IMDSv2 request
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const awsMetadataTokenHeader = "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token"
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// awsMetadataTokenTTLHeader is the header used to indicate the token TTL requested
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const awsMetadataTokenTTLHeader = "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds"
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// awsCertificate is the certificate used to validate the instance identity
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// signature.
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//
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// The first certificate is used in:
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//
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// ap-northeast-2, ap-south-1, ap-southeast-1, ap-southeast-2
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// eu-central-1, eu-north-1, eu-west-1, eu-west-2, eu-west-3
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// us-east-1, us-east-2, us-west-1, us-west-2
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// ca-central-1, sa-east-1
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//
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// The second certificate is used in:
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//
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// eu-south-1
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//
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// The third certificate is used in:
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//
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// ap-east-1
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//
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// The fourth certificate is used in:
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//
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// af-south-1
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//
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// The fifth certificate is used in:
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//
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// me-south-1
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const awsCertificate = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIDIjCCAougAwIBAgIJAKnL4UEDMN/FMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGoxCzAJBgNV
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BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpXYXNoaW5ndG9uMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdTZWF0dGxlMRgw
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FgYDVQQKEw9BbWF6b24uY29tIEluYy4xGjAYBgNVBAMTEWVjMi5hbWF6b25hd3Mu
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Y29tMB4XDTE0MDYwNTE0MjgwMloXDTI0MDYwNTE0MjgwMlowajELMAkGA1UEBhMC
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VVMxEzARBgNVBAgTCldhc2hpbmd0b24xEDAOBgNVBAcTB1NlYXR0bGUxGDAWBgNV
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BAoTD0FtYXpvbi5jb20gSW5jLjEaMBgGA1UEAxMRZWMyLmFtYXpvbmF3cy5jb20w
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gZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAIe9GN//SRK2knbjySG0ho3yqQM3
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e2TDhWO8D2e8+XZqck754gFSo99AbT2RmXClambI7xsYHZFapbELC4H91ycihvrD
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jbST1ZjkLQgga0NE1q43eS68ZeTDccScXQSNivSlzJZS8HJZjgqzBlXjZftjtdJL
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XeE4hwvo0sD4f3j9AgMBAAGjgc8wgcwwHQYDVR0OBBYEFCXWzAgVyrbwnFncFFIs
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77VBdlE4MIGcBgNVHSMEgZQwgZGAFCXWzAgVyrbwnFncFFIs77VBdlE4oW6kbDBq
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MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKV2FzaGluZ3RvbjEQMA4GA1UEBxMHU2Vh
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dHRsZTEYMBYGA1UEChMPQW1hem9uLmNvbSBJbmMuMRowGAYDVQQDExFlYzIuYW1h
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em9uYXdzLmNvbYIJAKnL4UEDMN/FMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF
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BQADgYEAFYcz1OgEhQBXIwIdsgCOS8vEtiJYF+j9uO6jz7VOmJqO+pRlAbRlvY8T
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C1haGgSI/A1uZUKs/Zfnph0oEI0/hu1IIJ/SKBDtN5lvmZ/IzbOPIJWirlsllQIQ
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7zvWbGd9c9+Rm3p04oTvhup99la7kZqevJK0QRdD/6NpCKsqP/0=
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIICNjCCAZ+gAwIBAgIJAOZ3GEIaDcugMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFwxCzAJBgNV
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BAYTAlVTMRkwFwYDVQQIExBXYXNoaW5ndG9uIFN0YXRlMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdTZWF0
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dGxlMSAwHgYDVQQKExdBbWF6b24gV2ViIFNlcnZpY2VzIExMQzAgFw0xOTEwMjQx
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NTE5MDlaGA8yMTk5MDMyOTE1MTkwOVowXDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxGTAXBgNVBAgT
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EFdhc2hpbmd0b24gU3RhdGUxEDAOBgNVBAcTB1NlYXR0bGUxIDAeBgNVBAoTF0Ft
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YXpvbiBXZWIgU2VydmljZXMgTExDMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKB
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gQCjiPgW3vsXRj4JoA16WQDyoPc/eh3QBARaApJEc4nPIGoUolpAXcjFhWplo2O+
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ivgfCsc4AU9OpYdAPha3spLey/bhHPRi1JZHRNqScKP0hzsCNmKhfnZTIEQCFvsp
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DRp4zr91/WS06/flJFBYJ6JHhp0KwM81XQG59lV6kkoW7QIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3
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DQEBCwUAA4GBAGLLrY3P+HH6C57dYgtJkuGZGT2+rMkk2n81/abzTJvsqRqGRrWv
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XRKRXlKdM/dfiuYGokDGxiC0Mg6TYy6wvsR2qRhtXW1OtZkiHWcQCnOttz+8vpew
