Merge branch 'herman/allow-deny-next' into herman/allow-deny

This commit is contained in:
Herman Slatman 2022-03-24 14:56:52 +01:00
commit cf34b32e61
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10 changed files with 54 additions and 13 deletions

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@ -73,4 +73,3 @@ issues:
- error strings should not be capitalized or end with punctuation or a newline - error strings should not be capitalized or end with punctuation or a newline
- Wrapf call needs 1 arg but has 2 args - Wrapf call needs 1 arg but has 2 args
- cs.NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual is deprecated - cs.NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual is deprecated
- rewrite if-else to switch statement

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@ -4,8 +4,9 @@ import (
"context" "context"
"encoding/json" "encoding/json"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose" "go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
) )
// ExternalAccountBinding represents the ACME externalAccountBinding JWS // ExternalAccountBinding represents the ACME externalAccountBinding JWS

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@ -9,10 +9,12 @@ import (
"time" "time"
"github.com/pkg/errors" "github.com/pkg/errors"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"github.com/smallstep/assert" "github.com/smallstep/assert"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme" "github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner" "github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
) )
func Test_keysAreEqual(t *testing.T) { func Test_keysAreEqual(t *testing.T) {

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@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ import (
"time" "time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi" "github.com/go-chi/chi"
"go.step.sm/crypto/randutil"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme" "github.com/smallstep/certificates/acme"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/api" "github.com/smallstep/certificates/api"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner" "github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
"go.step.sm/crypto/randutil"
) )
// NewOrderRequest represents the body for a NewOrder request. // NewOrderRequest represents the body for a NewOrder request.
@ -36,8 +38,8 @@ func (n *NewOrderRequest) Validate() error {
if id.Type == acme.IP && net.ParseIP(id.Value) == nil { if id.Type == acme.IP && net.ParseIP(id.Value) == nil {
return acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "invalid IP address: %s", id.Value) return acme.NewError(acme.ErrorMalformedType, "invalid IP address: %s", id.Value)
} }
// TODO: add some validations for DNS domains? // TODO(hs): add some validations for DNS domains?
// TODO: combine the errors from this with allow/deny policy, like example error in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-6.7.1 // TODO(hs): combine the errors from this with allow/deny policy, like example error in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-6.7.1
} }
return nil return nil
} }
@ -99,23 +101,29 @@ func (h *Handler) NewOrder(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return return
} }
// TODO(hs): this should also verify rules set in the Account (i.e. allowed/denied // TODO(hs): the policy evaluation below should also verify rules set in the Account (i.e. allowed/denied
// DNS and IPs; it's probably good to connect those to the EAB credentials and management? Or // DNS and IPs). It's probably good to connect those to the EAB credentials and management? Or
// should we do it fully properly and connect them to the Account directly? The latter would allow // should we do it fully properly and connect them to the Account directly? The latter would allow
// management of allowed/denied names based on just the name, without having bound to EAB. Still, // management of allowed/denied names based on just the name, without having bound to EAB. Still,
// EAB is not illogical, because that's the way Accounts are connected to an external system and // EAB is not illogical, because that's the way Accounts are connected to an external system and
// thus make sense to also set the allowed/denied names based on that info. // thus make sense to also set the allowed/denied names based on that info.
// TODO: also perform check on the authority level here already, so that challenges are not performed // TODO(hs): gather all errors, so that we can build one response with subproblems; include the nor.Validate()
// and after that the CA fails to sign it. (i.e. h.ca function?) // error here too, like in example?
for _, identifier := range nor.Identifiers { for _, identifier := range nor.Identifiers {
// TODO: gather all errors, so that we can build subproblems; include the nor.Validate() error here too, like in example? // evaluate the provisioner level policy
orderIdentifier := provisioner.ACMEIdentifier{Type: provisioner.ACMEIdentifierType(identifier.Type), Value: identifier.Value} orderIdentifier := provisioner.ACMEIdentifier{Type: provisioner.ACMEIdentifierType(identifier.Type), Value: identifier.Value}
err = prov.AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(ctx, orderIdentifier) err = prov.AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(ctx, orderIdentifier)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapError(acme.ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, err, "not authorized")) api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapError(acme.ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, err, "not authorized"))
return return
} }
// evaluate the authority level policy
err = h.ca.AreSANsAllowed(ctx, []string{identifier.Value})
if err != nil {
api.WriteError(w, acme.WrapError(acme.ErrorRejectedIdentifierType, err, "not authorized"))
return
}
} }
now := clock.Now() now := clock.Now()

