certificates/acme/api/revoke.go

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package api
import (
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/api"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/logging"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp"
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)
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type revokePayload struct {
Certificate string `json:"certificate"`
ReasonCode *int `json:"reason,omitempty"`
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}
// RevokeCert attempts to revoke a certificate.
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func (h *Handler) RevokeCert(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
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jws, err := jwsFromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
api.WriteError(w, err)
return
}
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if shouldCheckAccount(jws) {
_, err := accountFromContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
api.WriteError(w, err)
return
}
}
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// TODO: do checks on account, i.e. is it still valid? is it allowed to do revocations? Revocations on the to be revoked cert?
_, err = provisionerFromContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
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api.WriteError(w, err)
return
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}
// TODO: let provisioner authorize the revocation? Necessary per provisioner? Or can it be done by the CA, like the Revoke itself.
p, err := payloadFromContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
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api.WriteError(w, err)
return
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}
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var payload revokePayload
err = json.Unmarshal(p.value, &payload)
if err != nil {
api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapErrorISE(err, "error unmarshaling payload"))
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return
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}
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certBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(payload.Certificate)
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if err != nil {
api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapErrorISE(err, "error decoding base64 certificate"))
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return
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}
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certToBeRevoked, err := x509.ParseCertificate(certBytes)
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if err != nil {
api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapErrorISE(err, "error parsing certificate"))
return
}
serial := certToBeRevoked.SerialNumber.String()
_, err = h.db.GetCertificateBySerial(ctx, serial)
if err != nil {
api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapErrorISE(err, "error retrieving certificate by serial"))
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return
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}
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// if existingCert.AccountID != acc.ID {
// api.WriteError(w, acme.NewError(acme.ErrorUnauthorizedType,
// "account '%s' does not own certificate '%s'", acc.ID, certID))
// return // TODO: this check should only be performed in case acc exists (i.e. KeyID revoke)
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// }
// TODO: validate the certToBeRevoked against what we know about it?
reasonCode := payload.ReasonCode
acmeErr := validateReasonCode(reasonCode)
if acmeErr != nil {
api.WriteError(w, acmeErr)
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return
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}
options := revokeOptions(serial, certToBeRevoked, reasonCode)
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err = h.ca.Revoke(ctx, options)
if err != nil {
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api.WriteError(w, err) // TODO: send the right error; 400; alreadyRevoked (or something else went wrong, of course)
return
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}
logRevoke(w, options)
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w.Header().Add("Link", link(h.linker.GetLink(ctx, DirectoryLinkType), "index"))
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w.Write(nil)
}
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// logRevoke logs successful revocation of certificate
func logRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, ri *authority.RevokeOptions) {
if rl, ok := w.(logging.ResponseLogger); ok {
rl.WithFields(map[string]interface{}{
"serial": ri.Serial,
"reasonCode": ri.ReasonCode,
"reason": ri.Reason,
"passiveOnly": ri.PassiveOnly,
"ACME": ri.ACME,
})
}
}
// validateReasonCode validates the revocation reason
func validateReasonCode(reasonCode *int) *acme.Error {
if reasonCode != nil && ((*reasonCode < ocsp.Unspecified || *reasonCode > ocsp.AACompromise) || *reasonCode == 7) {
return acme.NewError(acme.ErrorBadRevocationReasonType, "reasonCode out of bounds")
}
// NOTE: it's possible to add additional requirements to the reason code:
// The server MAY disallow a subset of reasonCodes from being
// used by the user. If a request contains a disallowed reasonCode,
// then the server MUST reject it with the error type
// "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badRevocationReason"
// No additional checks have been implemented so far.
return nil
}
// revokeOptions determines the the RevokeOptions for the Authority to use in revocation
func revokeOptions(serial string, certToBeRevoked *x509.Certificate, reasonCode *int) *authority.RevokeOptions {
opts := &authority.RevokeOptions{
Serial: serial,
ACME: true,
Crt: certToBeRevoked,
}
if reasonCode != nil { // NOTE: when implementing CRL and/or OCSP, and reason code is missing, CRL entry extension should be omitted
opts.Reason = reason(*reasonCode)
opts.ReasonCode = *reasonCode
}
return opts
}
// reason transforms an integer reason code to a
// textual description of the revocation reason.
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func reason(reasonCode int) string {
switch reasonCode {
case ocsp.Unspecified:
return "unspecified reason"
case ocsp.KeyCompromise:
return "key compromised"
case ocsp.CACompromise:
return "ca compromised"
case ocsp.AffiliationChanged:
return "affiliation changed"
case ocsp.Superseded:
return "superseded"
case ocsp.CessationOfOperation:
return "cessation of operation"
case ocsp.CertificateHold:
return "certificate hold"
case ocsp.RemoveFromCRL:
return "remove from crl"
case ocsp.PrivilegeWithdrawn:
return "privilege withdrawn"
case ocsp.AACompromise:
return "aa compromised"
default:
return "unspecified reason"
}
}
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// shouldCheckAccount indicates whether an account should be
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// retrieved from the context, so that it can be used for
// additional checks.
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func shouldCheckAccount(jws *jose.JSONWebSignature) bool {
return !canExtractJWKFrom(jws)
}