forked from TrueCloudLab/certificates
119 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
119 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
package authority
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import (
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/pkg/errors"
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"gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2/jwt"
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)
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type idUsed struct {
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UsedAt int64 `json:"ua,omitempty"`
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Subject string `json:"sub,omitempty"`
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}
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// matchesOne returns true if A and B share at least one element.
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func matchesOne(as, bs []string) bool {
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if len(bs) == 0 || len(as) == 0 {
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return false
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}
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for _, b := range bs {
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for _, a := range as {
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if b == a {
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// Authorize authorizes a signature request by validating and authenticating
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// a OTT that must be sent w/ the request.
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func (a *Authority) Authorize(ott string) ([]interface{}, error) {
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var (
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errContext = map[string]interface{}{"ott": ott}
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claims = jwt.Claims{}
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)
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// Validate payload
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token, err := jwt.ParseSigned(ott)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, &apiError{errors.Wrapf(err, "authorize: error parsing token"),
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http.StatusUnauthorized, errContext}
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}
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// Get claims w/out verification. We need to look up the provisioner
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// key in order to verify the claims and we need the issuer from the claims
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// before we can look up the provisioner.
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if err = token.UnsafeClaimsWithoutVerification(&claims); err != nil {
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return nil, &apiError{err, http.StatusUnauthorized, errContext}
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}
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kid := token.Headers[0].KeyID // JWT will only have 1 header.
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if len(kid) == 0 {
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return nil, &apiError{errors.New("authorize: token KeyID cannot be empty"),
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http.StatusUnauthorized, errContext}
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}
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pid := claims.Issuer + ":" + kid
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val, ok := a.provisionerIDIndex.Load(pid)
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if !ok {
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return nil, &apiError{errors.Errorf("authorize: provisioner with id %s not found", pid),
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http.StatusUnauthorized, errContext}
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}
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p, ok := val.(*Provisioner)
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if !ok {
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return nil, &apiError{errors.Errorf("authorize: invalid provisioner type"),
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http.StatusInternalServerError, errContext}
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}
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if err = token.Claims(p.Key, &claims); err != nil {
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return nil, &apiError{err, http.StatusUnauthorized, errContext}
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}
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// According to "rfc7519 JSON Web Token" acceptable skew should be no
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// more than a few minutes.
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if err = claims.ValidateWithLeeway(jwt.Expected{
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Issuer: p.Name,
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}, time.Minute); err != nil {
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return nil, &apiError{errors.Wrapf(err, "authorize: invalid token"),
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http.StatusUnauthorized, errContext}
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}
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// Do not accept tokens issued before the start of the ca.
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// This check is meant as a stopgap solution to the current lack of a persistence layer.
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if a.config.AuthorityConfig != nil && !a.config.AuthorityConfig.DisableIssuedAtCheck {
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if claims.IssuedAt > 0 && claims.IssuedAt.Time().Before(a.startTime) {
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return nil, &apiError{errors.New("token issued before the bootstrap of certificate authority"),
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http.StatusUnauthorized, errContext}
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}
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}
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if !matchesOne(claims.Audience, a.audiences) {
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return nil, &apiError{errors.New("authorize: token audience invalid"), http.StatusUnauthorized,
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errContext}
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}
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if claims.Subject == "" {
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return nil, &apiError{errors.New("authorize: token subject cannot be empty"),
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http.StatusUnauthorized, errContext}
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}
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signOps := []interface{}{
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&commonNameClaim{claims.Subject},
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&dnsNamesClaim{claims.Subject},
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&ipAddressesClaim{claims.Subject},
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p,
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}
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// Store the token to protect against reuse.
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if _, ok := a.ottMap.LoadOrStore(claims.ID, &idUsed{
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UsedAt: time.Now().Unix(),
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Subject: claims.Subject,
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}); ok {
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return nil, &apiError{errors.Errorf("token already used"), http.StatusUnauthorized,
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errContext}
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}
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return signOps, nil
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}
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