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wx8JGMvowtuKB1iMsbwyRqZkFYLcvH+Opfb/Aayi20/ChQLdI6M2R5VU
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIICSzCCAbQCCQDtQvkVxRvK9TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJV
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UzETMBEGA1UECBMKV2FzaGluZ3RvbjEQMA4GA1UEBxMHU2VhdHRsZTEYMBYGA1UE
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ChMPQW1hem9uLmNvbSBJbmMuMRowGAYDVQQDExFlYzIuYW1hem9uYXdzLmNvbTAe
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Fw0xOTAyMDMwMzAwMDZaFw0yOTAyMDIwMzAwMDZaMGoxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMw
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EQYDVQQIEwpXYXNoaW5ndG9uMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdTZWF0dGxlMRgwFgYDVQQKEw9B
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bWF6b24uY29tIEluYy4xGjAYBgNVBAMTEWVjMi5hbWF6b25hd3MuY29tMIGfMA0G
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CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC1kkHXYTfc7gY5Q55JJhjTieHAgacaQkiR
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Pity9QPDE3b+NXDh4UdP1xdIw73JcIIG3sG9RhWiXVCHh6KkuCTqJfPUknIKk8vs
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M3RXflUpBe8Pf+P92pxqPMCz1Fr2NehS3JhhpkCZVGxxwLC5gaG0Lr4rFORubjYY
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Rh84dK98VwIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAA6xV9f0HMqXjPHuGILDyaNN
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dKcvplNFwDTydVg32MNubAGnecoEBtUPtxBsLoVYXCOb+b5/ZMDubPF9tU/vSXuo
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TpYM5Bq57gJzDRaBOntQbX9bgHiUxw6XZWaTS/6xjRJDT5p3S1E0mPI3lP/eJv4o
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Ezk5zb3eIf10/sqt4756
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIICNjCCAZ+gAwIBAgIJAKumfZiRrNvHMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFwxCzAJBgNV
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BAYTAlVTMRkwFwYDVQQIExBXYXNoaW5ndG9uIFN0YXRlMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdTZWF0
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dGxlMSAwHgYDVQQKExdBbWF6b24gV2ViIFNlcnZpY2VzIExMQzAgFw0xOTExMjcw
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NzE0MDVaGA8yMTk5MDUwMjA3MTQwNVowXDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxGTAXBgNVBAgT
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EFdhc2hpbmd0b24gU3RhdGUxEDAOBgNVBAcTB1NlYXR0bGUxIDAeBgNVBAoTF0Ft
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YXpvbiBXZWIgU2VydmljZXMgTExDMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKB
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gQDFd571nUzVtke3rPyRkYfvs3jh0C0EMzzG72boyUNjnfw1+m0TeFraTLKb9T6F
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7TuB/ZEN+vmlYqr2+5Va8U8qLbPF0bRH+FdaKjhgWZdYXxGzQzU3ioy5W5ZM1VyB
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7iUsxEAlxsybC3ziPYaHI42UiTkQNahmoroNeqVyHNnBpQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3
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DQEBCwUAA4GBAAJLylWyElEgOpW4B1XPyRVD4pAds8Guw2+krgqkY0HxLCdjosuH
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RytGDGN+q75aAoXzW5a7SGpxLxk6Hfv0xp3RjDHsoeP0i1d8MD3hAC5ezxS4oukK
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s5gbPOnokhKTMPXbTdRn5ZifCbWlx+bYN/mTYKvxho7b5SVg2o1La9aK
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIDPDCCAqWgAwIBAgIJAMl6uIV/zqJFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMHIxCzAJBgNV
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BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApXYXNoaW5ndG9uMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdTZWF0dGxlMSAw
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HgYDVQQKDBdBbWF6b24gV2ViIFNlcnZpY2VzIExMQzEaMBgGA1UEAwwRZWMyLmFt
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YXpvbmF3cy5jb20wIBcNMTkwNDI2MTQzMjQ3WhgPMjE5ODA5MjkxNDMyNDdaMHIx
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CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApXYXNoaW5ndG9uMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdTZWF0
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dGxlMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdBbWF6b24gV2ViIFNlcnZpY2VzIExMQzEaMBgGA1UEAwwR
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ZWMyLmFtYXpvbmF3cy5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBALVN
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CDTZEnIeoX1SEYqq6k1BV0ZlpY5y3KnoOreCAE589TwS4MX5+8Fzd6AmACmugeBP
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Qk7Hm6b2+g/d4tWycyxLaQlcq81DB1GmXehRkZRgGeRge1ePWd1TUA0I8P/QBT7S
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gUePm/kANSFU+P7s7u1NNl+vynyi0wUUrw7/wIZTAgMBAAGjgdcwgdQwHQYDVR0O
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BBYEFILtMd+T4YgH1cgc+hVsVOV+480FMIGkBgNVHSMEgZwwgZmAFILtMd+T4YgH
|
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1cgc+hVsVOV+480FoXakdDByMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKV2FzaGlu
|
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Z3RvbjEQMA4GA1UEBwwHU2VhdHRsZTEgMB4GA1UECgwXQW1hem9uIFdlYiBTZXJ2
|
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aWNlcyBMTEMxGjAYBgNVBAMMEWVjMi5hbWF6b25hd3MuY29tggkAyXq4hX/OokUw
|
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DAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQBhkNTBIFgWFd+ZhC/LhRUY
|
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4OjEiykmbEp6hlzQ79T0Tfbn5A4NYDI2icBP0+hmf6qSnIhwJF6typyd1yPK5Fqt
|
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NTpxxcXmUKquX+pHmIkK1LKDO8rNE84jqxrxRsfDi6by82fjVYf2pgjJW8R1FAw+
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mL5WQRFexbfB5aXhcMo0AA==
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----`
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// awsSignatureAlgorithm is the signature algorithm used to verify the identity
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// document signature.
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const awsSignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