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@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ func (m *mockCA) Sign(cr *x509.CertificateRequest, opts provisioner.SignOptions,
return nil, nil return nil, nil
} }
func (m *mockCA) AreSANsAllowed(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error {
return nil
}
func (m *mockCA) IsRevoked(sn string) (bool, error) { func (m *mockCA) IsRevoked(sn string) (bool, error) {
if m.MockIsRevoked != nil { if m.MockIsRevoked != nil {
return m.MockIsRevoked(sn) return m.MockIsRevoked(sn)

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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
// CertificateAuthority is the interface implemented by a CA authority. // CertificateAuthority is the interface implemented by a CA authority.
type CertificateAuthority interface { type CertificateAuthority interface {
Sign(cr *x509.CertificateRequest, opts provisioner.SignOptions, signOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) Sign(cr *x509.CertificateRequest, opts provisioner.SignOptions, signOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error)
AreSANsAllowed(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error
IsRevoked(sn string) (bool, error) IsRevoked(sn string) (bool, error)
Revoke(context.Context, *authority.RevokeOptions) error Revoke(context.Context, *authority.RevokeOptions) error
LoadProvisionerByName(string) (provisioner.Interface, error) LoadProvisionerByName(string) (provisioner.Interface, error)

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@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ func TestOrder_UpdateStatus(t *testing.T) {
type mockSignAuth struct { type mockSignAuth struct {
sign func(csr *x509.CertificateRequest, signOpts provisioner.SignOptions, extraOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) sign func(csr *x509.CertificateRequest, signOpts provisioner.SignOptions, extraOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error)
areSANsAllowed func(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error
loadProvisionerByName func(string) (provisioner.Interface, error) loadProvisionerByName func(string) (provisioner.Interface, error)
ret1, ret2 interface{} ret1, ret2 interface{}
err error err error
@ -282,6 +283,13 @@ func (m *mockSignAuth) Sign(csr *x509.CertificateRequest, signOpts provisioner.S
return []*x509.Certificate{m.ret1.(*x509.Certificate), m.ret2.(*x509.Certificate)}, m.err return []*x509.Certificate{m.ret1.(*x509.Certificate), m.ret2.(*x509.Certificate)}, m.err
} }
func (m *mockSignAuth) AreSANsAllowed(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error {
if m.areSANsAllowed != nil {
return m.areSANsAllowed(ctx, sans)
}
return m.err
}
func (m *mockSignAuth) LoadProvisionerByName(name string) (provisioner.Interface, error) { func (m *mockSignAuth) LoadProvisionerByName(name string) (provisioner.Interface, error) {
if m.loadProvisionerByName != nil { if m.loadProvisionerByName != nil {
return m.loadProvisionerByName(name) return m.loadProvisionerByName(name)

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@ -2,10 +2,9 @@ package authority
import ( import (
"context" "context"
"errors"
"fmt" "fmt"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"go.step.sm/linkedca" "go.step.sm/linkedca"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/admin" "github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/admin"

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@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package provisioner
import ( import (
"context" "context"
"crypto/x509" "crypto/x509"
"fmt"
"net" "net"
"time" "time"
@ -126,6 +127,8 @@ func (p *ACME) AuthorizeOrderIdentifier(ctx context.Context, identifier ACMEIden
_, err = p.x509Policy.IsIPAllowed(net.ParseIP(identifier.Value)) _, err = p.x509Policy.IsIPAllowed(net.ParseIP(identifier.Value))
case DNS: case DNS:
_, err = p.x509Policy.IsDNSAllowed(identifier.Value) _, err = p.x509Policy.IsDNSAllowed(identifier.Value)
default:
err = fmt.Errorf("invalid ACME identifier type '%s' provided", identifier.Type)
} }
return err return err

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@ -245,6 +245,22 @@ func (a *Authority) isAllowedToSign(cert *x509.Certificate) (bool, error) {
return a.x509Policy.AreCertificateNamesAllowed(cert) return a.x509Policy.AreCertificateNamesAllowed(cert)
} }
// AreSANsAllowed evaluates the provided sans against the
// authority X.509 policy.
func (a *Authority) AreSANsAllowed(ctx context.Context, sans []string) error {
// no policy configured; return early
if a.x509Policy == nil {
return nil
}
// evaluate the X.509 policy for the provided sans
var err error
_, err = a.x509Policy.AreSANsAllowed(sans)
return err
}
// Renew creates a new Certificate identical to the old certificate, except // Renew creates a new Certificate identical to the old certificate, except
// with a validity window that begins 'now'. // with a validity window that begins 'now'.
func (a *Authority) Renew(oldCert *x509.Certificate) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) { func (a *Authority) Renew(oldCert *x509.Certificate) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {