* Introduce ContainerOwner field in RequestContext.
* Set ContainerOwner in aclv2 middleware.
* Set PropertyKeyContainerOwnerID for object ape request.
Signed-off-by: Airat Arifullin <a.arifullin@yadro.com>
* Soft APE check means that APE should allow request even
it gets status NoRuleFound for a request. Otherwise,
it is interpreted as Deny.
* Soft APE check is performed if basic ACL mask is not set.
Signed-off-by: Airat Arifullin <a.arifullin@yadro.com>
* Those methods that can access already existing containers and thus
can get container properties should read namespace from Zone
property. If Zone is not set, take a namespace for root.
* Otherwise, define namespaces by owner ID via frostfs-id contract.
* Improve unit-tests, consider more cases.
Signed-off-by: Airat Arifullin <a.arifullin@yadro.com>
* Do not convert CID from request to native-schema resource
format - this step is unneccessary for APE.
Signed-off-by: Airat Arifullin <a.arifullin@yadro.com>
* Introduce Request type converted from RequestInfo type
to implement policy-engine's Request interface
* Implement basic ape checker to check if a request is
permitted to be performed
* Make put handlers use APE checker instead EACL
Signed-off-by: Airat Arifullin <a.arifullin@yadro.com>
After presenting request statuses on the API level, all the errors are
unwrapped before sending to the caller side. It led to a losing invalid
request's context.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <carpawell@nspcc.ru>
Make it store its internal `zap.Logger`'s level. Also, make all the
components to accept internal `logger.Logger` instead of `zap.Logger`; it
will simplify future refactor.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Karpy <carpawell@nspcc.ru>
It doesn't make sense to check object relation in session check of
`ObjectService.Put` RPC which has been spawned by `ObjectService.Delete`
with session. Session issuer can't predict identifier of the tombstone
object to be created.
Signed-off-by: Leonard Lyubich <ctulhurider@gmail.com>
In previous implementation of `neofs-node` app object session was not
checked for substitution of the object related to it. Also, for access
checks, the session object was substituted instead of the one from the
request. This, on the one hand, made it possible to inherit the session
from the parent object for authorization for certain actions. On the
other hand, it covered the mentioned object substitution, which is a
critical vulnerability.
Next changes are applied to processing of all Object service requests:
- check if object session relates to the requested object
- use requested object in access checks.
Disclosed problem of object context inheritance will be solved within
Signed-off-by: Leonard Lyubich <ctulhurider@gmail.com>