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type awsConfig struct {
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identityURL string
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signatureURL string
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tokenURL string
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tokenTTL string
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certificates []*x509.Certificate
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signatureAlgorithm x509.SignatureAlgorithm
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}
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func newAWSConfig(certPath string) (*awsConfig, error) {
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var certBytes []byte
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if certPath == "" {
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certBytes = []byte(awsCertificate)
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} else {
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if b, err := os.ReadFile(certPath); err == nil {
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certBytes = b
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} else {
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return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "error reading %s", certPath)
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}
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}
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// Read all the certificates.
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var certs []*x509.Certificate
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for len(certBytes) > 0 {
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var block *pem.Block
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block, certBytes = pem.Decode(certBytes)
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if block == nil {
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break
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}
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if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" || len(block.Headers) != 0 {
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continue
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}
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error parsing AWS IID certificate")
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}
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certs = append(certs, cert)
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}
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if len(certs) == 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("error parsing AWS IID certificate: no certificates found")
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}
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return &awsConfig{
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identityURL: awsIdentityURL,
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signatureURL: awsSignatureURL,
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tokenURL: awsAPITokenURL,
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tokenTTL: awsAPITokenTTL,
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certificates: certs,
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signatureAlgorithm: awsSignatureAlgorithm,
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}, nil
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}
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type awsPayload struct {
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jose.Claims
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Amazon awsAmazonPayload `json:"amazon"`
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SANs []string `json:"sans"`
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document awsInstanceIdentityDocument
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}
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type awsAmazonPayload struct {
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Document []byte `json:"document"`
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Signature []byte `json:"signature"`
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}
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type awsInstanceIdentityDocument struct {
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AccountID string `json:"accountId"`
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Architecture string `json:"architecture"`
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AvailabilityZone string `json:"availabilityZone"`
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BillingProducts []string `json:"billingProducts"`
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DevpayProductCodes []string `json:"devpayProductCodes"`
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ImageID string `json:"imageId"`
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InstanceID string `json:"instanceId"`
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InstanceType string `json:"instanceType"`
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KernelID string `json:"kernelId"`
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PendingTime time.Time `json:"pendingTime"`
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PrivateIP string `json:"privateIp"`
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RamdiskID string `json:"ramdiskId"`
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Region string `json:"region"`
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Version string `json:"version"`
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}
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// AWS is the provisioner that supports identity tokens created from the Amazon
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// Web Services Instance Identity Documents.
