forked from TrueCloudLab/distribution
Merge pull request #862 from jlhawn/ng_auth_package
Refactor token verification to support x5c header
This commit is contained in:
commit
e50fcc0ab9
2 changed files with 114 additions and 103 deletions
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@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
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"io/ioutil"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/docker/libtrust"
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@ -97,16 +96,16 @@ func (ac *authChallenge) Status() int {
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// the WWW-Authenticate response challenge header.
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// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750#section-3
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func (ac *authChallenge) challengeParams() string {
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str := fmt.Sprintf("Bearer realm=%s,service=%s", strconv.Quote(ac.realm), strconv.Quote(ac.service))
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str := fmt.Sprintf("Bearer realm=%q,service=%q", ac.realm, ac.service)
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if scope := ac.accessSet.scopeParam(); scope != "" {
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str = fmt.Sprintf("%s,scope=%s", str, strconv.Quote(scope))
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str = fmt.Sprintf("%s,scope=%q", str, scope)
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}
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if ac.err == ErrInvalidToken || ac.err == ErrMalformedToken {
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str = fmt.Sprintf("%s,error=%s", str, strconv.Quote("invalid_token"))
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str = fmt.Sprintf("%s,error=%q", str, "invalid_token")
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} else if ac.err == ErrInsufficientScope {
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str = fmt.Sprintf("%s,error=%s", str, strconv.Quote("insufficient_scope"))
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str = fmt.Sprintf("%s,error=%q", str, "insufficient_scope")
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}
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return str
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@ -56,22 +56,8 @@ type Header struct {
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Type string `json:"typ"`
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SigningAlg string `json:"alg"`
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KeyID string `json:"kid,omitempty"`
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RawJWK json.RawMessage `json:"jwk"`
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SigningKey libtrust.PublicKey `json:"-"`
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}
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// CheckSigningKey parses the `jwk` field of a JOSE header and sets the
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// SigningKey field if it is valid.
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func (h *Header) CheckSigningKey() (err error) {
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if len(h.RawJWK) == 0 {
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// No signing key was specified.
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return
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}
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h.SigningKey, err = libtrust.UnmarshalPublicKeyJWK([]byte(h.RawJWK))
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h.RawJWK = nil // Don't need this anymore!
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return
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X5c []string `json:"x5c,omitempty"`
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RawJWK json.RawMessage `json:"jwk,omitempty"`
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}
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// Token describes a JSON Web Token.
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@ -135,10 +121,6 @@ func NewToken(rawToken string) (*Token, error) {
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return nil, ErrMalformedToken
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}
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if err = token.Header.CheckSigningKey(); err != nil {
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return nil, ErrMalformedToken
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}
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if err = json.Unmarshal(claimsJSON, token.Claims); err != nil {
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return nil, ErrMalformedToken
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}
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@ -174,108 +156,86 @@ func (t *Token) Verify(verifyOpts VerifyOptions) error {
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return ErrInvalidToken
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}
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// If the token header has a SigningKey field, verify the signature
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// using that key and its included x509 certificate chain if necessary.
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// If the Header's SigningKey field is nil, try using the KeyID field.
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signingKey := t.Header.SigningKey
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if signingKey == nil {
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// Find the key in the given collection of trusted keys.
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trustedKey, ok := verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[t.Header.KeyID]
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if !ok {
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log.Errorf("token signed by untrusted key with ID: %q", t.Header.KeyID)
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// Verify that the signing key is trusted.
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signingKey, err := t.VerifySigningKey(verifyOpts)
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if err != nil {
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log.Error(err)
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return ErrInvalidToken
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}
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signingKey = trustedKey
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}
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// First verify the signature of the token using the key which signed it.
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// Finally, verify the signature of the token using the key which signed it.
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if err := signingKey.Verify(strings.NewReader(t.Raw), t.Header.SigningAlg, t.Signature); err != nil {
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log.Errorf("unable to verify token signature: %s", err)
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return ErrInvalidToken
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}
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// Next, check if the signing key is one of the trusted keys.
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if _, isTrustedKey := verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[signingKey.KeyID()]; isTrustedKey {
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// We're done! The token was signed by
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// a trusted key and has been verified!
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return nil
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}
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// Otherwise, we need to check the sigining keys included certificate chain.
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return t.verifyCertificateChain(signingKey, verifyOpts.Roots)
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}
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// verifyCertificateChain attempts to verify the token using the "x5c" field
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// of the given leafKey which was used to sign it. Returns a nil error if
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// the key's certificate chain is valid and rooted an one of the given roots.
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func (t *Token) verifyCertificateChain(leafKey libtrust.PublicKey, roots *x509.CertPool) error {
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// In this case, the token signature is valid, but the key that signed it
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// is not in our set of trusted keys. So, we'll need to check if the
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// token's signing key included an x509 certificate chain that can be
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// verified up to one of our trusted roots.
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x5cVal, ok := leafKey.GetExtendedField("x5c").([]interface{})
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if !ok || x5cVal == nil {
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log.Error("unable to verify token signature: signed by untrusted key with no valid certificate chain")
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return ErrInvalidToken
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// VerifySigningKey attempts to get the key which was used to sign this token.
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// The token header should contain either of these 3 fields:
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// `x5c` - The x509 certificate chain for the signing key. Needs to be
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// verified.
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// `jwk` - The JSON Web Key representation of the signing key.
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// May contain its own `x5c` field which needs to be verified.
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// `kid` - The unique identifier for the key. This library interprets it
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// as a libtrust fingerprint. The key itself can be looked up in
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// the trustedKeys field of the given verify options.
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// Each of these methods are tried in that order of preference until the
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// signing key is found or an error is returned.
