forked from TrueCloudLab/certificates
493 lines
15 KiB
Go
493 lines
15 KiB
Go
package scep
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/url"
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microx509util "github.com/micromdm/scep/v2/cryptoutil/x509util"
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microscep "github.com/micromdm/scep/v2/scep"
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"go.mozilla.org/pkcs7"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
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)
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// Authority is the layer that handles all SCEP interactions.
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type Authority struct {
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prefix string
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dns string
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intermediateCertificate *x509.Certificate
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caCerts []*x509.Certificate // TODO(hs): change to use these instead of root and intermediate
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service *Service
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signAuth SignAuthority
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}
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type authorityKey struct{}
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// NewContext adds the given authority to the context.
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func NewContext(ctx context.Context, a *Authority) context.Context {
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return context.WithValue(ctx, authorityKey{}, a)
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}
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// FromContext returns the current authority from the given context.
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func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (a *Authority, ok bool) {
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a, ok = ctx.Value(authorityKey{}).(*Authority)
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return
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}
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// MustFromContext returns the current authority from the given context. It will
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// panic if the authority is not in the context.
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func MustFromContext(ctx context.Context) *Authority {
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if a, ok := FromContext(ctx); !ok {
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panic("scep authority is not in the context")
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} else {
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return a
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}
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}
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// AuthorityOptions required to create a new SCEP Authority.
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type AuthorityOptions struct {
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// Service provides the certificate chain, the signer and the decrypter to the Authority
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Service *Service
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// DNS is the host used to generate accurate SCEP links. By default the authority
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// will use the Host from the request, so this value will only be used if
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// request.Host is empty.
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DNS string
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// Prefix is a URL path prefix under which the SCEP api is served. This
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// prefix is required to generate accurate SCEP links.
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Prefix string
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}
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// SignAuthority is the interface for a signing authority
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type SignAuthority interface {
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Sign(cr *x509.CertificateRequest, opts provisioner.SignOptions, signOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error)
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LoadProvisionerByName(string) (provisioner.Interface, error)
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}
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// New returns a new Authority that implements the SCEP interface.
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func New(signAuth SignAuthority, ops AuthorityOptions) (*Authority, error) {
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authority := &Authority{
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prefix: ops.Prefix,
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dns: ops.DNS,
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signAuth: signAuth,
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}
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// TODO: this is not really nice to do; the Service should be removed
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// in its entirety to make this more interoperable with the rest of
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// step-ca, I think.
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if ops.Service != nil {
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authority.caCerts = ops.Service.certificateChain
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// TODO(hs): look into refactoring SCEP into using just caCerts everywhere, if it makes sense for more elaborate SCEP configuration. Keeping it like this for clarity (for now).
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authority.intermediateCertificate = ops.Service.certificateChain[0]
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authority.service = ops.Service
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}
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return authority, nil
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}
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var (
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// TODO: check the default capabilities; https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8894#section-3.5.2
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defaultCapabilities = []string{
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"Renewal", // NOTE: removing this will result in macOS SCEP client stating the server doesn't support renewal, but it uses PKCSreq to do so.
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"SHA-1",
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"SHA-256",
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"AES",
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"DES3",
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"SCEPStandard",
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"POSTPKIOperation",
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}
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)
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// LoadProvisionerByName calls out to the SignAuthority interface to load a
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// provisioner by name.
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func (a *Authority) LoadProvisionerByName(name string) (provisioner.Interface, error) {
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return a.signAuth.LoadProvisionerByName(name)
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}
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// GetLinkExplicit returns the requested link from the directory.
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func (a *Authority) GetLinkExplicit(provName string, abs bool, baseURL *url.URL, inputs ...string) string {
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return a.getLinkExplicit(provName, abs, baseURL, inputs...)
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}
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// getLinkExplicit returns an absolute or partial path to the given resource and a base
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// URL dynamically obtained from the request for which the link is being calculated.
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func (a *Authority) getLinkExplicit(provisionerName string, abs bool, baseURL *url.URL, inputs ...string) string {
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link := "/" + provisionerName
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if abs {
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// Copy the baseURL value from the pointer. https://github.com/golang/go/issues/38351
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u := url.URL{}
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if baseURL != nil {
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u = *baseURL
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}
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// If no Scheme is set, then default to http (in case of SCEP)
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if u.Scheme == "" {
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u.Scheme = "http"
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}
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// If no Host is set, then use the default (first DNS attr in the ca.json).
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if u.Host == "" {
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u.Host = a.dns
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}
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u.Path = a.prefix + link
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return u.String()
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}
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return link
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}
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// GetCACertificates returns the certificate (chain) for the CA
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func (a *Authority) GetCACertificates(ctx context.Context) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
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// TODO: this should return: the "SCEP Server (RA)" certificate, the issuing CA up to and excl. the root
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// Some clients do need the root certificate however; also see: https://github.com/openxpki/openxpki/issues/73
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//
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// This means we might need to think about if we should use the current intermediate CA
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// certificate as the "SCEP Server (RA)" certificate. It might be better to have a distinct
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// RA certificate, with a corresponding rsa.PrivateKey, just for SCEP usage, which is signed by
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// the intermediate CA. Will need to look how we can provide this nicely within step-ca.