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//
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// If DisableCustomSANs is true, only the internal DNS and IP will be added as a
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// SAN. By default it will accept any SAN in the CSR.
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//
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// If DisableTrustOnFirstUse is true, multiple sign request for this provisioner
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// with the same instance will be accepted. By default only the first request
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// will be accepted.
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//
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// If InstanceAge is set, only the instances with a pendingTime within the given
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// period will be accepted.
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//
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// IIDRoots can be used to specify a path to the certificates used to verify the
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// identity certificate signature.
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//
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// Amazon Identity docs are available at
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// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html
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type AWS struct {
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*base
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ID string `json:"-"`
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Type string `json:"type"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Accounts []string `json:"accounts"`
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DisableCustomSANs bool `json:"disableCustomSANs"`
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DisableTrustOnFirstUse bool `json:"disableTrustOnFirstUse"`
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IMDSVersions []string `json:"imdsVersions"`
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InstanceAge Duration `json:"instanceAge,omitempty"`
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IIDRoots string `json:"iidRoots,omitempty"`
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Claims *Claims `json:"claims,omitempty"`
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Options *Options `json:"options,omitempty"`
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config *awsConfig
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ctl *Controller
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}
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// GetID returns the provisioner unique identifier.
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func (p *AWS) GetID() string {
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if p.ID != "" {
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return p.ID
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}
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return p.GetIDForToken()
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}
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// GetIDForToken returns an identifier that will be used to load the provisioner
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// from a token.
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func (p *AWS) GetIDForToken() string {
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return "aws/" + p.Name
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}
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// GetTokenID returns the identifier of the token.
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func (p *AWS) GetTokenID(token string) (string, error) {
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payload, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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// If TOFU is disabled create an ID for the token, so it cannot be reused.
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// The timestamps, document and signatures should be mostly unique.
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if p.DisableTrustOnFirstUse {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
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return strings.ToLower(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])), nil
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}
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// Use provisioner + instance-id as the identifier.
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unique := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", p.GetIDForToken(), payload.document.InstanceID)
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(unique))
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return strings.ToLower(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])), nil
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}
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// GetName returns the name of the provisioner.
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func (p *AWS) GetName() string {
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return p.Name
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}
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// GetType returns the type of provisioner.
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func (p *AWS) GetType() Type {
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return TypeAWS
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}
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// GetEncryptedKey is not available in an AWS provisioner.
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func (p *AWS) GetEncryptedKey() (kid, key string, ok bool) {
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return "", "", false
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}
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// GetIdentityToken retrieves the identity document and it's signature and
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// generates a token with them.
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func (p *AWS) GetIdentityToken(subject, caURL string) (string, error) {
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// Initialize the config if this method is used from the cli.
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if err := p.assertConfig(); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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var idoc awsInstanceIdentityDocument
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doc, err := p.readURL(p.config.identityURL)
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if err != nil {
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return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error retrieving identity document:\n Are you in an AWS VM?\n Is the metadata service enabled?\n Are you using the proper metadata service version?")
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(doc, &idoc); err != nil {
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return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error unmarshaling identity document")
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}
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sig, err := p.readURL(p.config.signatureURL)
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if err != nil {
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return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error retrieving identity document:\n Are you in an AWS VM?\n Is the metadata service enabled?\n Are you using the proper metadata service version?")
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}
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signature, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(string(sig))
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if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error decoding identity document signature")
|
|
}
|
|
if err := p.checkSignature(doc, signature); err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
audience, err := generateSignAudience(caURL, p.GetIDForToken())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create unique ID for Trust On First Use (TOFU). Only the first instance
|
|
// per provisioner is allowed as we don't have a way to trust the given
|
|
// sans.
|
|
unique := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", p.GetIDForToken(), idoc.InstanceID)
|
|
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(unique))
|
|
|
|
// Create a JWT from the identity document
|
|
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
|
|
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.HS256, Key: signature},
|
|
new(jose.SignerOptions).WithType("JWT"),
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error creating signer")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
payload := awsPayload{
|
|
Claims: jose.Claims{
|
|
Issuer: awsIssuer,
|
|
Subject: subject,
|
|
Audience: []string{audience},
|
|
Expiry: jose.NewNumericDate(now.Add(5 * time.Minute)),
|
|
NotBefore: jose.NewNumericDate(now),
|
|
IssuedAt: jose.NewNumericDate(now),
|
|
ID: strings.ToLower(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])),
|
|
},
|
|
Amazon: awsAmazonPayload{
|
|
Document: doc,
|
|
Signature: signature,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tok, err := jose.Signed(signer).Claims(payload).CompactSerialize()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error serializing token")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return tok, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Init validates and initializes the AWS provisioner.
|
|
func (p *AWS) Init(config Config) (err error) {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case p.Type == "":
|
|
return errors.New("provisioner type cannot be empty")
|
|
case p.Name == "":
|
|
return errors.New("provisioner name cannot be empty")
|
|
case p.InstanceAge.Value() < 0:
|
|
return errors.New("provisioner instanceAge cannot be negative")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add default config
|
|
if p.config, err = newAWSConfig(p.IIDRoots); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validate IMDS versions
|
|
if len(p.IMDSVersions) == 0 {
|
|
p.IMDSVersions = []string{"v2", "v1"}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, v := range p.IMDSVersions {
|
|
switch v {
|
|
case "v1":
|
|
// valid
|
|
case "v2":
|
|
// valid
|
|
default:
|
|
return errors.Errorf("%s: not a supported AWS Instance Metadata Service version", v)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config.Audiences = config.Audiences.WithFragment(p.GetIDForToken())
|
|
p.ctl, err = NewController(p, p.Claims, config, p.Options)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token and returns the sign options that
|
|
// will be used on certificate creation.
|
|
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
|
|
payload, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "aws.AuthorizeSign")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
doc := payload.document
|
|
|
|
// Template options
|
|
data := x509util.NewTemplateData()
|
|
data.SetCommonName(payload.Claims.Subject)
|
|
if v, err := unsafeParseSigned(token); err == nil {
|
|
data.SetToken(v)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Enforce known CN and default DNS and IP if configured.
|
|
// By default we'll accept the CN and SANs in the CSR.
|
|
// There's no way to trust them other than TOFU.
|
|
var so []SignOption
|
|
if p.DisableCustomSANs {
|
|
dnsName := fmt.Sprintf("ip-%s.%s.compute.internal", strings.ReplaceAll(doc.PrivateIP, ".", "-"), doc.Region)
|
|
so = append(so,
|
|
dnsNamesValidator([]string{dnsName}),
|
|
ipAddressesValidator([]net.IP{
|
|
net.ParseIP(doc.PrivateIP),
|
|
}),
|
|
emailAddressesValidator(nil),
|
|
urisValidator(nil),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Template options
|
|
data.SetSANs([]string{dnsName, doc.PrivateIP})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
templateOptions, err := CustomTemplateOptions(p.Options, data, x509util.DefaultIIDLeafTemplate)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "aws.AuthorizeSign")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return append(so,
|
|
p,
|
|
templateOptions,
|
|
// modifiers / withOptions
|
|
newProvisionerExtensionOption(TypeAWS, p.Name, doc.AccountID, "InstanceID", doc.InstanceID),
|
|
profileDefaultDuration(p.ctl.Claimer.DefaultTLSCertDuration()),
|
|
// validators
|
|
defaultPublicKeyValidator{},
|
|
commonNameValidator(payload.Claims.Subject),
|
|
newValidityValidator(p.ctl.Claimer.MinTLSCertDuration(), p.ctl.Claimer.MaxTLSCertDuration()),
|
|
newX509NamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getX509()),
|
|
), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AuthorizeRenew returns an error if the renewal is disabled.
