Includes 69ecbb4d6d
(forward-port of 8b5121be2f),
which fixes CVE-2020-7919:
- Panic in crypto/x509 certificate parsing and golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte
On 32-bit architectures, a malformed input to crypto/x509 or the ASN.1 parsing
functions of golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte can lead to a panic.
The malformed certificate can be delivered via a crypto/tls connection to a
client, or to a server that accepts client certificates. net/http clients can
be made to crash by an HTTPS server, while net/http servers that accept client
certificates will recover the panic and are unaffected.
Thanks to Project Wycheproof for providing the test cases that led to the
discovery of this issue. The issue is CVE-2020-7919 and Go issue golang.org/issue/36837.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.13.4...go1.13.7
go1.13.7 (released 2020/01/28) includes two security fixes. One mitigates
the CVE-2020-0601 certificate verification bypass on Windows. The other affects
only 32-bit architectures.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.13.7+label%3ACherryPickApproved
- X.509 certificate validation bypass on Windows 10
A Windows vulnerability allows attackers to spoof valid certificate chains when
the system root store is in use. These releases include a mitigation for Go
applications, but it’s strongly recommended that affected users install the
Windows security update to protect their system.
This issue is CVE-2020-0601 and Go issue golang.org/issue/36834.
- Panic in crypto/x509 certificate parsing and golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte
On 32-bit architectures, a malformed input to crypto/x509 or the ASN.1 parsing
functions of golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte can lead to a panic.
The malformed certificate can be delivered via a crypto/tls connection to a
client, or to a server that accepts client certificates. net/http clients can
be made to crash by an HTTPS server, while net/http servers that accept client
certificates will recover the panic and are unaffected.
Thanks to Project Wycheproof for providing the test cases that led to the
discovery of this issue. The issue is CVE-2020-7919 and Go issue golang.org/issue/36837.
This is also fixed in version v0.0.0-20200124225646-8b5121be2f68 of golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Ensures that build tags get set in the Dockerfile so that OSS and GCS drivers
are built into the official registry binary.
Closes#2819
Signed-off-by: Ryan Abrams <rdabrams@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf74e4f91d)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Use a synthetic upstream registry when creating the testing mirror configuration
to avoid the test fail when trying to reach http://example.com
Signed-off-by: Fernando Mayo Fernandez <fernando@undefinedlabs.com>
Some registries (ECR) don't provide a `Docker-Upload-UUID` when creating
a blob. So we can't rely on that header. Fallback to reading it from the
URL.
Signed-off-by: Damien Mathieu <dmathieu@salesforce.com>
I've found this logic being in a single method to be quite hard to get.
I believe extracting it makes it easier to read, as we can then more
easily see what the main method does and possibly ignore the intricacies
of `ResumeBlobUpload`.
Signed-off-by: Damien Mathieu <dmathieu@salesforce.com>
When uploading segments to Swift, the registry generates a random file,
by taking the hash of the container path and 32-bytes of random data.
The registry attempts to shard across multiple directory paths, by
taking the first three hex characters as leader.
The implementation in registry, unfortunately, takes the hash of
nothing, and appends it to the path and random data. This results in all
segments being created in one directory.
Fixes: #2407Fixes: #2311
Signed-off-by: Terin Stock <terinjokes@gmail.com>