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//
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// This might also mean that we might want to use a distinct instance of KMS for doing the key operations,
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// so that we can use RSA just for SCEP.
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//
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// Using an RA does not seem to exist in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8894, but is mentioned in
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// https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nourse-scep-21.html. Will continue using the CA directly for now.
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//
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// The certificate to use should probably depend on the (configured) provisioner and may
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// use a distinct certificate, apart from the intermediate.
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p, err := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if len(a.caCerts) == 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("no intermediate certificate available in SCEP authority")
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}
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certs := []*x509.Certificate{}
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certs = append(certs, a.caCerts[0])
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// NOTE: we're adding the CA roots here, but they are (highly likely) different than what the RFC means.
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// Clients are responsible to select the right cert(s) to use, though.
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if p.ShouldIncludeRootInChain() && len(a.caCerts) > 1 {
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certs = append(certs, a.caCerts[1])
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}
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return certs, nil
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}
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// DecryptPKIEnvelope decrypts an enveloped message
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func (a *Authority) DecryptPKIEnvelope(ctx context.Context, msg *PKIMessage) error {
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p7c, err := pkcs7.Parse(msg.P7.Content)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("error parsing pkcs7 content: %w", err)
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}
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envelope, err := p7c.Decrypt(a.intermediateCertificate, a.service.decrypter)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("error decrypting encrypted pkcs7 content: %w", err)
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}
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msg.pkiEnvelope = envelope
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switch msg.MessageType {
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case microscep.CertRep:
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certs, err := microscep.CACerts(msg.pkiEnvelope)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("error extracting CA certs from pkcs7 degenerate data: %w", err)
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}
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msg.CertRepMessage.Certificate = certs[0]
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return nil
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case microscep.PKCSReq, microscep.UpdateReq, microscep.RenewalReq:
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csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(msg.pkiEnvelope)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("parse CSR from pkiEnvelope: %w", err)
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}
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// check for challengePassword
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cp, err := microx509util.ParseChallengePassword(msg.pkiEnvelope)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("parse challenge password in pkiEnvelope: %w", err)
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}
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msg.CSRReqMessage = µscep.CSRReqMessage{
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RawDecrypted: msg.pkiEnvelope,
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CSR: csr,
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ChallengePassword: cp,
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}
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return nil
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case microscep.GetCRL, microscep.GetCert, microscep.CertPoll:
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return errors.New("not implemented")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// SignCSR creates an x509.Certificate based on a CSR template and Cert Authority credentials
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// returns a new PKIMessage with CertRep data
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func (a *Authority) SignCSR(ctx context.Context, csr *x509.CertificateRequest, msg *PKIMessage) (*PKIMessage, error) {
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// TODO: intermediate storage of the request? In SCEP it's possible to request a csr/certificate
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// to be signed, which can be performed asynchronously / out-of-band. In that case a client can
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// poll for the status. It seems to be similar as what can happen in ACME, so might want to model
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// the implementation after the one in the ACME authority. Requires storage, etc.
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p, err := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// check if CSRReqMessage has already been decrypted
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if msg.CSRReqMessage.CSR == nil {
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if err := a.DecryptPKIEnvelope(ctx, msg); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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csr = msg.CSRReqMessage.CSR
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}
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// Template data
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sans := []string{}
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sans = append(sans, csr.DNSNames...)
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sans = append(sans, csr.EmailAddresses...)
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for _, v := range csr.IPAddresses {
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sans = append(sans, v.String())
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}
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for _, v := range csr.URIs {
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sans = append(sans, v.String())
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}
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if len(sans) == 0 {
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sans = append(sans, csr.Subject.CommonName)
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}
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data := x509util.CreateTemplateData(csr.Subject.CommonName, sans)
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data.SetCertificateRequest(csr)
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data.SetSubject(x509util.Subject{
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Country: csr.Subject.Country,
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Organization: csr.Subject.Organization,
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OrganizationalUnit: csr.Subject.OrganizationalUnit,
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Locality: csr.Subject.Locality,
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Province: csr.Subject.Province,
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StreetAddress: csr.Subject.StreetAddress,
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PostalCode: csr.Subject.PostalCode,
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SerialNumber: csr.Subject.SerialNumber,
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CommonName: csr.Subject.CommonName,
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})
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// Get authorizations from the SCEP provisioner.