|
|
// NOTE: This method does not actually validate the certificate or check it's
|
|
// revocation status. Just confirms that the provisioner that created the
|
|
// certificate was configured to allow renewals.
|
|
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) error {
|
|
return p.ctl.AuthorizeRenew(ctx, cert)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// assertConfig initializes the config if it has not been initialized
|
|
func (p *AWS) assertConfig() (err error) {
|
|
if p.config != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
p.config, err = newAWSConfig(p.IIDRoots)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkSignature returns an error if the signature is not valid.
|
|
func (p *AWS) checkSignature(signed, signature []byte) error {
|
|
for _, crt := range p.config.certificates {
|
|
if err := crt.CheckSignature(p.config.signatureAlgorithm, signed, signature); err == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return errors.New("error validating identity document signature")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// readURL does a GET request to the given url and returns the body. It's not
|
|
// using pkg/errors to avoid verbose errors, the caller should use it and write
|
|
// the appropriate error.
|
|
func (p *AWS) readURL(url string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
var resp *http.Response
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
// Initialize IMDS versions when this is called from the cli.
|
|
if len(p.IMDSVersions) == 0 {
|
|
p.IMDSVersions = []string{"v2", "v1"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, v := range p.IMDSVersions {
|
|
switch v {
|
|
case "v1":
|
|
resp, err = p.readURLv1(url)
|
|
if err == nil && resp.StatusCode < 400 {
|
|
return p.readResponseBody(resp)
|
|
}
|
|
case "v2":
|
|
resp, err = p.readURLv2(url)
|
|
if err == nil && resp.StatusCode < 400 {
|
|
return p.readResponseBody(resp)
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: not a supported AWS Instance Metadata Service version", v)
|
|
}
|
|
if resp != nil {
|
|
resp.Body.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// all versions have been exhausted and we haven't returned successfully yet so pass
|
|
// the error on to the caller
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request for metadata returned non-successful status code %d",
|
|
resp.StatusCode)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *AWS) readURLv1(url string) (*http.Response, error) {
|
|
client := http.Client{}
|
|
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, url, http.NoBody)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
resp, err := client.Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return resp, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *AWS) readURLv2(url string) (*http.Response, error) {
|
|
client := http.Client{}
|
|
|
|
// first get the token
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, p.config.tokenURL, http.NoBody)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
req.Header.Set(awsMetadataTokenTTLHeader, p.config.tokenTTL)
|
|
resp, err := client.Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
|
if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request for API token returned non-successful status code %d", resp.StatusCode)
|
|
}
|
|
token, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// now make the request
|
|
req, err = http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, url, http.NoBody)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
req.Header.Set(awsMetadataTokenHeader, string(token))
|
|
resp, err = client.Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return resp, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *AWS) readResponseBody(resp *http.Response) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
|
b, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return b, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// authorizeToken performs common jwt authorization actions and returns the
|
|
// claims for case specific downstream parsing.
|
|
// e.g. a Sign request will auth/validate different fields than a Revoke request.
|
|
func (p *AWS) authorizeToken(token string) (*awsPayload, error) {
|
|
jwt, err := jose.ParseSigned(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrapf(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; error parsing aws token")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(jwt.Headers) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errs.InternalServer("aws.authorizeToken; error parsing token, header is missing")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var unsafeClaims awsPayload
|
|
if err := jwt.UnsafeClaimsWithoutVerification(&unsafeClaims); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; error unmarshaling claims")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var payload awsPayload
|
|
if err := jwt.Claims(unsafeClaims.Amazon.Signature, &payload); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; error verifying claims")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate identity document signature
|
|
if err := p.checkSignature(payload.Amazon.Document, payload.Amazon.Signature); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; invalid aws token signature")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var doc awsInstanceIdentityDocument
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload.Amazon.Document, &doc); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; error unmarshaling aws identity document")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
case doc.AccountID == "":
|
|
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document accountId cannot be empty")
|
|
case doc.InstanceID == "":
|
|
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document instanceId cannot be empty")
|
|
case doc.PrivateIP == "":
|
|
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document privateIp cannot be empty")
|
|
case doc.Region == "":
|
|
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document region cannot be empty")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// According to "rfc7519 JSON Web Token" acceptable skew should be no
|
|
// more than a few minutes.
