83dd4ff0a6
Signed-off-by: James Hewitt <james.hewitt@uk.ibm.com>
328 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
328 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: "Token Authentication Implementation"
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description: "Describe the reference implementation of the Distribution Registry v2 authentication schema"
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keywords: registry, on-prem, images, tags, repository, distribution, JWT authentication, advanced
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---
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# Distribution Registry v2 Bearer token specification
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This specification covers the `distribution/distribution` implementation of the
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v2 Registry's authentication schema. Specifically, it describes the JSON
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Web Token schema that `distribution/distribution` has adopted to implement the
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client-opaque Bearer token issued by an authentication service and
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understood by the registry.
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This document borrows heavily from the [JSON Web Token Draft Spec](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-32)
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## Getting a Bearer Token
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For this example, the client makes an HTTP GET request to the following URL:
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```
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https://auth.docker.io/token?service=registry.docker.io&scope=repository:samalba/my-app:pull,push
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```
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The token server should first attempt to authenticate the client using any
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authentication credentials provided with the request. As of Docker 1.8, the
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registry client in the Docker Engine only supports Basic Authentication to
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these token servers. If an attempt to authenticate to the token server fails,
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the token server should return a `401 Unauthorized` response indicating that
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the provided credentials are invalid.
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Whether the token server requires authentication is up to the policy of that
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access control provider. Some requests may require authentication to determine
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access (such as pushing or pulling a private repository) while others may not
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(such as pulling from a public repository).
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After authenticating the client (which may simply be an anonymous client if
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no attempt was made to authenticate), the token server must next query its
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access control list to determine whether the client has the requested scope. In
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this example request, if I have authenticated as user `jlhawn`, the token
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server will determine what access I have to the repository `samalba/my-app`
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hosted by the entity `registry.docker.io`.
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Once the token server has determined what access the client has to the
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resources requested in the `scope` parameter, it will take the intersection of
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the set of requested actions on each resource and the set of actions that the
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client has in fact been granted. If the client only has a subset of the
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requested access **it must not be considered an error** as it is not the
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responsibility of the token server to indicate authorization errors as part of
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this workflow.
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Continuing with the example request, the token server will find that the
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client's set of granted access to the repository is `[pull, push]` which when
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intersected with the requested access `[pull, push]` yields an equal set. If
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the granted access set was found only to be `[pull]` then the intersected set
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would only be `[pull]`. If the client has no access to the repository then the
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intersected set would be empty, `[]`.
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It is this intersected set of access which is placed in the returned token.
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The server will now construct a JSON Web Token to sign and return. A JSON Web
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Token has 3 main parts:
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1. Headers
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The header of a JSON Web Token is a standard JOSE header. The "typ" field
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will be "JWT" and it will also contain the "alg" which identifies the
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signing algorithm used to produce the signature. It also must have a "kid"
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field, representing the ID of the key which was used to sign the token.
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The "kid" field has to be in a libtrust fingerprint compatible format.
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Such a format can be generated by following steps:
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1. Take the DER encoded public key which the JWT token was signed against.
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2. Create a SHA256 hash out of it and truncate to 240bits.
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3. Split the result into 12 base32 encoded groups with `:` as delimiter.
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Here is an example JOSE Header for a JSON Web Token (formatted with
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whitespace for readability):
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```
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{
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"typ": "JWT",
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"alg": "ES256",
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"kid": "PYYO:TEWU:V7JH:26JV:AQTZ:LJC3:SXVJ:XGHA:34F2:2LAQ:ZRMK:Z7Q6"
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}
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```
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It specifies that this object is going to be a JSON Web token signed using
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the key with the given ID using the Elliptic Curve signature algorithm
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using a SHA256 hash.
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2. Claim Set
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The Claim Set is a JSON struct containing these standard registered claim
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name fields:
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<dl>
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<dt>
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<code>iss</code> (Issuer)
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</dt>
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<dd>
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The issuer of the token, typically the fqdn of the authorization
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server.
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</dd>
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<dt>
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<code>sub</code> (Subject)
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</dt>
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<dd>
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The subject of the token; the name or id of the client which
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requested it. This should be empty (`""`) if the client did not
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authenticate.
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</dd>
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<dt>
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<code>aud</code> (Audience)
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</dt>
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<dd>
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The intended audience of the token; the name or id of the service
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which will verify the token to authorize the client/subject.
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</dd>
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<dt>
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<code>exp</code> (Expiration)
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</dt>
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<dd>
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The token should only be considered valid up to this specified date
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and time.
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</dd>
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<dt>
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<code>nbf</code> (Not Before)
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</dt>
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<dd>
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The token should not be considered valid before this specified date
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and time.
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</dd>
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<dt>
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<code>iat</code> (Issued At)
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</dt>
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<dd>
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Specifies the date and time which the Authorization server
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generated this token.
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</dd>
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<dt>
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<code>jti</code> (JWT ID)
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</dt>
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<dd>
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A unique identifier for this token. Can be used by the intended
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audience to prevent replays of the token.