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func (t *Token) VerifySigningKey(verifyOpts VerifyOptions) (signingKey libtrust.PublicKey, err error) {
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// First attempt to get an x509 certificate chain from the header.
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var (
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x5c = t.Header.X5c
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rawJWK = t.Header.RawJWK
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keyID = t.Header.KeyID
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)
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switch {
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case len(x5c) > 0:
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signingKey, err = parseAndVerifyCertChain(x5c, verifyOpts.Roots)
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case len(rawJWK) > 0:
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signingKey, err = parseAndVerifyRawJWK(rawJWK, verifyOpts)
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case len(keyID) > 0:
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signingKey = verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[keyID]
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if signingKey == nil {
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err = fmt.Errorf("token signed by untrusted key with ID: %q", keyID)
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}
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default:
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err = errors.New("unable to get token signing key")
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}
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// Ensure each item is of the correct type.
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x5c := make([]string, len(x5cVal))
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for i, val := range x5cVal {
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certString, ok := val.(string)
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if !ok || len(certString) == 0 {
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log.Error("unable to verify token signature: signed by untrusted key with malformed certificate chain")
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return ErrInvalidToken
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}
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x5c[i] = certString
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return
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}
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func parseAndVerifyCertChain(x5c []string, roots *x509.CertPool) (leafKey libtrust.PublicKey, err error) {
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if len(x5c) == 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("empty x509 certificate chain")
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}
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// Ensure the first element is encoded correctly.
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leafCertDer, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(x5c[0])
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if err != nil {
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log.Errorf("unable to decode signing key leaf cert: %s", err)
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return ErrInvalidToken
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to decode leaf certificate: %s", err)
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}
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// And that it is a valid x509 certificate.
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leafCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(leafCertDer)
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if err != nil {
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log.Errorf("unable to parse signing key leaf cert: %s", err)
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return ErrInvalidToken
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to parse leaf certificate: %s", err)
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}
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// Verify that the public key in the leaf cert *is* the signing key.
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leafCryptoKey, ok := leafCert.PublicKey.(crypto.PublicKey)
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if !ok {
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log.Error("unable to get signing key leaf cert public key value")
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return ErrInvalidToken
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}
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leafPubKey, err := libtrust.FromCryptoPublicKey(leafCryptoKey)
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if err != nil {
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log.Errorf("unable to make libtrust public key from signing key leaf cert: %s", err)
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return ErrInvalidToken
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}
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if leafPubKey.KeyID() != leafKey.KeyID() {
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log.Error("token signing key ID and leaf certificate public key ID do not match")
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return ErrInvalidToken
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}
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// The rest of the x5c array are intermediate certificates.
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// The rest of the certificate chain are intermediate certificates.
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intermediates := x509.NewCertPool()
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for i := 1; i < len(x5c); i++ {
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intermediateCertDer, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(x5c[i])
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if err != nil {
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log.Errorf("unable to decode signing key intermediate cert: %s", err)
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return ErrInvalidToken
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to decode intermediate certificate: %s", err)
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}
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intermediateCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(intermediateCertDer)
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if err != nil {
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log.Errorf("unable to parse signing key intermediate cert: %s", err)
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return ErrInvalidToken
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to parse intermediate certificate: %s", err)
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}
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intermediates.AddCert(intermediateCert)
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@ -290,12 +250,64 @@ func (t *Token) verifyCertificateChain(leafKey libtrust.PublicKey, roots *x509.C
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// TODO: this call returns certificate chains which we ignore for now, but
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// we should check them for revocations if we have the ability later.
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if _, err = leafCert.Verify(verifyOpts); err != nil {
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log.Errorf("unable to verify signing key certificate: %s", err)
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return ErrInvalidToken
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to verify certificate chain: %s", err)
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}
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// The signing key's x509 chain is valid!
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return nil
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// Get the public key from the leaf certificate.
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leafCryptoKey, ok := leafCert.PublicKey.(crypto.PublicKey)
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if !ok {
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return nil, errors.New("unable to get leaf cert public key value")
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}
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leafKey, err = libtrust.FromCryptoPublicKey(leafCryptoKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to make libtrust public key from leaf certificate: %s", err)
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}
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return
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}
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func parseAndVerifyRawJWK(rawJWK json.RawMessage, verifyOpts VerifyOptions) (pubKey libtrust.PublicKey, err error) {
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pubKey, err = libtrust.UnmarshalPublicKeyJWK([]byte(rawJWK))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to decode raw JWK value: %s", err)
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}
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// Check to see if the key includes a certificate chain.
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x5cVal, ok := pubKey.GetExtendedField("x5c").([]interface{})
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if !ok {
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// The JWK should be one of the trusted root keys.
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if _, trusted := verifyOpts.TrustedKeys[pubKey.KeyID()]; !trusted {
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return nil, errors.New("untrusted JWK with no certificate chain")
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}
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// The JWK is one of the trusted keys.
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return
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}
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// Ensure each item in the chain is of the correct type.
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x5c := make([]string, len(x5cVal))
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for i, val := range x5cVal {
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certString, ok := val.(string)
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if !ok || len(certString) == 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("malformed certificate chain")
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}
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x5c[i] = certString
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}
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// Ensure that the x509 certificate chain can
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// be verified up to one of our trusted roots.
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leafKey, err := parseAndVerifyCertChain(x5c, verifyOpts.Roots)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not verify JWK certificate chain: %s", err)
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}
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// Verify that the public key in the leaf cert *is* the signing key.
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if pubKey.KeyID() != leafKey.KeyID() {
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return nil, errors.New("leaf certificate public key ID does not match JWK key ID")
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}
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return
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}
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// accessSet returns a set of actions available for the resource
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