forked from TrueCloudLab/certificates
Add early authority policy evaluation to ACME order API
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parent
613c99f00f
commit
9e0edc7b50
10 changed files with 54 additions and 13 deletions
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@ -73,4 +73,3 @@ issues:
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- error strings should not be capitalized or end with punctuation or a newline
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- Wrapf call needs 1 arg but has 2 args
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- cs.NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual is deprecated
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- rewrite if-else to switch statement
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@ -4,8 +4,9 @@ import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
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)
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// ExternalAccountBinding represents the ACME externalAccountBinding JWS
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@ -9,10 +9,12 @@ import (
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"time"
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"github.com/pkg/errors"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
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"github.com/smallstep/assert"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
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)
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func Test_keysAreEqual(t *testing.T) {
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@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ import (
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"time"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/randutil"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/api"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/randutil"
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)
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// NewOrderRequest represents the body for a NewOrder request.
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@ -36,8 +38,8 @@ func (n *NewOrderRequest) Validate() error {
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if id.Type == acme.IP && net.ParseIP(id.Value) == nil {
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return acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "invalid IP address: %s", id.Value)
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}
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// TODO: add some validations for DNS domains?
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// TODO: combine the errors from this with allow/deny policy, like example error in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-6.7.1
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// TODO(hs): add some validations for DNS domains?
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// TODO(hs): combine the errors from this with allow/deny policy, like example error in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-6.7.1
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}
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return nil
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}
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@ -99,23 +101,29 @@ func (h *Handler) NewOrder(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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return
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}
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// TODO(hs): this should also verify rules set in the Account (i.e. allowed/denied
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// DNS and IPs; it's probably good to connect those to the EAB credentials and management? Or
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// TODO(hs): the policy evaluation below should also verify rules set in the Account (i.e. allowed/denied
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// DNS and IPs). It's probably good to connect those to the EAB credentials and management? Or
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// should we do it fully properly and connect them to the Account directly? The latter would allow
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// management of allowed/denied names based on just the name, without having bound to EAB. Still,
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// EAB is not illogical, because that's the way Accounts are connected to an external system and
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// thus make sense to also set the allowed/denied names based on that info.
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// TODO: also perform check on the authority level here already, so that challenges are not performed
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// and after that the CA fails to sign it. (i.e. h.ca function?)
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// TODO(hs): gather all errors, so that we can build one response with subproblems; include the nor.Validate()
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// error here too, like in example?
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for _, identifier := range nor.Identifiers {
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// TODO: gather all errors, so that we can build subproblems; include the nor.Validate() error here too, like in example?
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// evaluate the provisioner level policy
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orderIdentifier := provisioner.ACMEIdentifier{Type: provisioner.ACMEIdentifierType(identifier.Type), Value: identifier.Value}
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err = prov.AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(ctx, orderIdentifier)
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if err != nil {
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api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapError(acme.ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, err, "not authorized"))
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return
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}
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// evaluate the authority level policy
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err = h.ca.AreSANsAllowed(ctx, []string{identifier.Value})
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if err != nil {
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api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapError(acme.ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, err, "not authorized"))
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return
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}
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}
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now := clock.Now()
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@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ func (m *mockCA) Sign(cr *x509.CertificateRequest, opts provisioner.SignOptions,
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return nil, nil
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}
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func (m *mockCA) AreSANsAllowed(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error {
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return nil
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}
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func (m *mockCA) IsRevoked(sn string) (bool, error) {
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if m.MockIsRevoked != nil {
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return m.MockIsRevoked(sn)
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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
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// CertificateAuthority is the interface implemented by a CA authority.
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type CertificateAuthority interface {
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Sign(cr *x509.CertificateRequest, opts provisioner.SignOptions, signOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error)
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AreSANsAllowed(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error
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IsRevoked(sn string) (bool, error)
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Revoke(context.Context, *authority.RevokeOptions) error
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LoadProvisionerByName(string) (provisioner.Interface, error)
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@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ func TestOrder_UpdateStatus(t *testing.T) {
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type mockSignAuth struct {
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sign func(csr *x509.CertificateRequest, signOpts provisioner.SignOptions, extraOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error)
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areSANsAllowed func(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error
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loadProvisionerByName func(string) (provisioner.Interface, error)
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ret1, ret2 interface{}
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err error
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@ -282,6 +283,13 @@ func (m *mockSignAuth) Sign(csr *x509.CertificateRequest, signOpts provisioner.S
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return []*x509.Certificate{m.ret1.(*x509.Certificate), m.ret2.(*x509.Certificate)}, m.err
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}
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func (m *mockSignAuth) AreSANsAllowed(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error {
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if m.areSANsAllowed != nil {
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return m.areSANsAllowed(ctx, sans)
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}
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return m.err
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}
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func (m *mockSignAuth) LoadProvisionerByName(name string) (provisioner.Interface, error) {
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if m.loadProvisionerByName != nil {
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return m.loadProvisionerByName(name)
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@ -2,10 +2,9 @@ package authority
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/pkg/errors"
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"go.step.sm/linkedca"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/admin"
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@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package provisioner
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/x509"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"time"
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@ -126,6 +127,8 @@ func (p *ACME) AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(ctx context.Context, identifier ACMEIden
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_, err = p.x509Policy.IsIPAllowed(net.ParseIP(identifier.Value))
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case DNS:
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_, err = p.x509Policy.IsDNSAllowed(identifier.Value)
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default:
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err = fmt.Errorf("invalid ACME identifier type '%s' provided", identifier.Type)
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}
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return err
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@ -245,6 +245,22 @@ func (a *Authority) isAllowedToSign(cert *x509.Certificate) (bool, error) {
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return a.x509Policy.AreCertificateNamesAllowed(cert)
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}
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// AreSANsAllowed evaluates the provided sans against the
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// authority X.509 policy.
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func (a *Authority) AreSANsAllowed(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error {
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// no policy configured; return early
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if a.x509Policy == nil {
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return nil
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}
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// evaluate the X.509 policy for the provided sans
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var err error
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_, err = a.x509Policy.AreSANsAllowed(sans)
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return err
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}
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// Renew creates a new Certificate identical to the old certificate, except
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// with a validity window that begins 'now'.
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func (a *Authority) Renew(oldCert *x509.Certificate) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
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