|
|
now := time.Now().UTC()
|
|
if err = payload.ValidateWithLeeway(jose.Expected{
|
|
Issuer: awsIssuer,
|
|
Time: now,
|
|
}, time.Minute); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrapf(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; invalid aws token")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validate audiences with the defaults
|
|
if !matchesAudience(payload.Audience, p.ctl.Audiences.Sign) {
|
|
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; invalid token - invalid audience claim (aud)")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate subject, it has to be known if disableCustomSANs is enabled
|
|
if p.DisableCustomSANs {
|
|
if payload.Subject != doc.InstanceID &&
|
|
payload.Subject != doc.PrivateIP &&
|
|
payload.Subject != fmt.Sprintf("ip-%s.%s.compute.internal", strings.ReplaceAll(doc.PrivateIP, ".", "-"), doc.Region) {
|
|
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; invalid token - invalid subject claim (sub)")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validate accounts
|
|
if len(p.Accounts) > 0 {
|
|
var found bool
|
|
for _, sa := range p.Accounts {
|
|
if sa == doc.AccountID {
|
|
found = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !found {
|
|
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; invalid aws identity document - accountId is not valid")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validate instance age
|
|
if d := p.InstanceAge.Value(); d > 0 {
|
|
if now.Sub(doc.PendingTime) > d {
|
|
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document pendingTime is too old")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
payload.document = doc
|
|
return &payload, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns the list of SignOption for a SignSSH request.
|
|
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
|
|
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
|
|
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.AuthorizeSSHSign; ssh ca is disabled for aws provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
|
|
}
|
|
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "aws.AuthorizeSSHSign")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
doc := claims.document
|
|
signOptions := []SignOption{}
|
|
|
|
// Enforce host certificate.
|
|
defaults := SignSSHOptions{
|
|
CertType: SSHHostCert,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validated principals.
|
|
principals := []string{
|
|
doc.PrivateIP,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("ip-%s.%s.compute.internal", strings.ReplaceAll(doc.PrivateIP, ".", "-"), doc.Region),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only enforce known principals if disable custom sans is true.
|
|
if p.DisableCustomSANs {
|
|
defaults.Principals = principals
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Check that at least one principal is sent in the request.
|
|
signOptions = append(signOptions, &sshCertOptionsRequireValidator{
|
|
Principals: true,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Certificate templates.
|
|
data := sshutil.CreateTemplateData(sshutil.HostCert, doc.InstanceID, principals)
|
|
if v, err := unsafeParseSigned(token); err == nil {
|
|
data.SetToken(v)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
templateOptions, err := CustomSSHTemplateOptions(p.Options, data, sshutil.DefaultIIDTemplate)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "aws.AuthorizeSSHSign")
|
|
}
|
|
signOptions = append(signOptions, templateOptions)
|
|
|
|
return append(signOptions,
|
|
p,
|
|
// Validate user SignSSHOptions.
|
|
sshCertOptionsValidator(defaults),
|
|
// Set the validity bounds if not set.
|
|
&sshDefaultDuration{p.ctl.Claimer},
|
|
// Validate public key
|
|
&sshDefaultPublicKeyValidator{},
|
|
// Validate the validity period.
|
|
&sshCertValidityValidator{p.ctl.Claimer},
|
|
// Require all the fields in the SSH certificate
|
|
&sshCertDefaultValidator{},
|
|
// Ensure that all principal names are allowed
|
|
newSSHNamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getSSHHost(), nil),
|
|
), nil
|
|
}
|