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</dd>
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</dl>
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The Claim Set will also contain a private claim name unique to this
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authorization server specification:
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<dl>
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<dt>
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<code>access</code>
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</dt>
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<dd>
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An array of access entry objects with the following fields:
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<dl>
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<dt>
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<code>type</code>
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</dt>
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<dd>
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The type of resource hosted by the service.
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</dd>
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<dt>
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<code>name</code>
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</dt>
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<dd>
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The name of the resource of the given type hosted by the
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service.
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</dd>
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<dt>
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<code>actions</code>
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</dt>
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<dd>
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An array of strings which give the actions authorized on
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this resource.
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</dd>
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</dl>
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</dd>
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</dl>
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Here is an example of such a JWT Claim Set (formatted with whitespace for
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readability):
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```
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{
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"iss": "auth.docker.com",
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"sub": "jlhawn",
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"aud": "registry.docker.com",
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"exp": 1415387315,
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"nbf": 1415387015,
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"iat": 1415387015,
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"jti": "tYJCO1c6cnyy7kAn0c7rKPgbV1H1bFws",
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"access": [
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{
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"type": "repository",
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"name": "samalba/my-app",
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"actions": [
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"pull",
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"push"
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]
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}
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]
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}
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```
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3. Signature
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The authorization server will produce a JOSE header and Claim Set with no
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extraneous whitespace, i.e., the JOSE Header from above would be
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```
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{"typ":"JWT","alg":"ES256","kid":"PYYO:TEWU:V7JH:26JV:AQTZ:LJC3:SXVJ:XGHA:34F2:2LAQ:ZRMK:Z7Q6"}
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```
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and the Claim Set from above would be
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```
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{"iss":"auth.docker.com","sub":"jlhawn","aud":"registry.docker.com","exp":1415387315,"nbf":1415387015,"iat":1415387015,"jti":"tYJCO1c6cnyy7kAn0c7rKPgbV1H1bFws","access":[{"type":"repository","name":"samalba/my-app","actions":["push","pull"]}]}
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```
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The utf-8 representation of this JOSE header and Claim Set are then
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url-safe base64 encoded (sans trailing '=' buffer), producing:
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```
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eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IlBZWU86VEVXVTpWN0pIOjI2SlY6QVFUWjpMSkMzOlNYVko6WEdIQTozNEYyOjJMQVE6WlJNSzpaN1E2In0
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```
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for the JOSE Header and
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```
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eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJqbGhhd24iLCJhdWQiOiJyZWdpc3RyeS5kb2NrZXIuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDE1Mzg3MzE1LCJuYmYiOjE0MTUzODcwMTUsImlhdCI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwianRpIjoidFlKQ08xYzZjbnl5N2tBbjBjN3JLUGdiVjFIMWJGd3MiLCJhY2Nlc3MiOlt7InR5cGUiOiJyZXBvc2l0b3J5IiwibmFtZSI6InNhbWFsYmEvbXktYXBwIiwiYWN0aW9ucyI6WyJwdXNoIl19XX0
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```
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for the Claim Set. These two are concatenated using a '.' character,
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yielding the string:
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```
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eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IlBZWU86VEVXVTpWN0pIOjI2SlY6QVFUWjpMSkMzOlNYVko6WEdIQTozNEYyOjJMQVE6WlJNSzpaN1E2In0.eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJqbGhhd24iLCJhdWQiOiJyZWdpc3RyeS5kb2NrZXIuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDE1Mzg3MzE1LCJuYmYiOjE0MTUzODcwMTUsImlhdCI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwianRpIjoidFlKQ08xYzZjbnl5N2tBbjBjN3JLUGdiVjFIMWJGd3MiLCJhY2Nlc3MiOlt7InR5cGUiOiJyZXBvc2l0b3J5IiwibmFtZSI6InNhbWFsYmEvbXktYXBwIiwiYWN0aW9ucyI6WyJwdXNoIl19XX0
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```
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This is then used as the payload to a the `ES256` signature algorithm
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specified in the JOSE header and specified fully in [Section 3.4 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
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draft specification](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-38#section-3.4)
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This example signature will use the following ECDSA key for the server:
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```
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{
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"kty": "EC",
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"crv": "P-256",
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"kid": "PYYO:TEWU:V7JH:26JV:AQTZ:LJC3:SXVJ:XGHA:34F2:2LAQ:ZRMK:Z7Q6",
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"d": "R7OnbfMaD5J2jl7GeE8ESo7CnHSBm_1N2k9IXYFrKJA",
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"x": "m7zUpx3b-zmVE5cymSs64POG9QcyEpJaYCD82-549_Q",
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"y": "dU3biz8sZ_8GPB-odm8Wxz3lNDr1xcAQQPQaOcr1fmc"
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}
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```
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A resulting signature of the above payload using this key is:
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```
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QhflHPfbd6eVF4lM9bwYpFZIV0PfikbyXuLx959ykRTBpe3CYnzs6YBK8FToVb5R47920PVLrh8zuLzdCr9t3w
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```
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Concatenating all of these together with a `.` character gives the
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resulting JWT:
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```
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eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IlBZWU86VEVXVTpWN0pIOjI2SlY6QVFUWjpMSkMzOlNYVko6WEdIQTozNEYyOjJMQVE6WlJNSzpaN1E2In0.eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJqbGhhd24iLCJhdWQiOiJyZWdpc3RyeS5kb2NrZXIuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDE1Mzg3MzE1LCJuYmYiOjE0MTUzODcwMTUsImlhdCI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwianRpIjoidFlKQ08xYzZjbnl5N2tBbjBjN3JLUGdiVjFIMWJGd3MiLCJhY2Nlc3MiOlt7InR5cGUiOiJyZXBvc2l0b3J5IiwibmFtZSI6InNhbWFsYmEvbXktYXBwIiwiYWN0aW9ucyI6WyJwdXNoIl19XX0.QhflHPfbd6eVF4lM9bwYpFZIV0PfikbyXuLx959ykRTBpe3CYnzs6YBK8FToVb5R47920PVLrh8zuLzdCr9t3w
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```
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This can now be placed in an HTTP response and returned to the client to use to
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authenticate to the audience service:
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```
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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Content-Type: application/json
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{"token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IlBZWU86VEVXVTpWN0pIOjI2SlY6QVFUWjpMSkMzOlNYVko6WEdIQTozNEYyOjJMQVE6WlJNSzpaN1E2In0.eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJqbGhhd24iLCJhdWQiOiJyZWdpc3RyeS5kb2NrZXIuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDE1Mzg3MzE1LCJuYmYiOjE0MTUzODcwMTUsImlhdCI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwianRpIjoidFlKQ08xYzZjbnl5N2tBbjBjN3JLUGdiVjFIMWJGd3MiLCJhY2Nlc3MiOlt7InR5cGUiOiJyZXBvc2l0b3J5IiwibmFtZSI6InNhbWFsYmEvbXktYXBwIiwiYWN0aW9ucyI6WyJwdXNoIl19XX0.QhflHPfbd6eVF4lM9bwYpFZIV0PfikbyXuLx959ykRTBpe3CYnzs6YBK8FToVb5R47920PVLrh8zuLzdCr9t3w"}
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```
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## Using the signed token
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Once the client has a token, it will try the registry request again with the
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token placed in the HTTP `Authorization` header like so:
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```
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Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkJWM0Q6MkFWWjpVQjVaOktJQVA6SU5QTDo1RU42Ok40SjQ6Nk1XTzpEUktFOkJWUUs6M0ZKTDpQT1RMIn0.eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJCQ0NZOk9VNlo6UUVKNTpXTjJDOjJBVkM6WTdZRDpBM0xZOjQ1VVc6NE9HRDpLQUxMOkNOSjU6NUlVTCIsImF1ZCI6InJlZ2lzdHJ5LmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJleHAiOjE0MTUzODczMTUsIm5iZiI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwiaWF0IjoxNDE1Mzg3MDE1LCJqdGkiOiJ0WUpDTzFjNmNueXk3a0FuMGM3cktQZ2JWMUgxYkZ3cyIsInNjb3BlIjoiamxoYXduOnJlcG9zaXRvcnk6c2FtYWxiYS9teS1hcHA6cHVzaCxwdWxsIGpsaGF3bjpuYW1lc3BhY2U6c2FtYWxiYTpwdWxsIn0.Y3zZSwaZPqy4y9oRBVRImZyv3m_S9XDHF1tWwN7mL52C_IiA73SJkWVNsvNqpJIn5h7A2F8biv_S2ppQ1lgkbw
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```
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This is also described in [Section 2.1 of RFC 6750: The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750#section-2.1)
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## Verifying the token
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The registry must now verify the token presented by the user by inspecting the
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claim set within. The registry will:
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- Ensure that the issuer (`iss` claim) is an authority it trusts.
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- Ensure that the registry identifies as the audience (`aud` claim).
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- Check that the current time is between the `nbf` and `exp` claim times.
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- If enforcing single-use tokens, check that the JWT ID (`jti` claim) value has
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not been seen before.
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- To enforce this, the registry may keep a record of `jti`s it has seen for
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up to the `exp` time of the token to prevent token replays.
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- Check the `access` claim value and use the identified resources and the list
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of actions authorized to determine whether the token grants the required
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level of access for the operation the client is attempting to perform.
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- Verify that the signature of the token is valid.
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If any of these requirements are not met, the registry will return a
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`403 Forbidden` response to indicate that the token is invalid.
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**Note**: it is only at this point in the workflow that an authorization error
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may occur. The token server should *not* return errors when the user does not
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have the requested authorization. Instead, the returned token should indicate
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whatever of the requested scope the client does have (the intersection of
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requested and granted access). If the token does not supply proper
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authorization then the registry will return the appropriate error.
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At no point in this process should the registry need to call back to the
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authorization server. The registry only needs to be supplied with the trusted
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public keys to verify the token signatures.
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