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ctx = provisioner.NewContextWithMethod(ctx, provisioner.SignMethod)
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signOps, err := p.AuthorizeSign(ctx, "")
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error retrieving authorization options from SCEP provisioner: %w", err)
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}
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opts := provisioner.SignOptions{}
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templateOptions, err := provisioner.TemplateOptions(p.GetOptions(), data)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error creating template options from SCEP provisioner: %w", err)
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}
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signOps = append(signOps, templateOptions)
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certChain, err := a.signAuth.Sign(csr, opts, signOps...)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error generating certificate for order: %w", err)
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}
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// take the issued certificate (only); https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8894#section-3.3.2
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cert := certChain[0]
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// and create a degenerate cert structure
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deg, err := microscep.DegenerateCertificates([]*x509.Certificate{cert})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// apparently the pkcs7 library uses a global default setting for the content encryption
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// algorithm to use when en- or decrypting data. We need to restore the current setting after
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// the cryptographic operation, so that other usages of the library are not influenced by
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// this call to Encrypt(). We are not required to use the same algorithm the SCEP client uses.
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encryptionAlgorithmToRestore := pkcs7.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm
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pkcs7.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm = p.GetContentEncryptionAlgorithm()
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e7, err := pkcs7.Encrypt(deg, msg.P7.Certificates)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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pkcs7.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm = encryptionAlgorithmToRestore
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// PKIMessageAttributes to be signed
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config := pkcs7.SignerInfoConfig{
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ExtraSignedAttributes: []pkcs7.Attribute{
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{
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Type: oidSCEPtransactionID,
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Value: msg.TransactionID,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPpkiStatus,
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Value: microscep.SUCCESS,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPmessageType,
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Value: microscep.CertRep,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPrecipientNonce,
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Value: msg.SenderNonce,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPsenderNonce,
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Value: msg.SenderNonce,
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},
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},
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}
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signedData, err := pkcs7.NewSignedData(e7)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// add the certificate into the signed data type
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// this cert must be added before the signedData because the recipient will expect it
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// as the first certificate in the array
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signedData.AddCertificate(cert)
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authCert := a.intermediateCertificate
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// sign the attributes
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if err := signedData.AddSigner(authCert, a.service.signer, config); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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certRepBytes, err := signedData.Finish()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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cr := &CertRepMessage{
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PKIStatus: microscep.SUCCESS,
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RecipientNonce: microscep.RecipientNonce(msg.SenderNonce),
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Certificate: cert,
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degenerate: deg,
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}
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// create a CertRep message from the original
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crepMsg := &PKIMessage{
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Raw: certRepBytes,
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TransactionID: msg.TransactionID,
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MessageType: microscep.CertRep,
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CertRepMessage: cr,
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}
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return crepMsg, nil
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}
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// CreateFailureResponse creates an appropriately signed reply for PKI operations
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func (a *Authority) CreateFailureResponse(ctx context.Context, csr *x509.CertificateRequest, msg *PKIMessage, info FailInfoName, infoText string) (*PKIMessage, error) {
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config := pkcs7.SignerInfoConfig{
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ExtraSignedAttributes: []pkcs7.Attribute{
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{
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Type: oidSCEPtransactionID,
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Value: msg.TransactionID,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPpkiStatus,
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Value: microscep.FAILURE,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPfailInfo,
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Value: info,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPfailInfoText,
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Value: infoText,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPmessageType,
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Value: microscep.CertRep,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPsenderNonce,
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Value: msg.SenderNonce,
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},
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{
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Type: oidSCEPrecipientNonce,
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Value: msg.SenderNonce,
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},
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},
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}
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signedData, err := pkcs7.NewSignedData(nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// sign the attributes
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if err := signedData.AddSigner(a.intermediateCertificate, a.service.signer, config); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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certRepBytes, err := signedData.Finish()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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cr := &CertRepMessage{
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PKIStatus: microscep.FAILURE,
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FailInfo: microscep.FailInfo(info),
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RecipientNonce: microscep.RecipientNonce(msg.SenderNonce),
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}
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// create a CertRep message from the original
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crepMsg := &PKIMessage{
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Raw: certRepBytes,
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TransactionID: msg.TransactionID,
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MessageType: microscep.CertRep,
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CertRepMessage: cr,
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}
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return crepMsg, nil
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}
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// MatchChallengePassword verifies a SCEP challenge password
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func (a *Authority) MatchChallengePassword(ctx context.Context, password string) (bool, error) {
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p, err := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(p.GetChallengePassword()), []byte(password)) == 1 {
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return true, nil
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}
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// TODO: support dynamic challenges, i.e. a list of challenges instead of one?
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// That's probably a bit harder to configure, though; likely requires some data store
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// that can be interacted with more easily, via some internal API, for example.
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return false, nil
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}
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// GetCACaps returns the CA capabilities
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func (a *Authority) GetCACaps(ctx context.Context) []string {
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p, err := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return defaultCapabilities
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}
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caps := p.GetCapabilities()
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if len(caps) == 0 {
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return defaultCapabilities
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}
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// TODO: validate the caps? Ensure they are the right format according to RFC?
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// TODO: ensure that the capabilities are actually "enforced"/"verified" in code too:
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// check that only parts of the spec are used in the implementation belonging to the capabilities.
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// For example for renewals, which we could disable in the provisioner, should then also
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// not be reported in cacaps operation.
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return caps
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}
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